THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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CONTENTS FOR VOLUME XXXVII

ARTICLES

	PAGE
ADAMS, GEORGE P. The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics (Symposium)	128
BALZ, ALBERT G. A. The Characterization of Moral Evolution	403
BLAKE, RALPH MASON. Why Not Hedonism? A Protest	1
BURNS, C. DELISLE. Progressive Morality	225
CORY, HERBERT ELLSWORTH. The Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Good	159
HENDERSON, ERNEST N. Ethical Bases of Economic Reward	349
HERRICK, C. JUDSON. Biological Determinism and Human Freedom	36
HOOK, SIDNEY. The Ethics of Suicide	173
LAIRD, JOHN. Of "Right" and "Good" and of Mr. Ross's Views	337
LANZ, H. The Doctrine of Non-Resistance and Its Antithesis	53
LODGE, RUPERT CLENDON. Platonic Immortality as the Highest Good	288
MACLEAN, DONALD A. Christian Industrial Democracy: Its Moral Basis	377
MORRIS, CHARLES W. The Total-Situation Theory of Ethics	258
OAKELEY, HILDA D. The Religious Element in Plato's Philosophy	67
RAO, G. HANUMANTHA. The Basis of Hindu Ethics	19
REID, LOUIS ARNAUD. Beauty and Moral Betterment	239
ROSS, W. D. The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics (Symposium)	113
RUSSELL, LEONARD J. Value and Existence (Symposium)	138
STAPLEDON, OLAF. Mr. Bertrand Russell's Ethical Beliefs	390
SWABEY, MARIE COLLINS. Democracy and the Concept of Quantity	189
TAEUSCH, C. F. An Approach to the Science of Ethics	269
TOWNSEND, H. G. The Synthetic Principle in Butler's Ethics	81
TURNER, J. E. Determinism and Moral Experience	419
WILLIAMSON, C. Private Views of the Last Fin-de-Siècle	362
WRIGHT, WILLIAM KELLEY. The Objectivity of Moral Judgments (Symposium)	147

A SYMPOSIUM UPON ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY

The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics. By W. D. Ross	113
The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics. By George P. Adams	128
Value and Existence. By Leonard J. Russell	138
The Objectivity of Moral Judgments. By William Kelley Wright	147

DISCUSSION

Ethical Concepts Vital to Market Research. By William J. Reilly	88
Ethical Inwardness in Greek Tragedy. By Ronald B. Levinson	91
Kant's "Empty" Moral Law. By Margaret C. Amig	94

Digitized by Google

PAGE

BOOK REVIEWS

ADAMS, GEORGE P., et al. (eds.). *Studies in the Problem of Norms*. By A. P. Brogan 314
BIRDSEYE, CLARENCE F., *Arbitration and Business Ethics*. By C. F. Taeusch 324
BOUGLÉ, C. *The Evolution of Values*. By Charner M. Perry . . . 321
BRÉADY, J. WESLEY. *Lord Shaftesbury and Social-Industrial Progress*. By M. Jourdain 311
CHANG, W. S. *The Development, Significance and Some Limitations of Hegel's Ethical Teaching*. By J. S. Mackenzie 103
CLARK, JOHN MAURICE. *Social Control of Business*. By J. H. Tufts. . 101
DICKINSON, G. LOWES. *The International Anarchy, 1904–1914*. By Eugene N. Anderson 317
DOUGLAS, PAUL H. *Wages and the Family*. By A. P. Brogan . . . 215
HALDANE, VISCOUNT. *Human Experience: A Study of Its Structure*. By C. D. Burns 213
HAMMOND, J. L. AND BARBARA. *The Rise of Modern Industry*. By M. J. . 104
HAYES, EDWARD CARY (ed.). *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*. By T. V. Smith 435
HEERMANCE, EDGAR L. *The Ethics of Business*. By C. F. Taeusch . . 212
HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights; and Man and the State*. By George H. Sabine . . 307
HORTON, WALTER MARSHALL. *The Philosophy of Abbé Bautain*. By Charner M. Perry 435
KRABBE, H. *The Modern Idea of the State*. By T. V. Smith . . . 208
LEUBA, JAMES B. *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*. By E. F.. . 214
MARGOLD, CHARLES W. *Sex Freedom and Social Control*. By T. V. Smith 323
MASON, DANIEL GREGORY. *Artistic Ideals*. By T. V. Smith . . . 433
MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM. *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*. By C. D. Burns 433
NOBLE, EDMUND. *Purposive Evolution*. By DeWitt H. Parker . . . 431
PÉRIGORD, PAUL. *The International Labor Organization*. By Paul H. Douglas 210
SMUTS, GENERAL THE RT. HON. J. C. *Holism and Evolution*. By C. D. Burns 314
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *Religion in the Making*. By Henry Nelson Wieman 312

NOTES

Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. . . 336

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For September and October, 1926

Brains of Rats and Men

That man's brain has been slowly developed from other kinds of animal brain structures, that human behavior patterns and the noblest human faculties are functions of man's peculiar protoplasmic organization—to many these still seem difficult statements to accept. Their truth, however, is further demonstrated by C. Judson Herrick in *Brains of Rats and Men*, his new book on the origin and biological significance of the cerebral cortex. It is a volume that belongs to that rare class of scientific works of genuine literary merit, in which Mr. Herrick traces the evolution of this amazingly complex organ from fishes to men, and follows step by step the elaboration of its functions.

Objective behavior and subjective experience are here reformulated in biological terms. Mr. Herrick demonstrates incisively that the entire intellectual, emotional, and moral life of mankind can be explored as biological functions without loss of their supreme values as distinctively human attributes and without passing outside the realm of natural laws.

Others have tried to read human faculties backward into the lower animals. Mr. Herrick reverses the order and, beginning with the simplest structures prophetic of cerebral cortex, he reads this history through to its culmination in man. He outlines also the development of the thalamus and corpus striatum and their functional relations with the cortex.

He turns then to the mechanism of learning, centering the discussion about the brains of rats and men, the two species of mammals whose behavior patterns have been studied most intensively under conditions of laboratory control. Recent experiments upon learning in rats are summarized.

In considering the transition from brute to man, Mr. Herrick calls attention to the fact that the brain of man is more than twice as heavy as that of an ape of equal body weight and that this increase is chiefly in the cerebral cortex. The complexity of the internal texture of the human cortex surpasses that of an ape in still larger measure.

Mr. Herrick emphasizes the unscientific character of the oversimplification of human behavior so popular in some psychological circles. He believes that human nature cannot be understood without recognizing that its patterns of behavior are very different from those of rats and monkeys, and that conscious experience is an essential component of these human behavior patterns in their biological aspects.

Approaching the problems of human nature from the biological side and with biological technique, the author works out a common ground upon which objective psychology and introspective psychology may meet without sacrificing what is good in either method. He has demonstrated that, without transgressing the boundaries of biological science, we can set in their places objective behavior in all its manifestations: affect, impulse, volition, and the whole intellectual and moral life together with the structural mechanisms employed.

The concluding chapters have a special significance for psychology and education, since they throw light upon such problems as the subconscious, complexes, habit, vital reserves, experience, association, will, and the relations of mind and body.

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This account of the cerebral cortex, its evolution and its functions, by one of America's foremost neurologists touches upon problems that are fundamental to all the sciences that take living things, and man in particular, as their province: biology, psychology, anthropology, the social sciences, education, medicine. *BRAINS OF RATS AND MEN.* By C. JUDSON HERRICK. *$3.00, postpaid $3.15.*

* * *

"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"

Beyond all other ideas of government, democracy means not merely a governmental mechanism, but a way of life. The social philosopher who thus broadly conceives it must turn to the most general interests of mankind. Thomas Vernor Smith, in his new book *The Democratic Way of Life*, re-endows "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—worn slogans of a goal that has never been reached—with some of the spirit of the days when they were magic words; and makes a brilliant commentary upon the questions of humanizing work, the proper use of leisure, religion in a democracy, birth control, and democratic leadership.

To make clear the abiding real content of the democratic trinity of ideals, Mr. Smith inquires into these goals as they stand today. He looks upon liberty as fundamental, a natural end for life, and would restrict it only for the sake of fraternity. He admits that liberty is neither more nor less than doing as one pleases, but believes that through proper education men may please more and more to act fraternally.

Fraternity, Mr. Smith holds to be a natural and ethical end for man. It is, in his view, the basis of religion, and the function of religion in a democracy is to foster brotherhood within the group and universal brotherhood.

What can equality as an ideal mean in the light of the present-day facts? Mr. Smith's equalitarian ideal means fundamentally that whatever objects or activities are regarded as good must be admitted to be as good when experienced by one person as when experienced by another. He sees in war and industrial autocracy the arch-enemies of equality, and in the cessation of wholesale hostility, the development of industrial democracy, necessary measures for the attainment of the equality ideal.

Bertrand Russell has expressed the belief that with present technology, the four-hour day awaits only the will to have it. Regarding such optimism as at best prophetic of a distant time, Mr. Smith, in considering work and leisure, prefers to place emphasis upon the humanizing of work, and to give up the tenaciously held idea that the good life is to be found exclusively in leisure. The supreme moral task of the hour, in Mr. Smith's view, is in banishing drudgery and monotony, and investing otherwise unpleasant work with meaning.

What kind of leadership is needed in a democracy? Mr. Smith rejects the conception of leadership of prestige and authority inherited from monarchies, and replaces it with the new conception of leadership suggested by science. The new type of leader is a leader by virtue of knowledge, and his function is to point, not to order. Science having discredited the spectacular and omniscient type of leader, democracy must be judged not by its ability to produce a few "master-leaders," but by its ability to make every citizen a creative leader in some enterprise.

Mr. Smith has brought to these principles of democracy, upon which so much enthusiasm has been lavished and over which so much disappointment has been felt, an undeniable tinge of modernity. He has formulated a democratic credo, a profession of the social faith of a modern man. *THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE.* By THOMAS VERNOR SMITH. *$1.75, postpaid $1.85.*

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A New French Grammar

One hears it frequently said that of the making of French grammars there is no end but that the French grammar has yet to be written. That is to say a new one may legitimately make its bow without regarding too much the weight of its predecessors.

The new *Introduction to the Study of French* by Otto F. Bond will make a place for itself among French texts where the rapid attainment of the ability to read and understand French is the end most desired. Teachers who find that the prolonged syntactical study and delayed actual reading made necessary by most grammars is somewhat boring both to instructor and student will welcome this grammar which equips the student in twenty lessons to read interesting material.

It is a "comprehension" grammar, brief, thorough, and intensive, and written from the point of view of the student struggling with the difficulties of the printed page and the spoken word and desiring a mastery of these problems early in the course.

The "reading method" upon which this book is based has been in use in the Junior College of the University of Chicago for five years with remarkable success. It has led to an average reading of 1,500 to 1,800 pages in the first year of instruction in French.

In an article in the *Modern Language Journal* for April, 1926, Mr. Bond says: "If Mary White wants to read *Le Petit Chose* or *Abeille* before she can order from a French menu or juggle a pair of partitive constructions in a negative sentence, why not let her do it? She cannot fail to get some good out of the performance even if she doesn't get all the story with full literary appreciation. Suppression of her desire to read cannot be expected to heighten her interest in partitive constructions!"

In preparing a text which concentrates on the problem of getting the student to the point where he can follow his natural interest in reading, Mr. Bond has performed a valuable service for instructors whether or not they agree with him that the primary aim of the junior college course should be the development of reading ability. The text may be followed by the direct method or the grammar-translation method, and its value as a starting-point for the course and a means for creating interest in the course is not lessened.

An Introduction to the Study of French is one of the new "University of Chicago Junior College Series" designed through specially constructed texts to accomplish efficiently in one year the purpose of elementary modern-language instruction at the college level. Another volume in the series, already published, is *The Sounds of French* by Otto F. Bond, a graded, intensive, phonetic drill manual, equipped with analytical exercises. In December, a third volume in the series, *Premières Lectures*, will appear. It is a first reader to be begun with the twelfth recitation of the course and to lead to extensive (outside) reading by the twentieth. *AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF FRENCH.* By Otto F. Bond. *$1.00, postpaid $1.10. THE SOUNDS OF FRENCH.* By Otto F. Bond. *$1.25, postpaid $1.35.*

* * *

For the Bacteriology Laboratory

Instructors arranging courses in bacteriology, serology, and immunology will find helpful the new *Laboratory Outlines in Bacteriology and Immunology* by John F. Norton and I. S. Falk. For students of these subjects it will serve as a handbook and guide in the laboratory. The material consists of exercises which are designed to acquaint the student with a variety of the best methods, to give him practice in working with different groups of bacteria, and to illustrate immunologic phenomena.

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The Democratic Way of Life

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Thomas Vernor Smith in this new book re-endows "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—worn slogans of a goal that has ever been reached—with some of the spirit of the days when they were magic words. Here is a brilliant commentary upon democracy as a way of life.

To make clear the abiding real content of the democratic trinity of ideals, Mr. Smith inquires into these goals as they stand today. To bring about the ideal democracy, he advocates voluntary limitation of families, humanizing work, making religion serve the purposes of universal brotherhood, cessation of war and abandonment of industrial autocracy, development of industrial democracy, and recognition of the leadership based upon science instead of that based upon authority.

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These outlines should be in the hands of the instructor and of each member of the class. The manual is a flexible one in its arrangement and can easily be adapted to the character of the course offered, and to the amount of time available for laboratory work. There is material here for a full year's work, but it is so arranged that the manual is equally useful for shorter courses. *LABORATORY OUTLINES FOR COURSES IN BACTERIOLOGY AND IMMUNOLOGY.* By JOHN F. NORTON and I. S. FALK. *$2.00, postpaid $2.10.*

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The Origins of the Gospels

Ernest DeWitt Burton continued during his last years the researches concerning the origins of the Four Gospels which had been the basis of his valued *Short Introduction to the Gospels.* He made further investigations regarding the dates of the Synoptic Gospels, and approached the Fourth Gospel from a new point of view, applying the method of source criticism that he had already used with conspicuous success for the Synoptic Gospels.

These significant advances have been incorporated by Harold R. Willoughby in a new revision of the volume which brings to biblical students Dr. Burton's final conclusions. Two important sections of fresh material found in Dr. Burton's files have been added. The first renders an exceptional judgment regarding the dates of the Synoptic Gospels. The second outlines a unique theory concerning the composition of the Fourth Gospel which illuminates the Johannine depiction of Jesus.

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Richard Green Moulton spent his life in the study and interpretation of world-literature and the culmination of his work is *The Modern Study of Literature.* It is a

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book that embodies his familiarity with literature in all its forms, and his extraordinary ability to act as a guide to others in the development of literary appreciation. In it he reached the final formulation of a complete philosophy of literature, and applied it to the greatest literary masterpieces.

Moulton's method of interpretation regarded all literatures as one, and dealt with ancient, medieval, and modern, whether of England or of the Continent, as different manifestations of a single impulse. To him the great mistake of modern literary study was its failure to recognize the unity of all literature. In *The Modern Study of Literature* he supplied the comprehensive synthesis which he thought to be the great need of modern criticism.

His method was that of inductive observation, and he looked upon literary growth as a matter of evolution as definite as development in the physical world. Moulton's life as an interpreter of literature is summed up in this, his greatest work—a volume that every student and lover of world-literature should read. *THE MODERN STUDY OF LITERATURE.* By RICHARD GREEN MOULTON. *$3.00, postpaid $3.15.*

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Vol. XXXVII OCTOBER 1926 No. 1

CONTENTS

PAGE

WHY NOT HEDONISM? A PROTEST. 1
By RALPH MASON BLAKE, University of Washington

THE BASIS OF HINDU ETHICS 19
By G. HANUMANTHA RAO, Maharajah's College, Mysore, India

BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM 36
By C. JUDSON HERRICK, University of Chicago

THE DOCTRINE OF NON-RESISTANCE AND ITS ANTITHESIS . . . 53
By H. LANZ, Stanford University

THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY 67
By HILDA D. OAKELEY

THE SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE IN BUTLER'S ETHICS 81
By H. G. TOWNSEND, University of Oregon

DISCUSSION

Ethical Concepts Vital to Market Research 88
By WILLIAM J. REILLY, Cincinnati, Ohio

Ethical Inwardness in Greek Tragedy 91
By RONALD B. LEVINSON, Harvard University

Kant's "Empty" Moral Law 94
By MARGARET C. AMIG, Richmond, Virginia

BOOK REVIEWS

CLARK, JOHN MAURICE, Social Control of Business 101
By J. H. TUFTS

CHANG, W. S., The Development, Significance and Some Limitations of Hegel's Ethical Teaching 103
By J. S. MACKENZIE

HAMMOND, J. L., AND BARBARA, The Rise of Modern Industry . . . 104
By M. J.

SHORTER NOTICES 105

BOOKS RECEIVED 111

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXVII OCTOBER 1926 Number 1

WHY NOT HEDONISM? A PROTEST

RALPH MASON BLAKE

In current discussions of ethical theory it has become the tradition to treat hedonism on the more or less definite assumption that its rejection is a foregone conclusion. Its falsity is so thoroughly taken for granted that it is thought possible to dispose of its claims in very short order indeed. It is usually treated with ill-disguised contempt as an antiquated heresy that has so long since been definitely refuted that its truth can scarcely be contemplated as a genuine possibility at all. Its "fallacies" are summarily pointed out, in a few brief pages, and we are hurried on to a consideration of theories more worthy the attention of a mature mind.

I find this state of affairs extremely unsatisfactory. For my own part, I may as well say at once, I accept the hedonistic position. If there are any serious difficulties in the way of such acceptance, I very much wish to know what they are. The current "refutations" seem to me for the most part simply puerile—so much so, indeed, that I should feel a sense of shame in proposing to discuss them seriously were it not for the scandalous fact that they are still solemnly repeated and piously deferred to. Perhaps it is some such sense of shame that keeps Mr. Santayana, who, almost alone among contemporary writers, adopts a fully hedonistic position, from dealing with the current objections. Mr. Santayana, however, prefers in general to expound rather than to argue his philosophy, and the truth of hedonism in particular doubtless seems

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to him so evident that he cannot bring himself to any careful consideration of the alleged difficulties. The occasion therefore seems ripe for such a discussion, and it is something of the sort which, in summary fashion, I here propose to undertake.

Let it first be clearly understood, however, that in attempting to defend hedonism from its critics I am by no means concerned with the *integral* defense of any historical hedonistic system. By hedonism I do not mean Epicureanism, or Benthamism, or the doctrines of J. S. Mill. There is not the slightest difficulty in showing, and it has in fact been demonstrated *ad nauseam,* that these historic theories are one and all infected with serious fallacies and gross errors. I believe, however, that there is a set of fundamental principles which, whether or not it has ever been held in this precise form by any of the classical proponents of hedonism, at any rate seems to have been more or less approximated by each of them; that this set, moreover, will be recognized as undoubtedly constituting *a* hedonistic system; and, finally, that *this* hedonistic system is by no means to be disposed of by the simple device of showing that it has usually been inadequately stated, defended by fallacious arguments, and combined with inconsistent or erroneous principles.

This central core of hedonistic doctrine has been most clearly and completely disengaged from its various historical accompaniments not by any advocate of the theory, but, oddly enough, precisely by its acutest critic, Mr. G. E. Moore (in his *Ethics,* Home University Library). Ignoring all complications and refinements of interpretation, the bare essentials of this view can be stated in a highly compressed form in seven propositions. Of these the first two are simply preliminary definitions of terms. They are as follows: (1) To say of a thing that it is *intrinsically* good means that it would be good even if it existed quite alone, without any accompaniments or effects whatever; and (2) to say of a thing that it is *ultimately* good, or good *for its own sake,* means (*a*) that it is intrinsical-

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ly good, and (*b*) that it contains no part which is not intrinsically good. The next three propositions are definitions of moral concepts. They are not peculiar to hedonism as such, but characterize it as a *teleological,* rather than a *formalistic,* system of ethics.[1] These propositions are as follows: (3) To call a voluntary act *wrong* means that the total consequences of some other action possible to the agent under the circumstances form a whole which is intrinsically better than the whole formed by the total consequences of the act in question. (4) To call a voluntary act *right* means that it is not wrong. (5) To call a voluntary act a *duty* for a given agent, or to say that the agent *ought* to perform it, means that, among the acts possible to the agent under the circumstances, the total consequences of the act in question form a whole which is intrinsically better than the whole formed by the total consequences of any of the other possible acts. The next proposition also is not necessarily peculiar to hedonism as such. It amounts to a denial of Mr. Moore's principle of "organic unity" (cf. his *Principia Ethica*), and might form a part of a non-hedonistic system. This principle is as follows: (6) The intrinsic value of a whole is always in proportion to the amount of ultimate value which it contains. The last proposition is the characteristic and peculiar thesis of hedonism, viz., (7) pleasurable consciousness is always ultimately good (or good for its own sake); and nothing else is ever ultimately good.

And now for the current objections. Most of these, I think it will readily be seen, simply do not touch at all the theory previously stated. So far as it is concerned, they are completely beside the mark. For example, much ink is still expended upon the refutation of "psychological hedonism," i.e., the once fashionable theory that the sole human motive is the desire for pleasure. (Cf., e.g., Dewey's constant recurrence to this subject in his *Human Nature and Conduct.*) In view of the fact that no serious thinker, so far as I know, now holds

[1] For this distinction, cf. Paulsen's *System of Ethics,* Book II, chap. i.

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any such theory, this ink is simply wasted. The doctrine was, of course, accepted by most of the hedonists of the past, and was indeed frequently put forward by them as a proof of the truth of their ethical theory. Its falsity is, however, now generally recognized, and its uselessness as a basis for demonstration of the ethical theory fully admitted. It evidently forms no part of the doctrine previously stated, and is in no way implied thereby. Discussion of it is therefore wholly irrelevant to any living issue.

But even those who recognize the irrelevance of psychological hedonism sometimes formulate and criticize ethical hedonism in a way which is almost equally irrelevant. Hedonists hold—so the matter is frequently put—that even though the desire for pleasure is not actually the sole human motive, yet nevertheless it *ought* to be. Thus Miss Calkins tells us[2] that "according to this theory the proper, though not the invariable, object of the morally willing self is pleasure." And according to Mr. Joad[3] "although other things besides pleasure may be desired, pleasure is the only thing that ought to be desired." Now, whether or not such a doctrine has actually formed a part of hedonistic systems in the past, it certainly ought to be plain that it is by no means an *essential* feature of such a system. Not only is it not in any way implied in the foregoing propositions, but on any reasonable view of things would seem even to be definitely excluded thereby. For according to these principles to say that no man *ought* ever to desire anything other than pleasure means that the total consequences of a desire for something other than pleasure *never* form a whole which contains more pleasurable experience than does the whole formed by the total consequences of any other possible desire; and to most observers of human life this statement seems to be plainly false. Hence, indeed, the familiar "hedonistic paradox" to the effect that "pleasure to be got must be forgot"—a paradox which may certainly be quite

[2] *The Good Man and the Good*, p. 73.

[3] *Common-Sense Ethics*, p. 13; cf. p. 15.

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consistently accepted by hedonists. The fact that hedonists judge the value of acts by reference to their consequences in pleasure by no means commits them to the view that such consequences are best attained by making them directly the sole human motive and the sole object of human desire. Nobody makes any scruple of admitting that such a valuable end as health, for example, is not best attained by making it a direct and constant object of conscious concern. It should therefore not surprise us to find that the like is true also of other valuable ends. In fact, I am not familiar with any system of ethics in which it is held that desire for the ultimate end proposed by the system should be made the sole human desire. Why then should it be supposed that hedonists alone are bound to maintain such a doctrine?

As for the connection of hedonism with egoism, it might seem superfluous at this late date to insist that hedonists need in no way be adherents of egoism. Yet this confusion still to some extent persists, even among writers who ought to know very much better. Thus Professor Münsterberg seems to have supposed that a hedonist can consistently regard any given act as constituting for him a duty only provided he can view it as resulting in a preponderance of pleasure for *himself;* for he argues against hedonism as follows:[4] "When we will the morally good, we do indeed wish that the good also give us joy, but we know that it is not good simply because it gives us pleasure. . . . . Even if we acknowledge the pleasure in the minds of other human beings as goal for our moral action, the moral itself is not therefore based on pleasure. . . . . We feel it our duty to serve the pleasure of others, but this duty cannot itself come into question as a pleasure. We may submit to it with pleasure, but we do not submit to it because it gives us pleasure." But need a hedonist maintain that our duty must needs be a pleasure in the doing?

Mr. Joad also thinks it an inconsistency in a hedonist to admit "that the individual can, and ought to, desire some-

[4] *Eternal Values*, p. 39.

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thing which may have no relation to his own pleasure, namely, the good of the community";[5] for he tells us not only that Mill's implicit admission of this doctrine involved him in inconsistencies, but also that "these inconsistencies in Mill are important, and I have dwelt on them at some length because they demonstrate the impracticability of maintaining, even with the best will in the world, that pleasure is the only thing of value. . . . . They reveal themselves most completely in Mill's work, but they are implied in any form of utilitarian hedonism."[6] I should very much like to have it pointed out just *how* the rejection of egoism implies any inconsistency in such a form of utilitarian hedonism as that outlined above.

Another classical line of attack upon hedonism consists in elaborate criticism of the so-called "hedonistic calculus." If the rightness and wrongness of actions depend upon the degree to which a greater or less "quantity of pleasure" is realized in their consequences, then, in order definitely to determine upon the rightness or wrongness of any action, we must be able somehow to predict the consequences of various actions and to estimate the relative "quantities of pleasure" involved. Now no one would deny, I suppose, that it is no easy matter to forecast the future, especially in such a complicated sphere as that of human conduct and its effects; nor will any one be disposed to doubt that there are grave difficulties involved in the determination and comparison of quantities of pleasure and displeasure. I cannot here enter into the details of this question, but it ought to be clearly understood that precisely similar difficulties affect any teleological system of ethics whatsoever. Every such system makes the value of actions depend upon the quantity of good which they succeed in realizing; every such system holds that some actions are better than others, that some realize more and some less good. In every such system, therefore, some sort of "calculus" is

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

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necessary, and I find it very difficult to understand how it can be any easier to determine such quantitative questions as are here involved in terms of "satisfaction of desire" or "harmony" or "self-realization" than it is in terms of pleasure and displeasure. Hedonists have at least made a resolute attempt to deal with this aspect of the matter. I fail to see how any teleological system can view such an attempt as superfluous; and I am not aware that any system has made the attempt with more earnestness or with greater success than hedonism.

Professor Dewey is one of those who make much of the defects of the "calculus" as an objection to hedonism. But I cannot help thinking that he interprets the doctrine in a manner that is highly artificial and unreal. He seems to suppose that in the view of hedonists the calculus can be applied with perfect mathematical precision to the determination of the results of individual acts severally, and that, too, with absolute accuracy and certainty of result.[7] This seems to me something of a caricature of the hedonistic view. I venture to think that even Bentham and Mill, who no doubt entertained somewhat exaggerated notions with regard to the applicability of the calculus, never went to anything like such lengths. And what is Professor Dewey's own conclusion with regard to the calculus? He tells us that

> the problem of deliberation is not to calculate future happenings, but to appraise present proposed action. We judge present desires and habits by their tendency to produce certain consequences. . . . . The future outcome is not certain. . . . . But its tendency [i.e., the tendency of the fire which Professor Dewey uses as an example] is a knowable matter, what it will do under certain circumstances. And so we know what is the tendency of malice, charity, conceit, patience. We know by observing their consequences, by recollecting what we have observed, by using that recollection in constructive imaginative forecasts of the future, by using the thought of future consequences to tell the quality of the act now proposed.[8]

[7] Cf., e.g., *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 50–51.

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 206–7.

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the chorus of objections. "A state of unbroken pleasure would not really be pleasant. A continuous heaven of constant enjoyment would be intolerable boredom." Such an objection surely represents mere confusion of thought. How can pleasure be unpleasant? How can enjoyment be boredom? "But uninterrupted pleasure is an ideal which is impossible of attainment in any actual human life. It is a mere chimera." Or, as Professor Rogers puts the point:[10] "That at which a sensible human being aims is no unimaginable state of the intensest possible pleasure unaccompanied by pain. . . . . Rational satisfaction is no dream of an undisturbed and impossibly complete state of felicity."[11] But what hedonist has asserted the attainability of such an ideal? Are hedonists, then, wholly ignorant of the conditions of human life? In truth they are not so foolish as to maintain the attainability of any such perfect consummation, or to counsel attempts to realize the impossible. What they hold is simply that the intrinsic value of any state of affairs is in proportion to the amount of pleasurable experience it contains, and that human effort should be so directed as to make this amount *as great as possible*. No overstrained idealism is implied. A hedonist may, indeed, consistently also be a pessimist. We should not forget that the truth of pessimism has often been argued from hedonistic premises.

But then, says Professor Rogers, "in practice the only clear meaning, therefore, that a 'sum of pleasures' carries is this, that I want my life to be a continuous series of satisfied moments lasting as long as possible. But this is pretty much an empty platitude, which throws almost no light at all on what constitutes satisfaction at any given moment."[12] But is it to be expected of any theory of the nature of the ultimate end that it should automatically reveal the particular means

[10] *Theory of Ethics*, p. 50.

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

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to that end? For Professor Rogers "that at which a sensible human being aims is . . . . the realization that he is making the most of life that it is possible for him, with his particular interests and limitations, to make, considering the means at his disposal."[13] How much light does *this* way of formulating the end throw upon "what constitutes satisfaction at any given moment"?

The interesting feature of Professor Rogers' case is that *de facto* he comes very near, despite his protests, to being a hedonist himself—if only he were not so desperately afraid of the name. "Only when we can point to pleasure," he writes, "is the judgment of value felt to be *justified.*"[14] "No aim will be called reflectively a *good* aim unless it tends to result in pleasure."[15] But still he will not be called hedonist. He does not "intend to say that mere pleasurableness by itself is a good. Pleasantness as such is not good because pleasantness does not exist by itself; a good is concrete, and pleasantness merely an abstract quality" (*loc. cit.*). But, may we ask, what hedonist attaches any value to mere "pleasantness" as an abstract universal? It is, of course, only concrete pleasurable experience which he values.

Professor Dewey finds it a fundamental defect in utilitarianism that it thinks "of the good to which intelligence is pertinent as consisting in future pleasures and pains." This, in his view, involves a "catastrophe." He emphasizes the "contrast between such conceptions of good and of intelligence and the facts of human nature according to which good, happiness, is found in the present meaning of activity, depending upon the proportion, order, and freedom introduced into it by thought as it discovers objects which realize and unify otherwise contending elements.[16] Professor Dewey's thought, here and elsewhere, seems to be that utilitarian hedonism unduly emphasizes satisfactions to be realized in a distant and none

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 31.
[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 50.
[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 38.
[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 212.

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too certain future at the expense of the happiness to be gained in the present through the solution of immediate conflict; that it unduly exalts remote and more or less doubtful advantages at the expense of present fruition (cf. p. 265). That such a tendency to some extent may have operated in the history of utilitarianism I will not deny. But I see not the slightest reason to suppose that such an emphasis is the only one which can be consistently adopted by one who accepts the hedonistic position.

Professor Calkins rejects hedonism because of the "narrowness" of its conception of the good. "'Why then,' the non-hedonist protests to the hedonist, 'why do you exclude activity and thought from your conception of the good, or ultimate end, why do you limit this chief good to happiness alone?'"[17] The very asking of this question, it appears, is sufficient to refute hedonism, for without more ado Professor Calkins continues on the next page, "Now that the hedonistic answer to this question is discredited, we turn, naturally enough, to anti-hedonistic doctrines." And what do we find? "It is already clear that only one qualitative theory of the good can escape challenge for its narrowness. This is the doctrine which describes the good not in terms of any one kind of consciousness, as pity, loyalty, wisdom, or happiness, but as inclusive of all of these experiences and of all others which people wish or will for themselves" (p. 78). But is it really so clear that there is no "narrowness" here? Might we not ask, with a pertinence equal to that of the non-hedonist's former inquiry, "Why do you exclude things not wished or willed from your conception of the good? Why do you limit the ultimate end to things wished or willed alone?" It is, of course, evident that *any* theory of the end must distinguish between what is ultimately good and what is not, and must therefore inevitably suffer from this form of "narrowness."

Many criticisms of hedonism reduce to most elementary

[17] *The Good Man and the Good*, p. 76.

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misunderstandings of the hedonistic distinction between pleasurable experience as intrinsic and ultimate good, and moral value as a species of extrinsic or instrumental good. Thus A. E. Taylor writes: "A man is not morally good because his career has been marked by extraordinary cases of unexpected good luck, nor is the life of one of the lower animals to be reckoned morally good because it may contain a vast number of pleasant moments."[18] But hedonists, of course, do not say that *moral* goodness consists in enjoyment of pleasure; for them moral goodness is an *extrinsic* value derived from the fact that certain actions and dispositions *result in* consequences which are more pleasurable than the results of other acts and dispositions. The same confusion is apparent also in Taylor's treatment of the question, Is the good always pleasant? He interprets this to mean "Is the morally good or *right* act always accompanied by more pleasure than a wrong act?" To the question so stated no hedonist would dream of giving an affirmative answer. Professor Fullerton also gives a criticism of hedonism based on this same misunderstanding. After quoting Bentham to the effect that all pleasure is in itself a good, even the pleasure a malicious man "takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his adversary undergo," he asks, "Can the pleasure of a malignant act properly be called *morally* good at all?"[19] This question being answered in the negative, Bentham's position is considered to be refuted. But, as we have seen, no hedonist dreams of maintaining that pleasant experience is *in itself* a *moral* good. In fact, for hedonism nothing whatever is in itself, i.e., intrinsically, a moral good.

Another favorite procedure of the critics is based upon the fact that hedonists have often professed to give demonstrative *proofs* of the truth of their theory. These attempted demonstrations are examined and found to be inconclusive, or posi-

[18] *Problem of Conduct*, p. 327.

[19] *A Handbook of Ethical Theory*, p. 224; cf. p. 240.

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tively fallacious. Hedonism, it is thus discovered, has "failed to prove its case," and we pass on to consider the alternative theories. Now let us admit at once that the fundamental principles of hedonism are incapable of demonstration. So far as I can see, the critics are quite right in rejecting all the alleged proofs that have ever been offered, and I know of nothing that can be set in their place. But how stands the case with the alternative theories? Is it possible to give a demonstration of *their* fundamental principles? Their advocates scarcely pretend that it is. These alternatives are accepted, not because of any rigorous proof of their truth, but on quite other grounds. The fact that hedonism "fails to prove its case" in itself certainly constitutes no proof of the truth of any other theory. The truth of the matter seems to be that no theory of ethics, in so far as it is a question of ultimate ends, is susceptible of "proof" in the strict sense. In fact, even Bentham and Mill were on occasion prepared to admit as much. Thus Bentham says of the fundamental principle of hedonism, "Is it susceptible of any direct proof? It should seem not: for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere."[20] And Mill also remarks: "To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles."[21] Unfortunately, however, Mill nevertheless attempted, in his fourth chapter, precisely such a proof as he had here stated to be impossible. His lack of success is certainly not surprising.

Fundamental ethical principles, in fact, as Mr. Moore so properly insists, are accepted or rejected on intuitive grounds. The most that any adherent of any ethical system can do by way of persuading another to accept his theory is to state its fundamental principles as clearly and adequately as possible, to take care that these are properly interpreted, and that the issues are not obscured by any confusion with irrelevant or in-

[20] Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, Vol. I, sec. 364.

[21] *Utilitarianism*, Everyman's ed., p. 32.

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consistent doctrines, to exhibit the implications of these principles and their consistency or inconsistency with other human beliefs, and then simply to appeal to the reflective judgment of his hearer. If the latter, having once clearly understood the principles and their implications, thereupon rejects them, then *cadit quaestio*.

For my own part, when I subject to such a test the fundamental principles of hedonistic ethics, they appear to me to ring true. Indeed, it seems to me to be actually self-evident that all pleasurable experience is ultimately good. It does *not* seem to me self-evident that *nothing but* pleasurable experience is ever ultimately good; but much careful reflection has hitherto failed to reveal anything else which *does* seem to me ultimately good. Again, it is not self-evident to me that the intrinsic value of a whole is necessarily always in proportion to the amount of ultimate good which it contains; but in every instance which I have ever considered it has always seemed to me that this is actually the case. Consequently I am forced to adopt a hedonistic position. If other men judge these matters differently I know of no way of "refuting" them; but, on the other hand, I have never been able to see that any of the considerations advanced in opposition to hedonism constitute a refutation of *it*.

From what has been said, however, it is obvious that there may be perfectly *legitimate* criticisms of hedonism—those, namely, which consist simply in presenting for judgment "hard cases" concerning which it is thought that the only conclusion consistent with hedonistic principles will nevertheless, on careful reflection, be rejected. But such criticisms, however legitimate in method, have never actually seemed to me in the least conclusive. Such force as they at first sight sometimes appear to have always turns out to arise, so far as I can see, from some confusion of thought which still clouds the issue. Once these confusions are cleared away, I never seem

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to find in these "hard cases" anything incompatible with the truth of hedonism.

Any adequate consideration of this phase of the matter would lead us too far afield to allow of our undertaking it on the present occasion with any degree of fulness. I shall therefore simply illustrate the way in which it seems to me possible to dispose of such hard cases by the examination of a few upon which Mr. Moore chiefly depends, and which I hope will be more or less typical. The following is an instance which he believes will persuade us that even wholes containing no pleasure may be intrinsically valuable: "Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can .... and then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth,"[22] and then suppose that no one ever can or does receive pleasure or displeasure from either world in any respect or degree whatever. "Would it not be well to do what we could to produce [the beautiful world] rather than the other?" Would not the former be intrinsically better than the latter? Now I ask myself whether this case does not derive most of its apparent force from the circumstance that the reader who makes this imaginative comparison very naturally revolts from the image of the ugly world and at the same time takes pleasure in the thought of the beautiful world, and that he neglects explicitly to notice and to discount this fact. I also ask myself whether the reader is not influenced, and his judgment unconsciously perverted, by the fact that we can scarcely compare these two imaginary worlds without the thought that the beautiful world obviously possesses greater pleasure-producing *potentialities* than the ugly one; by the fact that it is difficult to compare these two imaginary worlds without reference to the consideration that the one world provides, for any conscious being that might sometime be introduced upon the scene, a better basis for enjoyment than does the other. Once I care-

[22] *Principia Ethica*, p. 8.

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fully notice and discount such sources of bias, I entirely fail, for my own part, to see any superior value in the beautiful world.

Another of Mr. Moore's examples—one of those which to his mind "constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure," is as follows. If this hedonistic principle is true, it "involves our saying . . . . that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed—no knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities—must yet be intrinsically better—better worth creating—provided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existed *as well as* pleasure."[23] This instance seems almost deliberately framed to confuse the issue; for it is very difficult in considering the matter to remember that, if we are not illegitimately to introduce into our second world an additional increment of pleasure, by "enjoyment of beauty" we must here distinctly mean merely *contemplation* of beauty, wholly divorced from any element of pleasure. Moreover, it is difficult to keep our minds wholly free from the thought of the greater hedonic potentialities of a world possessing so many elements which in our experience are fruitful sources of enjoyment, as compared with a world from which these sources are eliminated. Once I clear my mind from such confusing associations, however, I feel no further difficulty in reaching the hedonistic conclusion.

Mr. Moore also points out that the hedonistic theory compels us to assert that "the state of mind of a drunkard, when he is intensely pleased with breaking crockery, is just as valuable, in itself—just as well worth having, as that of a man who is fully realizing all that is exquisite in the tragedy of King Lear, provided only the mere quantity of pleasure in both cases is the same" (p. 238). Here again, once I carefully abstract from all tacit reference to the differing promise and

[23] *Ethics*, pp. 237, 238.

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potentiality of these two states of mind, from all larger thought of their vastly differing significance for the total lives of these men and of their fellows, I find myself quite clearly committed to the hedonistic view of the matter.

I thus do quite clearly embrace the conclusion which Mr. Moore thinks self-evidently mistaken, "that if we *could* get as much pleasure in the world, without needing to have any knowledge, or any moral qualities, or any sense of beauty, as we can get *with* them, then all these things would be entirely superfluous" (p. 238). But I also quite as heartily agree with Mr. Moore that "the question is quite incapable of proof either way" (p. 238), and that "if anybody, after clearly considering the issue, does come" to the contrary conclusion, "there is no way of proving that he is wrong" (p. 238). My point simply is that there is no short and easy way with hedonism, and that the cavalier way in which it is commonly treated is wholly unreasonable and unjust.

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THE BASIS OF HINDU ETHICS

G. HANUMANTHA RAO

Of late considerable interest in Hindu ethics has been evinced by European scholars.[1] But the interest is still largely the interest of the philologist and the missionary, and not that of the moralist or the philosopher. A systematic study of Hindu ethics—its principles and theories, its virtues and institutions—is long overdue. But preliminary to such a study it is perhaps advisable to inquire into the basis of Hindu ethics for two reasons: First, without such an inquiry it is not possible to understand rightly the Hindu ethical theories and institutions, much less to evaluate them. Second,[1] the ideas of European scholars on this subject are still indefinite.[2] It is the aim of this paper to trace Hindu ethics to its roots in philosophy and fact. In other words, it attempts to show that Hindu ethics has its basis in metaphysics on the one hand and psychology and sociology on the other. In this it keeps close to the orthodox Hindu ethical tradition which finds expression in the *Bhagavad-Gita,* the Manusmriti, the Puranas, and the books of Niti.

I. METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF HINDU ETHICS

Dharma[3] or the good, according to the Vedas, stands for the ideal that stirs, sustains, and regulates everything that is

[1] Within the past two or three years have appeared two books on Indian ethics: *Hindu Ethics,* by Professor John Mackenzie of Wilson College, Bombay, and the *Ethics of India,* by Professor E. W. Hopkins of Yale University. The first is colored by the bias of a missionary who finds that every religion and ethic is defective except Christianity. The other is actuated by a more scientific motive of knowing facts as they are, and is "a mild protest" against the standpoint of the former. But both are one in this, that they study Hindu ethics from a historical point of view.

[2] See reviews of Professor Hopkins' book, *The Ethics of India,* by A. Widgery, in *Mind and the Quest,* October, 1925.

[3] *Dharma* is used also in a non-ethical sense, with which we have nothing to do in this paper. In the earlier portions of the Vedas, *dharma* and *moksha* are not differentiated. Only three *purusārthas* (ends of life), *dharma, artha, kāma,* are recognized. The good was later on defined more precisely and the relative good of social

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living, moving, and having its being. "Everything is rooted in *dharma*";[4] "*dharma* is the basis of the universe";[5] and "therefore do the wise say that the good is great."[6] The connotation of the term *dharma* is rather wide, as it stands not merely for right living, but for right-being (*Rta*) also. It stands for the ought that underlies all that is, and even God, who is the creator of the universe, is himself conceived as born of *Rta* (right order).[7] This *dharma* or right-being which is the central principle of the universe, is, in its inner core, spirit, spontaneous and creative; but viewed from without it appears as limited by time, space, and causality. While in other forms of being, physical and biological, the distinction between the inner and the outer, the ideal and the causal, is scarcely discernible, it becomes manifest in man. At one pole of his being he is one with the stocks and stones, and at the other pole he is one with the spirit, and divine; he is at once ape and angel, dust and Deity. On account of this polarity he is, as it were, divided against himself, and a perpetual struggle is set going between his higher and lower self. But the true meaning of his being does not consist in conflict, but rather in its transcendence. In spite of the downward drag of his lower nature, man is impelled to rise on the springs of his ideal nature. The goal of all this strife and struggle, hazards and hardships, is the realization of one's ultimate self (*moksha*).

The realization of the ultimate self (*moksha*) is, for the Hindu philosophers, a problem of life as well as of philosophy. For them the philosophical problem regarding the ultimate nature of our self is inseparably bound up with the practical problem of ethics. The search for the ultimate implies at the

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life was identified with *dharma*, and *moksha* came to stand for absolute good. *Dharma* is here used in a general sense to stand for the ideal that regulates all life—individual, social, and spiritual—and includes *moksha*.

[4] *Dharme sarvam pratistitam.* [5] *Dharmo visvasya jagatah pratisthā.*

[6] *Tasmād dharmam paramam vadanti.*

[7] See Bloomfield's *Religion of the Veda*, p. 26, and also Hopkins' *The Ethics of India*, pp. 51–52. Compare this with Plato's idea of the good and its relation to the idea of God.

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same time an attempt to realize the infinite. Philosophy is not mere speculation divorced from the highest needs of life; nor is ethics merely confined to custom and precept divorced from contemplation. Each is in and through the other. There is no philosophy for the Indian without a philosophic life, and there can be no spiritual life without speculation. A doctrine of philosophy is reached only through a certain discipline of life, and a discipline can have direction only through a doctrine. Mere doctrine without discipline is hollow and insincere; mere discipline without doctrine is blind and without direction. The tendency of modern European philosophers to consider metaphysical problems independently of ethics and moral problems independently of metaphysics, thought apart from life and life apart from thought, is altogether alien to the Indian philosophers. This does not mean that logical values are subordinated to ethical values. Metaphysics finds its verification in ethics, and logic, in life. The two are, therefore, inseparable and complementary. The moral and metaphysical problems rise together and can be solved only together; speculation reaches its end only through a scheme of life,[8] and life fulfils itself only through speculation.

It is this close relation between philosophy and life that has put the Hindu philosophers under the necessity of seeking a metaphysical basis for ethics and an ethical basis for metaphysics. This accounts also for the somewhat wider scope which the moral life assumes for the Hindu. While the Western moralists equate moral life with the merely human life of society, the Indian philosophers and moralists look forward to more than the purely human life and of society: a spiritual life which forms the crown and summit of the social life. While the social life is devoted to the realization of the aesthetic (*kāma*), the economic (*artha*), and the ethico-social (*dharma*) ideals, the spiritual life which is here and not hereafter

[8] See, for a detailed explanation of this, the present writer's articles, "Adhikāra, or the Fitness of a Philosopher," and "Where European and Indian Philosophy Touch," *Quest*, October, 1925, and January, 1926.

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is devoted to the realization of one's ultimate self. This coming of one's self to his true self constitutes the highest good of man. So that the good, for the Indian, is not confined to the mere individual and social good or the ideal of progress (*abhyudaya*); there is a greater good than individual or social good, which may, for lack of a better expression, be called absolute good or the ideal of perfection (*nihsreyasa*).

An inquiry into the different theories of *moksha* falls outside the scope of this paper. We may note in passing that our idea of the absolute good differs accordingly as our conception of the universe is monistic or dualistic, theistic or non-theistic, intellectualistic, voluntaristic, or mystic. If our view of reality is monistic, the ideal of life will be one of unity of one's self with everything else; if, on the other hand, our view of reality is dualistic or pluralistic, our ethical ideal will be one of isolation and separation. Similarly, if our view is theistic, our ideal will be one of devotion and action in the service of God; if non-theistic, the ideal of life will be one of self-realization; if intellectualistic, we realize our self through intuitive knowledge aided by the intellect (*jñānam vijñānasahitam*); if voluntaristic, we realize our self through sacrifice (*yajña*), or action through dispassion (*niskāmam karma*); if mystic, we have *moksha* through love (*bhakti*). All Hindu philosophers agree that the overcoming of selfishness (*ahamkāra*) is absolutely necessary to realize *moksha*. Most of them agree in this, that the realization of *moksha* involves the knowledge of our ultimate self, action through dispassion and love and devotion. They differ only in the emphasis they lay on each, knowledge, duty, or devotion. Some emphasize knowledge and subordinate to it duty and devotion; others emphasize duty and subordinate to it devotion and knowledge; still others lay stress on devotion and subordinate to it duty and knowledge. But the true view, the view of the non-sectarian scriptures like the Upanishads, the *Mahabharata,* and the *Bhagavad-Gita,* is that each presupposes the other and is in and through it. There can be no knowledge without devotion

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and duty, nor devotion without disinterested action and discrimination; nor can disinterested action exist without discrimination and devotion. To love is to live dispassionately, and to live dispassionately is to overcome delusion and to attain to knowledge. According to this view, therefore, neither religion, nor philosophy, nor ethics can exist each by itself; each finds its completion in the other and is inseparable from it.

II. EMPIRICAL BASIS

But metaphysics is not the sole basis of Hindu ethics. For the spiritual life is not the whole of life, though it is undoubtedly its roof and crown. Spiritual life is only the tail-end of life, and presupposes a whole course of evolution of individual and social life. The spiritual ideal of perfection (*nihsreyasa*) presupposes the social ideal of progress (*abhyudaya*).[9] The life of *nivrtti* (non-attachment) presupposes the life of *pravrtti* (attachment to social and relative ends). While the ethics of *nivrtti* is based upon metaphysics, the ethics of *pravrtti* is free from any particular metaphysical presupposition, and is based on empirical facts of biology, psychology, and sociology. Empirical ethics has only this working hypothesis, that one can be moral and ought to be moral, and it has nothing to do with the dualistic and monistic theories of the universe. This accounts for the fact that in India systems of philosophy diametrically opposed to one another still recognize a common ethical tradition which is mainly based upon positive facts.

1. *Psychological Basis.*—The concept[10] of evolution has a firm hold on the mind of the Hindus. Their biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics are greatly influenced by this con-

[9] *Manu* xii. 88: "Activity, according to orthodox tradition, is of two kinds: *pravrtti* and *nivrtti*. The first kind of activity leads to progress (*abhyudaya*), and the second, to perfection (*nihsreyasa*)."

[10] The *Sāmkhya* cosmology is at the basis of all Indian sciences, and the dominant concept of *Sāmkhya* cosmology is the idea of evolution. This idea of evolution, it must be understood, is far different from the modern idea of evolution, though it resembles it in certain important respects.

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cept. They believe in the continuity and unity of life.[11] Though it is in the human form that the spirit realizes its highest nature yet the human being has much of the animal in him which clogs the free flow of his higher nature. As he comes out of the nursery of nature he is a bundle of instincts and impulses. Reason is still in a dormant condition, and life is essentially affective in character. "A person consists of desires,"[12] of which three—the desire for wealth (*vittaisanā*), for wife (*dāraisanā*), and for the world (*lokaisanā*)—are prominent. All our intellectual and volitional activities are mostly devoted to the realization of these three desires, and center round a point of reference. This point of reference with its assemblage of functions constitutes the ego, and the general tone which it conveys to the organism is called *ahamkāra* (egoism). During the earlier stages of life man has more of this egoism than altruism, and he is called *ekaja* (once-born). Man at a higher level, which he reaches through education and social discipline, is called *dvija* (twice-born). It is in the twice-born that the moral personality takes a definite shape. It consists in the formation of a character out of the raw material of nature. It is only by gathering the diverse elements of nature and disposition into the unity of personality that man becomes truly man. If morality consists in the organization of the diverse factors of life, a proper understanding of it involves a knowledge of the place of (*a*) affection, (*b*) reason, and (*c*) will, in life.

[11] What the *Brhad Vishnu Purāna* says is particularly interesting: "Out of the 8,400,000 types of forms through which the soul has to pass, 2,000,000 belong to the immovable or minerals and vegetables; 900,000, to aquatic varieties of animals; . . . . as many, to the reptiles or turtles and the worms and insects; 1,000,000, to birds; 3,000,000, to quadrupeds; and 400,000, to anthropoid apes. After passing through these the soul arrives at the human form. In the human stage the soul perfects itself by deeds of merit, gradually develops the inward consciousness which makes the twice-born, and finally attains the birth, wherein the realization of Brahman becomes possible."

[12] *Brhadāranyaka Upanishad* iv. 4. 5. Cf. *Manu* ii. 2–4; "To act solely from a desire for rewards is not laudable, yet freedom from desire is hardly to be found in this world. . . . . Not a single act here appears ever to be done by a man free from desire; for whatever man does, it is due to the impulse of desire."

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a) Feeling occupies an important place in the moral constitution of life. A sound knowledge of the urge of our impulses is necessary for a stable system of ethics. For it is on the rock of feeling that rival schools of moralists have wrecked their systems. The *Cārvākas* lay too exclusive an emphasis on our sensibility rather than on our will and reason. Their philosophy is an argument for the free expression of our passions. They cannot put up with any discipline or organization. All discipline and organization are regarded as the devices of the cunning Brahmin to cheat the mass of mankind. To save mankind from the cunning devices of the priest, they recommend a ceaseless surrender to the impulse of the hour. Their ethics is the negation of will and reason. At the other extreme are the *Jainas* and the *Sāmkhyas,* who give no place to feeling in their scheme of life. They find in desire the root evil of life, and as a measure of escaping from evil and misery, they advocate the annulment of all desires. The absurdity of their position is obvious; the annulment of all desire is not possible unless they desire such an annulment; they cannot kill desire and yet desire. But the more orthodox Hindu schools maintain that mere reason and no feeling makes life empty, and all feeling and no reason makes life blind and aimless. They are therefore opposed to the ethics of sensibility and asceticism alike. *Kāma* is recognized as a dynamic force of life, and without it there would be no action. "Not a single action here appears ever to be done by a man free from desire; for whatever man does is the result of the impulse of desire."[13] Desire is the motive spring of all our actions, and is therefore regarded as a legitimate function of human life (*purusārtha*). This does not mean that unregulated passion is regarded as an ally of moral life; it is, on the other hand, regarded as the enemy of life, and hence we have what is called the *arisadvarga* (the class of six enemies). They are *kāma, krodha, lobha, moha, mada, and mātsarya.* The *kāma* that is recog-

[13] *Manu* ii. 4.

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nized as a *purushārtha* is regulated *kāma*. The author of the *Sukra Nīti* hits off the point when he says: "Do not subject your senses to too much severity, nor be enslaved by them."[14] "The mind of a man is said to be stable when it is not cowed down by anxiety and swollen by pleasure and is free from anger and passion.[15]

Equally important is the place of pleasure in moral life. Unthinking men believe that what they desire is pleasure, and are unconsciously committing the fallacy of psychological hedonism. "They desire the result of good deeds, not the deeds themselves."[16] They confuse the object of an action with the result thereof. The *Cārvāka* is the philosophical exponent of this common-sense attitude. The Sāmkhya philosopher goes to the other extreme when he says that the good is devoid of all feeling tone. Once again, the point of view of the strictly orthodox philosophers is more true to psychology. According to them, an end must be attractive if it is to move one to action. Unless the end is pleasing, one is not moved to action. Pleasure is therefore regarded as a moment in moral life, and its absence in life is looked upon as an abnormality. The good is therefore regarded as that which gives happiness,[17] and Manu rejects as unnatural the duty that does not lead to happiness.[18]

b) If *Kāma* is the stuff of life, *chitta* (volition) and *buddhi* (intellect) are the regulative and organizing principles of life. It is because man has intelligence and will that he is capable of being moral.

The first step in the organization of our impulses is the

[14] *Sukra Nīti*, Bk. iii, chap. 14, vs. 1.

[15] *Bhagavad-Gita* ii. 56.

[16] *Punyasya phalam icchanti, punyam necchanti mānavāh.*

[17] *Sukhasādhanakāranam dharmam.* Cf. *Sukra Nīti*, chap. 3, vs. 22: *Na sukham ca vinā dharmāt tasmād dharmo paro bhavét.*

[18] *The Laws of Manu* iv. 176: "Abandon the profit and pleasure that are devoid of goodness. And abandon the goodness which is devoid of pleasure and which wounds the feelings of society."

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act of inhibition. A moral life is one of restraint and regulation. An unthinking abandon to the mirth of the moment makes beasts of us all. Often a vivid representation of the pleasure of gratified desire is enough to outweigh many a serious consideration of life. To arrest a vivid image is already to be on the road to morality. Through inhibitory acts like equanimity (*sama*), self-command (*dama*), and self-control (*yama*), man enters upon the first stage of moral life. Though these acts are negative in character, they are regarded as virtues, for the arrest of our turbulent impulses is the first condition of a moral life. The pause puts a person on his guard and affords him an opportunity to consider the pro's and con's of a particular course of action before he undertakes a more positively moral course (*niyama*). He can weigh his larger and more abiding good with his immediate and passing pleasure in the scale of reflexion (*manana*).

It is here that reason actively enters into the constitution of our moral life. The function of reason in moral life is one of auto-criticism. To think out the consequences of alternative courses of action and select appropriate means for realizing the end of moral life is the next step in the organization of our ethical life. To be capable of some conception and imagination is, in most cases, to be able to avoid evil ways. As William James has said: "To sustain a representation, to think, is in short the only moral act." Krishna therefore advises Arjuna, "Knowing that knowledge is greater than mind, strengthen thyself by thyself and slay the foe [desire] which takes forms at will and is hard to meet."[19] If there is no reflection, the desires often bore through our good resolutions. "By controlling one's thoughts and acting with reflection no such desires can arise and disturb us.[20] But one must beware lest too much reflection lead to indecision and inaction. The *Bhagavad-Gita* draws our attention to this when it says: "Irreso-

[19] *Bhagavad-Gita* iii. 43.

[20] *Dhammapada.*

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lute men entertain endless thoughts and do not do any definite work."[21]

c) Though deliberation gives a certain direction to a moral act, what completes it is decision. It is the act of choice that lays the final stamp on our moral life; it constitutes character, as, in a sense, the object of choice becomes identical with one's person. As he thinks, so does he speak; as he speaks, so does he do; or, as Vidura says: "As he wills so does he become."[22]

But we must understand that even as one swallow does not make a summer, one act of choice does not make a moral personality. A ceaseless discipline of our thought, word, and deed goes to form a moral character. By habit (*nisarga*) is formed a character which becomes second nature. The difference between habit and nature is that the former is acquired and the latter is innate. But both have casual efficacy. Into our character goes all that we have done, so that at any one moment, as Buddha says: "We are all that we have done." Our actions, though apparently disappearing, remain unperceived and reappear in our efforts as tendencies (*pravrtti*).[23] Our moral personality is aptly likened to a caterpillar which at every point is said to drag itself behind it.[24] It is on the basis of this psychological law of habit that the law of *Karma* (moral causation) is formulated. "As is his desire, so is his will; as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap."[25] As long as man has desire he is bound by the law of moral causation which sets him in the wheel of endless rotation (*anuvrtti*). One can rise above the law of moral causation only through dispassion (*niskāma*).[26] "When a

[21] *Bhagavad-Gita* ii. 41.

[22] *Yadrg icched bhavitum tādrg bhavati purusah* (*Vidura Nīti* 38).

[23] *Dhammapada* i. 1.

[24] *Brh. Upanishad* iv. 4. 3.

[25] *Brh. Upanishad* iv. 4. 5.

[26] *Nyāya-Sūtra* iv. 1. 14: "The activity of one who has got over *klesa* does not involve one in *karma*."

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man's deeds are performed without covetousness, then, in as much as covetousness is gone, these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree, and become non-existent and are not liable to spring up again in future."[27] Hence does the Upanishad enjoin: "Enjoy through renunciation, do not covet."[28] "Action through dispassion is called *nivrtti;* pursuing this one goes beyond the effects of elements."[29] The life of *nivrtti* is a life of perfect freedom, and is far different from the life of *pravrtti,* which all of us are accustomed to live. It does not fall within the province of modern European ethics. In fact, it begins where European ethics ends.

2. *Principle of Dynamic Relativity.*—Between the ideal of *nivrtti* and man's actual nature there lies a huge gulf. The very height of the ideal which the Hindus have set before themselves has made a static and stereotyped life impossible. The moral life has been to them one of continuous ascent and of self-transcendence. We have continuously to rise on the stepping stones of our dead selves before we reach our abiding self. The moral life must be not merely dynamic, but also relative to the divergent conditions in which human beings live. In working out the ideal concretely the Hindus have taken into consideration the divergent facts of birth, social position, age, and even sex. They have prescribed different duties to persons working under different conditions, and at the same time they have held before them all the highest ideal for which they must continuously strive. The ideal is dynamic and at the same time relative. The principle of dynamic relativity is at the basis of the Hindu *varnāsramadharma.*[30] It is a scaffolding built to make ascent to the ideal of *nivrtti* possible.

[27] Warren's *Buddhism in Translations,* pp. 216–17.

[28] *Isa Upanishad* i.: *Tyaktna bhuñjītā mā grdhah kasya svid dhanam.*

[29] *Manu* xii. 89–90.

[30] Maryadam sthapayamasa yathanyayam yathagunam varnanam asramanām ca dharmam dharmabhrtām vara (*Mārkandéya Purāna*).

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a) The Asramas.—In view of the height of the ideal, life has been divided into four stages. The four stages are placed at the four turning-points of life, and mark, as it were, the four psychological moments of life. With each stage begins a certain kind of sacrifice. The first stage of sacrifice begins with *brahmacarya* (initiation). At this stage man is said to have his second birth.[31] The life of the student is devoted to the development of his individual self. The amount of sacrifice involved in this stage is not great. But the second stage of life, the life of *grhastha* (householder) is one of great sacrifices and responsibilities. Here man is not single, but double—nay, multiple.[32] This marks the distinct emergence of the social self—the bigger self of which our individual self is a part. The birth of the bigger self brings with it added responsibilities. The *grhastha* has to observe the five sacrifices[33] of life, which are so many ways of discharging one's debts to the universe in which he is living. He worships the sages by the recitation of the Vedas; the Gods, by burnt oblations; the manes, by funeral offerings; men, by gifts of food; and the *bhūtas*, by the *bali* offerings. This stage of life—the life of *grhastha*—is regarded as the very source and foundation of all other stages of life and is therefore highly praised by Hindu moralists and particularly by Manu. The life of *grhastha* is that of *pravrtti* (outward evolution), and the ideal that dominates it is that of progress, not that of perfection. The ideal of perfection emerges distinctly at the third stage of life. At this stage a man is said to enter upon his third birth.[34] The sacrifice he has to make here is that of his love of the world. After discharging the five debts and placing the burden of the householder on the shoulders of his son, he retires from the life of competition and enters upon the life of contemplation in order to cultivate an impartial frame of mind. But the greatest

[31] *Dvitīyam mauñjibandhane* (*Manu* ii. 169).

[32] *Manu* ix. 45.

[33] *Manu* iii. 81.

[34] *Trtīyam yajñadīksāyām* (*Manu* ii. 169).

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sacrifice he has to make begins at the stage of *sannyāsa;* it is the love of one's self. This is the last chain that binds him and is the hardest to break. When this ego is killed, the metaphysical self dawns upon him. Here man reaches the roof and crown of his life. All struggles and all strife cease, and there blooms the flower of peace and freedom.

b) *Varna.*—Though duties like harmlessness, honesty, abstention from appropriating others' wealth, purity and self-control, are enjoined by Manu on all four castes, yet over and above this he has felt it necessary to prescribe special duties to persons differing in hereditary qualities and profession. A system of ethics which serves a more serious purpose than that of a mere formal textbook ought to take into consideration individual differences, social and psychological. The same duties that are enjoined upon the teacher cannot be enjoined upon the trader; the duties prescribed to one who serves in the army cannot be prescribed to one who serves in a factory or on a farm. It is this principle of relativity that is at the basis of the Hindu class-morality.[85] There are only four classes of people—the Brahmins, the *Ksatriyas,* the *Vaisyas,* and the *Sūdras*—and there is no fifth class either according to the Vedas or according to Manu.[86] These distinctions, the *Mahābhārata* explains, arose as the result of differences in the deeds of men. "Those in whom restlessness, (*rajas*) loves and hates, and capacities for enjoyments and daring adventures prevailed turned from white to red, and became *Ksatriyas.* Those in whom *tamas* (darkness) appeared, and who clung to cattle and kind and land, became yellow, and *Vaisyas.* The rest, who loved killing and lying and grew avaricious and full of desires, became *Sūdras.*" These classes are not in any way peculiar to Indian society, though they are only distinctively recognized by Indian social philosophers. As J. S. Mackenzie well observes:

[85] Cf. W. Robinson, "Theory of Morals on a Class Basis," *International Journal of Ethics,* XXIX, 317.

[86] *Manu* x. 4.

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In any large group there are several distinguishable aspects. Especially in the life of a nation it seems possible to make a clear distinction between three important forms of activity—the cultural, the economic, and the legal, or political. They form the basis for the three higher castes in India and to some extent for the classes of freemen in Plato's *Republic,* and they are commonly recognized in Germany as the *Lehrstand,* the *Wehrstand,* and the *Nährstand.* The cultural aspect is generally regarded as the highest, and the economic as the lowest.[37]

But these differences which are due to heredity (*yoni*) can be overcome by *tapas* (penance) and *srautam* (good conduct). Even as man degenerates by his deeds, he regenerates himself by his good deeds. A *Sūdra* in whom the moral personality is hardly developed may by penance (*tapas*) attain to the highest spirituality. Similarly, a Brahmin, though highly endowed, may, by misuse of his abilities, degenerate into a *meeccha.* Manu recognizes the possibility of regeneration in caste.[38] There are many cases in Indian history of persons of a lower caste developing into a higher caste. Though in the majority of cases birth determined caste; where doubt arose it was decided on the basis of *sīla* (conduct). Speaking of a stage of society like that of India of today, where much degeneration in caste has set in owing to sexual immorality and blamable marriages, the *Mahābhārata* says: "Neither birth, nor sacrament, nor study nor ancestry can decide whether a person is twice-born. Character and conduct alone can decide."[39] "The external mark [of the order] is not the cause of character. It is the fruit of the *kataka* tree [clearing nut] that makes water clear, not its mere name."[40] Where the caste of the father and the mother could be surely detected, Manu lays down elaborate rules to determine the caste of children born of such parents. He even legalizes marriages between different castes, though he does not consider them to be the best.[41]

[37] J. S. Mackenzie, "Present Outlook on Social Philosophy," *Journal of Philosophical Studies* (January, 1926), p. 63.

[38] *Manu* x. 42, 127–28; ix. 335.

[39] *Vana-parva* cccxii. 106–8.

[40] *Manu* vi. 66–67.

[41] *Manu* iii. 39–42.

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c) The Hindu Dharma is not only based on *Asrama* and *Varna,* it is based on conditions of age, health, religion, time, place, and circumstance.[42] Accordingly, we have various distinctions in *dharma* such as *Nityadharma, Naimittikadharma, Desadharma, Samājadharma,* and so on. The *Nityadharma* refers to our daily duties. When and where one fails in doing them, one is expected to perform what are called casual duties (*naimittikakarma*). Rules of life devised to adapt one's self to conditions of age, of locality, season, society, and cycles constitute *vayodharma, desadharma, kāladharma, samājadharma,* and *yugadharma,* into which we do not propose to go any further in this paper.

The foregoing facts force upon us the conclusion that the Hindu *dharma* is neither illogical nor antisocial nor lacking in any philosophic foundation, as Professor Mackenzie has tried to make out in his book on Hindu ethics.[43] The ideal of Hindu life is nothing if it is not founded in philosophy and fact. It is set to the realization of the individual self, the social self, and the metaphysical self, and is, at every turn, based on psychological, sociological, and metaphysical principles. Nor is the moral consciousness of the Hindu feeble. He speaks with the fervor of Kant when he says that all else is momentary and not desirable for its own sake except the good will.[44] It may be that the ideal of *nivrtti* looks rather too high and too ascetic for the European moralist, who is not accustomed to rise higher than the merely social condition; but it is certainly not antisocial. On the other hand, the social order has much to gain by the influence of those who follow the path of *nivrtti.* Whenever social and moral disorder set in, the superman—

[42] "Manu has declared the peculiar laws of countries, castes, and families in the absence of rules of revealed texts" (*Vasistha* 1–17). See Manu vii. 203; viii. 41.

[43] *Hindu Ethics,* pp. 38, 241. Cf. also, Farquhar (*Hibbert Journal* [October, 1921], p. 24): "There is practically no ethical philosophy within the frontier of Hindu thinking."

[44] *Cānakya Nīti,* chaps. 5–21: "Wealth and life are transitory. In this ephemeral world virtue alone is permanent." Cf. also, Yudhisthira in his exile, addressing his queen, says: "I follow *dharma* not because I see any immediate profit, but because I am convinced that virtue is to be followed for its own sake."

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for such is the *nivrtta*—has been the sure guide of social man. In fact, the whole of the Indian social and moral organization —its laws and its religion—we owe to the genius of the superman. The ideal of Plato that philosophers should be kings has, in a way, been realized in India. Though the *sannyāsis* did not wield the regal power, yet the earthly kings were guided by the wise words of the recluse. If India is at present thrown into a moral, social, and political chaos, it is because the influence of the *sannyāsi* on human life has grown weak. If India should get regeneration, it would be only through its supermen. The fact that society has much to gain through the help of its supermen is being felt by a few philosophers even in the West.[45]

Nor is moral life commensurate with the life of *nivrtti*. The life of *nivrtti* occupies only a corner of life. In fact, the larger part of life is really social life. Life in society is enjoined upon one and all. Says Manu: "Only he who passes through all the stages, one after another, controlling his senses, offering up his energies to the fires of sacrifice, exhausting his vital powers in the helping of others, he only rejoices evermore."[46] "Not without discharging them [the debts of life] in full may he desire liberation. If he does so aspire upwards, before his time, he will fall deeper into matter." Though ascetic ideals have sometimes been emphasized, the rule of orthodox Hindu tradition is: "In the midst of activity alone wilt thou desire to live a hundred years."[47] "Inactivity is not freedom; renunciation leads not to perfection."[48] "There is no penance greater than a life of truth; good nature is the greatest strength."[49] "Drive away greed; practice forgiveness; hate that which is evil; speak the truth; tread in the

[45] See my article, "Where European and Indian Philosophy Touch," *Quest*, January, 1926.

[46] *Manu* vi. 34.

[47] *Isā Upanishad* 2.

[48] *Bhagavad-Gita*, chap. iii, vs. 4.

[49] *Bhartrhari* 79. Cf. *Sukra Nīti*, chap. iii, vss. 8–9.

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footsteps of great men, serve the learned; honour the noble-minded; treat kindly even those that are your enemies; protect fame; feel compassion for the downtrodden." These and similar words of *nīti* characterize the teaching of the universal textbooks of ethics of the Hindus.

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BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM

C. JUDSON HERRICK

The numerous attempts, old and new, to carry biological formulations and analogies over into the realm of human personal and social problems have not always clarified the latter. The slogan *Biologie ist heute Alles* requires some qualification or else a stretching of the limits of the biological field beyond what most biologists would claim.

There is, however, a growing demand for an attack upon problems of human behavior by the methods of natural science—observation, experiment, and the formulation of empirically determined rules of uniform, orderly, and verifiable natural process. Within their limitations these methods, faithfully followed, are sure to yield results of value.

Human nature can be studied by the methods of natural science in so far as the data employed are natural events inhering in a unitary system of orderly cause-and-effect sequences. The disruption of such a unitary system by the admission of uncaused action, of mystical factors, or of metaphysical absolutes or sanctions violates the scientific method as commonly defined by experts in this field.

It is of interest, accordingly, to ask how far it is profitable to push the inquiry into problems of human behavior with the ordinary methods of natural science. The natural order is regarded by most scientific investigators as deterministic. Human conduct is commonly regarded as in some respects free. The natural history of man is therefore confronted at the outset with a hoary problem which must be clarified before we can fix the limits of the inquiry. Is it possible so to define determinism and freedom as to conform with current scientific and popular usage and at the same time clarify the most acute

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problems of human conduct—self-control, self-determination, self-culture, social control, social culture, personal and social morality?

This is not a matter of academic interest merely. We are all concerned with it practically. And the writer, as a student of the nervous system, cannot evade it when confronted with the question, What do we do with our brains?

The usual biological descriptions rest on the assumption that the behavior of all living bodies, including human bodies, so far as known scientifically, follows in causally determined sequences. Most biologists are not interested in the metaphysics of causality. Practically, they have adopted an empirical doctrine of cause (without attempting rigorous definition) which amounts to observed uniformity of orderly change in the relations of matter and energy. By uncaused action they generally mean events which do not articulate in a unitary system of such orderly processes.

The naturalist characterizes the causal sequence as mechanistic or deterministic. The operations of inorganic and living mechanisms have been seen to go on in orderly ways. When the empirically determined rules or laws of this order are properly formulated they can be extended backward and forward to embrace events which have not been observed, and subsequent observations are found to conform with them.

What is meant by determinism in science is harder to explain, for there is apt to be a metaphysical implication concealed in it somewhere. Empirically it certainly does not involve predeterminism in the theological sense of foreordination or in the biological sense of preformation.

All growth and all evolution are genuinely creative processes. New structures and new modes of behavior appear at every turn. These are not made out of nothing, nor are they merely unfolded ready-made. Old stuff is worked over into new patterns, all in orderly or lawful sequence. When we say

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the new organ and its new function are causally determined, all that we mean empirically is that they occupy an assignable and verifiable place in an observable orderly sequence of natural events. This may be naïve philosophically, but practically it is adequate for scientific description and reasoning.

Every new event in the natural order is in this sense a result of previous events. It is also a cause of subsequent events. The new event determines the next step in the same sense in which it was determined. It is a determining agent in the sense that the succeeding history would have been different if it were not there, and in this sense it is a necessary component of this particular causal sequence. A new causal factor enters at every change. This again is empirically founded.

Thus we find in our biological analysis of causally determined behavior that our mechanistic determinism is resolved into a progressive determining. This process is orderly, lawful, and involves no interruption of natural causal sequences as biologists generally view them. Let us now inquire what we mean in ordinary speech by freedom.

The word "free" is popularly used in two different ways which are often confused. First it is applied to inorganic and simpler vital activities where a thing or a process with specific organization is able to exhibit the behavior characteristic of, or typical for, that organization in an appropriate environment. This *natural freedom* is illustrated by a freely flowing stream, "free air" at a garage, a freely twining tendril, the free flight of a bird. Such freedom must be defined in each particular case with reference to the specific factor of the behavior complex whose typical manifestation is in question. It may be impaired or abolished by defective (atypical) internal organization or by inappropriate (atypical) environing conditions. If a thing is free from a monetary standpoint a charge cannot be made for it. A caged bird is not free to fly. An imbecile is not free to become a successful engineer. An imprisoned highwayman is not free to practice his former vocation.

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Second, the word "free" is sometimes applied to human conduct with the seeming implication that the acts in question are absolutely self-determined independently of natural causal sequences, as "a free choice," "a free moral agent." This *mystical freedom,* in so far as it implies capricious, lawless, or uncaused action, cannot be articulated with a naturalistic system as this is defined in current scientific usage.

This inquiry is directed exclusively to natural freedom as exhibited in human conduct, with the aim of evaluating, by the method of natural science, its characteristics, its limitations, and its practical significance in personal and social adjustments.

Political freedom is obviously natural freedom as just defined. A political unit is free in so far as the normal activities of the people and their social evolution are not obstructed by government arbitrarily imposed upon them from without their own organization, even though the activities which they regard as normal or typical for the group are regulated by civil, criminal, and international laws. Political freedom develops within a system of political laws just as natural freedom everywhere operates within the realm of natural laws.

The efficacy of this freedom in all of these cases is commensurate with the smoothness of the adjustment of internal processes to environmental agencies, all in orderly or lawful sequences. Its value depends on the pattern of the organization and the setting or total situation within which it operates. The pattern of the adjustment in every case is dependent upon the complex of internal and external factors at the moment operative. Our interest here centers in the internal factors, for these, in higher animals, play a very special part in the control of behavior. The larger and better the internal apparatus of control of behavior the more diversified is the behavior and the larger the scope of the natural freedom when this behavior comes to its fullest expression.

Knowledge of the internal organization or the inner na-

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ture of man is the foundation upon which our estimate of the scope and significance of his natural freedom must be based.

The inner nature of a man at any moment has been determined by his hereditary endowments, by the environment within which he has lived, and by his own past reactions to environing influences. This is a matter of protoplasmic organization, and his conduct at this moment is the natural expression of that organization. The range of his natural freedom of action is determined by that organization and by the external circumstances at the moment prevailing. This is the causal complex which determines the present act. And the present act in its turn enters into the causal complex as an additional factor in determining the next succeeding act. This means that the protoplasmic organization is modified by the performance of the present act and by each succeeding act. The inner nature changes from day to day and hence the pattern of his natural freedom is in constant flux.

Biologists generally assume that consciousness (some sort of awareness) is a natural function of a specific pattern of bodily organization. The evidence for this belief is biologically adequate and is of exactly the same sort as is the evidence for the collocation of any other function and its organ. Thinking is a function of the human body (and particularly of the cerebral cortex) in just the same sense that flying is a function of the bird's body (and particularly of the wings). When thinking goes on there is protoplasmic activity just as truly as when flying goes on. Of this there is no doubt, though the internal activities and the organs employed are as different in the two cases as are the functions themselves.

When, therefore, we speak of conscious processes it must always be borne in mind that our awareness during feeling, thinking, willing, etc., is only one manifestation of a very complex organic process, just as flying is related with a multitude of internal processes not immediately evident to the observer.

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We do not know all about these internal processes in either case, and when we say "the bird flies and the man thinks," the known and unknown related internal protoplasmic activities are implicit in the statement in both cases. This must be kept in mind throughout the following discussion.

Thinking, as a natural function of the body, is knit in with the causal sequences of the vital process in just the same way as are the other protoplasmic activities. The function which I know introspectively as thinking would appear to another observer as protoplasmic activities of very complex sorts, provided he had adequate technique to observe all that is going on in my body.[1] This function, including all the factors of external stimulation, physiologically demonstrable bodily processes, and subjective experience, is the natural result of previous natural events. It is also a natural cause of succeeding events, of which some may be experienced subjectively, some are objectively demonstrable physiological activities, and some are events in the outside environment.

Common observation and the most critical unprejudiced scientific analysis agree that mental acts (thoughts, emotions, volitions, and the like) are causative factors in determining human conduct. The only way in which this observation can be articulated with the natural system in which the remainder of our vital processes inhere, is by the recognition that these acts are not disembodied functions. Even in those cases where we do not know the whole of the process, where we are quite ignorant of the organs involved and their physiologically de-

[1] As this statement stands it might be interpreted by some as an admission of their claim that a complete objective account of the bodily process exhausts the description of the situation in thinking. But this I do not grant, for the other observer of my thinking is incapable of experiencing the awareness which I experience. His "complete objective account" of the process does not and cannot express the whole of the situation. It is still incomplete, for my experience includes an awareness component from which he is debarred by the nature of things. The experienced character of subjectivity is just this solipsistic quality. As we are constituted this is the way we experience. I do not understand this. I accept it as a datum of experience.

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monstrable functions, we must assume that the mental process, which we do know, has its structural and physiological correlates, and that the process as a whole (including both its known and unknown components) is an integral part of the natural causal sequence which constitutes my life. With this understanding of the full significance of the terms employed we may say that the biological evidence demands that we regard conscious experience as a part of the vital process, as a true protoplasmic function, and, with the colligated structural changes in the nervous system (whether known or unknown), as a causative factor in human behavior.

As Dean Woodbridge has said to me, "We men are genuine factors in determining what the order of natural events is, and without us that order would be obviously different." Orion, Vesuvius, the Charter Oak, Pithecanthropus, and Julius Caesar—all the things and events designated by these words have shared in determining the present order of nature. And Julius Caesar's thinking was certainly no negligible component of his share.

Human thinking employs language and other symbols in the formulation of generalizations from experience and laws of nature. These laws express uniformities of experience which we call causal sequences. The experienced uniformity of these sequences justifies their extension into the future as well as the past, and so permits prediction of future events. The ability of mankind to do this is a natural function of the distinctively human organization of the nervous system; it is a component of the inner nature of man.

The man possesses the power of foresight; he can imagine the future consequences of a contemplated act; and he can judge what results will probably follow from the performance of each one of several ways of reacting to a present situation, all of which appear to be physically practicable. In the light of this prevision of the probable consequences of each of the

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contemplated acts a selection is made of some one of them. This is conscious choice and the intelligent selection made is a significant factor in the causal complex whose result is the performance of the course of action decided upon.

If it is objected here that the "intelligent selection made" implies a break in the natural causal sequence and some sort of an unnatural or mystical intervention, we can only remind the reader that this sort of "mystical freedom" was excluded at the beginning of our discussion, and if he insists upon injecting it at this point it will be impossible to follow the succeeding argument. Human choice is causally conditioned as truly as is that of a magnet when it "selects" iron filings from sawdust. But the human organism selects on a different basis and with a different mechanism. Of this structural mechanism we have inadequate knowledge, but the fact that a choice is made is objectively manifest. And we have some very characteristic subjective experience during its exercise which we can recognize and evaluate scientifically. There is no more ground for regarding this process of selection as magical than there is in the case of the magnetic selection of iron.

The belief that any one of several courses of action may be chosen is also a factor in the causal complex resulting in the behavior finally exhibited. In so far as this factor is operative, belief in freedom is a real component of the behavior, even though it should prove on subsequent analysis that the grounds for the belief are partially or wholly fallacious. On this view of the situation it is evident that judgments which have been reached, whether by valid or faulty logical processes, may be real causes of subsequent action.

A mental process—deliberation, choice, purpose, volition, emotion, with the related changes in the structural organization of the nervous system—is in its entirety a natural causal sequence. It is a determining factor in the same sense as are tropism and reflex. The only way in which these most signifi-

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cant components of human behavior can be recognized and evaluated scientifically is to regard them as functions of an organization of whose structure and mode of operation we have as yet very inadequate objective knowledge. For the enlargement of this knowledge we are striving; it is probably not an insoluble problem.

Intelligently directed choice seems to be a distinctively human attribute. Its possession, more than anything else, marks the difference between man and brute. And yet it involves no appeal to mystical or metaphysical entities. It is a natural function of the human type of body.

Knowledge of natural laws and how to use them forms the basis of the material advancement of human civilization. The accumulation of this knowledge in oral and written tradition and its application through systematic education as a means of social control have enriched the inner nature of man and thereby tremendously enlarged the scope of his natural freedom. The educated man in an appropriate physical and social environment is free to express his inner nature in ways that no brute can do. He is not free to disregard that nature of which he is part, but in conformity with natural laws he is free to exert a large measure of control over his inorganic, organic, and social environment. He exercises this control over his environment in conformity with natural laws just as truly as do beavers when they dam a stream, corals when they build a fringing reef, or rivers when they lay down their deltas, but the laws are different in all of these cases.

The exercise of any vital function may leave the internal organization in a different set or configuration from what it was before. Muscles are enlarged and strengthened by use. The inner nature of man changes from day to day. His cerebral cortex is the part of the body most susceptible to change in internal configuration through such personal experience. This is the organic basis of memory. And this too is a lawful process.

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After I have "made up my mind" to do a thing my mind is a different mind from what it was before, and my body is a different body. The pattern of this performance has behavioristic significance of radically different sort from that observed in a tropism or other unconscious impulse. We human beings have created a new type of behavior when we acquire the capacity to make conscious choices as contrasted with simpler unconscious discriminative reactions.

Intelligent people can foresee dimly or clearly the enduring effects of present conduct upon human internal organization, upon character. Intelligently formulated educational programs are based upon this principle. This is part of the apparatus of social control. In accordance with the same principle the individual can foresee the effects of present choices and decisions upon his own future development. He can purposefully engage in character-building. An ideal of personal, social, or moral attainment may be set up and he may so direct the course of his life as to favor growth toward this ideal—it may be athletic skill, art, wealth, professional attainments, or altruistic service. The ideal thus imagined is a natural product of his organization at the moment when it is formulated. It (and the related changes in cerebral texture) is also a true causative factor in determining his subsequent behavior. This act is a moral choice as this term is popularly used, whether or no it is made in view of clearly recognized ethical or religious motives, and without any necessary implication of uncaused action.

The "free agent" who makes such choices and fabricates such ideals is exercising his natural freedom, not only to express his present inner nature but also to change this inner nature so as to conform it to some new pattern. This is all that we mean by human freedom in common usage if the mystical concept of uncaused action is excluded.

The radical determinism at which we have now arrived puts all of human nature—including human thinking, senti-

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ment, choice, purpose, will, idealization, aspiration, hope, and satisfaction—into its place in the larger frame of natural events. It can be investigated and evaluated by the method of natural science as rapidly as adequate scientific technique is elaborated.

The natural freedom of man, which carries with it no implication of uncaused action or other mystical qualities, conforms to the definition with which we started: it means that the human being, with a specific organization which has grown to be what it is by natural processes, is able to exhibit the behavior characteristic of, or typical for, that organization when living in an appropriate environment. This is the natural expression of his inner nature.

What sets off human freedom in some of its manifestations from other kinds of natural freedom is the immeasurable difference between the inner nature of man and that of all other natural objects. The being who has some awareness of what is going on is certainly to that extent different from one who has no such awareness, even though the activities of both are carried through in orderly cause-and-effect sequences. And the awareness (with the related structural changes), if it be a natural event, cannot be neglected in an examination of the causal sequence, even though we may still be ignorant of its structural correlate, for the awareness itself is a datum of experience.

When the awareness (again with its related structural changes) envisages the future, this prevision becomes a factor in shaping present conduct, and when it envisages an as yet unattained ideal of personal character with an affective component of desire or aversion it may become a factor in the causal complex which results in what we call a free moral choice. This choice is certainly free in the naturalistic sense in which we have used the word. It is the natural expression of the inner nature at the moment of its exercise.

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The insect exhibits natural freedom as we have defined it when it behaves tropistically or reflexly. The dog exhibits a larger freedom of the same sort when he behaves intelligently. The man, when he behaves purposefully, has still larger freedom, for the factors upon which his behavior is contingent here include possible future events as well as actual past and present events. This enlarged freedom puts in his hand tremendously more effective control of his environment and of his own personal career. As soon as this control envisages social factors and the relation of self-determination to social determination, of self-control to social control, and of personal ideals to social ideals and sanctions, we call the natural freedom of this level of organization "moral freedom."

This moral freedom is still a natural process. Its exercise is one of the determining factors of human conduct. The contingencies as they arise are not chance happenings; they are not capricious, or disorderly, or lawless; they are not interventions disrupting natural causal sequences from some unnatural or supernatural realm. But the freedom to choose a given course of conduct from out of a *repertoire* of several contemplated acts, all of which seem to be practicable so far as determined by external conditions—the freedom to do this thing in view of internally determined conscious processes with the mechanism of wish, purpose, prevision and social accountability—this freedom is an incalculably bigger and better thing than any other natural process known on our planet. And its value is by no means destroyed by frank recognition that it is a deterministic process in the naturalistic sense already explained.

As a human being my natural freedom is enlarged to embrace capacity to do more things with my body than any brute can do, for I can supplement my bodily organs with tools; capacity to do more things with my mind, for I have powers of reason, judgment, imagination, appreciation, and sentiment,

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which they lack; and, finally, capacity deliberately and purposefully to strengthen and enlarge these abilities by intelligently directed effort, and to mold my own personality and character by fabrication of ideals and aspirations.

The mechanism of this freedom is profoundly different from those of the free movements of inorganic and simpler living bodies. Its biological and social significance is clearly different. Its personal significance is different. Let us examine the last point.

The conscious personality not only takes intellectual cognizance of certain of the events which are going on in his world; he also has satisfactions and dissatisfactions related with this knowledge. And here we may find a key which will open the door looking into the wider vistas of human personal freedom.

These satisfactions, too, are natural functions of our bodies. And they are the functions that make the life of a self-conscious personality worth while to him. While he is consciously participating in the orderly processes which constitute his life he experiences a joy of living, of striving and succeeding. And even beyond this he has satisfaction in his unrealized hopes, his ideals, and idealizations.

All living is a creative process in that old materials are fabricated in new patterns, and in organic evolution some of these patterns are preserved and from them ever new designs are constructed. Progressive organic evolution, that is, the unfolding and elaboration of the inner nature of the living substance in lawful patterns, is a natural causal sequence. It is creative. New organic patterns appear at every turn of the evolutionary process. These new patterns are designed and fabricated by orderly intrinsic forces reacting to a particular system of environing energies. The process in its entirety is an expression of natural freedom.

Now, in human evolution and in the personal development

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of every human individual similar natural causal sequences are manifest, though the patterns of the performance are more varied, more colorful, and of vastly greater significance in determining subsequent events. The fact that in the case of the man there is some awareness of what is going on is by no means a negligible epiphenomenon; for, as we have seen, this awareness is itself a causative factor in the process. We act in view of possible future contingencies; that is, possible results of future action become causative factors in determining present action. This too is a creative process.

The creative value of this ability to choose, and especially of this ability when exercised in its highest sphere, that of social and moral sanctions, is as much greater and better than the most complex reflex functions as human nature is better than brute nature, as altruistic behavior is better than animal greed.

Having attained the apparatus of human organization, including social organization, natural freedom becomes moral freedom without loss of its natural character. The pattern of change in behavior sequences has become so enlarged as to include consciously directed alteration of the reacting personality in directions set by ideals imagined and purposely striven for. In short, the creative pattern here is self-culture and character-building.

When man can consciously and purposefully participate in the fabrication of his own personality he has become, not a little lower than the angels, but a creator worthy of a place in any pantheon of divinities ever conceived by the human mind. And this he can do and does do in an orderly fashion as part of the natural world in which he lives.

We naturalists have certain satisfactions in standing at the sidelines and watching the orderly progress of the ever changing vital panorama. We crave an insight into the mechanism and meaning of creative evolution. We can view the

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pageantry of the march of human civilization from the outside as an event in our objective world, as a part of the larger process of cosmic evolution. As self-conscious individuals we also have a narrower and very different view of some phases of the process from the inside of the evolving mechanism. We have direct introspective experience of some parts of the process of creative living. And this view opens up satisfactions of very different sort from those which we enjoy as spectators merely in our rôles of biological investigators of objective process. We are marching in the procession and we are so fortunately circumstanced that we can view it now as a participant and again as a spectator from the outside. We do not get the same view from the two standpoints, and the satisfactions which we experience are, of course, different in the two situations.

All of our movements are orderly as part of the total cosmic pattern of natural sequence. We see something of this pattern and we take delight in it. We know that we are parts of the flowing pattern and we enjoy our rôles, however humble. It is good to be alive, and the broader the life, the deeper the satisfactions of life. And as we look backward and forward and see how our lives have been shaped by events of which we ourselves were part, and how our present acts and desires and hopes may share in weaving vital patterns yet to be, the finest human satisfactions come to expression. This is our freedom. It is freedom to live and grow, to know that we do it, and to enjoy this knowledge, to forecast the probable or possible future course of life and of personal development, and consciously to participate in the control of the future development. This natural freedom is real and in it we take satisfaction.

Our feeling of freedom is one of our greatest satisfactions. This feeling arises naturally during the free expression of our vital functions by reason of conscious participation in the per-

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formance of these functions. Most of us do not analyze this feeling of freedom, but we enjoy its exercise. And the belief in freedom, as we have seen, is at times a potent causative factor in determining a course of action. If one attempts to find a rational justification for this belief, his judgment may be true or faulty. The causal efficiency of the belief remains in either case as long as the feeling of freedom endures.

Free choice is a creative function in the same sense that biological growth is creative. It employs a vastly more complex mechanism, and its consequences are correspondingly more far-reaching. What is created here is personality, character, and social norms. Failure to cultivate and strengthen this function, its atrophy from disuse or its distortion from adherence to false standards of conduct (whether these are derived from faulty environment or are deliberately cherished by the person himself), such defective components of moral culture result in deterioration of the growing character as surely as analogous defects in nutrition and hygiene result in deterioration of the growing physique. This is not theory. It is fact attested by the sum of human experience.

In the preceding pages the attempt has been made to evaluate human freedom in terms of the common meaning of the word in so far as this can be done within the limits set by the methods of natural science. This naturalistic treatment requires that the concept of uncaused action and all metaphysical categories, absolutes, and sanctions be rigorously excluded. Such limited freedom will not be acceptable to those who demand the divine privilege of creating something out of nothing, or of choosing to which of the laws of nature they will conform their actions. The people who lay claim to such powers have difficulty in making good in practice. But natural freedom as here defined meets every practical need; and it embraces the noblest human capacities and satisfactions.

This is really a glorious vision. For natural freedom on

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the human plane makes us as gods, knowing good and evil, enjoying the good, fearing the evil, consciously shaping conduct and character and so creating new ideals of personal and social welfare. There is satisfaction in good achieved, in ideals approximated, in progress recognized, in hope entertained. These are all natural functions of our bodies. And the fact that we are free to perform these functions, which are denied to the brutes, makes of human freedom to live, to grow, and consciously to participate in shaping human life and evolution a supernal achievement. This freedom carries with it the highest human satisfactions. It is worth the price that mankind at his best has always been willing to pay for his freedom.

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THE DOCTRINE OF NON-RESISTANCE AND ITS ANTITHESIS

H. LANZ

The controversy indicated in the title of this paper is very old. Briefly stated it is concerned with the rightfulness of using violence in defense of what seems good. The advocates of non-resistance contest this, arguing that violence is always evil, and that it is never good to produce evil. Their opponents, on the other hand, maintain that without practicing violence we cannot live, that complete abstention from violence in any form would bring about the complete collapse of socially organized life. In this controversy, as, it seems to me, in all ethical problems, we have to distinguish two elements: (1) The rational element of proof, since both parties are trying to prove their point of view by reasonable arguments; (2) The emotional element of will-preference which makes us sympathize with one particular solution without regard to any argument. This latter element I shall call impulse.

The rational aspect of the controversy may be conveniently expressed in form of a dialectical process.

THESIS: PHILOSOPHY OF SANITY AND SAFETY

The doctrine of non-resistance is altogether impractical, immoral, and logically absurd. The advocates of that doctrine tell us we should not resist evil by evil. If one strikes you on one cheek, turn him the other; if one takes away your cloak, give him your coat also. Sentiments so beautiful may well seem very enlightening to those who never expect to be struck upon the cheek, and believe that if they are robbed of their cloak the police will find it and punish the thief. But if one takes such teaching seriously and tries, perchance, to put it into practice, one will soon find the precept contrary to one's conscience. It may be true, perhaps, if I am struck upon the

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cheek, I may try to turn the other, whereupon my assailant will most probably strike me again. But if I see a brute abusing a child, or a negro attacking a white woman, is it not my plainest duty to interfere, and use all the means in my power including plain physical violence, to prevent the outrage? Is it on any theory whatsoever advisable to let criminals run away from their prisons?

Practicing non-resistance would certainly ruin our social life. Society cannot live without practicing violence. We must protect our property; which means that we must maintain courts and police to capture thieves and bring them to justice. We must protect our liberty; that is, we must have some machinery of violence to enforce that degree of social order which alone assures our safety and our liberty. We are bound to protect our country; that is, we must maintain a powerful army and navy to defend our civilization.

And after all, the principle of non-resistance, if actually carried out in practice, would destroy itself, turning automatically into its opposite. Imagine an anarchistic society that had no courts, maintained no armies, and inflicted no punishment on anybody. For its existence a perfect absence of evil would be required. Otherwise it could not exist, as any infinitesimal amount of evil would in the long run destroy it. But if there were no evil, there would be nothing against which the principle of non-resistance could be practiced. Angels in paradise could never comprehend this strange platitude of human prophets. In real life such a society would soon become a society of happy babes having no conflicts, no troubles save those inflicted upon them by nature. It is well known, however, that conditions of relatively perfect happiness are highly unfavorable to the development of moral sentiment. People living under such conditions soon lose all sense of responsibility and suffering, and soon become all but perfect egoists. In other words, the principle of non-resistance, being essentially

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a weapon against evil, is bound to lose its validity as soon as its ideal is attained. It brings to pass a highly undesirable state of social contentment and personal smugness. The principle has a relative value only, i.e., it is valid only in so far as its opposite, the practice of violence, exists. Its ideal, however, is absence of violence. Thus in the pursuit of its own ideal it commits logical suicide. Like most truths of radicalism, it has value chiefly in criticism of the opposite point of view. And like most radical truths which come in contact with real life, it proves too uncertain to be relied upon, and easily passes into its opposite. What is more humanely idealistic than the dream of Christ? And what can be more inhumanely atrocious than historic Christianity, with the office of the Holy Inquisition as its climax?

ANTITHESIS: THE THEORY OF NON-RESISTANCE

It is quite useless to discuss an ethical precept apart from the concrete situation that gives it life and meaning. The foregoing illustration of an abused child or an attacked woman is not of the sort that gives life and meaning to the principle of non-resistance. The force of the doctrine lies in a quite different direction. The concrete situation from which the principle historically arises as a problem consists in the fact and the everlasting presence of social violence. There is much social evil that we, owing to traditions and conventions, are accustomed to regard as good. One such evil thing generally regarded as good is, for instance, war. Another is the excess of political power vested in the state. Nearly all prominent advocates of non-resistance have been in conflict with the state. It has been precisely against the state, and by no means against wicked individuals that their propaganda aimed. The theory of non-resistance is primarily a social doctrine; it is supposed to be practiced for the benefit of society, and not for the salvation of one's own soul.

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In this sense the principle of non-resistance is not a personal affair. It does not mean the willingness of an individual to endure private injuries or submit to any extreme of harsh abuse. It is a method of social work. To resist evil means, in this sense, to take no part in functions of the group, or the state, which result in an open or hidden violence. Tolstoy says,

> We are wrong when we say that the Christian doctrine is concerned only with the salvation of the individual and has nothing to do with questions of State. . . . . My personal existence is entangled with that of the State and the State exacts from me an unchristian activity directly contrary to Christ's commands.

The fundamental hypocrisy of so-called Christian civilization consists in relegating non-resistance to the status of a personal affair. We hear so much, especially from the pulpit, about righteous living, spiritual peace, loving our enemies, and the like. We are at least fifty-two times in a year most solemnly urged not to judge, not to condemn. And yet it seldom occurs to the average man that these words may mean something more important than merely refraining from gossip or being polite to those whom we dislike. The serious meaning of these words lies in their social aspect. Judge not, means—according to Tolstoy—"Institute no tribunals for the judgment of your neighbor." Love your enemies, means: "Do not go to war." Having the same social aspect of "loving enemies" in view, George Fox proclaims to the world:

> All bloody principles and practices we utterly deny; with all outward wars and strife, and fighting with outward weapons, for any end, or under any pretence whatsoever; this is our testimony to the whole world.

Much earlier the same principle was advocated by a Bohemian, Peter Chelcicky. He writes,

> God's people should seek God with their whole heart, and preserve truth and affection towards all people, friends or enemies; they should wish or do evil to no one; and if such things are done to them, they should suffer without revenge, returning evil for evil neither to the good nor to the evil.

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In the Middle Ages the doctrine of non-resistance seems to have been much more popular than is generally supposed. The study of medieval heresies suggests this view. The heretic is the radical, the socialist of the Middle Ages. Religion for him is merely a form in which he is accustomed to dress out his social convictions and aspirations. Medieval religious feuds were often caused by such incomprehensible trivialities as, for instance, the number of fingers used in a cross, or the place occupied by Satan before his fall. Such trivialities astonish us. And yet we must not forget that such bewildering theological puzzles as these involved momentous social issues. I have lately studied a certain medieval heresy which originated in Bulgaria in about the tenth century. The members of this sect called themselves Bogomili. By the end of the twelfth century Bogomilism had outgrown the limits of Bulgaria and become a universal European heresy. In the beginning of the thirteenth century all southern Europe, from Spain to the Bosphorus, was bordered with a chain of Bogomil settlements. In different countries these settlements bear different names. In Bulgarian, "bogomil" means a friend of God. In France they were called Albigenses, in Italy, Pararenas. In their teaching and many of their customs they were precursors of protestant Puritanism. In some localities they even called themselves Cathars, i.e., the pure ones, preaching the pure and uncorrupted life of the original Christian communities. They rejected all sacraments, and all ranks in state and in church. They were strict "prohibitionists," and wrote books concerning the origin of wine-making in which it was definitely and reasonably proved that wine-making originated from the devil. One pamphlet suggested that the famous tree of evil, of which Adam and Eve ate the fruit, was not an apple tree, but a pernicious grape-vine. Their guiding principle in life, however, which so greatly irritated the church and civil authorities, was non-resistance. According to the official accounts in the numerous court proceedings against them, they

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"disobeyed the authorities, urged people not to obey the king, and refused to go to war."

But the real origin of the doctrine is still older. All religions have it. China, according to the testimony of Count Keyserling, is the classic land of non-resistance. There is no doubt that the fundamental idea of Taoism is that of non-resistance. Lao Tse advocates non-action as the supreme remedy against all evil. The method, according to him, is all-powerful: "Having arrived at this point of non-action, there is nothing which man cannot do." "A kingdom is made one's own by freedom from action and purpose." He says further, "In a kingdom, the multiplication of prohibitive enactments increases the poverty of the people. The more display there is of legislation, the more thieves and robbers there are." On this ground he recommends his principle of "governing without government." One of the early precepts of Mahomet was the adjuration: "It is good to overcome evil with good, and it is evil to resist evil with evil." And in the Koran we find such statements as this: "If a man strike thee, and in striking drop his staff, pick it up and hand it to him again." This is perhaps even more obliging than our famous turning of the other cheek. Christ's contributions to the doctrine of non-resistance are well known.

On the whole, the arguments for practicing non-resistance may be summarized as follows: The thesis maintains that violence is necessary. Organized society cannot live without practicing violence. We have to protect our property, liberty, and country—the famous triad of the common sense. Quite recently another ideal of social unity has appeared on the stage—civilization. But we have been practicing violence in defense of our property, liberty, and civilization for the last two thousand years, yet evil of almost every kind known to history is hopelessly persistent. We have failed to eradicate evil by violence. Through everlasting violence the history of mankind appears as supreme nonsense. Eighteen hundred

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years ago the Roman Empire in defense of civilization was fighting against Christianity. In that struggle the Roman authorities acted by no means like barbarians. On the contrary they were highly refined people who were quite earnestly concerned with what in those days was indubitably regarded as a serious menace to civilization. The Christians, who could do nothing else, practiced non-resistance. And they won. Soon, however, they followed up their victory by organizing wars against Mohammedans and persecutions against Jews and heretics. This new form of "defending civilization" reached its climax with the institution of Holy Inquisition. The cruelties of the Inquisition, accompanied by an incredible official corruption in the Church, gave rise to a new type of opposition which found its expression in the Protestant movement. In the century-long struggle between Catholics and Protestants both parties used violence. It is wrong to imagine Protestants as suffering and abused, and always in the right. When the Cathedral of Nimes was taken by the Protestants the crowd took the great crucifix from the altar and dragged it through the streets scourging it at every corner.

> In the evening a fire was built in front of the Cathedral, and upon it were thrown the archives of the ecclesiastical bodies, the holy images, the relics of the saints, the decorations of the altar, and the Host itself. All were burned to ashes.

Many Catholics were slain in the disturbance. Protestants, not less than Catholics, knew how to prove their glorious ideals by assassination and pillage. The aristocrats of the time of Louis XIV cut the stomachs of their peasants and warmed their feet in their blood. And a half a century later the peasants paid them back by cutting their throats and hanging them on the street lamps. It was not a matter of individual outrage. On both sides was systematic murder, lasting for scores of years, each new season bringing merely a new form of oppression and violence. The nineteenth century was comparatively quiet, and therefore unreasonably optimistic.

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Out of its apparent quiet arises a new and formidable conflict which may prove to be more dangerous and more disastrous than medieval religious wars. In view of all this the cry of the conscientious objectors of all times and lands becomes more deserving of respect. You may have ideals, they cry out to us; if you would only abstain from fighting in their defense! For thousands of years you have been trying your method of resistance to evil by violence. Now try ours, try the reverse. You have failed to exterminate evil by evil. Now try to exterminate it by good. Does not it appear to you that non-resistance may be the best, perhaps the only, method for accomplishing what during the whole history men have vainly hoped to accomplish through violence?

Thus the validity of the thesis turns against itself. The thesis is valid because it seems reasonable to use violence for the benefit of society. But this "beneficent violence" has been a cause of so much evil that the question arises whether it would not be more expedient to let unbeneficent violence run the world, and quit playing at benefactor. The ultimate end of resistance is, perhaps, better achieved by non-resistance. Or in Hegel's terminology: *es hat das Andere seiner selbst an sich.*

PSEUDO-DIALECTICAL MIXTURES

Thus the doctrine of non-resistance is merely one pole of a complex dialectical process the other pole of which is the philosophy of sanity and safety. Each, if separately conceived, necessarily passes over into the other. *Jedes hat das Andere seiner selbst an sich.* To reconcile the extremes one must find a higher concept that will contain both conceptions as necessary elements of itself. To mix the extremes is, to say the least, utterly unphilosophical. One cannot attain the solution of a dialectical problem by a mere merging of opposing concepts like black and white resulting in a shade of grey. Precisely such, however, are the numerous compromises

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offered in the history of the controversy. Fathers of the Church, especially the Greek Fathers, were very active in devising intellectual schemes for rehabilitating Christian doctrine before the rigorous tribunal of common sense. I cannot go into the details of all those numerous experiments. One form of compromise, however, recently offered, I must mention. B. W. Bacon in his essay on "Non-Resistance, Christian or Pagan?" tries to persuade himself that Jesus teaches unlimited non-resistance where only personal and selfish interests are at stake, "but resistance unto blood for the sake of the Kingdom of God and His righteousness." It seems to me that to regard the doctrine of non-resistance as having a merely individual application is intellectual hypocrisy. It is a mixing of principles, an unphilosophical compromise.

It seems quite clear to me that any hopeful solution of the controversy must be based upon criticism of the premises common to both thesis and antithesis. Both arguments are decidedly utilitarian in nature. Therefore, the only way out of the controversy is through an attack upon its utilitarian presuppositions. But to deny utilitarianism is to take our stand upon the Stoical conception: whatever the results may be, always fulfil your duty. Thus, doing good for good's sake appears as the rightful synthesis of the two extremes. Both are quite possible, not because either of them results in a practical solution of all historic difficulties, but because under given circumstances either of them may be right, i.e., ordered by our conscience as our duty. According to a Russian sociologist, P. A. Sorokin, a man may socially stimulate actions of other men (1) by doing certain things and (2) by not doing certain things. One may feel insulted either by words, or sometimes by a "contemptuous silence." One may be guilty of a serious offense by neglecting one's duty, i.e., by a criminal inactivity. Both action and inactivity are social factors. Our ethical evaluation of those factors depends largely on circumstances.

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THE QUESTION OF IMPULSE

It is, however, not rational considerations alone that determine our choice of ethical standpoints. A radical comes to his radical convictions, not merely because he believes them to be true, but largely because he resents what he calls the narrow-mindedness of conservatism. On the other hand what makes a conservative choose his point of view is not the truth of it, not even the conviction that things as they are will forever prove to be the best—for this is not conservatism but philistinism—but largely his irritation against radicals. If there were no radicals, we could hardly expect to have any conservatives among us. Much of what we call our political convictions is determined by the impulsive dislike of our opponents and their views. This kind of dislike, this peculiar irritation grows in us through social influences. It is not based on our character, but depends largely on circumstances. Children, for instance, reared in a radical environment are often inclined to be conservatives, and vice versa. Animals lack such impulses. It is not a biological, but a social matter.

There was much of this social impulsiveness among the early Christians. Gibbon in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* tells us that when the edict depriving Christians of the protection of law was first posted in public places it was torn down by the hands of a Christian. His offense amounted to treason and deserved death.

> He was burned, or rather roasted, by slow fire; and his executioners, zealous to revenge the personal insult which had been offered to the emperor, exhausted every refinement of cruelty without being able to subdue his patience, or alter the steady and insulting smile which in his dying agonies he still preserved in his countenance.

Such self-control was only possible as a result, not of theoretical conviction, but of intense emotion.

The impulses which are today prompting men to non-resistance are of a similar nature. It may be of some interest to mention here a certain incident in the history of the Russian

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Revolution. The revolutionary movement in Russia presented almost a complete spectrum of brilliant political colors. It began with the moderate red of intellectual nihilism which, through all the shades of pink and rose, led to the intense red of economic bolshevism. As a political reaction to this beautiful color arose early in the twentieth century the ominous black of the Black Hundred. It is obvious, however, that such a dreadful name was given to the organization by its political opponents. In other countries it would probably have been called Legion of Honor, or National League, or the like. It was simply and solely a patriotic organization à la Ku Klux Klan; it was "black" because patriotism in Russia was considered, after Tolstoy, as one of the seven sins. With the beginning of the revolution, however, the ideological situation changed; patriotism ceased to be a fault, and became a virtue. Accordingly the black turned into white. Everybody knows that at the present time the political struggle in Russia is between the red and white forces. But very few people know that in 1919–21 there were also green armies in Russia. Heavy taxes imposed upon the population by both parties, constant requisitions, and incessant changes of government—the city of Kiev, for instance, was captured and abandoned by the whites some twenty times—made the average citizen utterly hopeless of all parties and all political platforms. Thus one of the peasants captured by the whites remarked that all platforms are good, and all parties are bad. This peculiar sentiment served as a powerful stimulus for the formation of large neutral units who called themselves "greens." This is an embryo of non-resistance, with the minimum of theory and maximum of impulse.

It is highly significant that during the whole history of civilization periods of sporadic revival of the theory of non-resistance always coincide with the epochs when the individual is on the defensive against some sort of political oppression. Judea under the Roman rule produced Christ. The white terror

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of the Roman government during the first two centuries after Christ produced specimens of resignation and self-denial unparalleled in the history of humanity. The revival and remarkable growth of the doctrine in Bohemia in the fifteenth century, culminating in the philosophy of Peter Chelcicky, was a natural response of the safety-seeking individual to the horrors of the Hussite wars. George Fox, the founder of the Society of Friends, lived at the time of the English Revolution. In recent times the doctrine of non-resistance has been given a new stimulus in a country where the thinking individual was constantly in a state of desperate self-defense against highly oppressive political regimes—in Russia. Wherever conservative and radical forces are engaged in a prolonged conflict there are apt to appear, at first isolated individuals, then groups and organizations, inclined in one way or another to practice non-resistance as a sort of methodical protest against continuous violence of the fighting parties. It happens partly because the individual grows tired of continuous and seemingly endless struggle; he begins to mistrust any party-call, any definite platform for action. Under the circumstances, non-action, in the sense of Lao Tse, appears to him as a natural and logical solution. Ideals are not merely the most plastic, but also the most cruel of all creatures. True is the poet's word:

> Schrecklich ist des Tigers Zahn,
> Doch das Schrecklichste der Schrecken
> Ist der Mensch in seiner Wahn.

Every ideal hides an embryo of violence. At the bottom of J. J. Rousseau's social and philosophical schemes one may vaguely discern the image of Robespierre. When the oppressed elements of society reach power they turn into oppressors. Therefore, Christianity fulfilled is the Holy Inquisition. When man is seeking after truth he loves and honors it. When he finds it he feels disappointed—for too often truth is very different from what we expect it to be. In every genius lives a nonenti-

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ty; every truth contains a great deal of prose. Paraphrasing our peasant, we may say that every ideal is good so long as it stays at home. When it goes into the street it becomes a very dangerous reality. It incites men to violence. From the perception and the hatred of this "ideal violence" springs the impulse to non-resistance.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the doctrine of non-resistance what precept of conduct can be recommended? Shall we practice non-resistance or is it our duty to resist evil? Theoretically, I believe, the question can not be brought to any definite conclusion. The controversy has all the marks of an antinomy. The mere duration of the argument for two thousand years, however, of itself indicates this. At all events, it would be presumption on my part to decide for either principle. In practice, however, men will choose one side or the other largely on the basis of what, under concrete circumstances, more vitally appeals to them as means of satisfying their social impulses. To prescribe any definite form of action for all circumstances and all characters would be quite absurd. Much depends upon the kind of evil one is facing in some particular case. The hero is but a shadow of the villain. History has created, and will ever be creative of, situations which require heroic resistance to evil. In a great crowd it is quite impossible to get along without using elbows. In the great turmoil of ideas and tendencies which constitutes social life it is ethically imperative to use violence. But fortunately ideas have no elbows, and cannot fight. They have to make men fight for them. If men stopped fighting, life would come to a standstill, and we should go nowhere. To make us go, heroes of resistance are necessary.

But at times it may be quite heroic to abstain from using one's elbows. When a fire alarm is given in a theater, and the panic-stricken crowd rushes to the exit, it is one's duty to keep calm and stand still. Permit me to end this paper with a story.

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When Nicolas II ascended the Russian throne he decided to give a generous gift to the people of Moscow. On a certain day all were invited to a public place in Moscow to receive a tin cup with the Emperor's initials and a small bag of cheap candies. So strong in human nature is the desire for holy relics that hundreds of thousands, the well-to-do and professional beggars alike, assembled at the place. Through some peculiarly Russian negligence of the police, the constantly growing crowd was soon completely disorganized, the police lost control, and the Tsar's generosity ended with a loss of hundreds of human lives. Among those who were killed were many children. In such a crowd, is not it more reasonable to abstain from using one's elbows? Your neighbor may perhaps remark that it is quite useless to stand still. Not using your physical force you "get nowhere." And yet under the circumstances is it not wiser not to get anywhere? For is it so important to get a tin cup and a bag of cheap candies? If everybody in the crowd had suddenly decided to practice non-resistance, nobody would have obtained a tin cup, but nobody would have been killed. By practicing resistance many people obtained a half pound of miserable candies, which was afterward piously preserved among the family relics. By practicing non-resistance they would have accomplished something infinitely more reasonable: they all would have gone home. How often, in travail costing thousands if not millions of human lives, human history brings forth results not less illusory than Nicolas II's tin cups! And how useful it is in such periods of epidemic insanity to practice non-resistance!

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THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY

HILDA D. OAKELEY

The excuse for bringing forward some considerations on a subject on which it might be supposed that everything possible had been said is that, in spite of all that has been written in regard to Plato's outlook, the most vital core of his religious philosophy, that in it which makes him the one philosopher of the natural religion of thinking humanity, seems never to have received sufficient emphasis. The reason for this lies, perhaps, in the fact that it is almost impossible to look at Plato in this respect with complete freedom from the Christian atmosphere, from which religious speculation has so constantly turned to him, and even in which it has consciously and unconsciously inclined to set him. Nevertheless, it may be held that our best hope of approaching the understanding of Plato on this side of his genius is to make the attempt to see him in his historical position, so far as that was pre-Christian, while recognizing that his fundamental religious ideas were, less perhaps than those of any other great thinker, affected by the conditions and beliefs of his own time and people. If our aim is to bring out what there is of eternal value in Plato's religious standpoint, we ought to watch him, as it were, wrestling with the main problems of religion, free from knowledge of the solutions offered by the greatest religious system of history, ourselves free as far as possible from the influence of this knowledge.

This may appear to be obvious, as a general principle. That it is not easy, however, may be seen when we reflect that the detachment required involves a detachment not only from the results of Christian philosophy, but also from conceptions which have entered through the history of Christianity into religious thought. A striking example of these conceptions

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may be found in the Christian view of the relation of the moral consciousness to religion, for the subtle but deep distinction between this and Plato's point of view is the more difficult to bear in mind, on account of the profoundly ethical strain in the whole of his teaching on the practical life. In this he appears to be, and in a general sense is, nearer to Christianity than any other pre-Christian thinker. Yet that a gulf remains will be realized by one who compares Plato's treatment of the position of man and his practical life in the universe with Kant's theory of the conviction of duty, and its relation to the ideas of reason, God, the soul, immortality. For Kant, whether or not a highly representative Christian philosopher, shows pre-eminently in his thinking the results of historical Christianity.

The interpretation of Plato's religious outlook which will be suggested in this article is determined by the following point of view. Plato appears to be occupied with the greatest religious problem which philosophy can bring forth, sometimes in triumphant moments assuming the answer, sometimes hesitating, at times willing to speak in paradoxes rather than remain silent, always conscious that without its solution, there can be no final peace for the human mind. The problem may be thus stated, Can the source of all value be identified with the power from which the universe proceeds?

The special forms taken by this problem at different stages of its development in Plato's philosophy, the unique character of its growth and expression in the two chief stages of his speculation, are determined by varying conceptions of the real relations between the spiritual, or the world of value, and the forces which dominate this sphere of change, and especially by the evolution of the idea of power. It is necessary here to refer briefly to a character which seems to be universal in its significance, though not always realized in fact, a character belonging to the development of natural religion from its prerational to its rational stage. Apart from the diver-

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gences caused by the emergence from time to time of religious movements inspired by great personalities, this development has the essential character of a transition from religion dominated by the idea and worship of power to religion dominated by the idea and adoration of value. Throughout, and through all stages of religious experience, the fundamental ground of the religious need, that which makes of man a "religious animal," is his nature as a finite-infinite being. But the struggle to get beyond the limitation of the finite is only realized for the primitive mind in the feeling after and fear of a power or powers beyond his horizon, and hence the nature of the sense of mystery, which, attaching as it does to all religious experience, takes for the savage gross forms, as fears of the unknown. For the religious attitude of natural religion at the rational stage, the sense of mystery seems to arise in the consciousness that the world in which value is perfect and unobstructed by dys-value is the realm of man's true life, and therefore real. Hence everything else, the appearances in the midst of which our existence passes, must be unreal, shadows, illusions. This is akin to the "Kingdom of Heaven" idea in its primal form. In philosophy it has its most perfect expression in the dialogues of Plato, especially those which modern scholars regard as belonging to his middle period.

As a metaphysician Plato felt primarily the need of understanding the world as a unity. In him culminated the search of Greek thought for the One. But this One must be the unity of value. It is not the changeless substance of all being which, according to Parmenides, can alone be thought, and therefore alone is, not the bare idea of unity to which Plato's philosophic imagination is in thrall. We follow his path lighted by the poet's deep joy in beauty. We watch the toil of his spirit, brushing aside illusory appearance and the confused tangle of changing phenomena, toward reality, the long and weary struggle of the seeker after truth in a world in which the lie and the more dangerous half-truth are so prevalent and popu-

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lar. At length we find him pausing enraptured before the supreme intuition that there is one source of all these ideals, one good, one origin of all value. But unity is not yet consummated unless this source is also the author of all that *is*, whatever it is, to which existence can be attributed. It is not enough that the good should be demonstrated to be universal source of that quality in the world which enables every soul, since it is akin to the ideas, to rediscover them through experience of earthly phenomena and even resolve these phenomena at exalted moments into the very likeness of eternal beauty and good. If something remains outside in the phenomenal, the particulars, only imperfectly imitative of the ideas, the universal, not conveying to the soul's apprehension pure form, perfection in nature and life, the completely intelligible, unity is not attained; the good is not source of all. This shadow hardly falls on the pure objective idealism of the *Republic*, though in that dialogue the difficulty of making a harmony out of human life is revealed more brilliantly than in any other, and on the plane of practical life it is recognized that God is not the cause of evil, but only of good.

But the idealism of knowledge is at this stage so strongly enthroned in Plato's *Weltanschauung* that it reigns superior to paradoxes. The perfectly real is perfectly knowable, and only the ideas and ideal are real. Perhaps the mystical motive of the depreciation of all particular things aids in concealing from the scientific logician the wreck of his hopes of complete knowledge, in the infinite individuality of things, which must ever escape the systematizing work of thought. For in the *Republic* that contemplative strain in Plato's genius which has led to the characterization of him as a mystic and the logical scientific interest are in close harmony. His spiritual need, as we may express it at this stage, was (as in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, perhaps we may add the *Symposium*) satisfied by the conception and contemplation of the world of ideas as the true home of the soul. Again, we might be

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tempted to indulge in the speculation that but for the strong practical and reforming motive in his outlook, which became more powerful and dominating on account of the impression made on him by the life and death of Socrates, the religious need might have been satisfied by the religious spirit of his search for truth. For this has been the case with other spiritually minded thinkers whom many have regarded as lacking in the religious instinct. But this would be to ignore another movement logically necessitated in his philosophy, which led to the religious conception of the world represented in the *Timaeus*.

In a recent study of Plato as a religious teacher by Mr. Paul More the *Timaeus* is, as often before, treated as the work in which Plato pre-eminently shows his natural kinship with Christian thought and the Christian conception of the universe. Especially is the dualism of the Platonic conception emphasized—the picture of the Demiurgus doing the best possible with a material only in part submissive to creative form —as essential to a truly religious view of the world, in which no compromise with facts of evil and disorder is tolerable, no attempt to establish monism by refusing to recognize the insistent reality of these facts. Mr. Archer Hind, on the other hand, in his edition of the *Timaeus*, rather than admit any doubt in regard to Plato's monistic idealism applies a doubly allegorical method to the interpretation of this dialogue. Not only does he (with many others) treat the story of the Creation as intended to be mythical, as perhaps the greatest and most characteristic of all the Platonic myths, but he even treats it as symbolic of a doctrine of absolute idealism, despite statements incompatible with that doctrine which Plato makes with the solemnity and dramatic emphasis which always with him attend upon important truths.

Such solemnity and emphasis characterize the phrases *Timaeus* uses in connection with those principles to which he

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attributes a power over against the power of creative mind—necessity, and that obscure entity, the "nurse and mother of all things," that third form of existence which, as he declares, must now be introduced into the account of the cosmos, in addition to the two hitherto admitted ideas and phenomena, and which he finally names "space." I think we must agree with Martin in his great commentary on the *Timaeus*, that here we have a dualism which cannot be ignored, however far we may go in other respects in an allegorical interpretation of this dialogue. What is the nature of this dualism? So long as the spiritual world for Plato was the world of ideas, while beside this nothing else could be accounted real, there was no need for another principle. Alike from the contemplative and aesthetic, and from the logical and scientific standpoints, there was nothing to obstruct the impression on the soul of the grand constellation of ideas, the sure grasp by the mind of the objects which being perfectly real are perfectly knowable. That power, life, motion, must be ascribed to the ideas as Being, is a principle first announced indeed in the most logical of Plato's dialogues, the *Sophist*, though hints of this line of thought had been given earlier. "O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life, and soul, and mind, are not present with perfect being?"[1] It is, however, in this logical dialogue that Plato expresses himself with greater bitterness than perhaps anywhere else against the evil force which he found in its worst form in sophistry, the concealment and whittling away of the truth, the delight in shams and delusions. Truth must be endowed with power if it is to prevail—the need for power implies the existence and reality of obstacles. The point which seems to be here suggested is Plato's growing passion for the realization of value in the world of experience, together with a growing consciousness of the necessity of power for its realization. The final result of this great process of his philosophy of value is seen in the *Timaeus*, when

[1] *Sophist*, p. 249 (Jowett's translation).

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from the study of an attempt to construct a wholly valuable life in the city state (*Republic*), Plato turns to the study of the construction of a valuable cosmos in the *Timaeus*.

There is, of course, a great gulf between these two dialogues, though they are closely associated as belonging to one grand scheme in the discussion introductory to the *Timaeus*. In the *Republic* the problem of the realization of value, the complete permeation of the material by the spiritual, is still treated by Plato within what may be described as a purely intellectual perspective. This is not to ignore the rich humanity of his vision of practical life, the education through the emotions, the temptations of the gifted youth, and his liability to corruption by the great Sophist of public flattery; the unforgettable pictures of the successive stages of corruption in the soul of society and the soul of the individual, and much besides which witnesses to Plato's searching insight into life. But his practical philosophy is, nevertheless, a faith in the creative force of reason alone. It may be impossible that philosophy should rule, but if it could the problem would be solved. The moving spring of Plato's practical imagination is still the vision of the ideas victorious in their own right, streaming into society once the barrier of ignorance is removed, and capturing the motive force of man as the daylight streams over the earth. In this respect his position was not unlike that of the first idealists of the French Revolution and their poetic English admirers, of Mill and the nineteenth-century believers in the invincible force of human intelligence, once set free by universal education. The important differences between Plato's and the modern ideology belong, of course, to the difference in their views of human personality. Plato's faith was not in the intelligence of the individual as such, but in intelligence permeating the state through the direction of the higher minds. That there are factors alien to reason in the state and the world none recognizes more clearly than the Plato of the *Republic*. But on the whole, and as re-

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gards the atmosphere and framework of the dialogue, he believes in the possibility of their subdual, captive to the spirit of reason, not forever incapable of following the march of logic over the rough material of existence, not forever blind to the glory of the ideas.

In the *Timaeus* there arises another power beside the power of creative mind, and the development of Plato's thought in regard to this other power is of the greatest interest in relation to his treatment of the religious problem. In the function of the Demiurgus or creative mind we have the last form taken by Plato's doctrine of the control of the universe by reason. Philosophic interest in the question of the advance of Platonic theory on the nature of mind has been especially directed to the transition from the objective idealism of the earlier period to the more subjective conception of the later position, when the vital presence of soul in the world is emphasized and the ideas seem to take a more subordinate place, however we understand Plato's doctrine of the relation of the good and the ideas to God, and of both to the world-soul. Soul in the individual also is no longer conceived as primarily an idea, but has its own elaborate treatment, as possessing elements of the same nature as those in the world-soul. As Dr. Caird[2] understands the transition, we pass to a more spiritual standpoint. Still more important, however, from the point of view taken in the present article, is the place given to an alien force in the very citadel of soul itself. There is in the soul of the world a principle of otherness, or difference, as well as a principle of unity, the "same." This is manifested in the irregularities of earthly phenomena failing to show the harmonious revolutions of the starry heavens, where measure and perfection reign supreme. In the human soul the element of otherness is greater in proportion to that of sameness than in the world-soul. In connection with this it may be noted that emphasis on self—the source of all vice, as he tells us in the

[2] *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers.*

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Laws—is the rebellion against the universal harmony. Thus the individual, so much discounted in the philosophy of ideas, may be said to be revenged in Plato's final philosophy. There is something in the human individual which is not imitative of the idea, and yet real, sufficiently real to destroy the monism of value. This terrific paradox for Platonism is Plato's last word, if we assume the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* to be the last dialogues.

The *Laws*, however, is dominated by a practical motive so strong in comparison with the *Republic* (utilitarian or directly practical) as to obscure at times the philosophical background. And the scheme of the *Timaeus* should, as I believe, be understood as a grand hypothesis, expressing Plato's supreme attempt to conceive this order as proceeding from the power which is the source of all value, an attempt which takes a mythical form allowing paradoxical elements to be present, welded by art into a unity with the whole. The mythical imagination informs, not, as in other dialogues, a part, but the whole discourse of *Timaeus*, because Plato is dealing with a theme about which he cannot be finally definite. Now the considerable place given in this alone of his works to the phenomena and processes of the natural universe—although referred to deprecatingly, as matters the investigation of which is rather a subject for pastime and recreation than for the severer hours of the philosopher—has been accounted for by some commentators as due probably to the insistent demands of the younger students of the Academy, for whom these matters were of growing interest. A still stronger cause for their introduction may, however, be found in the ground that all these facts and the behavior of things in nature can no longer be ignored now that difference, the "other," insists on having a place in reality; it must bring with it in its train that illimitable range of existences, the wrestle to understand which was to occupy human intelligence to an extent of which Plato could not dream, and the discovery of its powers to lead the

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practical efforts of mankind into paths fatal to much in which he saw man's chief good.

The treatment of nature in the *Timaeus* is one important sign, then, of Plato's admission of an other than pure reason to a share of power in this world, and the main causes which led to this are to be found in the necessities of his practical philosophy, equally with, perhaps more than in, those of logic. It was primarily through the breakdown, gradual and possibly never fully admitted to himself, of Plato's faith in the inevitable permeation by reason (that is, by the ideas) of any portion of the world of experience into which they had once entered, that he was compelled to recognize the existence of some alien force. It is no suggestion of weakness in the greatest genius to assume it to be modified even in its fundamental metaphysical conceptions by the experience of life. The supreme interest in the realization of value affected Plato's whole philosophical being in all its phases. The overwhelming difficulties in the way of bringing the scheme of things nearer to the ideal by any construction of reason, the apparent impotence of the human intellect over against non-rational factors even in the little social scene it might seem to dominate, worked psychologically upon his conception of the nature of the universe. The almighty power of "the good" begins to give way, even in the *Republic*.

The *Philebus*, that strangely detached treatment of the problem of value for human life, may be conceived in one aspect as an experiment in which it is attempted to determine the worth of existence in abstraction from the struggle of the practical arena. The worth of life is constituted by the presence of ideals whose value can be logically estimated and measured—so much order, harmony, symmetry, truth, and so on. Life may be treated as a work of art, a perfect balance of the activities concerned in the attainment of knowledge and beauty. The moral relations, the troublesome questions concerning the area of the good, the competition for goods,

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even those of the spirit, are passed over or ignored. If the eternal good is to be reflected in man's experience, it appears that this can only be under conditions in which the individual can freely develop his higher powers for the extraction from experience of all those elements in which this good is best imitated. The *Philebus* is more remote than the *Republic* from the idea of life as "a vale of soul-making." Yet this is, as are also the logical dialogues between the *Republic* and *Timaeus*, haunted by the shadow of the religious problem. The line of division between the spheres of order or harmony, and disorder, is drawn on a moral plane. The limit, πέρας, gives order to a material whose chaotic nature (infinite, unlimited ἀπείρον) shows dys-value as well as mere formlessness. In this passage the way is directly prepared for the *Timaeus*. But only in the latter do the implications of the greatest moral dialogues (*Republic, Gorgias*), the real significance of the warfare with sophistry and shams, with the lie in the soul, the belief that the unjust life brings happiness, become metaphysically explicit. There is another power, another law (not merely absence of law) beside harmony. In naming this principle "necessity," and the sphere of its working "space," Plato gathers into one all the streams of experience, practical, logical, scientific, which have compelled to the recognition of the "other"—the obstacle to the spiritual, which baffles all man's ideal efforts, in the translation of value into life, the attainment of truth, the realization of good, even (though least of all there) in the sphere of beauty.

We may conceive Plato as the exemplar of all philosophic idealism, in his development as in his genius universally. The common human experience of dualism in learning the ways of life, the obstruction met with through feelings and passions ill-attuned to what the world has to offer and through that ignorance of the inner side of our environment which makes us strangers here, is suddenly transformed and reformed, as the light of the intellect fully awakened streams upon it in the

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glory of fully self-conscious genius. An intoxicating faith in reason convinces the born idealist that nothing can escape its light or remain obnoxious to its form-giving creativity. Hence flow all the grandly simple paradoxes of the monism for which neither is evil a stumbling block, nor the course of nature, revealing to man's longing gaze from age to age only the external rules of its behavior, never its secret being. "Evil is nothing, is nought, is silence implying sound." At this point many great idealists have remained, satisfied that they have seen into the heart of things.

But the true Platonist passes on after a time, in which he has drunk deep of these peace-giving and all but soporific streams, for in the end he cannot live in the world "beyond good and evil," nor reverence a good which is not good, as Socrates would have judged it, since it can embrace the whole world, admitting even sophistry, and the lie in the soul, as necessary counterparts to reality and truth. The alien nature which stands in the way of the realization of values must then be given more than a negative place in the world of being. Not merely the obscure shadow and mockery of the real, it rears up its head as an existence in its own right, without which phenomena could not play their all too momentous part in experience; not altogether lawless, having its own laws which man can subdue only by obeying. Over against the seeing power of creative mind, the blind power of necessity must be set.

Here it is of importance to note that together with the recognition of this non-rational agency in the universe, there takes place a deepening and strengthening of the conception of the fundamentally rational constitution of things through the allegory of Creation. However mythical this form of the *Timaeus*, it seems at least to symbolize (as Dr. Caird has so finely brought out) the emergence of a more spiritual view of mind, as actively interpenetrating the world. Though on the one hand the non-rational has become more imposing and

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more to be reckoned with, on the other the rational is, as it were, endowed with a greater power to constrain it as suggested by the metaphorical language of personal interest—"God being good, desired that everything, so far as possible, should be like Himself."

It is not impossible that in the transition from the static to the dynamic view of the ideas as sources of value, from objective to spiritual idealism, Plato's growing interest in history played a part which has not, so far as I know, received attention hitherto. The Myth of Atlantis in the opening of the *Timaeus*, though doubtless to be regarded as poetic ornament, may at least have significance as a picture to remind us of the lapse of time, carrying with it this possibility that earlier generations may have approached the ideal in a great social construction nearer, perhaps, than we shall ever approach it again.

Present and future attempts should be looked at in the light of the past. However limited our knowledge of former ages, even if it were a blank, this holds good. There is an immeasurable past, and the one science of which every individual has the primary stuff in his own experience is the science of history, for he stands as a link in the generations, and has learned the basic fact of their different perspectives and atmospheres, through friendship with those he is leaving behind and with those who are passing on beyond him into a new age. That the grandiose conception of innumerable ages of human history was haunting Plato's thoughts in his latter years we may gather from the seer-like and almost solemn introduction to *Laws* iii. As with growing intensity he aspired to bring into a unity, and apply to moralization of present conditions, all his leading insights on the problem of human destiny, Plato would no longer be able to resist altogether the many occasions for pessimism as to the power of the ideal world in man's life presented by history and practical experience—such experience as the tragedy of Athens and Soc-

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rates, and his own failure in Sicily. It is possible to think of the unforgettable definition of time in the *Timaeus* as partly expressing the idea of the relation of the changing scene of human life to the eternal values which Plato would now shadow forth. Time "the moving image of Eternity." There is no direct and complete manifestation of the ideal for man, as there is no means of putting into a form in which our consciousness can receive it, the truth of eternity. Only through the phenomenally unending process in which a thousand scattered and imperfect images of the good are reflected, now more, now less clearly, is the eternal discerned by the spirit of man. Such is the idea of history to be found in Plato's philosophy, free from the delusive enchantments of modern ideas of progress.

We may also, I think, suggest as at least an element in the interpretation of the idea of the personal creator in the *Timaeus*, that it sums up the results of Plato's experience in the struggle of thought and life to bring together the principles of value and power. For if the blind forces which seem to go on their way, forever unproductive, ungenerative of any value through their own processes, or evolution, are from time to time in the secret course of personal experience, or on the stage of history, made to follow the vision of mind, we know this only through the experience of personality. In giving a "probable" account of the origin of the cosmos, Plato has no other power to invoke, whose agency is intelligible to man, capable of effecting the penetration of irrational force with the spirit of the good.

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THE SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE IN BUTLER'S ETHICS

H. G. TOWNSEND

During the seventy-five years between the publication of the *Leviathan* and the *Sermons* of Joseph Butler, no moralist was able to disregard or to find a convincing answer to Thomas Hobbes. Although Hobbes developed no systematic ethical theory, his plain denial of man's social nature and his treatment of all amicable relation among men as an artifact may fairly be said to have stirred the imagination of philosophers for more than a century. It shocked them into a defense of conventional theory but ultimately led to a masterly re-examination of the sanctions of human conduct in the works of Butler. Cumberland's *De Legibus Naturae* (1672) asserts that man is not by nature at war with his fellow-men and assumes rather than proves that there can be no conflict between the good of society and that of the individual. Ralph Cudworth with his Platonism and Samuel Clarke with his assurance that there must be something more essential in right and wrong than mere external authority still leave the controversy on the plane of a dispute, pitting their word against the word of the *Leviathan*. Even Shaftesbury (*Men, Manners and Opinions*, 1711) fails in some obscure way to come to grips with the theory of moral sanction advanced by Hobbes. After proposing two questions—What is the end of moral action? and What is the nature of man?—he devotes his time and energy to the latter. He finds a "gregarious tendency" and "natural affections." Egoism and altruism get equal respect from Shaftesbury, and virtue does not consist in the triumph of either, but rather in a proper balance between the two. So far it is well, but the inward weakness of an atomistic and descriptive ethics is not discovered. The philosophical weakness of mechanism gets no help from further analysis.

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The unsatisfactory theory, for example, that the mind is a bundle of a certain number of instincts does not become satisfactory by increasing the number, but by revising the figure of speech. Egoism and altruism must be transcended by some principle of relation rather than augmented by another category of the same order of being.

Butler clearly discerned the problem. It was not to find in man simply another tendency, appetite, or desire, but to lay bare the structural principle of integral personality. His method was a real change of venue—a trial in a different realm of facts. Nor does this mean that he sought the high a priori method. On the contrary, he is devoted to the patient observation of human nature. The a posteriori method, he says, "is in a peculiar manner adapted to satisfy a fair mind; and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances of life."[1] He turns his eye from the parts of human nature to the whole and discovers there facts as real as any, but facts of implication and synthesis.

The repeated statement that Butler writes like a modern must have at least this revision—that he writes as a modern philosopher might have written in 1726. Had he followed Kant he could hardly have had a firmer grasp on the implications of particularity and the limitations of simple induction. Nevertheless, he finds no escape from the philosophical vocabulary of his own time. He must talk of "self-love," "natural affections," "conscience," et cetera. It is significant that he can be placed with no particular school of his generation.[2] He could accept observations from all sides because he was concerned with a problem which the others had not raised. He could therefore employ the works of others without becoming a mere eclectic in the process. His constructive contribution to ethical discussion is not that he named another element in human nature, but that he turned the mind to contemplate the structural pattern of human nature.

[1] Preface, paragraph 5. [2] Cf. Lefevre, *Philosophical Review*, VIII, 128 ff.

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Whoever thinks it worth while to consider this matter thoroughly, should begin with stating to himself exactly the idea of a system, economy, or constitution of any particular nature, or particular any thing: and he will, I suppose, find, that it is a one or a whole, made up of several parts; but yet, that the several parts even considered as a whole do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which those parts have to each other. Every work both of nature and of art is a system: . . . . Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other; the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience [Preface, paragraph 7].

Although Butler has been grouped with authoritarians of Paley's type,[8] he is not in the least like Paley in his conception of authority. Authority for him is the authority of an internal constitution emerging in the process of experience. Conscience, moreover, is in like manner no name for an independent censor of conduct with an occult intuition of right and wrong. "Conscience" is used by Butler as a synonym of "the principle of reflection." Had he consistently used the latter phrase he might have left a clearer impression; for the word "conscience," then as now, connotes too many rules of conduct associated with religious or social formalism. It is hopeless to try to redeem the word from its lost condition. If taken quite literally it means just what Butler calls "the principle of reflection," for it is no more and no less than relevant knowing. But it cannot at this late date be taken literally. The reader of the *Sermons,* however, need be in no doubt that the author means to point to an internal principle of organization, whether he calls it conscience or a principle of reflection.

A certain ambiguity in Butler's treatment of this synthetic principle is due to his determination that self-love "shall be

[8] For instance by Windelband, *History of Philosophy,* p. 441.

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treated with the utmost tenderness and concern for its interests."[4] At times, as in the third sermon, he seems inclined to adopt the common interpretation of the moral law in terms of enlightened self-interest. Also in the *Analogy* we read:

> Self-love considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to God's commands, our interest being rightly understood; because this obedience and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every case one and the same thing [*Analogy*, I, v, paragraph 20].

To the question, Why not, then, seek individual happiness? he answers that we should certainly do so, provided always that we have a proper definition of happiness which must include benevolence and virtue, for "the temper of compassion and benevolence is itself delightful."[5] This leaning toward enlightened self-interest was a large concession to contemporary British ethics, but it led him to one of his most significant distinctions, namely, that between "self-love" and "particular affections." Particular affections are those desires which have an external object, as hunger, avarice, and the like. "It is not because we love ourselves," he declares, "that we find delight in such and such objects, but because we have particular affections toward them" (Preface, paragraph 37). Again, "Though a man hated himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that of the gout."[6] Self-love must be carefully distinguished as a general rational interest in self which chooses among the particular affections and guides the conduct in such a way that the true interest of the self may be best conserved. This is a great advance over the loose thinking which imagines that if a man is hungry it is somehow a proof that he loves himself. The confusion leads to a fundamental question begging. If Jack Sprat loved the lean meat and his wife the fat, shall we conclude that each was governed

[4] *Sermons*, XI, paragraph 3.

[5] *Sermons*, III, paragraph 8. [6] *Sermons*, I, paragraph 7, note.

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by self-love? This argument is condemned because it proves too much. Whatever explains everything explains nothing. Butler is perfectly clear in making the distinction, and he has thus furnished a significant criticism of egoistic theory. A man loves food; and he *also* loves himself. The love of self is related to the particular affections as a principle of order is related to the elements of a system.

There is a tendency at this point in the argument to identify the supreme synthetic principle with the similar principle of self-love. Yet Butler is saved from this by his treatment of benevolence. "There is a natural principle of benevolence in man," he says, "which is, in some degree to society, what self-love is to the individual."[7] The relation of this principle to the principle of rational self-love is not, however, made quite explicit. At times the reader finds them co-ordinated, at other times one or the other is subordinated. Here and there benevolence is even grouped with the particular affections to be ruled by enlightened self-interest. In other connections, however, he calls it a "principle in reasonable creatures."[8] On the whole he probably considers self-love a more basic or at least a more potent factor, for he explains at some length that it is necessary to curb self-love and encourage benevolence, not because the former is too strong, but because the latter is too weak. The final interpretation, however, is revealed in such a quotation as follows: "Love of our neighbor, then, must bear some proportion to self-love, and virtue to be sure consists in the due proportion. What this due proportion is . . . . can be judged of only from our nature and condition in this world."[9] From this and similar statements we can only conclude that in the long run he finds the love of our neighbor an element in human nature for which a place must be found in the virtuous

[7] *Sermons,* I, paragraph 6.

[8] Cf. *Sermons,* VI, paragraph 9; XII, paragraph 37; *Analogy,* I, v, paragraph 20.

[9] *Sermons,* XII, paragraph 13.

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life. The elements thus far enumerated are "particular affections," "self-love," and "benevolence." Self-love is of two kinds: It may be co-ordinate with, or it may be the principle of reason among, the particular affections. Benevolence, likewise, may be co-ordinate with particular affections and thus subordinate to self-love in the second sense mentioned, or it may be superior even to self-love—to society what self-love is to the individual.

Notwithstanding the ambiguity in the treatment of these concepts, the author goes straight forward to the idea of a final arbiter which is to determine the due proportion, i.e., "the principle in man by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions."[10] This is the faculty which distinguishes man from animals. Animals obey their whole nature and, according to Butler, man also should obey his whole nature; always remembering that conscience is one and a very superior aspect of it. In fact, this principle in man must have the controlling voice, as indicated in the following words:

> To allow no more to this superior principle or part of our nature than to other parts; to let it govern and guide only occasionally in common with the rest, as its turn happens to come, from the temper and circumstances one happens to be in; is not to act conformably to the constitution of man: neither can any human creature be said to act conformably to his constitution of nature, unless he allows to that superior principle the absolute authority which is due to it [Preface, paragraph 24].

The passions may have power, but the principle of reflection has authority. That self-love must take its place in the ranks to obey the commands of conscience is not for a moment in doubt. Whatever ambiguity might arise on this point is entirely avoided if we keep clear the distinction between self-love and the particular affections. It is superior to them as a principle of organization, but nevertheless it must submit to the supreme principle in man which seeks the organization of his whole nature, including benevolence.

[10] *Sermons*, I, paragraph 8.

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Butler's synthesis of self-love and benevolence under the rule of the principle of reflection has been misinterpreted because many lose sight of the fact that he was always concerned with human nature as a whole. If the interpreter sets out to prove that Butler was a rationalist, an egoist, or an altruist, he is bound to land in confusion, because Butler was all that and more. He was as much opposed to Hobbes and his idea of arbitrary and external authority as he was to those who would correct Hobbes by the mere assurance that it is natural for man to love his fellow-men. He does not propose to set altruism over against egoism, to cancel or deny self-love in any sense, but he seeks to transcend the dispute through the principle of reflection. He finds this principle implied in self-love and fully exhibited in conscience. He can freely accept the descriptions of human nature offered by his predecessors because for him the problem of ethics is to determine the value and relation of the parts of human nature. He has no fear of the facts of description, for his task is interpretation. A man does love food and other particular things; a man does love himself; a man does love his neighbor: but in none of these is he virtuous. Virtue is the search for the due proportion. The rational principle has a relation to the other aspects of human nature as pattern has a relation to points in space. It is the selective idea at work. Conscience, for Butler, is just this principle engaged in the realization of the good. It is in no sense hypostasized or abstract, but is vigorously mediate.

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DISCUSSION

ETHICAL CONCEPTS VITAL TO MARKET RESEARCH

WILLIAM J. REILLY

There was a time, not long ago, when the owner of a business was shop manager, office manager, sales manager, and what not, but within the past ten years business activity has become highly functionalized. Each function, during its early process of separation, has had associated with it certain malpractices that have in turn given birth to codes of ethical practice intended to protect the new function against unwise and unethical behavior.

Market research is perhaps the latest business function to separate itself and already a number of widely different types of organizations, such as advertising agencies, publishing companies, institutions of learning, manufacturers, and so on, have lately organized more or less separate departments for the study of markets.

As might be expected, certain malpractices have attended the recent growth of this new business function. During the past two years, the writer has visited the more important types of organizations engaged in market research work and an ample fund of observations reveal the more common and more harmful malpractices to be: first, misrepresentation of person; and second, misrepresentation of fact.

In considering the first malpractice, one can easily see that when misrepresentation of person occurs, it is usually in connection with *securing* market information.

When the market investigator goes out for information from manufacturers, dealers, or consumers, he is often asked, "Whom do you represent?" Almost certainly there can be no case in which the person desiring the information is justified in misrepresenting himself, and yet it was found not uncommon for men in charge of getting information for reputable, nationally known organizations to employ misrepresentation in gathering data. For instance, in getting information from competitors, these men often send out a young man in their organization who masquerades as a student of a certain university and who claims to be making a study on the subject. What follows is obvious. The competitor, having confidence in the young man's representation, often gives out confidential information which might operate to the competitor's disadvantage. After

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having been fooled once, this same competitor tends to become inaccessible as a source of information. With important facts so jealously guarded, legitimate scientific studies become next to impossible, and as a result market research, which can only exist on knowledge of fact, necessarily suffers.

So much for misrepresentation of person, than which there is only one more serious malpractice—misrepresentation of fact.

Mention has been made that when misrepresentation of person occurs, it is usually in connection with *securing* market information. On the other hand, when misrepresentation of fact occurs, it is usually in connection with *presenting* or *reporting* market information.

Most of those organizations gathering market information naturally have their own peculiar interests to serve and this often causes them to feature some facts and to cover up others in order to produce that effect which best serves their own interests. Perhaps they do not fully realize it, but they usually find to be true what they want to be true, for it is characteristic of any human being to want to prove his own ideas and pet theories. And unless one is continually aware of this characteristic tendency—even though he has a sincere desire to perform what is worthy to be called scientific—he will find himself inadvertently suppressing some facts and emphasizing other facts. Here again, the results are obvious. Executives who are given distorted information and who receive it as unbiased truth are misled or even sometimes cheated into spending money for programs that would not have been adopted had all the available facts been impartially presented. Consequently, the misled executive may become suspicious of all market studies and so lose the help offered by legitimate scientific workers.

Other related ethical concepts will develop with the growth of market research, but it is highly doubtful that any will assume greater fundamental importance than the two given above. For violations of these two are in reality phases of dishonesty which endanger the two foundations upon which market research as a science must be based; (1) accessibility of market facts and (2) unbiased presentation of market facts.

Since violations of these two ethical concepts are not uncommon, it is thought timely that a code of primary ethics for market research be constructed. An ideal code could be written endorsing the Golden Rule in general terms and it would be useful in so far as it would encourage the right spirit. But the most useful code of ethics perhaps is the practical one which makes matters at once more definite by dictating unfair practices or approved rules of action in answer to commonly recognized prob-

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lems in behavior. The following code of ethics is contributed as a practical one:

CODE OF ETHICS FOR MARKET RESEARCH

It shall be considered contrary to scientific method and shall be deemed professionally dishonorable for anyone engaged in market research

1. To misrepresent his identity to anyone under any circumstances while securing market information.
2. To make any misrepresentation of fact by
   a) Suppressing some facts and emphasizing other facts in order to produce a desired effect.
   b) Presenting as true and normal data any information secured from obviously abnormal sources.
   c) Presenting as unbiased testimony that which has been consistently secured through the use of leading questions.
   d) Presenting as fact any information secured by an investigator who is without training or without the ability to get facts.
   e) Allowing opinion or introspection to affect results when tabulating or reporting market information. All data must be handled objectively in such a way that any impartial person, dealing with the same material and having the same problem in mind, would arrive at the same results.

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ETHICAL INWARDNESS IN GREEK TRAGEDY

RONALD B. LEVINSON

It has at no time been so difficult to do justice to the ethical ideals of the Greek dramatists as in the full light of present-day anthropological studies. Before the infinite foliations of the *Golden Bough,* and the elaboration of its implications for Greek literature by scholars like Jane Harrison and Gilbert Murray, little was made of the traces of primitive ideas in classical writers. Such things were lightly passed over as literary conventions, or at most remarked as curiosa, but never regarded as integral parts of an organic whole; critics like Lessing and Goethe sought to meet Greek ideals without condescension on the common ground of the higher levels of speculative thought. While the historian of culture is unquestionably justified in his attempt to see the finished tragedy foreshadowed in the rude caprice of village vintagers, yet there are grave dangers in stressing the primitive elements in the ethical outlook of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and of thus reducing their moral insight to the status of tribal superstition.

This paper briefly considers, from the point of view of ethical inwardness, one or more plays from each of the three masters of Greek tragedy. It is asked: How far does the dramatist in each case treat sin as an objective fact, unrelated to the ethical intent or moral choice of the agent? At what rate is rightness of intent valued as extenuating the heinousness involved in a breach of the moral law objectively considered as a set of unqualified commands with divine sanction?

My first instance will be the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus. This play constitutes, as it were, the third and concluding act of a trilogy, of which the murder of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra and the divinely appointed vengeance at the hand of Orestes constitute the two preceding acts. Back of all this lies the ancestral guilt of Atreus, founder of the line, a red curtain against which the action of the entire trilogy is carried forward. In our play, the *Eumenides,* the frenzied Orestes, bearing the stain of the matricide to which the oracle of Apollo had prompted him, arrives at Delphi seeking the protection of his patron god. Close upon him press the Furies, a noisome band, black and loathly, like wingless harpies, dwellers in Tartarus, hateful to gods and men.[1] In marked antithesis to these dark chthonian powers stands Apollo, god of light,

[1] Aeschylus *Eumenides* ll. 49 ff.

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under whose shelter the fugitive Orestes is conveyed to Athens, where at solemn trial Orestes is, by the deciding vote of Athena, adjudged innocent and acquitted, the Furies being placated for the loss of their victim by the promise of an honorable place in the Attic Pantheon.

Now as concerns inwardness and outwardness, it is plain that Aeschylus is keenly aware of guilt as an objective reality, a curse of houses and a visible plague in the land. Guilt in this sense is concretely embodied in the Furies, whence their repulsiveness; but they are also the recognized and righteous agents of vengeance; their office has, until Apollo's intervention, never been challenged in the name of a higher law. The lesson intended by the poet would seem to be that guilt, however innocently acquired, cannot escape the consequences of its very nature or rise to its final vindication unpurified by suffering.

With Sophocles we enter a world less insistently ethical than that of Aeschylus. The moral landscape preserves a general character of resemblance, but in point of ruggedness and ethical grandeur we have left the Alps for the Euganean hills. We are certainly not quite out of the shadow of destiny; Oedipus will remind us of that; but the characters of Sophocles move about more freely, in the security that in the main human affairs slide on their own keel. There is far less intrusion of the supernatural, far less appeal to that ruling Zeus who reasons out his conclusions in terms of our human acts. Let me illustrate this thesis in such a way as to bring ethical inwardness into the focus of attention.

The *Electra* of Sophocles is concerned with the theme of the second act of the trilogy of Aeschylus which we have been considering. It is the story of the return of Orestes to Argos, and his vengeance upon his guilty mother and her paramour. The deed of Orestes and its occasion are the same here as in Aeschylus. He murders the offending pair. The significant difference is that in the play of Sophocles the act of vengeance casts no bloody shadow before it, that it entails no consequences but happiness to Orestes and his sister. There is no mote of anxiety in the clear sunshine of the concluding chorus: "O house of Atreus, through how many sufferings hast thou come forth at last in freedom, crowned with good by this day's enterprise!" The oracle of Apollo is trusted home; Clytemnestra is dead, and she has left no stain of bloodguiltiness behind her. The inwardness of Orestes' act is alone taken account of, to the neglect of the objective status of the external act, and it may well be questioned whether we have here entered a world of higher moral truth.

But we cannot justly rest our case for Sophocles at this point. The evidence of the two Oedipus dramas is crucial and decisive. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus,* the consequences of unwitting sin are the preoccupa-

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tion of the poet. Oedipus has brought down upon himself and his subjects the dire logic that attends the twofold crime of parricide and incest. No matter that he acted in ignorance of the "what" and the "to whom," which Aristotle held indispensable to moral action as such. The objective act demands objective recognition. In the second play, *Oedipus Coloneus,* we have to do with the same man, but aged now and blind, a wanderer and an exile. The old man, attended by his daughter, arrives by what Vergil would call the *fata deorum,* at Colonus, the place appointed by Apollo in his oracle for the final reckoning of the account. The god had promised Oedipus a final rest, a painless death which should distinguish him from other men, and after death, a peculiar guardian power over the land of his burial. There has settled upon the old man a clear conviction of his moral innocence. As Jebb says: "He has come to look upon himself as neither pure nor yet guilty, but as a person set apart by the gods to illustrate their will—as sacred."[2] The ultimate moral harmony attained, if something less than the Christian ideal of atonement, is in its way no less significant. It is a balancing of the two poles of inward innocence and outward guilt into a stability of moral order which is, in some sense, perhaps in Hegel's, higher than the possible attainment of either.

The attitude of Euripides toward our problem is displayed in frequent repudiations of the older view, and does not stand in need of extended treatment. This attitude is well displayed in his *Heracles,* in the scene which Gilbert Murray so enthusiastically describes:[3]

> [Heracles] has been mad and slain his own children; he has recovered and awakes to find himself bound to a pillar, with dead bodies that he cannot recognize round about him. He rages to be set free. He compels those who know to tell him the whole truth. Frantic with shame and horror, he wishes to curse God and die, when he sees Theseus approaching. Theseus has been his friend in many hard days and Heracles dares not face him or speak to him. The touch of one so bloodguilty, the sound of his voice, the sight of his face, would bring pollution to him. He shrouds himself in his mantle and silently waves Theseus away. In a moment his friend's arms are round him, and the shrouding mantle is drawn off. There is no such thing as pollution; no deed of man can stain the immortal sunlight, and a friend's love does not fear the infection of blood.

That Theseus here speaks in the name of Euripides may be confirmed from a striking parallel in his *Electra,* which gives the Euripidean version of the worn Orestes legend. In the last scene of this play is de-

[2] Introduction to his edition of the *Oedipus Coloneus,* p. xxi.

[3] *Euripides and His Age,* Home University Library, p. 99.

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picted with fine dramatic art the inevitable backwash of horror upon Orestes that follows his slaying of his mother. To him thus dismayed appear, like Theseus to Heracles, his mother's divine brethren the Dioscuri, who politely deplore the morality of Apollo's oracle, grant that their sister has received her due, and strenuously asseverate the moral integrity of Orestes, the innocent instrument in the hands of the god.

Here is a clear break with older Greek feeling. In the interests of a clear-eyed criticism of life which has resolved to see only what is there without any blurring of the edges, Euripides the rationalist has come to see bloodguiltiness purely in terms of a humanitarian ethics for which inwardness is the sole and sovereign standard of value. But it would be difficult to maintain that in proportion to his greater inwardness Euripides' treatment of ethical themes excels that of his predecessors in the plays considered.

The records of primitive peoples as collected by such historians as Frazer and Westermarck strongly suggest a constant correlation between ethical outwardness and primitive morality, and it is tempting to infer without more ado that the view of sin in Aeschylus and in the Oedipus plays of Sophocles is a mere survival of this earlier belief, an inference to which we are the more easily led by the intense subjectivism of Christian ethics, especially since Kant. But this would be to identify the tree with its root, and to learn of other moralities nothing but confirmation of our own. Surely in view of their clear consciousness of the meaning of inward innocence the assertion of Aeschylus and Sophocles that the outward act as such has its moral significance cannot be thus lightly dismissed.

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KANT'S "EMPTY" MORAL LAW

MARGARET C. AMIG

The purpose of this paper is to show that the large and important place which the conception of freedom held in Kant's teaching is responsible for his conception of the moral law as "empty."

By freedom Kant meant fundamentally self-activity which, taken negatively, is independence of the phenomenal, causal series of events. "The *will*," he explains, "is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and *freedom* would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently on foreign causes *deter-*

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mining it."[1] For the self really belongs to two worlds—the sense-world and the intelligible world; and while as a member of the sense-world it is under the physical necessity "of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes,"[2] the same self in the intelligible world is free of such constraint. In Kant's own words,

> a rational being . . . . has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognize laws of the exercise of his faculties . . . . *first*, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); *secondly*, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being independent on nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone [autonomy].[3]

The most important form of this self-legislation or autonomy of the will is moral freedom, voluntary conformity with the moral law or (negatively once more) independence of sensuous desires. The will, subject to the desire for any material object, is, as a matter of fact, motivated by the anticipated pleasure which that object will bring. It is therefore determined by feeling, which belongs to the world of sense. The will, on the other hand, which submits itself to the moral law "under the name of *obligation*, ... [suffers only a] . . . . moral constraint . . . . which may be called an internal, but intellectual, compulsion."[4] The determination of the will, therefore, in accordance with the moral law is *self*-determination or moral freedom. Kant very often confuses or identifies this moral freedom with freedom in the basal sense of self-activity. But this confusion is irrelevant to the present argument which disregards also Kant's occasional references to freedom in a third sense, that is, freedom of choice.

Kant states the moral principle or law in this way: "I am never to act otherwise than so *that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.*"[5] And he constantly stresses the emptiness, or lack of content of this law. Thus he says, "a rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by their matter, but by their form only."[6] And again: "It is the legislative form . . . . contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of determination of the

[1] Kant, *Theory of Ethics*, Abbott translation from Vol. VIII of Rosenkranz and Shubert Edition; *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 65 (Rosenkranz, p. 78) (Rosenkranz hereafter referred to as R).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 65 (R, p. 78).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 72 (R, p. 86).

[4] *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 121 (R, p. 144).

[5] *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 18 (R, p. 22).

[6] *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 114 (R, p. 136).

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[free] will."[7] But he also states the moral law in terms which are far from being empty, when he says: "*rational nature exists as an end in itself.* . . . . Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: *So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.*"[8]

The question therefore arises: Why does Kant make the moral law empty of content? Why does it have only form and not matter? Why does Kant deny an object to the will when he proceeds to add an imperative about using human beings as ends and not as means, to develop his conception of the Kingdom of Ends, and later on to discuss the *summum bonum?* I believe that the answer to this question is to be found in the ambiguity of his conception of the object-of-will.

There are two ways in which one may understand the expression "object-of-will." In the first place, it may denote that which is willed; and in the second, that which determines the will. That this double meaning occurs may be shown by an illustration. Critics of any ethics based on psychological hedonism claim that it results in determinism and therefore annuls itself. For, they reason, if we always *do* will pleasure, then any possible choices are decided for us in favor of pleasure, and *moral* decisions vanish. This criticism rests on the identification of *object-willed* with *object-which-determines-will.* It argues that to say we always will pleasure implies, so to speak, that pleasure wills us.

I think that both these meanings of object-of-will are to be found in Kant; and that when he denies any matter to the moral law he has in mind *object-determining-will.* For matter to Kant means phenomena, and the will being noumenal and autonomous, or *self*-legislating, simply cannot be determined by anything phenomenal. On the other hand, I think, that Kant means *object-determined-by-will,* or object effected by practical reason, when he discusses ends and the *summum bonum.* Therefore, one can see why there is both an "empty" negative and a very definite positive teaching in Kant's ethical writings, and can reconcile them. The reason for this dual conception, consequently, is not inconsistency in Kant's ethics but ambiguity in his terminology. An attempt to substantiate these statements follows.

1. Kant, himself, in at least two places makes the distinction between the two meanings of object-of-will. (*a*) In a footnote to a certain paragraph about what determines the will which "ought," Kant discusses the meaning of the term "interest." He says:

> The dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is called an *interest.* . . . . The human will can . . . . *take an interest* in a thing without therefore acting *from interest.* The former indicates the *prac-*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 117 (R, p. 139). [8] *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 47 (R, p. 57).

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tical interest in the action, the latter the *pathological* in the object of the action. . . . .[9]

The distinction here drawn between *"taking an interest"* and "acting *from interest"* indicates, I think, Kant's realization of what he is so frequently accused of neglecting, namely, the fact that in action, one does not merely act, but does *something*. Whenever the will, whether swayed by inclination, or impelled by a sense of duty, wills some action, that action takes place in the phenomenal world, the world of objects. Kant maintains, however, that although one may have an object in willing, the will is not necessarily influenced by that object; i.e., "The human will can *take an interest* in a thing without therefore acting *from interest.*" In other words, although the morally free will is determined by no object, there may be an object of the willing.

b) The second passage which I have selected gives more direct evidence that Kant distinguished between the two ways of taking object-of-will. It is found in the first "Remark" to the fourth theorem of chapter i of the *Analytic of Practical Reason*. Theorem IV, it will be recalled is about the autonomy of the will. Kant writes:

> Now, it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object, and therefore a matter; but it does not follow that this is the determining principle, and the condition of the maxim; . . . . Thus, the happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being. But if it were the determining principle of the maxim. . . . .[10]

c) A third passage confirms my point. Following a statement about the supersensible world which we look on "as an object of our will as pure rational beings"[11] comes this paragraph:

> Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to which the *will is subject*, and of a natural system which is *subject* to a will (as far as its relation to its free actions is concerned) rests on this, that in the former the objects must be causes of the ideas which determine the will; whereas in the latter the will is the cause of the objects; so that its causality has its determining principle solely in the pure faculty of reason. . . . .[12]

I have no doubt other passages can be found to support my view that Kant was aware of the double meaning of object-of-will. It is, however, less important to substantiate this first point than to show that Kant actually used the phrase now in one and now in the other of its

[9] *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 30, footnote (R, p. 37).
[10] *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 123 (R, p. 146).
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 133 (R, p. 159).
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 134 (R, p. 159).

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meanings. My second purpose is, therefore, to cite passages illustrative of such use.

2. The following are passages in which *object-of-will* means *object-which-determines-will:*

Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will. . . . .[13]

Therefore it was not the object (the happiness of others) that determined the pure will. . . . .[14]

But an end—being an *object* which must precede the determination of the will by a practical rule, and contain the ground of the possibility of this determination. . . . .[15]

. . . . they sought for an object-of-the-will which they could make the matter and principle of a law (which consequently could not determine the will directly but by means of that object . . . .)[16]

Passages in which "object-of-will" means "object-willed" include the following:

. . . . whether the causality of the will suffices for the realization of the object or not . . . .[17]

By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom . . . .[18]

. . . . afterwards determine the object in accordance with the will.[19]

A passage in which both meanings of "object-of-will" occur is:

This concept of an *object (as a good)* would at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining principle of the will.[20]

3. Now in the third place, I maintain that for Kant the matter of the law means *object-determining-will.* The following quotations substantiate this conclusion:

Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, i.e., every object of the will (as a determining principle), nothing is left but the mere *form* of a universal legislation.[21]

[13] *Metaphysic of Morals,* p. 17 (R, p. 20).

[14] *Critique of Practical Reason,* p. 123 (R, p. 147).

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 130 (R, p. 155).

[16] Ibid., p. 155 (R, p. 184).

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 135 (R, p. 161).

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 148 (R, p. 176), cf. the rest of the paragraph.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 155 (R, p. 185).

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 154 (R, p. 183). Italics the author's.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 114 (R, p. 136).

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. . . . they sought for an object of the will which they could make the matter and principle . . . .[22]

It is to be noted that both "matter" and "object-determining-the-will" are phenomenal to Kant. Thus he says in the Analytic, Theorem II and Corollary: "All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind, and come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness."[23]

4. I have finally to show, as I set out to do, the close connection in Kant's system of ethics between freedom and the emptiness of the moral law. (*a*) Freedom in the negative sense means that the will is independent of phenomenal causality. Any moral law, which is compatible with freedom, therefore, must ensure the will's independence of any and all determination in the world of sense. Since matter of the law would be phenomenal and thus determined, the moral law must be purely formal or empty. Therefore Theorem III of the *Analytic* states:

A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by their matter, but by their form only.

By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will. This object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. . . . . Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, i.e., every object of the will (as a determining principle), nothing is left but the mere *form* of a universal legislation. . . . .[24]

And in Problem I is found:

Now if no other determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that universal legislative form, such a will must be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation, namely, the law of causality; such independence is called *freedom* in the strictest, that is in the transcendental sense.[25]

Obviously, if the will is determined by the form of the law alone, that form itself must be non-phenomenal. Kant affirms this in Problem I of the fourth theorem.

Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason and is, therefore, not an object of the senses, and consequently does not belong to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles that determine events in nature according to

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 155 (R, p. 184). See also p. 129 (R, p. 154)—the table of "Material Principles," and following. Here the "material part" means an end and end means an object, determining the will.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 108 (R, p. 129).

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 114 f. (R, p. 136).

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 116 (R, p. 139).

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the law of causality, because in their case the determining principles must themselves be phenomena.[26]

b) Freedom in its positive sense, means *self-legislation*. Therefore, if the will is self-determined, it cannot be dependent on any object. Again it is seen that the law cannot include any matter. Theorem IV states:

> If . . . . the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the practical law, *as the condition of its possibility*, there results heteronomy of the elective will, namely, dependence on the psychical law that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to follow pathological law; . . . .[27]

Perhaps it seems contradictory to say that the will is autonomous and at the same time hold that it is determined by the form of the law. If one remembers that the moral law is derived from practical reason, he will see that the formal law, as the object or determining principle of the will, merely expresses its dictates. In precise terms, the will is *self*-determined *in accordance* with the formal law of morality.

It has thus been argued that when Kant describes the moral law as empty of matter, or object, he means by that term "the object which determines the will." When on the other hand he teaches that man is an end in himself; and that the *summum bonum* is the object of the good will he is speaking of object in the second sense of the term as effected by will. Kant's insistence on the formulation of the moral law before any discussion of what the good is, is responsible for the emphasis laid on the formalism or emptiness of his ethics; and that formalism is due, as I have tried to show, to his conception of the morally willing self as free. His positive teaching, however, must not be lost sight of. When thoroughly understood, it will be seen to follow and supplement rather than contradict his negative ethics. *"The concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it."*[28] For it is not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral law, and makes it possible, but that, on the contrary, it is the moral law that first determines the concept of good, and makes it possible, so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely."[29]

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 116 (R, p. 138 f.).
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 122 (R, p. 145).
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 154 (R, p. 183).
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 155 (R, p. 184).

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BOOK REVIEWS

SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS. By John Maurice Clark. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1926. Pp. xviii+483.

Under this title Professor Clark considers a broad range of fundamental problems. This volume is listed as one of a series entitled "Materials for the Study of Business"; but it may with equal or greater fitness be regarded as a treatise on economic and political philosophy. It envisages as its field the interpretation of the problem of adjusting conflicting interests and claims of rights, and harnessing selfish interests to mutual service. Individualism and socialism are alternative schemes for this end. But individualism is discovered to be a much more complex system than is ordinarily supposed. As actually applied we have not a system of private rights to be invaded as little as possible by government, an alien control; we have a scheme which can operate only in the enveloping medium of a broader community life. To analyze the intricate interrelations between our business system and the law of the land, to discover the subtle as well as the obvious types of safeguarding public welfare, is then the first problem. This involves a comparison of the existing status of business with the conditions required under a strict theoretical individualism and a comparison of the present order with previous types of control and with other possible systems.

"We are living in the midst of a revolution." Three groups of causes are at work: "organized large scale production, ... the growth of democracy, ... the growth of science and the changing attitude of the human mind itself toward the world at large and toward human organization in particular." In a brilliant chapter, "Are We Rulers or Subjects," the author pictures the enormous strength of business organization and the far-reaching effects of machinery. He admits that at present machines have the better of us in many respects and that our political state is not ready for controlling the process. The question so incisively raised by Tawney as to whether production for profit can give production for use is considered, and the need of progressive change in the constitution of private industry is recognized. "If private industry does not meet this test, its tenure is insecure and its outlook for the future is dark."

Part II, "General Instruments of Control," discusses through several chapters legal institutions and their relations to economic life, and fol-

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lows this with a discussion of the necessity for standards and of the general informal controls, such as codes of the professions and business. This gives an account of the actual progress of control through police power, property affected with public interest, regulation of competition, leading up to a chapter on "An Economic Constitution for the State." One notable advance over earlier individualistic treatments is the setting up of a definite scientific standard as one of the conditions under which public control may be justified. "The presumption should always be against allowing the state to substitute its judgment for that of any individual in matters which primarily concern him unless the state's judgment is fortified by some systematic and impartial reckoning, ... or by a standard of human welfare which has scientific authority." Of the code of business he remarks: "A most curious mixture of the more presentable phases of intelligent private interest, class interest, community obligation, and natural human sympathy, wherein altruism is upheld one moment and apologized for the next, and virtue and expediency are inextricably interwoven." Henry Ford has been hated as a traitor to his class in his dealings with labor.

Part III studies particular types of control, such as price control, fair earnings, trusts. A final chapter, "If I Were Dictator," summarizes certain principles, for bringing about gradual improvement, in which the scientific features are emphasized. Industrial councils would take over many quasi-public functions. The principles which would be suggested to them by the dictator would involve some very radical changes over present practices. In fact, the outstanding feature of the proposed program is the fact that our dictator does not dictate.

The outcome of the book is therefore different in principle from the older defences of individualism or attacks of socialism. Instead of the sweeping arguments which left the opponents not a leg to stand upon, we find an attitude of exploration, with confidence in the application of scientific methods to solve an increasing proportion of difficult problems. But will the business world stand for such employment of science? This will doubtless depend in part upon showing that production for use is capable in many cases of yielding a large profit; but it must depend also upon the growth of humane and democratic standards; and for these we must look to influences outside the economic field.

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THE DEVELOPMENT, SIGNIFICANCE AND SOME LIMITATIONS OF HEGEL'S ETHICAL TEACHING. By W. S. Chang, Ph.D. (Mich.), D. Phil. (Oxon), Professor of Philosophy and Education in the National University of Peking. Shanghai, China: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1925. Pp. xi+137.

This is an important and valuable work; and it has a special interest as coming from a representative of a country very different both from Hegel's Germany and from the English-speaking communities of our own time. It is an attempt, similar to that of Professor Reyburn,[1] to deal in a comprehensive way with all the writings of Hegel that are concerned with ethical problems. This is a difficult task; for Hegel did not write any work that could properly be described as a treatise on ethics, at least in the somewhat limited sense that is usually given to that term by British and American writers. Most of what Hegel has to say on the subject is contained in writings that would now be characterised as dealing with social and political philosophy, rather than with ethics in the narrower sense of the term. This fact has led to some misconceptions and to a certain amount of misrepresentation. The circumstance that the most considerable of Hegel's writings bearing upon matters of conduct is concerned mainly with the legal and political aspects of life, regarded to some extent historically, has given rise to a tendency to view his general attitude towards human affairs as having a certain hardness such as is now commonly associated with that of the extreme supporters of the Prussian State. Even writers largely in sympathy with the idealistic movement of which Hegel was the greatest representative—such as the late Professor C. E. Vaughan[2]—appear to have been somewhat misled in this way. Professor Chang's survey, along with the excellent little book by Professor Reyburn, should go far to remove such misconceptions. I do not mean to affirm that they are entirely unfounded. It must be admitted that Hegel, more perhaps than most men, boasted two soul-sides. His adventurous speculations, as Professor J. A. Smith remarks in an Introductory Note, were qualified by "his practical wisdom and his sturdy, and to tell the truth, often pedestrian common sense." But, in the light of the comprehensive outlook that is here supplied, the whole system is made very much more intelligible; and some of the features that had appeared a little harsh are greatly softened. Professor Chang admits a somewhat undue emphasis on nationality; but this was almost inevitable at the time when Hegel wrote—the time when the national con-

[1] *The Ethical Theory of Hegel*, Clarendon Press, 1921.

[2] See his *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*, Vol. II.

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sciousness of the German people was being somewhat harshly awakened. He admits also that Hegel had an undue tendency to subordinate the conception of the nation to that of the state—a fault that has been noted in some of Hegel's British disciples as well as in the work of their master. As was to be expected from a Chinese author, he is somewhat dissatisfied also with Hegel's treatment of the family. Here, of course, some allowance has to be made for differences in the social customs of different countries.

It would not be possible in a short review to consider the details of Professor Chang's treatment, even if I were more competent than I am to examine them; but I can confidently recommend the book to readers of this *Journal*. It appears to me to be remarkably clear, full, accurate, and judicious.

J. S. MACKENZIE

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

THE RISE OF MODERN INDUSTRY. By J. L. and Barbara Hammond. London: Methuen & Co., 1926. Pp. xii+280. Price, 10*s*. net.

Mr. Hammond studies in his new volume the English industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in sharp and telling perspective, a period when man passed definitely from one world to another, and to a society acquisitive rather than feudal in character. Starting from the commercial revolution consequent upon the discoveries of Columbus and other great explorers, which moved the trade center from west to east, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, he stresses the salient stages of the new development, such as the changes in transport which preceded railways, the dissolution of the peasant village, the elimination of custom as codified in the old craft guilds and the free hand thus given to capital. While it would have been impossible to record the effects of the industrial revolution in the entire field of industry in a book of the present scope, the diverse industries of coal, iron, and cotton are taken as representatives of different aspects. The stages of the change thus briefly indicated, Mr. Hammond, who is more interested in its human and social than its material aspect, proceeds to investigate the darker shadows of the new system, such as the "shadow of slavery" extending from the traffic in negro slaves to the employment of child labor in factories, and points to the resemblance between the arguments by which the two abuses were defended.

It was natural for the age that witnessed the first swift triumphs of

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the new system to worship production for profit. Any people into whose hands this power had fallen must have been intoxicated and reduced to the state that Matthew Boulton described as "steam-mill mad," just as any people that had just controlled the new wealth of America in the fifteenth century would have been as frantic as the Spaniards in their pursuit of gold and silver. Over a large surface of the industrial community (as Lord Shaftesbury wrote in 1842) "man has been regarded as an animal, and that not an animal of the highest order; his loftiest faculties, when not prostrate, are perverted, and his lowest exclusively devoted to the manufacture of wealth." The cooler sense of the twentieth century sees upon the industrial society of the nineteenth century the curse of Midas, "the new factories and the new furnaces were like the pyramids telling of man's enslavement rather than his power, casting their long shadows over the society that took such pride in them." It is the point of view of Blake, seeing the "dark satanic mills."

The two final chapters describe the struggle between the blind passion for production and the instinct to create a society. Here the struggle is illuminated by a comparison with two other ages of confusion, the period of pillage consequent upon the Roman seizure of the Mediterranean, and the violence which followed the discovery of America. As in these cases, mankind has to some extent retraced its steps after the first descent into chaos, and remedial institutions were devised, such as the factory law, the civil service, and the trades unions, the first two by the governing classes, the last a contribution from the governed.

The book, as the author tells us, is written for the general reader; and its scope and intention are adequately described in the preface. As in all the author's books, however, the spirit and visionary power of his presentment are peculiarly valuable, as is the wide historic sense which limits his indignation and keeps the action presented upon the wide theater in due perspective.

M. J.

SHORTER NOTICES

RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM. By R. H. Tawney. London: John Murray, 1926. Pp. xiv+339. Price 10*s.* 6*d.*

The moral theories and ideals implied in our contemporary business practices have been already studied by Troelsch and Max Weber. But Mr. Tawney has carried the historical treatment of the problem much farther. The book begins with a general treatment of the medieval theory affecting eco-

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nomic life, the argument against "usury" and the subordination of economic to ethical and religious issues. Then an excellent account is given of the theories of Luther, Calvin, and the English Puritans. It is pointed out that Calvin attempted to make a step forward by allowing for the new economic issues of his day; but his effort resulted in confirming the tendency to disregard ethical considerations or at any rate to subordinate them to interests in wealth-getting. The Puritans made a virtue of success in business: and this has greatly affected the United States. The complacent assumptions of post-Reformation social standards have reinforced the tendency to overrate the importance of wealth-production and still more of the acquisition of wealth. Mr. Tawney's book is essential for any student who is interested in the moral problems of contemporary business and industry. He corrects the more extreme views of Max Weber, since he is not convinced that Protestantism is essentially ineffectual in regard to economic greed. But perhaps Mr. Tawney does not allow sufficiently for the fact that even the medieval theory of "business" was partly an excuse for what the majority found it convenient to do. There is a tendency to idealise the middle ages: but of course Mr. Tawney sees that the reason why the middle ages did not make the mistakes of the Reformation was that the issues were never faced by the middle ages. The moral problems of the existing economic system are seldom faced and the chief value of Mr. Tawney's book will be that it assist us to face them.

C. D. B.

A Study in Moral Theory. By John Laird, Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926. Pp. 327. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Professor Laird is known by his book on realism and the self. Here he attempts a restatement of ethical theory on a Kantian basis. The book is based on lectures delivered in the University of California. Duty and will, as in Kant, play prominent parts and the imperatives and obligations of the moral life are attached to that extreme individualism which Professor Laird himself connects with the "Protestant" tradition. The reason appears at a later stage and psychological data are discussed only in chapters vi and vii. Professor Laird rejects the view that moral values are social, and he confuses this view with some other in referring to "collective willing" whatever that may be. The final chapter deals with moral philosophy.

It is strange that Professor Laird does not deal with the more Aristotelian view of Professor L. T. Hobhouse and that the "practice" which is referred to in "the application to practice" appears to be as limited as that regularized in Königsberg at the end of the eighteenth century. Duty is not analyzed, nor "the sense of duty." The self of which Professor Laird speaks appears to be a metaphysical fact but its relation to the morality of "self" development is not explained. It must, however, be said that the book is full of acute analysis and contains reference to the literature of politics for the purpose of very cogent

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criticism. Perhaps the author would regard it as a sufficient end that his book is able to stir the reader to definite disagreement. The book is less formal than ethical treatises usually are and thereby it gains immensely.

C. D. B.

THE WORSHIP OF NATURE. Vol. I. By Sir James Frazer. London: Macmillan Co., 1926. Price, 25s. net.

Sir James Frazer's Gifford lectures are a record and exposition of the fact that "the mind of man refuses to acquiesce in the phenomena of sense," but driven by some impulse seeks for something more real than the world which is always in a state of flux. The book is thus a study of natural religion in one of its aspects, the worship of nature, which overflowed the limits of one Gifford course and was continued into the second; so that the second aspect, the worship of the dead, is not included or discussed. Except for the introduction, this first volume is one of Sir James' feats of marshaling an immense army of facts, and of classifying and expounding the theology of simple folk, taking the great natural phenomena one by one, the sky, the earth, the sun. The sky, earth, and the sun are thought to be animated and to resemble man in kind, but to exceed him in degree. There seems to be an universal need to form a conception that will simplify and unify if possible. The multitude of spiritual beings which were imagined by the savage were limited "in virtue of what we may call the economy of thought," were generalised and reduced to a comparatively small number of deities; thus animism was replaced by polytheism. But the instinct for simplification and abstraction was still at work sapping this Pantheon, and polytheism tended to resolve itself into monotheism. Thus, as Sir James notes in an interesting analogy, the spiritualistic theory of the world has undergone a process of simplification and unification analogous to that undergone by the materialistic theory: as the materialistic hypothesis has reduced the multitudinous forms of matter to one substance, hydrogen, so the spiritualistic hypothesis has reduced the number of spirits to one god.

Sir James's attention has been given (as he says) almost exclusively to the early history, or rather to the embryology of natural religion; hence he draws upon this immense reservoir of his knowledge of the ideas of the ancients and backward races as to the divine nature and its relations to the world, and the result is a complex, picturesque and fantastic record. "Crude theories and preposterous practices," and there are many in the record, are not without interest, in that they enable us to reconstruct the efforts of these naïve and simple pioneers of philosophy, refusing to rest and acquiesce in the phenomena of sense.

M. J.

RELIGION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES. By Julius Seelye Bixler. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1926. Pp. xvii+225.

This is a survey of the attitude of William James toward religion. In addition to the published writings the author has had access to unpublished

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letters and has published several of these. The relation of James's religious beliefs to the various aspects of pragmatism, empiricism, and pluralism is considered at length. The author is convinced that the religious attitude which James sets forth is "sure to appeal and is already appealing to the generation just coming to maturity." The volume is printed as one of the series of "Amherst Books" and to those who remember the devotion to philosophy of President Julius Seelye it will appear fitting that this excellent study by his grandson should have a place in this series.

J. H. T.

THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS. A Course of Four Lectures Delivered in the University of London in March, 1924, by Hans Driesch. London: The Faith Press, Ltd. Pp. 63. Price 2*s.* 6*d.*

This little book gives a summary of Professor Driesch's well-known philosophy, but it is also a very clear statement of the general character of any philosophy. The chief philosophical conceptions are explained and their connection with ordinary experience is very well rendered. The book may form a useful summary introduction to philosophy.

C. D. B.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEBEN UND LEHRE. Von Ferdinand Tönnies, O. O. Prof. zu Kiel. (3d enlarged edition.) Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag, 1925.

The second edition of this book was published twelve years ago. The changed political situation gives a new interest to this discussion of the English political philosopher who was a "realist" in the best and the worst senses of that word. Professor Tönnies gives us seventy-three pages on the life and times of Hobbes and about two hundred pages on his doctrine. Hobbes' logic and physics are dealt with fully, but naturally about half the book discusses his social theory. The materialism of Hobbes' outlook is excellently stated. There is a full bibliography.

C. D. B.

THE KEY TO THE STUDY OF ST. THOMAS. By Francesco Olgiati. Translated from the Italian by John S. Zybura. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1925. Pp. viii+176. Price, $1.25 net.

Attempting to supplement the various detailed studies of the Thomistic system by giving a synthetic and unified interpretation in terms of the focal idea, this volume emphasizes the conception of being in St. Thomas' philosophy. The Thomistic metaphysics, theodicy, theology, psychology, logic, and ethics are all presented as developments of this one fundamental concept. When this key is used, we should be able to see, if our author may be believed, that all philosophers from the dawn of philosophic investigation down to the time of St. Thomas are representatives of a continuous preparation culminating in the magnificent flowering of the two great *Summae,* and that the Thomistic system furnishes the key for the solution of the fundamental problem on which depends the future of philosophic thought.

C. M. PERRY

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KUNG-TSE. By Richard Wilhelm. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag, 1925. Pp. 210.

This is a volume in the series of the "Classics of Philosophy." It contains a short account of the life of Confucius and of his work; and the author then gives an analysis and criticism of his teachings. The fundamental point is said to be not the conclusion but the method—"To penetrate through everything" is the essential. As for the social theory adopted by Confucius, simplicity in tastes and "consumption" is most important. The whole statement of Confucianism is clear and fully documented.

C. D. B.

EUGENICS AND POLITICS: ESSAYS. By F. C. S. Schiller. London: Constable and Co., 1926. Pp. 220. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

The pragmatism or humanism which is naturally connected with Dr. Schiller's name is not apparent in these essays: for they are as absolute in tone as any idealism. The main argument is that eugenics would provide principles by which the type of humanity now prevailing could be immensely improved. Eugenics is said to be opposed by "civilization," in the sense of that ill-used word which connects it with war and not with Dr. Schiller's theories. There is a long interlude in the form of a dialogue between Plato and the author; an essay on the downfall of the Roman Empire and one answering various objections to eugenics. Dr. Schiller in his preface admits that this book must be regarded as "lighter literature to arouse interest in the subject" rather than as a contribution to the problem of improving the race. The *Essays* are amusingly written and full of "hits" at contemporary foibles and prejudices.

C. D. B.

FALSE DAWN. By A. Carthill. Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons, 1926. Pp. 224. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

The author has already published two political essays, "The Lost Dominion" and "The Legacy of Liberalism." The present group of short remarks deals with Revolution or, as the author puts it, "The present tract is confined to an inquiry—that is, as to what are the causes which render a society susceptible to revolutionary ideas?" The great danger in England at present is said to be the Trade Union movement. Fascism is good in Italy, but unnecessary in England where the political institutions are sound. However, there is grave danger even in England from Communism. The author apparently does not live in England and that may be a partial explanation of his mistakes in regard to facts.

C. D. B.

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS PRESENTED TO JOHN WATSON. "Queen's University Studies." Kingston, Canada: Queen's University, 1922. Pp. 346. Price. $1.50.

This volume of essays in commemoration of the completion of fifty years of service as Charlton Professor of Moral Philosophy by Dr. John Watson includes eleven essays by colleagues, students, or friends. It is a tribute in

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which many who have not known Professor Watson personally will gladly join, for few writers in philosophy have been so continuously active, and none in this country has extended his contributions through so long a period. The paper by Professor Lodge on Moral Validity in the Platonic System is, like all author's contributions, a careful and judicious study. In particular, the aim is to interpret the actual meaning of the good as that which constitutes reality.

It must have meant much to Queen's University to have had such a personality as that of Dr. Watson through half a century; and the University, as well as Dr. Watson, is to be congratulated upon this volume.

J. H. T.

THE AO TRIBE OF ASSAM. By William Carlson Smith, with an Introduction by J. H. Hutton. London: Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. xxvii+244. Price, $5.00.

A sympathetic study of a tribe which has offered several interesting problems in its culture complex and which is now undergoing changes in its customs because of contacts with Christianity. The government has also interfered with the practice of head hunting. "When this practice was stopped the Nagas had to satisfy their craving for new experience in some other way and this has actually led to a lowering of the moral tone of the group in certain ways."

J. H. T.

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: ITS CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE, AND WORK. By A. P. Fachiri, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Oxford University Press, 1925. Pp. 342.

This is a short and yet very complete explanation of the nature and the work of the International Court. It does not deal with the theory of international jurisdiction, as the book of M. Politis, on the Court, does; but Mr. Fachiri's work will be found most valuable as a work of reference. Indeed, it is not too much to say that it is essential for any library of a university or college. The latter part of the book gives in detail the cases which have been before the Court, as, for example, that of French nationality in Tunis and the Palestine concessions. The last chapter, which deals with the relation between the Court and the League, shows that the position of the United States in regard to the League need not be changed even if the United States became one of the members constituting the Court. There is a full appendix giving the texts of documents, and throughout the book there are detailed references to the publications of the Court.

C. D. B.

THE HISTORY OF UTOPIAN THOUGHT. By Joyce O. Hertzler. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926. Pp. 321. Price, $1.50.

The author has here attempted both to give on a small scale the history of utopias, sacred and secular, and to indicate the sort of matrix out of which such thinking arises, the type of personality to whom the visions come, and the relation of such thinking to social progress. Ideals grow out of lacks; they come to sensitive souls who feel deeply the lacks; they become socially effective through suggestion and imitation; and—though progress would perhaps have taken place much as it has without them—utopias have, thinks he, accelerated social

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advance. The compensatory function served by idealistic thinking is not here emphasized, and the account as a whole suffers in still other regards when compared with Lewis Mumford's delightfully written *The Story of Utopias*.

T. V. S.

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

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The International Journal of Ethics

Vol. XXXVII JANUARY 1927 No. 2

CONTENTS

PAGE

A SYMPOSIUM UPON ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY

The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics 113
By W. D. Ross, Oxford University

The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics 128
By George P. Adams, University of California

Value and Existence 138
By Leonard J. Russell, University of Birmingham

The Objectivity of Moral Judgments 147
By William Kelley Wright, Dartmouth College

THE SUBLIME, THE BEAUTIFUL, AND THE GOOD 159
By Herbert Ellsworth Cory, University of Washington, Seattle

THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE 173
By Sidney Hook, New York City

DEMOCRACY AND THE CONCEPT OF QUANTITY 189
By Marie Collins Swabey, New York University

BOOK REVIEWS

Krabbe, H., The Modern Idea of the State 208
By T. V. Smith

Périgord, Paul, The International Labor Organization 210
By Paul H. Douglas

Heermance, Edgar L., The Ethics of Business 212
By C. F. Taeusch

Haldane, Viscount, Human Experience: A Study of Its Structure . . 213
By C. D. Burns

Leuba, James B., The Psychology of Religious Mysticism 214
By E. F.

Douglas, Paul H., Wages and the Family 215
By A. P. Brogan

SHORTER NOTICES 217

BOOKS RECEIVED 223

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXVII JANUARY 1927 Number 2

A SYMPOSIUM UPON ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY

THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS IN ETHICS[1]

W. D. ROSS

In this title I find two preliminary difficulties: (1) What is meant by the *basis* of a judgment, and (2) what is meant by the implied distinction between objective and subjective judgments?

1. By the basis of a judgment might be meant the psychological cause (e.g., prejudices, hopes, fears) that lead us to form a judgment. To discover what these are forms an interesting problem, but not (I think) a very important one. For to say that a judgment is due to causes is to imply that it is not based on reasons, and so far as this is the case we have no ground for believing it to be true; it will be a mere accident if it is true. The question we are meant to discuss must be the question of the *logical* basis of our judgments, or in other words, the question, What are the facts which make them true, when they are true? Now this seems to mean two different things according as the judgment in question is a direct or an inferential one. In the latter case the basis of the judgment naturally means the premise or premises on which it rests. In the former case it

[1] Read at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy and printed with the permission of the Congress.

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cannot mean this, and can, I think, mean nothing but the *fact* expressed in the judgment. In the former case, again, the question, What is the basis of such and such a judgment? (the question implied in our title) is unmeaning. If the judgment has a basis at all, i.e., if it is expressive of a fact, the basis can only be the fact already expressed in the judgment. The real question, then, about a judgment not reached by inference is not, What is its basis? but, Has it a basis? i.e., Does it express a fact? or, in other words, Is it true? In the latter case the question, What is its basis? is a significant question, since it may not be clear what the premises are that warrant a given inferential judgment. In the case of judgments put forward as direct we have only to ask, Have they a basis? In the case of inferential judgments we have to ask both, Have they a basis? and, If so, what is it? But the first question cannot be answered without answering the second. We can discover that the judgment has a basis only by discovering what the basis is. But first of all, since it is not always clear whether our judgments are direct or inferential, we must ask which they are.

2. The distinction drawn between objective and subjective judgments is a puzzling one. The possible meanings of "objective" that occur to me are (*a*) believed to be true independently of their being judged. But in this sense all ethical judgments, and all judgments whatsoever, are objective. In making any judgment I inevitably believe it to be true independently of my judging it. This meaning, then, will not serve for a division of judgments into objective and subjective. (*b*) Actually true independently of being judged. Now what is true must necessarily be true independently of being judged. (Or, lest anyone should object that truth is a characteristic only of judgments, and that judgments can exist and can be true only if they are judged, let me say that if a judgment is true, the fact which it states must be a fact independently of being judged to be such.) In this sense, therefore, the distinction between objective and subjective judgments will

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simply be that between true and false judgments, but incorrectly expressed. To say that our predications of good, for instance, may be true, but not in this sense objective, is to say that good = thought good by a mind. But this is a circular definition which leads at once to a vicious infinite regress; and it may further be refuted by the following consideration. We could suppose, say, an act of self-denial which neither the doer nor anyone else had ever pronounced good. If now some mind became aware of it, it might pronounce that the act had been good even when it was not being thought so. Its goodness then cannot be equated with being thought good by a mind. Shall we say, then, that good means such as to be thought good *when* attended to by a mind? That this will not do is made clear by asking whether the thought in question is true or false. That which is falsely thought good when attended to is obviously not good. And if we say to be good = to be such as to be truly thought good when attended to, that very phrase implies that the thing in question really is good apart from being attended to. (*c*) True independently of any psychological effect produced by the subject of the judgment on the judger. It is, I think, mainly in this sense that doubt is felt as to whether any of our predications of good or of right are objectively true. When, for instance, it is said that our predications of good are merely subjective, it is usually meant that good means simply pleasant, or desired, or approved, or tending to satisfy desire, or, in general, producing a certain psychological effect on the judger.

The questions that emerge then are the following: (1) Are there such things as goodness and badness, rightness and wrongness, independently of any psychological effect produced by their subjects on the judger? (2) If there are, can we discover what subjects they belong to? (3) Are the judgments in which we predicate them direct or inferential, or some the one, some the other? (4) If any are inferential, what are their premises?

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1. We have to ask, then, whether good means producing a certain kind of experience in a mind. This may be subdivided into two main possibilities. (*a*) Good might mean thought good by a mind. This suggestion I have already dealt with. (*b*) The only other way in which we might say "Good = such as to produce a certain effect on a mind" is to say "Good = such as to produce a certain state of *feeling* in a mind." This has been perhaps the commonest way of trying to make "good" subjective; witness the many attempts to equate good with pleasant, or desired. This attempt is not open to the same objection as the last, since the antithesis of true and false does not apply to feelings. I discard pleasant and desired as quite obviously not coextensive with good, let alone identical with it. The most natural name to give to the feeling, the tendency to produce which is to be identified with good, is the feeling of approval. But when I try to analyze what may loosely be called by this name, I can find nothing in it but the thought that the thing approved is good, + a feeling of pleasure in contemplating it. So that to say Good = such as to rouse approval when attended to means good = such as to rouse the thought that it is good, + a certain pleasure, when attended to; and we can see the unsatisfactoriness of this by once more asking whether the thought is true or false. That which is falsely thought good and gives pleasure is not good. And if good = such as to be truly thought good and to give pleasure, that implies that the thing called good is good apart from being thought good and therefore apart from rousing approval.

Does "*S* is good" mean, then, that this relation exists between *S* and me, e.g., that *S* is desired by me, or pleases me, or fulfils my desire? Of all such suggestions far the most plausible, to my mind, is the last. If even this can be seen to be untrue, I may perhaps be excused for not discussing the others. To this suggestion there are two objections (and very likely many more): (*a*) We often experience pleasures (e.g.,

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that of smelling a sweet-scented flower) which we have not desired. That they tend to satisfy desire could, I think, be known only by first desiring them and then finding that when we get them they satisfy our desire. But in fact we judge them to be good without having desired them at all. (*b*) It seems to be characteristic of *all* objects of desire that they tend to satisfy the desire for *them*. If a man desires revenge, this desire is satisfied when he takes his revenge. Yet we do not judge revenge to be good, but to be bad. "Yes," it may be said, "but revenge does not permanently, or completely, satisfy." It certainly does not satisfy our desire for things other than revenge. But if we interpret "tending to satisfy desire" not as "tending to satisfy the desire for itself," but as "tending to satisfy desire in general," no particular thing will be good, since no particular thing tends to satisfy all our desires. Only the sum of all objects of desire would then be good. But in fact we judge particular things to be good—virtue though it does not always or completely satisfy desire for pleasure, and pleasure though it does not satisfy desire for virtue. If tending to satisfy desire = good, then if we take tendency to satisfy desire in the one sense many things will be good which in fact we judge to be bad, and if we take it in the other sense no particular thing will be good at all. If we had only our predications of better and worse to take account of, this objection would perhaps not arise. We might argue, as many philosophers have done from Plato onward, that virtue satisfies other desires than the desire for virtue itself, while pleasure satisfies no desire but the desire for itself, and often hinders the satisfaction of desires for such things as virtue and knowledge; we might thus explain our judgment that virtue is better than pleasure, consistently with this definition of good. But this would involve treating goodness and badness as forming (like heat and cold) a continuous series in which only an arbitrary line can be drawn between them; while in fact we

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cannot help thinking of some things as definitely good and others as definitely bad.

It would seem, then, that tendency to satisfy desire is not coextensive with good; and therefore *a fortiori* it cannot be the meaning of good. Yet this is, in my judgment, the most plausible of all attempts to make goodness identical with some psychological relation between an experience and its experiencer. And it would seem to follow that goodness is even in this sense objective. I conclude, then, that good does not mean "such as to arouse some experience in a mind." Yet I have the conviction that apart from mind there is no such thing as good or value. The only possible conclusion is that good is a characteristic only of minds and states of mind. Now we undoubtedly apply the name "good" to many other things. A thing of any kind may be good in the sense of being good of its kind—a work of art, a machine, etc. I must therefore explain that my remarks about good apply only to good in the sense of good in itself, apart from any consequences or any use to which the thing in question may be put. And in this sense we do not, I think, say of a work of art or a machine that it is good. A work of art is good because it arouses a certain experience in a competent observer; a machine, because we can make a certain use of it. In point of fact, the only things we do think good in themselves are states or qualities of mind. Of a noble act I can say that it is good whatever may happen in consequence of it; and I can say the same, I think, of a pleasant experience as such, and of an intellectual achievement as such. I conclude, then, that good is objective in the sense of being independent of being attended to and of rousing any sort of experience in a mind, but not independent of mind, since it belongs only to minds and to their states and qualities.

2. We have next to ask the question whether we are ever able to discover what things are good. I must start by assuming, what I cannot doubt, that the mind is competent, when

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rightly used, to know in part the nature of reality. I claim to know that this is so, and if anyone is inclined to resist the claim, I must nevertheless ask him to allow me to make it. For unless we make this claim we can certainly not discuss philosophy or anything else, since whenever we say anything we claim to be saying something that is true of reality.

Now I seem to know, as certainly as I know anything, that such things as virtue, insight, and pleasure are good. To the assertion that virtue is good it might properly be objected that it is tautological, since by virtue we mean only a *good* state of character. But the same objection cannot be made to the statement that insight and pleasure are good. And the statement that virtue is good is only a brief way of saying that certain kinds of character or of motive—such as conscientiousness, courage, benevolence—which are not good by definition, yet are good. The great authority of Kant, no doubt, stands against the claim that any motive other than conscientiousness is good; but the mass of competent opinion asserts that benevolence and courage, for example, are good, even if less good than conscientiousness; and perhaps *no one* doubts that conscientiousness is good. Again, many doubt whether knowledge is in all cases good; the value of knowledge of unrelated matters of fact must in any case be small. But probably no one doubts that insight into the reasons and causes of things is good. And though we may think some pleasant states of consciousness bad on the whole, we judge their badness to spring from some element in them other than their pleasantness, and our whole attitude to such things as kindness, cruelty, and reward implies that we think pleasure in itself good, even if we deny that it ever exists in itself, apart from accompaniments in virtue of which the goodness of the whole state may be disproportionate to its pleasantness. When we seem often by consideration to detect goodness in something, the only check we can reasonably be asked to impose on ourselves is that of inquiring whether others have an

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opposite opinion, or no opinion, on the matter. And I believe that as regards the three states of mind I have named, the opinion I have expressed survives this test with very considerable success. Virtue, insight, pleasure—these are the things one or more of which have been selected as the good by the main schools of ethical thought, and it may well be the case that all have been right in what they asserted, and wrong in what they denied.

3. We have next to inquire whether our predications of good are direct or inferential. Obviously, none of them can be justified by inference unless there is some characteristic such that *all* the things possessing it are good. Now the attempts to state such a characteristic have, so far as I can recollect, all been attempts to find some psychological effect on the mind, production of which is coextensive with goodness. These have usually tried to show that the characteristic in question is identical with goodness, and when they have taken this form they would not, even if successful, have shown our predications of good to be inferential. For if $X =$ good, we do not infer the goodness of S from seeing it to be X, because to be X and to be good are the same thing. If, however, X and good are coextensive without being identical, our predication of good might be inferred from the predication of X. If my previous contentions were right, however, none of the characteristics put forward as identical with good is even coextensive with it, and in view of the failure of all such attempts hitherto we are perhaps justified in thinking that no such attempt is likely to be successful.

If our predications of good are inferential, then, it would seem that they must rest on no *single* middle term. I have ventured to suggest that virtuous, intelligent, pleasant are three different characteristics each of which implies the goodness of anything of which it can be predicated. We may say benevolence (or a particular instance of benevolence) is good because it is a species or instance of virtue; the knowledge of

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geometry (or a particular state of such knowledge) is good because it is a species or instance of insight; the pleasure of playing games (or a particular instance of it) is good because it is a species or instance of pleasure. But I doubt if these can be called real inferences. For to be a species or instance of virtue, insight, or pleasure is not a mere attribute of such a species or instance; it is its whole nature. To say that the insight into geometrical truth is a form of insight, or that the pleasure of playing games is a form of pleasure, is a mere tautology and not a judgment at all; and if so, it cannot serve as the premise of a syllogism.

Again, if we take some complex state of mind, such as love (which I believe to be a peculiar complex of benevolence and pleasure, and probably insight as well) or the aesthetic experience (which I believe to be a peculiar complex of pleasure and insight), can we say, supposing my analysis of them is right, that their goodness can be inferred from the goodness of their components? It might appear that we can. The analysis of them into their components is not a tautology. It may be disputed, and it may very likely be wrong. But if right, it might seem to afford a sufficient premise for judging love and the aesthetic experience to be good. It might be objected that what Professor G. E. Moore calls the principle of organic unities forbids us to infer the goodness of a complex from the goodness of its elements. But I can, at any rate, think of no complex that is bad though *all* its elements are good. Still, the mere fact that I admit the necessity of looking to see if there are instances to the contrary shows that I do not see the inference to be necessarily true; I do not look to see if there are witnesses to the contrary of the principle that $2+2=4$. And in any case, even if it *could* be inferred that love or the aesthetic experience is good, I feel sure that our judgment that they are so is intuitive; that something can be inferred does not prove that it cannot be seen intuitively.

When we are judging of complexes which contain both

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good and bad elements, our judgments are more doubtful. It seems clear here that we cannot infer the goodness or badness of the whole from that of the components. What happens here, it seems to me, is that in doubtful cases we first let our mind dwell on the elements. We realize as clearly as possible their nature and their degree of goodness or badness, and then pronounce a judgment on the whole which is neither logically inferred from our judgments on the parts, nor self-evident. I think, in fact, that our judgments in such a case are always opinion and never knowledge.

It would appear, then, that the only predications of good that are inferential are those in which we are not predicating goodness in itself, but goodness as a means. Such judgments may be divided into two kinds: (*a*) those in which we merely judge something to be a means to some end without judging this end to be good, and (*b*) those in which we judge something to be a means to an end which is good. The former are not ethical judgments at all, but merely assertions of causal relations; the latter are ethical judgments of a secondary kind, resting partly on causal and partly on primary ethical judgments.

We now pass to the second great class of ethical judgments, those in which we predicate "right" or "my duty." All the same questions arise here as arose with regard to predications of good. We must ask (1) whether acts are right in virtue of some psychological effect they produce on the mind of the judger. To say that they are right in virtue of being judged right is to fall into the same difficulties we have already recognized. It would be more plausible to say they are right in virtue of a feeling they arouse in us, a feeling for which the most suitable name is sense of obligation. But the main ingredient of what might loosely be called the feeling of obligation can, I think, easily be seen to be the judgment that the act is obligatory; and, as before, we must not make the obligatoriness of actions rest on their being judged to be obligatory. It

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seems to me clear that when we judge an act to be obligatory we judge it to be so in its own nature, independently of anything we may either think or feel about it.

2. When we turn to the question whether we can attain to knowledge of the rightness or wrongness of actions, I find again somewhat the same position that we discovered with regard to predications of goodness. We seem to be able to judge without any possibility of doubt that certain simple types of action are right: telling the truth, fulfilling our promises, returning good for good, dividing goods fairly, promoting virtue, insight, and pleasure to the best of our ability. But when it comes to pronouncing on the rightness of particular acts in particular circumstances, certainty seems to be entirely lacking. The possible consequences of every act are infinite in number and various in kind. An act which is the fulfilment of a contract may seem also to be likely to produce more actual harm than good. An act likely to produce good for one set of persons may be likely to do harm to others, and we may be quite unable to foresee either which set will be the more numerous or whether the good gained by each member of the one set is greater or less than the harm suffered by each member of the other. It seems necessary to say that even in the cases which seem simplest, all that we can reach is a fairly probable opinion. Yet we are not left to our own unassisted wisdom in the matter; for the collective judgment of the world is so strongly in favor of the general rightness of such things as veracity and justice that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred we shall probably be right in preferring them to acts which in the particular circumstances seem as if they would do more good. And our moral judgments are not in this respect worse off than our non-moral judgments on practical affairs. Suppose that a man tries to discover, not what is right, but what will best promote his health, or wealth, or happiness. A thousand accidents may interfere with his best-calculated plans. Yet the fact that probable opinion is all that

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we can reach in such matters does not prevent men (when they do their best) from acting with fair success from a prudential point of view; nor need the uncertainty of our moral judgments make the moral life ineffective.

3. We have next to ask, What is the basis of our predications of right? Here once more the question presents itself, whether there is any term either equivalent to, or coextensive with, right. The only proposed term which seems at all plausible is that which is proposed by utilitarianism, viz., that right = productive of the maximum possible good. Now in many cases this seems to be the ground on which we judge actions to be right. In the absence of any special obligations to particular people we simply ask ourselves how we can produce the maximum of good, and judge that action right which seems likely to do so. But it seems clear that there are many cases of special obligation (such as that of paying debts, keeping promises, telling the truth, repaying services, effecting just distributions) in which we judge an act to be right without necessarily having any opinion that it is likely to produce the maximum good. We judge that the mere fact that we have given a promise is sufficient, not to make it necessarily always right to fulfil it, but to create a strong presumption in favor of its being right even where there is no reason to think we shall thus produce a maximum of good. The significance of this will depend on whether the view under discussion is the view that right simply means "productive of maximum good," or the view that in fact right is coextensive with "productive of maximum good."

Against the former view it is conclusive to point out that we often actually judge actions good without judging them to be likely to produce the maximum good, or indeed thinking of maximum good at all. Against the latter view this objection is not conclusive; for one who holds this view may retort that even if we sometimes do so judge, we never should do so. On the other hand, while one who says the two notions are identi-

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cal cannot be called on to prove the identity (which will be a matter of direct intuition), one who merely says they are coextensive may be called on to prove that they are so. To me, at least, it is by no means self-evident that they are, and I have never seen a cogent argument in favor of their coextensiveness. No doubt it would in some ways simplify our problem if we could think that there is a simple notion coextensive with rightness, by applying which we might judge of the rightness of actions. But it is more important to have a true view than to have a simple one. We have rejected the simple view that there is any single notion coextensive with good, and it looks as if we ought also to reject the simple view that there is a single notion coextensive with right.

I must try to say why this view seems to me too simple to account for the facts of the moral consciousness. It holds that our duty is to produce the maximum good, irrespective of the question of who is to possess it. My objection is that we actually judge, and cannot help judging, that it makes a great difference who is to possess the good we bring into being. We judge, and, as far as I can see, cannot help judging, that it is much more incumbent on us to produce good for someone to whom we have promised to do so, than for someone to whom we have made no promise; for someone who has rendered us services, than for someone who has not done so; that we ought to divide fairly, rather than unfairly, even though we do not think more good will thus be brought into being. In other words, I would urge that the view in question regards all mankind as standing only in one relation to the agent that has moral significance, viz., that they are possible beneficiaries by his action; while in fact they stand in many other relations as well, and relations of great moral significance: relations such as those of wife or husband, of parent or child, of friend or benefactor, of creditor or promisee. Or, to put the matter in yet another way, I would urge that past and present relations between us and the persons to be affected by our action make

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a great difference to our duty, independently of the mere amount of good to be produced by our action. That this is the way we actually judge about duty I feel no doubt; and I question anyone's right to say that we are wrong in so judging. These special duties which I emphasize as distinct from the duty to produce as much good as we can are in no way arbitrary. I assert no such duty except where I see a definite reason for its existence—a definite promise made by me in the past, a definite service done to me in the past, a definite inequality of merit in those who may benefit by my action, and so forth.

But, I may be told, I land myself in a hopeless conflict of duties if I assert the existence of duties other than that of benevolence. I certainly should be doing so if I asserted these to be (in a certain sense of the word) absolute, as Kant, for instance, does. But this I do not assert. The difference of the view I venture to submit from this may be put in either of two ways. (*a*) Suppose, for instance, that I may use a sum of money either to pay a rich and worthless creditor or to relieve a needy and excellent person who has no particular claim on me beyond that of his need and worth. Here I have a duty to pay a debt and also a duty to relieve distress. But all duties that are stated thus in general terms are duties having only a certain degree of obligatoriness. I must, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, judge which is more incumbent on me (which may in some cases be the one, and in some, the other). Most people would, I fancy, judge that in most cases we should pay the debt; but that where the need and the worth of the distressed person are very great we should relieve the distress; and that the only duty which is absolute is the duty of doing that one of the relative or prima facie duties which is more obligatory. Or (*b*) we may say not that it is our duty to pay debts, but that it *tends* to be our duty to pay debts, and also tends to be our duty to relieve distress, and that when we decide that it is our duty on the whole to do the one and not the other, yet the other action *qua* payment of

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debt or *qua* relief of distress still has a *tendency* to be our duty. This way of putting the matter is analogous to the way in which we have to state physical laws. If we said that bodies always move toward one another with a speed proportional to their mass and in inverse ratio to the square of their distance, we should have to admit many exceptions to this law, viz., whenever another force than gravitation (or gravitation toward a third body) is at work. But if we state the law of gravitation as a law about *tendency* to move in the specified way, we can preserve its absoluteness, since the tendency still exists when it is nullified or modified by some other tendency. In a similar way the absoluteness of the law of justice and of the law of benevolence is preserved if they are stated as laws of tendency. And with this, I think, the theoretical problem of conflict of duties is removed, though no doubt the practical difficulty of deciding our duty in the particular circumstances remains acute. Acute it certainly is, but not, I believe, more acute than on any other theory. For it cannot, I venture to say, be seriously claimed that even the simplest of all theories, hedonistic utilitarianism, appreciably lessens the difficulty of seeing what our duty is, and still less is this done by a utilitarianism which recognizes other goods than pleasure.

Finally, the perception of various prima facie duties, or (as I should on the whole prefer to say) of the tendencies of various acts to be my duty, in a complex situation is not related to the perception of my duty here and now as the perception of premises is to the apprehension of the conclusion. The one seems to be a psychological preparation for—not the logical basis of—the other. In this respect the moral judgment is like the aesthetic. Our judgment on a work of art as a whole is not a conclusion from our judgment on its parts or elements; yet we could not make the former unless we had first made the latter. In both cases, in the long run, ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις: the final judgment is intuitive, though not in the sense in which that implies infallibility.

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THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS IN ETHICS[1]

GEORGE P. ADAMS

An ethical judgment is the explicit and articulate expression of a practical interest, activity, or attitude, just as a theoretical judgment is the equally articulate expression of a purely cognitive interest or attitude. At every level of practical activity, from the instinctive seeking of food or the instinctive shunning of danger through the manifold preferences, desires, and interests of living beings to the fully conscious recognition of some supreme organizing Good, there is always present a discernment of, and a response to, some value, or something of value.

Because of this fact, because a *judgment* of worth is present (whether explicitly formulated or not) within our practical activities, our choices and preferences, our desires and interests, there exists the possibility of distinguishing between those practical attitudes which are valid and those which are invalid. By an *objective* ethical judgment we mean a judgment which expresses and formulates a practical attitude which is valid. If there be a lower limit of practical activities, exhibiting no trace of any implicit judgment, such as may be the case in the purely physiological processes and tropic reactions of plants and the lower animals, then at that line no question of objectivity or validity arises at all. Only with respect to a judgment, or that which is akin to the nature of judgment, does the question of validity and objectivity arise. An event which just occurs—the fall of a stone or the growth of a seed—is real and exists; it is an objective fact, but it is neither valid nor invalid. It makes no claim to objectivity in any sense which is under discussion in the fields of the normative sciences.

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Having said this, we seem committed to the necessity of making a fundamental distinction between the *basis* of objective (i.e., valid) judgments in ethics and the causally efficacious factors which condition ethical judgments (and the practical attitudes which such judgments formulate) and which thus determine their existence as events. Such practical activities, the moral life of individuals and communities, are, of course, events which occur, and like all events they are imbedded within a tissue of outlying energies and events, with causal linkages to those antecedent events which determine them to be the events that they are. But we primarily mean by the basis of objective judgments, in ethics as in cognition, that which makes such judgments valid, that which determines them to be true rather than that which determines their existence and which brings them into being as events which just occur. The necessity of making some such distinction seems clearly indicated by the one fact, if by nothing else, that both valid and invalid judgments are equally conditioned by antecedent causes; the good life and the bad life, the choice of the worse as well as the choice of the better, no less than a process of reasoning which is fallacious or sound, are, as events, the outcome of causally determining factors and processes. But only *valid* judgments, ethical or cognitive, possess a basis in the sense of grounds upon which their validity depends. Invalid judgments lack any such basis.

The discovery of the causal factors which determine the existence of practical attitudes, of men's loyalties and their preferences, of morality as a fact and datum of human society, has come to be the task of the psychological, historical, and social sciences. The discovery of the objective basis of morality and of moral judgments, of the conditions which determine the validity or lack of validity of such judgments, is the central problem of moral philosophy. The first of these two tasks is to be accomplished by the observation and description of matter of fact, in the manner which has been impressively

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formulated by M. Lévy-Bruhl in his *Science of Ethics*. The second of these tasks plunges us into the philosophical conflicts of opposed theories in ethics: the theories of value, of knowledge, and of metaphysics. No wonder that men have tired of these disputes, and have urged that we concentrate our efforts upon the humbler but more feasible tasks of exploring the factual conditions—biological, psychological, and social—upon which the moral judgments and the practical life of an individual, a community, a culture, depend.

There is nothing more familiar in the history of modern reflection concerning the problem of validity, whether cognitive or practical and moral, than this distinction between the order of matter-of-fact energies which causally determine our judgments and the grounds upon which the worth of our judgments depend. But the problem becomes pressing whether these grounds upon which validity rests are themselves anything objective, whether they are in any sense knowable or verifiable. With the growth of the modern scientific conscience and scientific method, the conviction became prevalent that empirical, verifiable, and scientific knowledge has to do only with matter-of-fact structures and processes which determine subsequent events according to causal regularities and principles which it is the business of science to discover. This had as its result the belief that since what we may really be said to know is never anything but matter of fact, the validity of our choices and deeds, our loyalties and ideals, is not subject to the jurisdiction of knowledge at all, but is solely a matter of feeling or of will.

We are, indeed, confronted by a dilemma. Some distinction there must be between the causes and stimuli, the conditioning factors of our judgments which psychology and anthropology, biology and sociology, have so largely uncovered, and on the other hand, the grounds which entitle us to believe that *some* of our judgments may be valid, our theoretical judgments true, and our practical judgments right. Now either one

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of two things: either *all* of our judgments are completely determined by the mere matter-of-fact energies of nature, life, and society, *or* some, at least, of our judgments are, or may be in part, determined by the reasons which confer validity upon them. In the case of moral judgments this would mean that the Good, as an objective value, would be one of the conditioning elements determining, at least in part, our desires and our interests.

Naturalistic ethics chooses the first alternative. The only basis of moral judgments which it admits are the matter-of-fact forces which press upon us, forces and energies which are brutely factual, whether biological, social, or psychical. We may confer upon them a spurious and adventitious ideality and worth by clothing this matter of fact which constrains us with the cloak of value pronouncements, as is done in the familiar hedonistic syllogism, to wit: The Good is whatever, as a matter of fact, is desired; what is desired is pleasure; therefore the Good is pleasure. When we strip away these fictitious trappings and see the moving forces of our practical life for what they are, we discover only blind and irrational factual drives, the pressure of vital impulse, or feeling and desire, of economic and social necessity. Such as these have alone generated and they alone really determine our moral judgments in ways which an adequate science of man may hope to uncover. The rock upon which this venture is shipwrecked is, we believe, the sheer impossibility, on this basis alone, of ever making any distinction between valid and invalid judgments of value. Any such distinction becomes quite irrelevant the moment it is supposed that the determining factors of *all* judgments of value lie in an order of natural facts divested of every element or aspect of value, of the Good. The same kind of consideration is, we point out in passing, applicable to our theoretical judgments. If these too are completely determined by psychological mechanisms which go their own way regardless of the logical requirements and con-

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straint of logical and natural principles, the distinction between true and false judgments, in so far as truth and falsity pertain to our judgment about what is real, becomes wholly meaningless.

Shall we then choose the second alternative, and say that our moral judgments (and this means our entire practical life at each successive level of its development) are in part determined by the causal factors which scientific knowledge may disclose, and also are, or may be in some measure, determined by an objective Good which is wholly different from the empirical, factual, and causal elements which psychology, anthropology, and the social sciences are able to discover? This way lies the venture of Kantian and neo-Kantian ethics, with the dualism of a formal, intelligible world of freedom, and a mechanically conditioned order of real events, and with the hopeless task before it of making the Good which dwells in the intelligible world determine our deeds, and at the same time keeping intact their complete determination by causal, psychological factors. This is, indeed, one form of that antinomy of ethical idealism and ethical realism which was depicted in the opening chapters of Royce's first published book. You appear able to maintain the integrity and autonomy of practical will attitudes, of values and of ideals, only in so far as you refuse to base them upon the discovery of what does, as a matter of fact, exist in the order of nature, life, and mind. No ought or value judgment is derivable from premises which are solely descriptive of existence. But in thus apparently saving the autonomy of moral judgments and moral ideals, in thus escaping both the naturalistic and the metaphysical fallacies, you relinquish the possibility of any such control over judgments of value as we have over our theoretical judgments through an appeal to the facts. If, on the other hand, any judgments of value have an objective basis, their validity apparently rests upon the discovery of something which, as a fact, exists. This, indeed, means that value judgments are con-

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trollable and verifiable, but only at the cost of their autonomy. Their validity depends upon the *existence* of some fact and upon nothing else whatever. Value judgments become but disguised fact judgments.

This dilemma and problem are characteristically modern, and they spring from that radical bifurcation of value and existence which is another form of that bifurcation of nature to which Mr. Whitehead has ascribed so many of our modern perplexities in the *Philosophy of Nature*. The problem did not, in the main, present itself thus to the thinkers of antiquity because they did not draw the same boundary between the order of values and the order of facts with which we have long been familiar. For the thought of classical Greek idealism, what is known to be objectively real and hence capable of controlling our judgments is both a "fact" and also a value. As Nettleship put it, for Plato "the reality of things is what they mean; what they mean is determined by their place in the order of the world; what determines their place in the order of the world is the supreme Good, the principle of that order." In other words, both our theoretical knowledge of the real and our practical choices and ideals are not—or need not be—exclusively determined by the constraint of *mere* matter of fact, purged of every trace of objective meaning and value. Both our theoretical and practical responses to the world are, in so far as they possess validity, determined by an objective order which is both existential, real, and which is also the locus and expression of that which possesses significance, of the idea of the Good. This means that what for us are our practical and non-theoretical interests are a *discovery* and disclosure of an objective structure, of a Good which constrains, no less than are our theoretical judgments, in so far as they are valid, constrained and determined by the order of existence and the real. It means the refusal to effect a radical cleavage between the life of knowledge and the life of practice.

What, now, require explanation and critical appraisal are

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the forces and motives which led to the disintegration of this central tenet of Greek idealism, and to the modern bifurcation of the order of matter of fact which alone is the object of our theoretical and cognitive interests, and the order of values upon which are directed our practical, our social, political, aesthetic, and moral interests. In such an inquiry we should have, I believe, to note especially two things: first, that the extrusion of all aspects of value and meaning, of the idea of the Good, from the order of knowable facts in the interests of scientific intelligibility was an offshoot of, and an incident within, a very deep and wide historical process, of a cultural division of labor, wherein each of the specific human interests asserted its autonomy and its independence of every other interest. Religious, political and national, economic, aesthetic, and scientific interests and attitudes, each of these broke away from the control of any inclusive and total idea which made them all, in theory, moments within, and aspects of, a single organizing principle. The vitality and wealth of the energies which were disclosed within each of these major channels of human life proved to be too massive and overwhelming to submit to, and to be constrained by, the framework which had been inherited from classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. Now, just as the potency and pressure of economic motives and interests refused any longer to submit to the control of older moral and religious ideals (in the manner so masterly portrayed by Mr. Tawney in his recent study), just as the life of feeling and imagination discovered a wealth of new aesthetic meaning which disrupted the older fusion of art and religion, so likewise in the realm of knowledge and of science. The world of nature, life, and mind was discovered to contain an infinite wealth of facts which could no longer be pressed into the older, simple teleological framework of values and of the Good. The inevitable and fruitful result was the growth of the physical, biological, and historical sciences bent solely upon the discovery and mastery of the facts of nature

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and of life, a cognitive enterprise which would have been impossible had it been guided by the older traditional assumptions of the fusion of reality and value. But there resulted as well just that insistent dilemma with respect to the basis of our practical interests and our judgments of value, a dilemma which has its roots in the assumption that orderly knowledge and science deal only with matter of fact, which is *wertfrei*, stripped of all objective meaning and value, and that the world of our practical interests and values has its roots in will-attitudes, desires, and feelings totally distinct from our cognitive apprehension of the real. On these premises values are neither knowable nor intelligible. They belong to a dimension and realm apart from that order of facts which may be known by scientific and theoretical inquiry. The extrusion of values from the real, and hence the absence of any objective Good which determines our judgments of value, leaves, in principle, no objective basis for value or moral judgments as distinct from descriptive judgments of matter of fact.

It must be remarked, in the second place, that the order of physical processes, motions in space and time, supplied in the first instance the point of departure for the modern development of the sciences directed upon a study of the facts of experience. This physical order is characterized by a minimum of meaning and a maximum of sheer "objective" fact. To locate the determining factors of a particular physical object or configuration one need go only to a contiguous physical object or the immediately preceding physical configuration. Such mechanical determination of physical facts by immediate impacts and shoves, and the apparent absence of all determination by anything more total, remote, or ideal provided a paradigm which was taken over successively by the biological, psychological, and social sciences. Within the limits which were set by the physical sciences as a model, the possibility of discovering something other than brute contiguous facts as the determining factor of the processes of living organisms, minds,

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and historical structures was reduced almost to the vanishing point.

In the present scientific and philosophical ferment we are witnessing, I believe, a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the results to which we have been led through an acceptance of those initial premises which appeared, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as alone making possible the knowledge of things, untrammeled by the framework of ancient assumptions. The rigid demarcation of the order of facts from the order of values, whether Kantian, naturalistic, or romantic, and the belief, modeled upon the procedure of the physical sciences, that the sole determinants of all facts are the immediately contiguous facts in space and time—these initial beliefs are being increasingly subjected to critical scrutiny. Living bodies, minds, historical individuals, and communities, when seen for what they are, are not congeries of particular facts and processes each one of which is determined only by its immediately preceding causes and stimuli. There is, throughout, the pressure of something more total, inclusive, and organic. Even in the physical order what strikes the attention of the layman is the necessity of recognizing a vastly more complex and, in a sense, a more ideal type of determination than any which the older mechanistic views were able to provide. In the order of living bodies, the concepts of organism and environment, of the maintenance of function, growth, and regulation, denote a kind of determination of specific biological data, quite other than their exclusive determination by physical impact and stress. As Herr Scheler has remarked, in the world as known by the physicist there simply isn't any such thing as a retina responding to light and color. And in describing and understanding that which occurs in the order of mind and consciousness—perception, idea, sentiment, desire, and interest—it becomes necessary to go still farther afield, vastly to increase the area of those determining factors which make our conscious lives what they are. Facts remote

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in space and time, structures, relations, and systems which far outreach the area of spatially and temporally contiguous causes, determine our memories and anticipations, our desires and our interests. This widening of the area within which the determining factors of both ideas and desires, our cognitive and practical acts, are to be sought, makes it possible, I venture to suggest, to say that an objective Good or value constrains our practical life no less than that an objective real constrains our cognitive ideas. The objective Good is neither a shadowy, detached realm of validity, which leaves everything existing in nature and mind at the mercy of sheer mechanical determination, nor is it but the verbal cloak which we throw over some of the purely factual and brute energies which we single out from the play and welter of mere matter of fact.

Thus I should say that the only basis of objective judgments in ethics, as of all valid judgments, whether theoretical or practical, lies in the nature of the real world as that world is disclosed by experience at all of its levels and interpreted by clews which also are supplied solely by our total experience. This is to commit neither the naturalistic nor the metaphysical fallacy, for these fallacies arise only in case we first suppose that what exists has nothing to do with meaning or value, and then permit *that* kind of existence to dictate to us our moral ideals. Were existences wholly *wertfrei*, then the determinants of our existing judgments, acts, and attitudes would be equally *wertfrei*, and neither truth nor goodness would be there to torment us with their solicitations and constrain those of our activities which are most characteristically human and rational.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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VALUE AND EXISTENCE[1]

LEONARD J. RUSSELL

I

In dealing with the problem of knowledge, Kant took it for granted that the problem was one of synthesis. But he saw that an empirical synthesis was not sufficient. He saw that the inquirer must not come with a perfectly open mind if he is to learn of nature. Hence he introduced the notion of a priori synthesis.

This a priori he regarded as one contribution to the complex whole of knowledge, the other contribution being the empirical material presented for synthesis. He saw that knowledge claims universality and necessity, and that these claims could not be justified from the side of the empirical contribution. Hence he concluded that the universality and the necessity depended on the a priori contribution. And he set himself to interpret knowledge in accordance with this conclusion.

But in the end he did not succeed in justifying his view, and his attribution of universality and necessity to the a priori fails to convince.

I believe that Kant was right in insisting that there is an a priori element in knowledge; wrong in associating with it the universality and necessity which knowledge claims.

II

We may set out the main propositions leading to Kant's view thus:

1. Knowledge claims universality and necessity.

2. A sound theory of knowledge must acknowledge this and justify it.

[1] Read at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy and printed with permission of the Congress.

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3. Knowledge depends on data presented in sense (empirical element).

4. Knowledge is the result of a synthesis of disjointed materials.

5. Knowledge involves an element which is not presented in sense, which what is presented in sense cannot confirm or refute, but which rather serves as a means for dealing with what is presented in sense (a priori element).

6. The empirical element consists of the disjointed materials, the a priori element consists of the principles of synthesis.

7. Because the empirical element cannot justify the claim of knowledge to universality and necessity, we must justify this claim on the basis of the a priori element.

8. Thus the forms of synthesis are universal and necessary. Hence a priori = universal and necessary.

Now of these propositions, I should admit and deny that it is necessary that a sound theory of knowledge need make good the claim *here and now*. A sound theory of knowledge must admit that what knowledge is striving after is universality and necessity. And it must justify the striving. It need not admit that knowledge is in possession here and now of anything universal and necessary.

As to (3) and (4), granting that knowledge depends on data presented in sense, it is not necessary to suppose that what sense receives consists of disjointed materials which need synthesis *ab extra*. Knowledge grows by a process which involves differentiation of fragmentary experiences from the matrix of experience as well as the articulation of these experiences into a fuller experience; and the principles controlling this articulation are perhaps connected with the conditions under which the differentiation takes place.

If this is the case we might be able to accept (5), with a new meaning. "Knowledge involves an element not presented in sense," since it is that which conditions the articulation of the sense-presented elements. "Which what is presented in

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sense cannot confirm or refute, but which rather serves as a means for dealing with what is presented in sense"—this we should have to examine closely, in the light of the whole history of knowledge.

If we spoke of it as a priori, we should then do so only in the sense (*a*) that it is not logically dependent on the articulation of the sense-presented elements; (*b*) that it in some way controls this articulation. We should have to remember that there is nothing in this meaning of the a priori to lead us to regard the a priori as universal or necessary.

The clear-cut statements of (6), (7), and (8) would then have to go, and our interest would center on endeavoring to make out (5), and to see how it actually operates, if it exists at all.

III

This paper is based on the view that knowledge does involve such principles. Their main characteristics are (1) that they function as a priori, in the sense that they cannot be derived by any logical process from propositions capable of being described as "based on experience," and that they are not capable of being refuted by appeal to "facts." (2) They are not self-evident; they need justification through their relation to experience (as Kant rightly said). They are not universal and necessary in experience, in the sense of being eternally unalterable in content; and they cannot be set out in a complete and final system.

If we consider only their second and third characteristics, we shall fail to see why they should be described as any more than scientific hypotheses; but thereby we shall fail to do justice to the complexity of the situation in which man's activity finds itself. For the fundamental point is the stubbornness with which man adheres to these principles in spite of apparent facts to the contrary.

We may take, for example, the attitude of the investigator who finds a bowl of water warm to one hand and cool to the

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other. A "wise passivity" would record the facts and note that "warm" and "cool" can belong to the same thing at the same time, just as "large" and "small," or as "yellow" and "round." It would record the facts, and, as far as I can see, would leave them there. It would involve more than passivity to ask under what conditions water is warm and under what conditions it is cool. What the investigator actually does is to insist that the full situation cannot have been disclosed, because as disclosed the facts are self-contradictory; he saves the situation by substituting "appears" for "is," and asks under what conditions the water "appears" warm to the one hand and cool to the other.

Now the principle, self-contradictory predicates cannot belong to the same thing, may be interpreted in a purely formal way. But, so interpreted, it is incapable of telling us what actual predicates are self-contradictory. Or it may be part of a fuller statement explaining what predicates we are going to refuse to accept as belonging to one thing. It is then not a tautology or a generalization from facts (for facts cannot "confirm" or "refute" a refusal on our part to accept them as rational), but a rule with which we approach the facts, a touchstone by which we are to know whether our efforts to understand the facts are successful.

As a purely formal statement it is no doubt universal and necessary, inevitable and unchanging. But once we give a concrete account of what predicates we are going to take as self-contradictory when they are regarded as belonging to one thing (and we cannot avoid this), we have a principle which the history of thought shows to have functioned in an a priori manner, and to have been subject to modification in the course of time.

Or we may take as an example the closely related demand for permanence: the insistence that what is genuinely real cannot change. The significance of this for Western science and for philosophy has been amply brought out by M. Meyer-

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son; we need only note here, first that it is *not* a generalization from experience (which, on the contrary, shows more change the more we investigate it), but rather a refusal to accept experience for what it pretends to be; secondly, that it is *not* a mere scientific hypothesis, in so far as it does not admit of being confirmed or refuted in the ordinary way, and indeed is persisted in stubbornly in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; thirdly, that it is just this persistence in it that has given rise to the mechanistic science of the last three hundred years; fourthly, that it still operates so strongly that modern thought is finding great difficulty in modifying it in the interest of the reality of change.

I have endeavored elsewhere to show that the modern scientific outlook is the result of a number of these principles, functioning as a priori, operating as "demands." They cannot be reduced to a system of principles which are rounded off and complete. They are subject to modification, and are in no way finally fixed. "Subject to modification," though never "refuted." Man refuses to accept as final experiences which do not conform to his demands. He uses his demands as a clue to the nature of the universe, in spite of facts to the contrary. But it may happen that his outlook changes, so that he is ripe for a modification of his demand. His change of outlook may be partly helped by the fact that the old demand beats unavailingly at the gates of reality, while a modified demand moves more easily among the facts; but this by itself would not be enough to bring about a modification of a demand. As Mr. Russell has said about certain views in philosophy, man is not argued out of them, but has to grow out of them.

IV

It is not only in man's intellectual outlook that we find such principles functioning. The account of value is, it seems to me, best given in parallel terms, and the intellectual demands are best understood when set among the values in general.

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1. Value involves appreciation: something we set a price on, something we have set our heart on.

2. But it involves not mere unregulated desire. It involves approval. It is that which we consider ought to triumph over all the other things on which we may set our heart.

3. I should go farther and (with, e.g., Bradley and Bosanquet) say that it is something which our head approves no less than our heart. It is that which we feel to be in harmony, not only with our desires, but with the nature of things.

4. But I should be unwilling to say that it is something that we feel justified in asserting with confidence to *be* in harmony with the nature of things; to be with absolute certainty that which sheds light on the nature of reality, so that we can say we *know* reality through it. I should prefer to say that, while being subject to modification, it functions in an a priori manner.

Our attitude, then, to what we value should not be a mere cautious "If we can find it to be justified, then we shall accept it; if not, we shall leave it aside," nor a bold, confident "If it is not justified, then the universe is meaningless."

It should be, rather, We feel justified in using this that we value, as a clue to the nature of the universe, in spite of facts to the contrary. We shall force the universe if we can to show itself such as to bear us out. We shall not modify it merely because of the difficulty of maintaining it. As long as it is what we value, we shall hold to it in spite of appearances to the contrary. But we recognize that what men have valued, men have outgrown; though we find that they outgrow one set of values only when they find themselves under the influence of another set. And we believe that what man comes in the end to value, the universe will justify.

This is the attitude of the "idealist" man of affairs in face of a situation which, men would say, demands "realism"; and when the idealist finds himself thwarted at every turn, his plans defeated, he refuses to admit that his policy was wrong.

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He will refuse to admit that he *is* defeated. He regards the fire at which he is burnt as "a candle that will never be put out"; the cross on which he hangs, as the true cross. And who shall say that he is wrong? We have many instances, surely, of men who refused to be discouraged by failure, but who, in the end, were accepted as pioneers of the truth. Their enemies were not only men, but facts: it was in the face, not of men, but of facts, that they dared to take their own way.

Now, I do not wish to insist on any pure or unconditioned "liberty," on any "will to believe" that can maintain whatever it likes in the face of overwhelming odds in the way of fact. What I do wish to insist is that the whole situation of man, in respect of his whole activity, involves the functioning of principles in an a priori way, principles which he endeavors to force reality to accept. Man never knows when to give them up, and his only method of discovering "whether they are of God or whether they come from himself alone" is to persist in them as long as they are his values.

V

The situation in all the spheres of man's activity is on precisely the same footing, no sphere having any self-evident prerogatives above the rest; and the difficulty is that the demands made in the various spheres do not harmonize.

A demand, to be effective, must make itself felt in such a way as to modify the outlook of a large body of men for a considerable time. But not all the demands operative in a given civilization at a given epoch are made by the same body of men or by the same man at the same time. The old quarrels between poets and philosophers, the conflicts between religion and science, between morality and art, between libertarians and necessitarians, between optimists and pessimists—all can be brought to a sharp issue by reducing them to the differences of demand from which they spring; the question, "What are your demands?" measures, without spanning, the gulfs.

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In Western civilization we can say that the total effective demands fall into four main groups: those connected with science, art, ethics, and religion. In this situation of the conflict of demands, what attitude is man to adopt?

He must go forward with his life in his hands, so to speak, accepting the demands he finds himself constrained to make, insisting on them resolutely in face even of facts to the contrary; for only so can man across the ages come to a knowledge of himself and of the universe. But this is only one side. To his resolution he must add the toleration which comes of insight into the whole situation. The history of human thought and human activity is a record of the disciplining of human demands. Man must demand; but he does not know what demands he ought to make, and he can only come to know this by making them, and insisting on them, and being himself molded in the process of his resistance to reality's resistance to his demands. Reality is the potter's wheel against which man must hold himself firmly if he is to be truly molded; and it is only by his demands that he can hold himself against the wheel.

The word "loyalty" is appropriate here. Man must endeavor to be loyal to all the demands he is constrained to make. Thus, he ought to refuse to accept as ultimate a science which satisfies his intellectual demands, but leaves his practical demands unsatisfied; or an ethics or a religion which satisfies his practical demands, but leaves his intellectual demands unsatisfied. But at the same time, in the intellectual sphere, man has only his intellectual demands, and he must not compromise with them in that sphere, but insist on them as if they were absolute; and the same is true in all the spheres. For only so can the demands receive discipline, i.e., undergo such modification as will bring them nearer to the nature of things.

The situation, we should never forget, must be taken in its entirety; and the situation in its entirety seems to justify the view that the disciplined demands arrived at by man in any

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sphere of his activity (e.g., pure intellect, or ethics, or religion) cannot be accepted as final unless in the end they square with the disciplined demands arrived at by man in all his spheres of activity.

VI

The present thesis, then, is, on its positive side, that values must function as a priori in the building up of experience; and on its negative side, that they are not ultimate or unalterable, but receive discipline in the long run in the development of experience. Thus, without values, no knowledge of existence, no experience, no life. Values are posited a priori as *justificanda*. They are not posited as *justificata*. We have to "force them" on reality. They cannot be upheld in the long run unless they receive certification in the last detail and as a systematic whole by the facts. And this means that their application to reality cannot be finally accepted unless it results in a view of reality as a whole and in detail which satisfies all the demands that man as he then is finds himself constrained to make; so that the science, philosophy, art, ethics, and religion of that day (if such there be) all have the same vision; all accept, without any disloyalty or sense of strain, the same thing.

If this ideal is felt to be impossible of attainment, it can nevertheless be used as a regulative conception by means of which to bring clearly before one's self the enormous distance that man has yet to travel before his infancy is passed.

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THE OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

In what sense are moral judgments objective? It is usually agreed that the validity of the moral judgments of any individual is independent of his own feelings and opinions and must be ascertained by some more objective standard. But what determines the standard? Is it simply the moral consciousness of the society in which he lives? To answer affirmatively would be to say that moral judgments are objective so far as individuals are concerned but that they are not objective when the attempt is made to compare the moral judgments of one age and clime with those of another. It is frequently supposed that moral philosophy is forced to choose between two alternatives. Either moral judgments are subjective and not objective, in the sense that they depend on the moral consciousness of a particular period or social group for their validity; or there are absolute standards, valid for all time and eternity and accessible to human inquiry, by which the validity of our moral judgments can be tested. This paper will attempt to indicate a *via media* between these alternatives.

Such intuitions as "good," "right," "better," "ought," and their opposites, or at least some of them, are unanalyzable and irreducible to anything else. Animals do not have these intuitions; all adult men do have them. Infants do not have them; children gradually acquire them. Their first appearance indicates a new level of emergent evolution. These intuitions are a priori in the sense that everybody has them and recognizes their validity. No intelligent person can deny their truth, any more than he can deny the truth of the most elementary principles of mathematics. However, they are purely formal and devoid of content. Henry Sidgwick thought that he could dis-

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cover three axioms of the good: (1) justice—impartiality between one's self and other persons, treating similar cases similarly; (2) prudence—impartial concern for all parts of one's life, not preferring a present lesser good to a greater future good; and (3) benevolence—preference for the greater good of another to one's own lesser good.[1] The three axioms, however, refer to quantity: what they chiefly say is that more good should be desired in preference to less good, it being implied in the notion of good that it is what ought to be desired.[2] It is only on the quantitative side, therefore, that a set of moral judgments could be deduced from them.

Are there any *intrinsic* types of good that are self-evident and axiomatic? Love, friendship, beauty? In a sense the goodness of these values is self-evident, disinterested, intrinsic. Would it be possible to make a foundation out of them and from it to derive the rest of ethics? The virtues, for example, might be said to be of instrumental value, since they promote the increase and conservation of love, friendship, beauty, and like values.[3] However, these intrinsic goods cannot be stated in any a priori way, apart from experience and calculation of consequences, that would indicate what all men in all ages have, or ought to have, acknowledged. There are many objects of love: the love of sweetheart, wife, paramour; homosexual love; the love of children by mothers and by stepmothers; the love of friends, of country, of science, of God, of war, of peace, of capital, of labor. Corresponding to each of these objects of love there is a different sentiment of love, the sentiment in each case being an organization of instincts or early acquired impulses with reference to the object and to other interests of the self. Many loves are good, and many loves are bad. No two periods in past history, however, have

[1] *Methods of Ethics*, Book III, chap. xiii.

[2] Sidgwick's axioms imply the moral outlook of democracy. They would not have appeared axiomatic to an aristocratic society.

[3] My own opinion is that virtues and all other values are both intrinsic and instrumental, and could not be the one without also being the other.

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been in agreement with each other in all details regarding which loves are good and which are bad. Nor is there unanimity on this subject even in our time. There has been equal diversity respecting friendship. In regard to beauty: while it is not really true that there is no disputing about tastes, no objective standard of beauty is generally accepted.

It follows, therefore, that while there are various notions like "good," "bad," "ought," "love," "friendship," and "beauty" that have intrinsic moral value, it is impossible to deduce from them, a priori, moral judgments that would hold universally. These notions are formal, and the content to be attached to them in moral judgments must be gotten in some other way. As Mr. G. E. Moore says in the *Principia Ethica,* moral judgments are synthetic. Their content must be derived from experience. As a matter of fact, the moral judgments rendered by individuals in each period have been made in the light of the moral tradition that has come down to them from the past, revised in some details in their own time as a result of reflection, prompted by some new emergency.

Many time-honored tests of the content that ought to be attached to "good" have been tried in the past and have not been without merit. There is the utilitarian device: identify the good with pleasure, and measure it quantitatively. That action should be adopted which will bring the greatest pleasure to the greatest number. The utilitarian method has much in its favor, more than its idealistic opponents were willing to admit. The latter were right in their refutation of psychological hedonism; and they showed truly enough that the good cannot be identified with the pleasant; good is good and pleasure is pleasure. But the idealistic opponents of utilitarianism failed to see that it might be possible to claim that, though pleasure is neither always desired nor identical with good, it might still be an excellent index of what is good. Mercury is not heat, but a column of mercury in a thermometer may measure temperature accurately. It is diffi-

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cult to think of ordinary cases where we should advocate as right and what ought to be done anything that would tend to diminish the total amount of pleasure experienced by mankind, or where we should refuse to approve a measure that would clearly tend to increase this amount.[4] Thus revised, the utilitarian test of the good is of great value.

A similar remark can be made concerning the Kantian categorical imperative. As a formal device to determine the rightness of acts a priori, the categorical imperative has been successfully refuted. Kant's favorite illustrations of acts in violation of this imperative—suicide, borrowing money under false representations, slothfulness, and refusing to assist others—are not wrong for the reason Kant supposed, *viz.*: that there is some logical inconsistency of a purely formal character implied in these acts. The acts are wrong because they are in contradiction with human welfare, with the goods that individuals recognize that they ought to desire for themselves and for others. But when the formalism has been eliminated from Kant's versions of the categorical imperative, the latter can be seen to be both sublime and effective tests of what is good. We certainly ought to will what we might rationally desire to become universal practice, and we cannot think it right to permit ourselves to do what we should condemn in others. We ought always to respect our own personalities and those of other men. We ought to conceive ourselves as members of a commonwealth of men of good will in which everyone is at the same time sovereign and subject, and the good which each wills is what his reason convinces him that he as a moral and social being actually wishes. It is hard to think of any measure as good and right that arbitrarily condones in some what it condemns in others or that calmly proposes to exploit individual fellow-citizens, savages, or subject nations to their own detriment and for the sake of the profit of others. On the other

[4] Professor James MacKaye in his *Logic of Conduct* has recently restated and defended utilitarianism in a way that avoids most of the older objections to it.

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hand, no proposal could be denounced as bad that would unquestionably increase self-respect, enrich human personalities, and render men more capable of governing their own lives and becoming more intelligent citizens.

Let us apply utilitarian and Kantian tests, revised as suggested in the preceding two paragraphs, to any moral question settled in past ages, and in regard to which there is no dispute in our own generation because our own mores, collective representations, and stereotypes are unanimous in their deliverances—say religious liberty; abolition of the slave trade; universal manhood suffrage; or prohibition of polygamy. The moral judgments of our age on these points can be established to our satisfaction equally by (revised) utilitarian and Kantian formulas. Religious intolerance, importation of slaves from Africa, denial of political rights to poor men, and polygamous marriages diminished the total aggregate of human pleasure, and violated fundamental respect for humanity. Yet there were conscientious people in earlier ages who might have applied these formulas in exactly the opposite ways, who believed that only one state religion ought to be permitted in order to avoid internal conflicts and disputes, which diminish human happiness and degrade human character. Blacks were usually better fed and happier on American plantations than in African jungles; moreover, they became Christians and learned to respect humanity in themselves and in others. There were those who believed that only the rich, the wise, and the good are politically competent, and to confine voting to them insured wiser decisions, and so both promoted the pleasure of mankind and accorded respect for every one in accordance with his dues. Polygamy could be thought to promote the pleasure of husbands, and to reduce the misery of wives by dividing household responsibilities among them; moreover, it served to increase the self-respect of all concerned. If these arguments appear flimsy to us, it is because

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we are judging with the moral consciousness of our own century.

Suppose we apply revised utilitarian and Kantian standards to current issues on which our moral consciousness is divided. Ought the United States to enter the World Court and the League of Nations? Ought child labor to be prohibited by an amendment to the federal constitution? Is legal prohibition of the sale of intoxicants right? Some would answer affirmatively in each case; these measures will increase the total pleasure of mankind; they also are necessary to afford respect for the moral worth of all persons. Others would say the opposite. To sacrifice the autonomy of the United States to an international superstate, or that of our individual states to the federal government, or of individuals in their personal conduct to governmental regulation, would diminish the total happiness of mankind and would fail to respect the moral worth of individuals, states, and nations as ends in themselves.

The conclusion might seem to follow that the utilitarian and Kantian tests, even when critically revised and reinterpreted, are quite worthless. But that would not be true. The moral questions settled in previous generations were decided by the use of such tests or others not so good. Men at first disagreed in the conclusions which they reached by means of them. In the end they came to agreement, not always without recourse to *argumenta ad baculum,* but usually in decisions that might have been reached peaceably by thoughtful reflection, if they had been able to gather together all of the evidence and reflect on it calmly and without passion. The questions in dispute today will gradually be settled, let us hope, by rational consideration of intrinsic values and moral consequences in a way that will be in accordance with revised utilitarian and Kantian formulas. People differ today on moral issues because of no fault of revised utilitarian and Kantian tests but because the full data to which these tests should be

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applied are not available or are not fully understood. Even in mathematics, formulas can be applied only when the facts are clear and unquestioned.[5]

What are we then to conclude? Simply this: The content of the good can be decided in any age by reflective application of such tests as the utilitarian and Kantian (revised), if, and when, sufficient information regarding facts and consequences becomes available. However, decisions can be rendered only in the light of the knowledge and experience available to the age. There is no way to be absolutely sure that future ages, with wider experience and greater social and economic achievements, will decide in all cases as we have done. We, however, can see more clearly than the generation before us, because we are able not only to profit by the fruits of their experience, as handed down to us in the moral tradition, but to add our own experience to it. And if we faithfully solve, as well as we can, the moral problems of our own time, we shall transmit a richer moral tradition to those who come after us; and they in turn will attain a more adequate moral consciousness than we.

Nor need we stop here. The work of comparative ethics is constructive as well as destructive. Comparison of the moral judgments of one age and clime with those of another does not merely disclose the lack of absolute finality in the conscience of every period or people. It also reveals that there has, on the whole, been a line of moral development or progress. The common good of humanity is becoming better defined both in its denotation and in its connotation as the centuries pass.[6] If it be said that we are simply judging past ages by our own standpoint and values, it can be replied that we are heirs of all the ages and that our judgments are more competent than

[5] Space does not permit discussion of the methods and criteria of other classical ethical systems. However, similar conclusions would follow from the application of any tests that have had serious standing and support in modern moral philosophy.

[6] Perhaps this is best shown by Professor L. T. Hobhouse in his *Morals in Evolution* and later works.

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those of our ancestors. But we must be humble before our children. They will judge more wisely, in their turn, than we. Our moral decisions have finality as compared with those of earlier times; they will be in their turn modified with further progress.

But succeeding ages may be times of decadence and dissolution—even suppose Western civilization is already undergoing decline and nearing its fall. Perhaps it might be replied that the philosophers of decadent periods in the past have often realized their limitations. They have tried to preserve as much as they could of the insight of the great classical periods that preceded them, and have often made creditable contributions. The last Western philosopher—and it is not necessary to suppose that his name is Spengler or that he has yet been born—will find as much consolation in philosophy for himself and his contemporaries as did Boëthius.

If there are inheritances of acquired characters, if there are no human instincts of much moral consequence, and if the mind of every baby is a wax tablet at birth (as Locke is alleged to have supposed) and his character wholly a product of a social environment which can be indefinitely modified in whatever way men decide upon, this article should now come to an end. It has already indicated some degree of objectivity in moral judgments. But a great deal more can be said if it be true—and I still believe that it is—that Professor William McDougall[1] is right in maintaining that man comes into the world with a fairly definite collection of instincts which are inherited from his animal ancestors and which could not disappear unless man were to pass by mutation into a new spe-

[1] Professor McDougall seems to me to have answered convincingly those who have sought to prove that instincts do not exist in man or are too insignificant to be of ethical importance. Compare the new American edition of his *Social Psychology* (Boston, 1926), supplementary chapter iv; and his articles in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1922 and 1924, and in the *Pedagogical Seminary*, February, 1925.

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cies. For so long as man remains man, his instincts will continue to have about the same relative intensity and other characteristics. They will not be altered by inheritance of acquired characters. Changes in social organization and education will not modify the innate mental constitution. Children a thousand years hence will be born with the same native instincts and emotions of fear, pugnacity, self-assertion, tenderness, sociability, sex, acquisitiveness, and constructiveness as today.

Within the next thousand years at least, the physical environment will not change—the earth will not grow cool fast enough for that, and no comet is likely to strike it in that time. The tendency will continue to be for human population to increase more rapidly than means of subsistence, except as it is limited by birth control, destroyed by wars, famines, and pestilences, or as new developments in agriculture and industry proceed more rapidly still. Social organization will retain some form of what Professor Hobhouse has called the "principle of citizenship," and its ethical ideal will continue to be a union of individual rights and the common good of humanity. Mankind will continue to manifest the paradoxical "unsociable sociableness" that Kant observed in them. Most individuals will have instincts of fear, pugnacity, self-assertion, and sex that will tend to be too vehement and unruly for the demands of associated life according to the principle of citizenship. Most men will always have too feeble acquisitive and constructive instincts, while a few will have them overprominent—a condition that will render communism or any form of complete economic equality psychologically impossible. The majority of youths, as well as college alumni and the general public, will continue to have feeble instincts of intellectual curiosity and to be overfond of watching a few athletes work hard in contests to amuse them; so the educational problem

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will always present the resulting difficulty in some form or other.

To generalize: Social control will always involve a co-ordination of instinctive tendencies to render people, so far as possible, wise, courageous, just, benevolent, chaste, temperate, economical, and regardful of intellectual values. In other words, instincts can never be permitted to develop in a random way into sentiments that would be unfavorable for the welfare of individuals and the common good of society. Sentiments, on the other hand, must ever be rationally guided and cultivated into virtues.

A virtue is a sentiment which grows through the efforts of the individual and the moral education that society affords him. It is a co-ordination of his instinctive tendencies in a manner that will serve society. The instinct of curiosity thus co-ordinated becomes the virtue of wisdom; those of acquisitiveness, constructiveness, and self-assertion become that of economy. The subjection of instinctive appetites becomes temperance. Pugnacity rationalized[8] becomes the virtue of courage—prudence in avoiding unnecessary risks, resolution in facing physical and moral obstacles for important causes. All the cardinal virtues, which include in their number at least courage, honor, temperance, benevolence, justice, wisdom, economy, loyalty, respect, and reverence, will need to be cultivated by everyone in order that he may obtain the fullest life for himself and contribute most to the common good.

The relative strength of instincts differs in individuals, and results in various types of character or personality. This will continue to be true in the future. For instance, a person whose pugnacious instinct is unusually strong should become a brave radical champion of worthy causes. A timid man with

[8] "Rationalize" and "rationalization" as employed in this paper refer to *logical* reasoning and not to the *pseudo*-rationalizations (as they ought to be called) to which Freudians have called attention in recent years.

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less pugnacity and more fear in his native constitution should become one of those prudent conservatives who prevent the radicals from pulling up society by the roots in their endeavors to straighten its growth. Both men will have the virtue of courage, but in different blends of pugnacity and fear. While society requires individuals of diverse types, all individuals must acquire characters that make possible their co-operation in the general welfare. Thus all virtues are rational, individual, and social.

As the generations pass, such rationalization of instincts will result in better men—men with more markedly individualized traits, and yet men who are more socialized. But no Utopia may be expected. The instincts will remain substantially the same, as human biological inheritance will not greatly change.[9]

So the principles of ethics will remain substantially as now, in their broad outlines. The major contents of moral judgments will be modified only as science applied to the natural resources of the earth will lead to different economic possibilities and as social organization within localities and nations will improve and international relations become bettered.

In conclusion, then, ethics has an objective basis in two general ways: First, there is a *line of ethical development* that proceeds from age to age. Second, the comparatively permanent native inheritance of mankind—the instincts—and the relatively enduring type of social organization, as we have every reason to hope it will prove to be—that of Citizenship—will evoke the necessity for the same *virtues* so long as man remains man, the animal he now is, inhabiting the planet on which he now dwells. (Or at any rate, these statements hold

[9] The author's doctrine of virtues in relation to instincts and sentiments will be found further stated in articles in the following: *Philosophical Review*, July, 1913, and March, 1915; *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1915; *Journal of Religion*, September, 1924.

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for any reasonable period that we need to take into account; to put it conservatively, for the next thousand years.)

Whether there are absolutely and eternally objective moral values subsisting in some Platonic realm outside of time and space and existence, which our human moral evolution copies, or in which it in some way participates, is an interesting question for metaphysicians, but it has no practical bearing upon ethics. The only moral values we know or can seek are those which we learn from reflection on human experience —our own, and theirs before us to whom we owe our moral tradition.

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THE SUBLIME, THE BEAUTIFUL, AND THE GOOD

HERBERT ELLSWORTH CORY

It was not in nature's plan for us, her chosen children, to be base and ignoble—no, she brought us into life, and into the whole universe, as into some great field of contest, that we should be at once spectators and ambitious rivals of her mighty deeds, and from the first implanted in our own souls an invincible yearning for all that is great, all that is diviner than ourselves. . . . . And this is why nature prompts us to admire, not the clearness and usefulness of a little stream, but the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, and far beyond all the Ocean.—LONGINUS.

For the student of the sublime these sentences are more than the first stretch of blazed trail; they also remain today with no need of broadening the first vista of a permanent avenue of insight.

But the work of Longinus, whether in the first or the third century, like that of most pioneers, was unsystematic and so fragmentary that it waited long before it inspired adequate continuators. A few rather faltering reflections emerged at last in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. These paved the way for Kant, who, for all his limited knowledge of the arts, may still be regarded as the profoundest of all writers on the sublime. His more romantic followers were so fascinated by the concept that they lavished upon it some of their most brilliant and confusing suggestions. They have taught us to hold it indispensable. They have tempted us to despair of explaining it. Benedetto Croce would cut the Gordian knot of romantic paradoxes by declaring that the sublime means everything and therefore nothing. But nothing demonstrates more clearly than a patient analysis of this concept, so favored by the children of passion and wonder, that for all their waywardness the romantic Titans were fundamentally constructive.

It is not surprising that the more romantic followers of Kant were at times lost in their own exaltation, since Kant

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himself, though he framed an epoch-making definition of the sublime, was compelled so to do not so much by the inspiration of his topic as by the inadequacy of his account of beauty. Kant was so preoccupied with form that he failed to do justice to expression as a constituent of beauty. By "expression," a shuttlecock for many a temperamental battledore, I mean, with Santayana, that property of an object which arouses in the mind of the observer associations of other days and other objects. These associations may reinforce the pleasant emotions aroused by the materials and the form of the object. Or they may be so unpleasant as to nullify the object's charm. Or they may be so pleasant that they clothe with irresistible glamor that which is chaotic in form and revolting in materials. Moreover, these associations may be so fused with the object as to become indistinguishable. They may be hopelessly apart and distracting. Or they may be in conflict with the object, yet not intolerably so. In the last instance the observer may experience the sublime. But Kant would have understood both the beautiful and the sublime more clearly if he had recognized the presence of expression even in those closely integrated reactions that are involved in the pure aesthetic rapport with an object. He would not have limited beauty to arts which approach abstract design. He would not have been insensible to the pure beauty of some aspects of nature. Nor would he have denied the epithet "sublime" to many a passage in art which, on his grounds, would have perplexed him because of its obvious worth and because of the limitations of his categories.

Nevertheless Kant carried humanity far forward in the appreciation of the sublime: negatively by that caution which held him from conceiving of the sublime as a species of the beautiful, as did those romantics who played into the hands of Croce; positively by his recognition of those affinities which ever draw the sublime and the good toward neighborliness. Kant has been censured, by Bosanquet for example, for failing to synthesize the sublime with the beautiful. But it will be

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the main purpose of this essay to contend that we need a concept in closer harmony with those dynamic psychologies which are today gradually replacing the more artificial static systems, a concept which will do justice to the *approach* to beauty, the experience of beauty *in the making*, an experience to which we may apply the word "sublime" in the fullest justice to the history of the word and to its future, if it is to survive at all. This view may at first shock those who think of the sublime as the superbeautiful. But we can perhaps conserve the element of truth in the theory of the sublime as the most beautiful kind of beauty without sinking into those pitfalls which Croce finds awaiting those who would make the sublime a species of beauty. Beauty is indeed an ultimate, autonomous experience. It is perilous to talk of degrees of beauty unless in a special sense to be expounded in due time. But the progress of art and aesthetic insight is profoundly dependent on certain quasi-aesthetic experiences which in the end widen the frontiers of our rapport with objects as beautiful. For these troublous but exalting experiences there is no word that has richer traditional claims than sublime.

Kant held that objects whose immensity evokes thoughts of bewildering infinity and objects of overwhelming power turn our thoughts inward toward self-consciousness of the nobler sort and inspire the experience of the sublime, an experience more subjective than beauty in that we are at first depressed and then find comfort in the thought that we must believe in our own freedom. For the very forces that are bred in mountainous and firmamental spaces do by their very irresistibility stir us to a realization that we are the captains of our souls, answerable only to the categorical imperative, self-condemned to duty though the heavens fall. This account of the matter seems indebted to Burke's emphasis on the terrible as a cause of the sublime. But it is Burke's view crucially and subtly refined. It has been criticized as too subjectivistic and too moralistic. But both these features, according to the the-

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sis of this essay, point in the right direction, although the second is so overstated that it sweeps the sublime too far away from the beautiful and so threatens to inspire a pedantic and sterile asceticism.

A study more concerned than this one with history would find it delightful and necessary to tarry with Schiller's lyrical speculations, with the grudging and most instructive concessions of Schlegel concerning ugliness, with Goethe's enthusiasm over Gothic architecture and the drawings of Albrecht Dürer, with Schelling's soaring but inevitably unsuccessful attempt to define beauty as the infinite represented in finite form, with the influence of Schelling on the divine chit-chat of Coleridge, and the influence of Coleridge on the more sluggish but more grandly brooding Wordsworth, with the stately philologizing of De Quincey, with Hegel's interpretation of the sublime as involving man's awed recognition of the transcendence of God and God's law at a stage of human evolution more primitive, more dependent on symbols than that moment of dialectical clairvoyance when man reasons himself into the very blood, bone, and sinew of God. All of these romantic or classical-romantic reveries, for our logical and psychological purposes, reappear more compactly in a twentieth-century controversy between A. C. Bradley and E. F. Carritt. Bradley, in his *Lectures on Poetry,* declares that the sublime is a species of the beautiful. He associates it with the contemplation of greatness and power. These imposing aspects of objects are said to arouse in us at first a feeling of being "checked, baffled, menaced" and presently thereafter a feeling of "expansion or uplifting." According to the thesis of my essay, as will grow more and more clear, Bradley has described both the sublime and the beautiful. He has lost Kant's insight. But in his illustrative examples Bradley confronts us with a fascinating range of problems. The most provocative of these, a quotation from Turgenev, has called from Mr. Carritt a perfect

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barrage of puzzled and illuminating queries and comments. Let us first examine the passage from the great novelist.

I was on my way home from hunting, and was walking up the garden avenue. My dog was running on in front of me.

Suddenly he slackened his pace, and began to steal forward as though he scented game ahead. I looked along the avenue, and I saw on the ground a young sparrow, its beak edged with yellow, and its head covered with soft down. It had fallen from the nest (a strong wind was blowing, and shaking the birches of the avenue); and there it sat and never stirred, except to stretch out its little half-grown wings in a helpless flutter.

My dog was slowly approaching it, when suddenly, darting from the tree overhead, an old black-throated sparrow dropped like a stone right before his nose, and all rumpled and flustered, with a plaintive desperate cry flung itself once, twice, at his open jaws with their great teeth.

It would save its young one; it screened it with its own body; the tiny frame quivered with terror; the little cries grew wild and hoarse; it sank and died. It had sacrificed itself.

What a huge monster the dog must have seemed to it! And yet it could not stay up there on its safe bough. A power stronger than its own will tore it away.

My dog stood still, and then slunk back disconcerted. Plainly he too had to recognise that power. I called him to me; and a feeling of reverence came over me as I passed on.

Yes, do not laugh. It was really reverence I felt before that little heroic bird and the passionate outburst of its love.

Love, I thought, is verily stronger than death and the terror of death. By love, only by love, is life sustained and moved.

Carritt, in his *Theory of Beauty*, complains that the sparrow is too small to be sublime on Bradley's definition, and that we are attracted toward him first and last while we are repelled by the dog first and last, an attitude difficult to square with Bradley's notion of a soul at first thwarted then exultant. Carritt goes on to speak of Prometheus, with whom "we sympathize, though he feels pain," and a storm, with which "we sympathize . . . . though it inflicts pain." After suggesting that such discrepant examples point toward a belief in "two species of so-called sublimity which are strikingly different," he enumerates various plausible examples of sublime objects—

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a rainbow, a mountain, an old beggar of Rembrandt, a viper, poverty personified, Fate, Iago, an earthquake, Jehovah, heroic tragedy, a hurricane—to show that the only constituent of Bradley's definition common to all of these is their capacity to arouse in us uplifting or expansive emotions. But these emotions are inspired by the beautiful. So Bradley's differentia for the sublime appears to vanish in thin air. All this reasoning is but a recent version of the dilemma which troubled the followers and foes of Hegel and led them to formulate such a string of paradoxes that we may well sympathize with Croce's impatient dismissal of the slippery concept. In this, as in many other ways, Carritt is inclined to follow Croce with some reservations which, in this particular case, are so tenuous as hardly to be reservations at all.

We may begin our answer to Croce and Carritt with the remark that it is hardly likely that artists and philosophers could be so intensely concerned with the concept of the sublime in so many eras were it not for the fact that there is some differentiable phenomenon which demands explanation. Indeed, Carritt does attempt to account for this lasting perplexity in a passage which we may best discuss when we couple the concept of the sublime with the concept of expression. But let us examine just now Carritt's difficulties with Bradley.

First of all, we should remind ourselves that a growing number of students of the concept of value are enlisting in defense of the relational theory. The sublime, like the beautiful, the useful, and the good, is not a quality or complex of qualities in the object, nor is it the state of mind of the beholder or agent. It involves both, because it is the relation which binds both together temporarily or permanently as the case may be. There must be an object which has qualities which in some way will influence some souls. And there must be in a soul the contents or attributes which will color that soul's response to the object. Carritt, although his own view of beauty seems at times relational, nevertheless, when he considers the sublime,

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dwells too exclusively on the object or analyzes the beholder as if the moods of such a person must perforce remain forever as fixed as the maiden and lover on the Grecian urn. Value is an internal relation. This means that the value of an object is quite as much dependent on the mind of the observer as upon its own qualities. We must not expect that Turgenev's sparrow, a viper, Rembrandt's beggar, poverty personified, Iago, mountains and cataracts, hurricanes and earthquakes, a rainbow, Fate, heroic tragedy, and Jehovah will arouse in everyone at every moment that mood which will inspire a unanimous attribution of the epithet "sublime."

In the case of the episode from Turgenev it is doubtful whether Carritt has selected the right object for contemplation. It is not the sparrow, but her instinctive deed as a revelation of nature's mingled grandeur and caprice, which should properly be acclaimed sublime. Somewhat similarly, it is what the viper is about that matters. Suppose, for example, he were at safe distance manifesting his slippery strength and grace; that would both repel and charm us.

A beggar might arouse horror because of his appalling condition and exaltation because of his patience or because of the invincibility of the *élan vital* which survives even such anguish, anxiety, and humiliation. Poverty could be so personified as to convey a similar concrete image stinging us to the same distracting and internecine responses. Iago's cold treachery arouses our hate and dread, but these clash with the admiration aroused by his intellectual acumen and with the pitying love wrung from us by his loneliness, especially at the close.

Mr. Carritt received no baffling or menacing impression of immeasurable power during his contemplation of the sunrise over Monte Rosa. But many a man has found himself oscillating under a mood of awe and fascination before a dark overhanging precipice which seemed at one moment to be his protector, at another to lower over him with a silent curse. A visit to the Falls of Schaffhausen failed to verify for Carritt what

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he had read in Kant and Coleridge. For my part I too found this same cataract fawnlike, as Carritt did, as I sat below it one evening. But once, as I stood close beside it halfway down, its tumult stirred me to flee from it and to become one with it.

Before we turn to the earthquake and the hurricane we may do well to consider a state of mind which E. Bullough calls "psychical distance." The phrase is dangerous if taken too literally. But Bullough's own examples make his meaning clear. And Herbert Sidney Langfeld's illustrative example in his *Aesthetic Attitude* is so apt for our meditations on the earthquake and the hurricane that we must quote it entire.

> Let it be supposed that an individual is on a ship during a storm, and there is serious danger of shipwreck. It is quite possible that even in such a situation, a man of artistic temperament would admire the movements of the waves, and the dash of the spray, entirely oblivious of danger, and with no concern as to what the high seas may ultimately do to the ship. Descriptions of such a state of mind, even in situations of extreme danger, are frequently found in literature. For Dr. Bullough there would here be complete psychical distance. Suddenly, however, a wave larger than any previous one approaches and the artist's muscles set in preparation to meet the blow. Dr. Bullough would say that at that instant he has entirely lost his distance, that is, his aesthetic attitude. It will now be better understood why Dr. Bullough has termed the distance "psychical," for it denotes the mental attitude. In the one instant the man is entirely lost in the shape of the wave and its force, and in the color of the water; in the next, although he still sees the shape and its color, he is interested only in his preparation to meet the contingency.

To this we may add that if man contemplates the wave or an earthquake or a hurricane with complete "psychical distance," then these are beautiful. But if self-preservative impulses—then psychical distance, then again the one, then again the other—arise in the presence of these objects, then, just as long as these moods arise in alternation, just so long are these attitudes sublime.

A rainbow usually seems beautiful, and holds us, as long as it endures, in close rapport. But at times it may not only make our hearts leap up, but it may fill us in the next moment

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with an exquisite fear that it will fade soon from our vision. Or, to the primitive Hebrew, it has brought charm for its colors and reassurance and fear in the thought that it is God's bow. Just as long as these dissonant moods triumph in rapid succession, just so long is that rainbow sublime.

Fate in one instant we may trust or even honor for the poetic justice it metes out, only to fear it immediately thereafter for its blindness. While we waver between trust and fear it is sublime. As for heroic tragedy, Hegel was inclined to deny its sublimity in order that it might be more grandly crowned. Hegel had in mind no doubt those tragedies which pass on to one of those healing dénouements which once more proved to his audacious mind that somehow at the heart of things the real is the rational, and the rational, the real. But a tragedy flows in time to such sustained lengths that its intensity is bound to be echoed by radical vicissitudes of sentiments in its author or in its beholder. Is it not fair to say that at its climax, when we are tense, it is sublime, while at its dénouement (if it has one) it is beautiful?

For Hegel, Jehovah was the uniquely sublime object. And from our point of view, without conceding that God alone is sublime, we may find Hegel's psychology of the beholder quite in consonance with our thesis. At this point in his dialectic Hegel has in mind God as conceived by the Hebrew poets. And he characterizes the thought of the Hebrew poets as symbolic, that is to say, profound and grand, but vague, confused, pre-rational. Now we have associated the experience of the sublimity of an object with a keen inner conflict which rends the soul of the observer. God then is sublime when he arouses, not our reason, but, in unstable alternation, our groping fear and love, so that our souls, as in Marlowe's mighty lines, framed "of four elements, warring within ourselves for regiment," are so "aspiring" that they can at least vaguely "comprehend the wondrous architecture of the world," and are "always moving with the restless spheres."

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If our analysis of these instances is reasonable, then they are not, as Carritt holds, possessed of but one property in common, a property which we attribute only to things which we worship as beautiful. All of these objects *may*, if they find us sufficiently unstable, stir us to moods which Bleuler and Freud like to call ambivalent. And this ambivalence is the clew to the explanation of sublimity.

After reconsidering (1) the possibility of opposing the sublime to the beautiful and (2) the grounds for maintaining the sublime to be a high degree of beauty, Carritt seems to cast his lot with the second alternative. We have already reduced a representative list of famous sublime objects to a common denominator which would make them sublime in the first meaning.

If we inquire into the justification for speaking of degrees of beauty, as we have promised to do, we shall perhaps discover why Carritt concludes by holding "sublimity," on his definition, to be "only a little worthier of scientific respect than any vague interjection expressing aesthetic approval." Since beauty is an intrinsic, absolute, ultimate, immediate value, its own excuse for being a joy forever, it appears prima facie absurd to talk about degrees. While we are under their spell it is irrelevant to us whether *vers de société* and a miniature artificial lake in Golden Gate Park are or are not more beautiful than an epic and Lake Michigan. But there are times when in non-aesthetic moods we reflect not without purpose on our first fine careless raptures and compare and contrast our experiences. Carritt endeavors to explain degrees of beauty in terms of "depth, which depends really upon the apparent recalcitrancy of the elements taken up." If we could accept this suggestion we could discern the sublime (with its implication of struggle) and the beautiful (with its implication of harmony and equilibrium) woven together. But Mr. Carritt's suggestion does not always account for the facts. We call both Dante and Homer supreme poets. Their work might be said to have that high degree of beauty which some critics

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would call sublimity. But Homer's work contains few passages recalcitrant enough to stem the appreciation of anyone short of a dullard, while Dante is often difficult. Both, however, are so great that few critics are so hardy as to attempt to place one above the other. "Depth," then, in the sense of "recalcitrancy" does not appear to be a safe criterion of the degree of beauty. As an alternative I suggest that a given work of art is more beautiful than some other because it appeals to more people—provided that all these people have cultivated tastes and tastes so cultivated that spontaneity is not thereby destroyed. Similarly, I may take, in non-aesthetic reflective moods, two passages. One by Coleridge:

> O pure of heart! Thou need'st not ask of me
> What this strong music in the soul may be!
> What, and wherein it doth exist,
> This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist,
> This beautiful and beauty-making power,
> Joy, virtuous Lady! Joy that ne'er was given,
> Save to the pure, and in their purest hour,
> Life, and Life's effluence, cloud at once and shower,
> Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
> Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower,
> A new Earth and new Heaven,
> Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud.

And now this by Lovelace:

> Tell me not, (sweet), I am unkinde,
> That from the nunnerie
> Of thy chaste breast and quiet minde
> To warre and armes I flie.
>
> True: a new Mistresse now I chase
> The first foe in the field;
> And with a stronger faith imbrace
> A sword, a horse, a shield.
>
> Yet this inconstancy is such,
> As you too shall adore;
> I could not love thee, dear, so much,
> Lov'd I not Honour more.

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Under the spell of either passage I feel naught but its unique perfection. But on reflection I find that I have actually been more frequently in rapport with the lines from Coleridge's "Dejection" than with the lyric by Lovelace. Moreover, I find that I more often seek out the passage from the Lake poet than the cavalier's gayly grave au revoir to Lucasta. Thus I am justified, in non-aesthetic moods, in judging the former to be more beautiful than the latter. But over Coleridge I would not cry "Sublime!" My experiences with both excerpts are purely positive. And I am committed to the view that the experience of the sublime involves an oscillation of negative and positive impulses and feelings. My introspection of this experience thus tallies with some of the most salient portions at least of the experiences of Longinus, Boileau, Addison, Burke, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Hartmann, Coleridge, Wordsworth, De Quincey, Ruskin, Bradley, and many more.

But for me the mood of the sublime means a greater instability, a more sustained struggle between positive and negative dispositions than Bradley, Hartmann, Schopenhauer, and not a few of the others would admit. Not one of them has declared unequivocally for an instability as acute, sustained, and complex as that herein confessed. One might well ask, somewhat after the manner of Carritt: "How could a little sparrow be responsible for all this pother?" And my reply that the sparrow's instinctive devotion reminds us of the grandeur and caprice of nature may be met with the charge that I am bringing in associations too remote and intellectual to serve us. But just here we must remember that with Santayana we enlisted "expression" as a constituent of our definition of the sublime as well as of the beautiful. And although expression is common to both, its differences have much to do with the causation of the two different experiences we are contrasting.

The "expression" of an object, we saw, is the quality it acquires through the associations it evokes in the mind of the observer with other objects and with the light of other days.

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Sometimes these associations are closely fused with the object here and now; sometimes they are hopelessly irrelevant, and sometimes they are distracting, but not intolerably so. This last possibility may spell sublimity. The expression of an object which we call sublime stirs us to an attitude somewhere between that of the truth-seeking scientist and the beauty-seeking art lover. The expressions, the "meanings," of an object which make the scientist curious are either certain causal relations which tend to draw his attention away from it to other things and to principles of uniformity which blur its uniqueness, or the relations of its parts within it which distract attention from the thing as a whole. The artist yearns to be united with an object as a whole, as interesting in its own right, as preciously unique. For him its parts must be so integrated as to inspire an integration within himself. If associations with the past arise they must be fused utterly with the thing here and now if the artist, in adoration, is to whisper "Beautiful!" But the sense of the sublime is stimulated often when the art lover is torn between his need of truth and his need of beauty. The expressions or associations which seem then to emanate from the object are not so distracting as to sting him into the implacable curiosity of historian or anatomist. Nor are they so near spontaneous fusion as to exhort him to attain that inner harmony and equilibrium which are constituents of the pure aesthetic experience.

At this point there emerges a further reason for keeping the sublime distinct from the concept of beauty. Sublimity is a dazzling weathercock which swerves now truthward, now beautyward, and ever and anon, as we shall soon see, toward the good or toward the ugly. A man who finds an object sublime may aspire to peace either from the Pisgah-sight of the external relation of knowledge or from the seraphic glow of the internal relation of value. He may seek the whole truth and nothing but the truth about it. Or he may follow the other path of closer and closer contemplation of the thing as a whole, in its own right, now, until he has canonized it, entered

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into a mystic marriage with it. Or the thing may be to him as a trumpet, breathing soul-animating strains to stir his will to do a good deed. Or he may recoil from the thing, appalled by its hideousness. So long as this man is by turns repelled and fascinated and so restrained by its size and power, it will remain in his eyes sublime. There is, however, in this tempestuous experience a "joy of battle" which no doubt is the germ of truth in Kant's emphasis of the sense of freedom which sublimity unleashes.

Yet from the vision of the sublime we may sink back to a defeated recognition and acceptance of ugliness if the greatness and power of the object overwhelm us with a hypnotic conflagration of fear and pride and hate, of shrinking or concealment or flight, of sneer or tense and frozen immobility. An ignominious outcome. But the possible attainment of beauty, truth, or goodness is worth the risk. He who invokes the sublime is one who aspires to conquer wider and wider frontiers for righteousness. To do this he must track the ugly, as Beowulf sought Grendel's witch-mother, by plunging through a noisome mere to its dank lair. He who shirks the ugly is a traitor to truth, goodness, and beauty.

An object is sublime, then, just as long as its greatness and power, or the associations of greatness and power which it excites in the mind of the beholder, arouse in that beholder a sustained oscillation of attention which fixates the object and himself by turns, sentiments which are dominated now by fear, pride, hate, now by love, and conations of aversion and attraction vibrating in internecine war. The sublime is not a species of the beautiful. Indeed, it may sternly admonish us to the contemplation of ugliness. But it may beacon us toward beauty and goodness and truth. And though in one sense it is below beauty, it is superbeautiful in that through the contemplation of ugliness, through the fearlessness of fear, the scorn of scorn, and the hate of hate we may, when the majestic dissonance is resolved, enlarge our horizon of beauty on and on into infinity.

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THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE

SIDNEY HOOK

I

"I take it that no man is educated," wrote William James in one of his letters, "who has never dallied with the thought of suicide." Yet James was no modern Hegesias. His philosophy was an affirmation, not a deep-seated denial or questioning of life. He relied upon the sense of instinctive curiosity and pugnacity to make life worth living for those "who have cast away all metaphysics to get rid of hypochondria." Only in some of the sacred books of the East and the mystic novels of Russia is the message written clear-gray on black: that the highest assertion of personality of one who has not asked for his existence is suicide.

The problem of suicide has generally been approached from the sociological and theological aspects. The studies of Masaryk[1] and Durkheim,[2] who followed the pioneer work of Quetelet, have been in the main scholarly researches into the statistical correlations between the character of the climate, the variation in age, the purchasing power of wages, and other indexes of the tone of economic life, and the suicide rate. And from a molar point of view, the positive coefficients discovered to hold between these diverse social phenomena have been very illuminating. But, as is quite evident, these investigations leave the heart of the individual question entirely unaffected. This is not a criticism so much as a reminder of the self-confessed delimitation of all studies based on large numbers. Nor, on the other hand, has current theological doctrine been more discriminating in its consideration of the particular case. The teaching of Western religion since the time of

[1] *Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung* (Vienna, 1881).

[2] *Le Suicide* (Paris, 1897).

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Augustine has been a resolute condemnation of all forms of self-destruction, and the criminal legislation of various communities has reflected these sentiments. Not so many years ago the penal code of the state of New York specified that any person guilty of an attempt upon his own life was guilty of a felony punishable by fine or imprisonment.[8] Only when it dawned upon our enlightened legislators that this statute was setting a premium upon truly effective attempts at suicide was the article repealed. It was practically saying to the hesitant: "Make a good job of it or you will be punished." To this day in many districts, a person whose complicity in such an unfortunate affair has been established may be tried for homicide.

There is another method of treating the problem, however, which is far more relevant and significant for the specific deed than either the absolute pronouncements of theology or the summaries and conclusions of sociology. It is the method of moral and philosophic analysis. From this standpoint, the individual suicide, just as any other individual act, is judged by a certain moral scale or standard. This is the only intelligent approach, for it is as clear that no knowledge of statistical tables will enable us to predict whether our friend who is trembling at the brink of destruction will take the plunge as it is that no moral judgment passed upon his act can be derived from a perusal of such figures. And it is also true that those who spell out with difficulty the letters of a supernatural revelation generally add moral support to their deliberate judgment. Now it is no exaggeration to say that traditional social morality in modern times has set its face sternly against suicide. Suicide has been interpreted as indicating a dry-rot of the soul, as a perverse and pernicious setting-at-nought of all

[8] Compare in the *Digest* of Justinian: *Mori licet cui vivere non placet.* I am not unaware that legislation of the kind referred to above has often been motived by a desire to insure the faithful performance of military service regarded as due from each subject. But it was not *this* particular kind of bad reasoning that influenced the state legislature.

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human values, and finally as a cowardly flight from the duties and burdens to which human flesh is heir. This attitude is not confined to the great mass of people whose views, molded by press, school, and church, have been baked hard in the social crust. It is an attitude expressed everywhere by the official spokesmen of the official morality. Of forty-two French textbooks on moral education consulted by Bayet which treat of the question of suicide, forty condemn it outright, allowing no extenuating circumstances. And although some may see merely the wisdom of the ostrich displayed in the fact that of thirty-eight English and American texts examined by the present writer, thirty-two do not mention the subject at all (four express disapproval, two are noncommittal), it is the writer's impression that most of the authors who make no mention of the matter consider the question as closed beyond the need of discussion.

In the course of this paper, I shall try to show that any system of thought which absolutely refuses to countenance suicide as a rational possibility is either irresponsibly optimistic or utterly immoral. Admitting the right to take one's life under *some* circumstances, I shall attempt to sketch some of the cardinal doctrines of a theory of moral education designed to make suicide less prevalent in other trying moments and situations. To uphold a position of this kind has often required a great deal of temerity, for fools and obscurantists have not been loath to distort a particular justification into a wholesale recommendation. But that is the price we pay for not speaking out *plainly* rather than for speaking out at all.

Although the cult of suicide has been viewed as a psychical aberration peculiar to modern society and suicidal practices have multiplied many times over in the last century, reaching appalling figures in the last decade, hardly any modern philosopher has preached or advocated it as a way out. Almost all of the avowed pessimists more or less inconsistently have advised against it: Leopardi, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and

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Nietzsche.[4] On the other hand, ancient philosophy on the whole seems to have regarded a self-inflicted death as justified when committed by the wise man. Plato and Aristotle, it is true, objected to suicide on the ground that the state loses a citizen; but both allowed it in extreme cases. Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and the entire Stoic school enjoined suicide upon those who were unable to free themselves from dominating impulses of envy, cupidity, or debauchery. To snuff out the candle of one's life was also permitted in the face of extreme difficulties. Saint Augustine, the most uncompromising opponent of voluntary death in the history of thought, scornfully points out the root incompatibility between the voluntaristic psychology of Stoicism and its cosmic determinism.[5] If there are no ills in life, is it not passing strange that the *wise* man should seek to end all in death? It would be just as rational, Augustine might well have said, for a man who complained not of the burden of life but of its brevity to shorten his natural life-span. Augustine is more consistent but hardly therefore more profound when in consonance with an unmitigated theological determinism he denied to men and women—even to outraged virgins—the right to hand their souls back to God. Plotinos, from the point of view of cultural continuity the last of the Greek philosophers, taught that there was to be no withdrawal from the evils of this world so long as there was any hope of the soul's progress in the upward way. But his theodicy was not so cruelly optimistic as to hold that there was always room or ground for hope.

Bayet, whose eight-hundred-page thesis on suicide and morality represents almost a lifetime of research, has found that the literary currents of French cultural life reflect a reaction to suicide which is apparently more complex than what has been called the traditional point of view.[6] He contrasts the

[4] An exception should be noted for Philip Mainlander (Baitz), for whom suicide is a way to salvation. Cf. *Philosophie der Erlosung* (Frankfort, 1894), pp. 350–51.

[5] *City of God.* Bk. XIX, chap. iv.

[6] *Le Suicide et la Morale* (Paris, 1922).

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morale simple, which passes adverse judgment against all forms of self-destruction, and the *morale nuancée,* which evaluates the act by its motives and effects. The *morale simple* seems to be bound up with the social mores, the *morale nuancée* with social morality. Bayet finds that the arguments advanced against suicide fall under nine divisions.[7] These can really be reduced to five. Surprisingly enough, Bayet seems to be unacquainted with the simple yet effective argument propounded by Leopardi in his *Dialogue between Plotinos and Porphyry,* an imaginary conversation based on Porphyry's confession in his *Life of Plotinos* that Plotinos' intercession had saved him from doing violence to himself while wrestling with a stubborn mood of hypochondria.[8]

II

The major arguments advanced against suicide may be classified under the following heads:

1. *Suicide is a crime against society.*—This has been the chief objection leveled by rational morality. The resolution to cut the bonds that tie us to earth, it is argued, does not absolve us from the moral mandates we recognized as valid until that moment. The fact of our social existence implies the existence of certain social duties, the compelling power of which does not depend upon our acknowledgment of them, etc.

Now, it would be a very easy line of defense against this view to make detailed inquiries as to the exact nature of the duties which the individual owes society and whether these duties are morally compelling irrespective of the social status and opportunity of the person upon whom they are alleged to

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 26–29.

[8] Another surprising omission in Bayet's book arises from his apparent unfamiliarity with Dr. Binet-Sangle's *L'Art de mourir* (Paris, 1919). Dr. Binet-Sangle is the most ardent and outspoken defender of voluntary death in all Europe. Developing a suggestion in Thomas More's *Utopia,* he goes so far as to advocate the founding of *un institut d'euthanasie* to be operated by the state under the supervision of a board of philosophers and physicians and to which souls in distress may apply for a truly definitive treatment.

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be binding. This would raise too big a problem to be thrashed out here, but, like so many other questions of rights and duties, it implies that each one has in certain respects an equal stake in society. And this, by no means is everyone willing to grant. But we may counter with a more direct and effective response. Far from being a crime against society, suicide may actually further the welfare of society. The logic of utilitarian ethics leads inevitably to this position, to the surprise of a number of its professed adherents. The greatest good or happiness of the greatest number may sometimes be attained by personal sacrifice, as the annals of heroism and martyrdom well attest. Unless it is maintained that life itself is worth living—a position that is tantamount to the repudiation of all morality—I cannot see how personal immolation in order to foster and further the ends that give meaning to life can be categorically condemned before an attempt is made to ascertain the impelling motives and weigh the derivative effects. And if it is true that we can readily think of situations not so far removed from our daily experiences in which suicide would be a legitimate means to attain our ends, often a praiseworthy means, and sometimes even an obligatory means, then it follows that we can flatly contradict the first argument and retort that it is not altogether inconceivable that sometimes refusal to commit suicide would constitute a crime against society.

2. *Suicide is cowardly.*—Aside from the line of defense taken above, which in essentials covers every objection, it is evident that if by cowardice is meant *physical* cowardice, then there is presumptive evidence against it in the *behavior* of a great many suicides. Sometimes the implication seems to be that were a self-inflicted death conceived and executed without any hesitancy whatever, less blame would attach to it. This is absurd, for, other things being equal, the greater the hesitation, the greater the probability that the reflective energies are engaged in tragic debate. If by cowardice is meant *moral* cowardice, the shrinking and shirking from responsibili-

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ties and obligations personally incurred, then the particular suicide has really been prejudged, a fact which is disguised from us because of confusing phraseology. In this last case, significant judgment can be passed on the specific event only after an analysis has been carried out in the same terms of our ethical vocabulary as we use for other events.

3. *Suicide is a violation of our duty to God.*[9]—In the absence of specific biblical texts, it is a much mooted point whether the sixth commandment can be extended to cover suicide; but having confined ourselves to questions of ethics, we are excused from entering into considerations of pure theology.

4. *Suicide is unnatural.*—The word "unnatural" ought to be stricken out from the pages of our ethical vocabulary. Too many proposals are dismissed with a word whose only intelligible meaning makes it irrelevant to ethical evaluation and whose promiscuous use, empty of any definite or concrete connotation, makes it positively pernicious, blinding those who mouth it to the fact that they have already passed judgment. If "unnatural" means "unusual," then courage, sacrifice, temperance, and every other good whose rarity is attested by the fact that it is regarded as an ethical ideal become unnatural. What else is meant by the word, save a definite indication of a vague disapproval, is difficult to say. Were it not for the platitudinous vacuity of so much ethical effusion on the subject, one would have to apologize for calling attention to the fact that the descent of the moth into the flame and the precipitate bolt of the rabbit into the jaws of the python are as natural as the self-preserving instincts of other creatures.

5. *Suicide is an insult to human dignity.*—The obvious retort is that we generally recognize certain kinds of life as much more insulting to human dignity than any suicide can possibly be. A political prisoner about to be tortured, fearing that a

[9] In the words of the edict of Louis XIV, *"un crime de lèse-majesté divin et humain."*

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confession might be wrung from him in the throes of his agony, opens his veins. Another human being, helpless in the torment of an incurable, advanced stage of cancer, administers to himself an overdose of morphine. A third, subject to recurrent fits of insanity, in a lucid moment snuffs out the feverish flame of consciousness. Who will say that the lives these men fled were worthy of human beings, were conducive to noble, dignified living or complete personal expression? The medical tradition of enshrining the practice of keeping a patient alive as long as possible irrespective of prospects of recovery makes its grudging genuflections before the white cow of moral orthodoxy. Now, there may be adequate reasons for adopting this attitude in specific cases, but to erect reasons of occasion into inflexible principle of practice is too often prolonging the span of human life by degrading its level and diminishing its dimensions. Why should not the tenderness lavished upon a dumb, suffering dog be extended to an articulate human being who in the grip of a mortal ailment asks to be relieved from a "mattress grave"? It requires a brazen optimism, unless one believes in miracles, to reply that there is always room for hope. Such a reply, however, concedes the main point at issue, since it is tacitly admitted that it is not the sacredness of life but the hope of attaining a certain order of life which should determine the specific recommendation. In this connection we may recall that the lingering death urged by Schopenhauer upon all who would still the assertion of the will in themselves is a mode of suicide much more inhuman than a thousand direct measures could be.

6. *Suicide is cruel in that it inflicts pain upon one's friends and family.*—This last argument seems to be too simple and obvious to have much importance; but in the opinion of the writer, although far from being a conclusive argument against suicide, it is much more weighty than any of the others. It is the final and most effective argument that Leopardi puts into the mouth of Plotinos, "To reckon as nothing the grief and

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anguish of the home circle, intimate friends and companions, or to be incapable of feeling such grief, is not wisdom but barbarity." Unless one is imbued with the most implacable distrust of the deliverances of introspection, he cannot but be impressed, if people whom he knows are ever to be taken at their word, with the fact that consideration for the peace of mind of one's friends and family is the most powerful deterrent to suicide. It is the common confession of those who have just grazed the abyss of darkness and fought their way back to the light again. And it is not to be wondered at that in a mental crisis the sympathies and bonds formed in the course of one's lifetime should tighten. The cruelty of which we are guilty can be excused when it is the result of a close adherence to nobler ideals than love and friendship. For how many do nobler ideals exist?

Of course this argument has no absolute force, for it does not touch that individual whose spiritual roots are not strongly intertwined with those of his fellows. It also breeds a spirit of exclusive emphasis upon love and friendship, forgetting too often that in this world even these must sometimes be sacrificed. We shall see, however, that what is sound in this objection may be of significance in suggesting the possible place for emphasis in a system of moral education.

III

"When the *taedium vitae* attacks a man it can only be regretted, not censured," wrote Goethe to Zeltner, whose son had committed suicide. *Taedium vitae* may be a malady of the soul; it is also more than that, since it is as often the result of reflection as of the lack of it. Life-weariness is not always begotten of the satiety consequent upon excess. Nor is the accession of such a mood an unfailing index of a spiritless melancholia or a progressive paranoia. A short-sighted jurisprudence and medical theory has often regarded acts performed in these moments as unmotived, and the poignant declarations of the literary testaments as revealing attitudes of

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mind more in need of cure than of refutation. Yet the modern consciousness seems to be peculiarly subject to this spiritual lassitude. Wealth and station are no safeguards against it. The intricate web of disillusionment and despair in which the mind palpitating for vital experience is finally stilled has been subtly spun out for us in the modern novel—especially the Russian novel. In this section we shall make a brief excursion into the field of Russian literature in order to illustrate certain types of psychodramatic suicidal impulses, to lay bare their spiritual sources and tragic fulfilments.

Some years ago the novels of Dostoyevsky were used by Masaryk as source books in his courses in abnormal psychology at the University of Prague. They are even richer in their bearing on the phenomenology of the ethical and religious consciousness. The rapt religious soul—more than a little warped—is as much reflected in the moral dyspepsia of the character in *Notes from Underground* who begins his splenetic confession with "I am a sick man. . . . . I am a spiteful man," as in the cosmic mutiny of Ivan Karamazov, whose pitiful "Euclidean understanding" cannot make out how the polar parallels of good and evil ever can meet at infinity—at some remote moment of eternal harmony. The feverish romanticism of the unnamed character writing from an underground hole arises from his revolt against the insufferable certainty of mathematical and physical necessities. His failure to suppress or control his own spiteful impulses, to transform the world by a gesture, is expressed in a venomous perversity that takes a masochistic delight in ferreting out ugly motives in himself and others. No promise of a beatific harmony can console Ivan for the tears of one tortured child; and refusing to regard the presence of evil as one of the major perfections of the universe, he hastens "to return his entrance-ticket to God." Dostoyevsky believed that he who rejected the God-man of Christianity for the man-god of positivism and socialism was driven by the logic of his position to commit either suicide or

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murder. This startling deduction was achieved not so much by reasoning as by those imaginative flights to which contemporary God-seeking spirits are given.[10] But the periodic crises and waves of startling conversions and hypostases which welled up after Dostoyevsky hurled his stone into the muddy stream of Russian life are symptomatic of the absolute antinomies which pervade Russian thought and politics. Raskolnikoff in *Crime and Punishment* is torn by the fancied dilemma of always killing or never killing. Kirillov in *The Possessed* believes that to recognize that there is no God, and not to recognize at the same instant that one is God one's self, is an absurdity. Identifying the attribute of godhead with self-will, he kills himself to establish his new terrible freedom. Stavrogin, having followed his senses and mind from one guidepost to another, is drowned in a sea of half-hearted negations. He ends it with a nail and soaped cord. Smerdyakov, whose heart and mind do not feel the living presence of God, seizes the casually uttered phrase of Ivan, "All things are justifiable," as a pretext to kill a dissolute wretch. Yet, even when he acts as his own hangman, he knows that he cannot expiate that death by his own.

The three generic problems which obsessed Dostoyevsky: (1) the existence of evil, (2) the validity of objective ethical standards as against ethical solipsism, and (3) the question of moral responsibility, were handed down to the next generation of Russian writers. They are the ideas which have set off the fuse to the powder magazine of more than one fervent soul. Soloviev follows Dostoyevsky in believing that morality can be founded only on the basis of a supernatural order, that atheism and moral anarchy are bedfellows.[11] Andrayev, dwelling upon the problem of evil, becomes preoccu-

[10] The distinction cannot be too sharply drawn between the modern mysticism which makes its leap to Nirvana at one bound and the mysticism of the type of Plotinos in which the beatific ecstasy crowns the dialectical ascent. There is nothing savoring of *Schwarmerei* in the latter variety.

[11] *Justification of the Good*, p. xix.

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pied with death. Almost every line of his work is a variation on the same dismal theme. Merezkovski, a self-heralded disciple, having failed to erect a niche for Christ on Mount Olympus, has fallen a prey to intermittent moods of frenetic religiosity. To Dostoyevsky is indirectly due the long line of revolutionary Hamlets in Russian literature and life.[12]

After the abortive revolution of 1905, the spiritual currents of Russian life were at their ebb. The golden dreams and longings of the preparatory phase had become transmuted into a leaden despair. The sensitive-spirited sought an escape from the maddening horrors of an autocratic reaction. The three avenues of escape from themselves and an unendurable social milieu which opened up for them were suicide, mysticism, and sex.[13] In Artzibashev's *Sanine* the chief protagonist embodies the type of worldly-wise intelligence for whom all ideals and goals have the same status and relation among themselves as the natural equality of colors and sounds, and who openly proclaims the glorified egoism of a rapturous life of the senses. But the author, *malgré lui,* has cast others in a finer mold. Even Yourri, who had neither faith in life nor faith in death and who died by accident rather than by deliberate suicide, was above sneering at a man who lost his life in the wilderness in an attempt to save a friend. And then there is that timid creature Soloveitchik, who, sickened by the cruelty of man and nature, cannot blunder through, and creeps into a corner to die. Mystical fervor broke out in unexpected places. Vania in Ropshin's *Pale Horse* believes that it is wrong to kill, and yet he writes to his comrades from the prison cell in which he awaits execution for having assassinated the governor, "I did not feel in me the strength *to live* for the sake of

[12] *Vide* Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia,* 2 vols. (London, 1919. Translated from the German.)

[13] Lenin, who as leader of the extreme socialist element bitterly contested all three tendencies, bitingly remarks in his pamphlet on *The Infantile Sickness of "Leftism" in Communism* that after the revolution of 1905, "pornography took the place of politics."

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love, and I understood that I could and ought *to die* for the sake of it." George, the hardened practitioner of propaganda by the deed, as a result of his brooding on Vania and the ethics of terrorism suffers a paralysis of his revolutionary will. Overwhelmed by the sense of the futility and vanity of all things, the flame of his revolutionary fire reduced to ash, he shakes off the lingering touch of the natural beauty around him and goes out into the autumn night—his revolver with him.

What can save these religious souls?

IV

In view of the foregoing, it may appear not a little anomalous to offer anything in the nature of a moral propaedeutic to make suicide less prevalent. Yet there is no inconsistency involved, for we have not retreated from our main position that suicide is sometimes ethically justifiable. It is admitted that for a great number of suicides there seems to be no ethical necessity and that for even a greater number, the fleeing of this life is a sign of moral surrender. Of course this commits the writer to a belief in the objectivity of moral values, that is to say, to a belief that they are not completely dependent upon *our* recognition of them. The only view which would make suicide altogether justifiable is a thoroughgoing ethical solipsism. But it is yet to be established how a theory of radical solipsism can posit an ethics, since on this view the word "justifiable," lacking an intelligible opposite, is empty of concrete content. Everything or anything becomes justifiable if it is an adequate means of gratifying a conscious desire. The apparently diametrically opposed views that suicide is always justifiable or never justifiable, just as the formulas "this is the best of all possible worlds," "this is the worst of all possible worlds," or "everything is mental," "everything is material," are really different ways of expressing the same thing—in the point at issue, the absence of any standard of what is right or

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wrong, good or bad. And it must not be forgotten that social *a*morality is social *im*morality.

If the sacredness of human life be invoked to furnish grounds against all forms of self-destruction, then we are duty bound in logic and in humanity to adopt the same attitude toward war and capital punishment. The converse, however, does not follow. The implications of an absolute interdiction of suicide resolutely carried out lead directly to the acceptance of a philosophy of non-resistance. The doctrine of non-resistance literally interpreted is self-defeating and contradictory. The only logically coherent derivative theory is one of *passive* resistance, which is not so much a religion as a social philosophy with a religious flavor.[14] It is insisted here that an absolute crime suicide can never be, for a moral crime consists only in the conscious surrender or betrayal of certain ideals involved in the specific act. For philosophers at any rate, it is not life itself, as Aristotle held forth long ago, that is worth living, but only the *good* life. We may define the good life differently, but no matter what our conception of the *good* life is, it presupposes a physical basis—a certain indispensable minimum of physical and social well-being—necessary for even a limited realization of that good life. Where that minimum is failing together with all rational probability of attaining it, to avoid a life that at its best can be only vegetative and at its worst run the entire gamut of degradation and obloquy, what high-minded person would refuse the call of the poet *"mourir entre les bras du sommeil"?* We must recognize no categorical imperative "to live," but to "live well."

From the above, two corollaries may be drawn significant for a theory of moral instruction: (1) No rational morality can compel us to perpetuate lives that are irretrievably blasted by accident or birth, or blighted by some horrible malady before which remedial measures are unavailing; and more im-

[14] For an elaboration of these theses see the writer's article on "The Philosophy of Non-Resistance," *Open Court*, January, 1922.

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portant, (2) no social morality can be equally binding upon everyone unless a social reconstruction makes possible a more equable distribution of the necessities of life. The necessities of life are to be understood as functions of our material and cultural development. Specific recommendations, however, may be urged bearing more directly on suicide.

When life ceases to offer that which makes our activities meaningful and our purposes self-sustaining, the fatuity of bare living cannot but be poignantly brought home to the sensitive intelligence. Those who lose faith in a single exclusive ideal are sorely tempted to desperate measures. Precipitate action arising from too hasty conclusions concerning the futility of all things may to some extent be counteracted by presenting the moral life as an organization of specific, individual *goods* rather than as a holy quest for *the* good. We cannot, so to speak, live through one sense. Besides the possible depression which may attend the deprivation of stimuli, the danger with which all intense sense expression is fraught makes continued enjoyment of its exercise extremely precarious. Suicide is all too frequent among those who have lived for color only, or sound only, or love or power or fame only. The senses give out, the soul grows cold, and the world is too often refractory. Even the truth alone—be it austerely spelled as The Truth—does not save, for it is too easy to kill one's self by pressing on its sharp point. It is almost banal to repeat that the probability of succumbing to the feeling of *taedium vitae* is inversely proportional to the number of interests in which one is actively engaged. We should expect therefore that the aims of moral instruction should point toward (3) an ethical pluralism, a democracy of certain values, an emphasis not on the value of life but on the values of living, rather than toward an ethical monism or hierarchical scheme of values culminating in a *summum bonum*.

Leopardi's argument, together with the testimony of those whose tragic soliloquies have not eventuated into more tragic

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deeds, seems to show that there are certain goods which make the feeling of human kinship and kindness beat more strongly within our breast. These goods, which must have a place in every moral creed or practice, are (4) love and friendship. As social and personal ties, their very existence implies a capacity for tenderness and sacrifice which makes inevitable hardships more endurable. The more we live in the lives of others, the more certain do our own lives become.

For those romantic souls, angels in revolt, who are moved to cosmic mutiny at the sight of man's pitiful finitude, his helplessness before unavoidable frustration, disease, and death, who at the cry of a kitten are like "to hurl their souls back into the face of God with a curse," we can offer as a religion a kind of inverted Manichaeism in which the supreme power is regarded as the personification of all the forces of evil and destruction in the universe. Masaryk concludes his study of suicide with a plea for a new religion. Here is a religion which is a bond that unites mankind—for once transcending national boundaries—against a common enemy.

NEW YORK CITY

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DEMOCRACY AND THE CONCEPT OF QUANTITY

MARIE COLLINS SWABEY

It seems more than a matter of accident that the centuries which witnessed the dawn of science in the ancient world and its new developments in the modern should have been those which marked the rise of democracy as a political principle in human thinking. Yet the golden age which saw the triumphs of Democritus, Hippocrates, Zeno, and Euclid also beheld the flowering of classical democracy in the Greek city states; while similarly in modern times the era of enlightenment which knew such men as Galileo, Harvey, Descartes, Newton, Lagrange, and Laplace also shed its glow upon Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Paine, and Kant. Any explanation of this concurrent advance of science and democratic theory which dismisses the coincidence merely by characterizing each of these periods as a "general" renaissance is obviously verbal. A more fruitful suggestion, if I am not mistaken, is to be looked for in the peculiar claim of each to be an age of reason and of mathematical investigation. By an inevitable extension of principles from one field to another, those generations of Greek thinkers who achieved the first great discoveries in the theory of atomism, logic, geometry, and number were led to conceive the state also as a collection of homogeneous units regulated by laws of quantity and number; and similarly in modern times those who witnessed the successful application of mathematics to the motion of physical phenomena found suggestions therein for the incorporation of the viewpoint of mechanism into government. Indeed, men like Hobbes and Spinoza set themselves the specific task of applying the new mechanical philosophy to political theory. And in the current conceptions of popular sovereignty, majority rule, corporate persons, and representation, these quantitative and mathematical ideas came to be more or less clearly expressed.

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Democracy, like natural science, as we shall try to show, seeks to obtain mastery over the external world by treating its objects numerically and as subject to determinations of magnitude. In this respect it merely ranges itself on the side of an ideal which has come to be generally recognized as governing exact knowledge, viz., the ideal that the most adequate comprehension of nature is to be gained through the correlation with, or translation of, phenomena into terms of mutually commensurable quantities. Stated in extreme form, this is the doctrine that there is just so much science in a given discipline as there is mathematics in it. Without going so far, it must nevertheless be admitted that much of our most trustworthy knowledge at the present time is expressible in mathematical equations (such as the laws of chemical compounds, of gravitation, of heat, sound, electricity); and that, further, the basic assumption of physical science (the principle of the conservation of matter and energy) asserts the equivalence of all qualitative changes to transformations of quantity. Now democracy also within its special sphere aims to associate concrete data with reckonable numbers and to treat them by definite quantitative methods. By introducing number as a common denominator into human affairs, it seeks to weld an aggregate of freely acting individuals into that unity and order which is the object of the state. As for those other modes of government which make *quality* and *difference* fundamental, they, according to the democratic viewpoint, are bound to fail in the long run, just as medieval science was bound to fail, through the insufficient use of quantitative measurement; in other words, through the lack of homogeneity and commensurability in their terms, which alone can render the parts of a system intelligible to each other.

In its fundamental calculations, the common denominator of the democratic state is the "person" or personal identity. A "person" implies, of course, a human mind in a human body; while personal identity emphasizes the recognition of

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rational consciousness by itself and others. Considerations of size usually oblige the state, however, to limit the group of persons included in it by means of certain artificial restrictions (of residence, age, sex, etc.) to a narrower class known as citizens or as voters. Once membership in the state has been duly defined by law, such definition is accepted as fully designating the civic unit, and all persons qualifying under it are treated as on a par and as precisely equivalent to one another. Any additional marks which they may exhibit (such as the possession of property, special training, etc.) are disregarded as irrelevant. Moreover, since citizenship is determined by the law or constitution, it takes account of persons only as examples of a class, and never as individuals. What is created by definition is always universal. The state is interested in the particular citizen only as he shares in, or illustrates, this common nature of citizenship. But in so far as he claims his uniqueness as a person different from all other persons, the state ignores him. In this sense the state disregards the *principium individuationis,* recognizing perhaps that any determination of the question whether there are beings alike in nature leads beyond the province of logic and experience to the antinomies of speculative metaphysics.[1] At any rate these issues are avoided in democratic theory by conceiving persons in their public, rather than their private, capacity; in their logical, rather than their metaphysical, aspect. Personal identity is interpreted in the last analysis as an application of the logical law of identity and not of the metaphysical *principium individuationis.* That is to say, the fundamental law of thought, *A is A,* when applied to the class "persons," is taken as meaning *I am I, you are you,* and since each is as much himself as is any other, logically speaking, all are equal.[2] In this sense the identity of each person rests on the same basis as

[1] On the one hand, *non repetitio* is apparently required as a postulate of the noumenal order, whereas partial repetition at least is implied in all our relations with phenomena.

[2] Cf. this *Journal,* XXXV, 146 f.

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that of every other, and not on some private difference or uniqueness from the rest.

The notion of equality which is central in democracy is clearly a logical and mathematical conception. Differences of opinion arise, however, when it is asked *in what respect* persons are affirmed equal in the democratic state. With the growth of biological knowledge, the claim to conceive men as equal in a natural sense, as approximating to the same physical or mental stature, has had to be abandoned. In place of asserting equality as a fact, it has come to be affirmed as an ideal. Admitting that men do not appear to be equal, we none the less feel that they "ought" to be. Along with a gradual shifting of the claim to equality from the factual to the normative world, the conception becomes more definite and specialized. The slogan "Give every fellow his chance," which perhaps sums up the democratic attitude today as well as any, has in it the intention to guarantee not only equality before the law and universal suffrage, but equality of opportunity including such things as universal education, protection of public health, and the control of monopolies. Now while hardly anyone would deny that the idea of equality has, like many another concept dealing with human relations, the power to rouse the will, to warm the emotions, and to serve as a goal of the social process, nevertheless its full significance is more than that of a regulative idea. The truth is that equality is not merely an ideal among men, but a logical condition of their experience; upon it depends the possibility of all communication of ideas, commercial exchange, and co-operative enterprise. In other words, it is only by accepting the genuineness and authenticity of other persons in the same sense as, and as equivalent to, our own that we are able to enter into any relations with them. Without the recognition of others as *as much themselves as we are ourselves,* intercourse would lose its objective reference and intelligible meaning. Only by being "on the level" can I establish myself on a footing with my

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fellows in social dealing. If I were to try to converse with a stone, I should have to treat it as "as good as" and "as real as" I was. In this sense, the logical equality of persons is as inevitably presupposed in all communication as is the truthfulness of what is communicated. And if equality is thus required as a premise of all common thought and action, it may be expected to work itself out sooner or later in the conclusions that follow them. Showing in political organization, as in individual and racial thinking, the presuppositions of conduct reveal themselves to knowledge and are incorporated as consciously accepted standards of life.

But once the concept of equality is admitted, the notions of number, per capita enumeration, and determination by the greater number are not far to seek. In the phrase "each to count for one and nobody for more than one," the root of the matter is expressed: citizens are to be taken as so many equivalent units, and issues decided by summation of them. Clearly, such a conception of government rests upon acceptance of mathematical quantity. Now by quantity is meant, in the words of De Morgan, nothing more nor less than "that which is made up of parts not differing from the whole save in being less."[3] Once we conceive of a whole (like the state) as composed of proper parts (the citizens), which are formally distinct but without qualitative differences, we are applying the idea in its essentials. Involved in it is the assumption, not only that the whole is authoritative over any of the parts, but that what there is more of has *ipso facto* greater weight, quantitatively speaking, than what differs from it merely by being less. In the democratic state this idea is expressed in the postulate that the opinion of the people as a whole, or of the greater part of them, is authoritative over that of any one person or lesser group of persons. Thus, when a division of opinion occurs among the citizens and is duly recorded by voting, the largest group which agrees in its opinion shall be

[3] A. De Morgan, *Connexion of Number and Magnitude*, p. 2.

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accepted, by virtue of its superior weight of numbers, as having the sanction of quantity on its side. For, since in a democratic state the sovereign power is assumed to reside in the community as a whole, it is reasoned that, in default of unanimity or the polling of all the citizens, that part of the community whose opinions are in the numerical majority is more likely to represent the opinion of the whole body approximately than is any other part.

In this connection it is to be noted that no claim of infallibility is made for per capita enumeration and determination by the greater number as a device for allowing the will of the people as a whole to gain expression; the most that is urged is that such a method has a greater probability of correctly than of incorrectly representing them. In this qualified reliance upon the popular election as merely "more likely" to represent the will of the people than not, we have an indication of the logic of probability which underlies, if I am not mistaken, the theory of the democratic state and which furnishes it a certain measure of a priori justification. Wherever in the world of nature the human mind has to deal with large collections of items whose members are not all individually directly observable, the most reasonable method by which to treat them, apparently, is the statistical method of frequencies. Now, since in a democracy the sovereignty is conceived to reside in the people as a totality (a group not ordinarily open to exhaustive examination), and since the government is somehow expected to take account of the will of every member, the most feasible solution of the difficulty seems to be to adopt a statistical method resembling that of certain games of chance. In a democracy the people as a whole comes to be regarded more or less consciously as if it were a great ballot-box, the contents of which are being continually drawn out and registered in successive elections. By observing the character, combinations, and proportional frequencies of what is drawn, the government seeks to deduce the contents of the box as a

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whole; in other words, the real will of the entire people. While the interpretation of any given election has only a probability of correctness as an index of the popular will, the method of "sampling" and frequencies involved shares, to a degree at least, the rationality and reliability of the laws of permutations and combinations upon which it is based. In other words, although in a democracy the generalizations from numerical results are usually arrived at by variations upon the method of so-called a posteriori probabilities, it should be remembered that these in turn are derived by an inverse process from what is fundamentally an a priori calculus, every event being interpreted as if it were one of so many equally likely a priori alternatives.

Let us try to make clear how these principles are involved in democratic government. In the first place, given any collection of a limited number of items of determinate constitution (be they men, stars, coins, or what not), it is, as we know, theoretically possible to deduce by logical steps in advance of experience all the possible combinations and permutations into which members of this collection can enter with each other. Moreover, this knowledge makes possible the computation of the number of ways in which a particular event (i.e., a certain specific arrangement of the members) could come about; which number of ways, relative to the total number of possible arrangements, is said to measure the probability of the event. Thus we can easily calculate in advance the total number of ways in which four pennies can go together in a single throw, as well as the probability of their falling in any specific grouping at a single cast. Similarly, substituting an election for the throw of pennies, we could determine all the possible ways in which four citizens (supposing these to be all the voters) could vote, and the probability of any given result of the election. Of course, we are assuming that the issue is a dichotomous one upon which the voters would vote either "yes" or "no." Ordinarily, however, such exact deduction of

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the probable results of an election is not possible owing to the uncertainty as to the number of voters that will vote, not to mention the difficulties of calculating the combinations of large numbers. Nevertheless the elements of the mathematical theory are clearly presupposed in the popular election, (1) the electorate being conceived as a group of so many homogeneous units capable of any possible distribution by the laws of chance and (2) the election interpreted as a simultaneous distribution of these elements under conditions guaranteeing that no special causes are operative to produce one arrangement rather than another, and hence insuring a result that satisfies the demands of equality.

Indeed, one of the chief advantages of the theory of probability in this connection is that it offers a method by which the democratic principle of equality can be realized in accordance with the requirements of exact reasoning. Thus, when a popular election is apprehended as the simultaneous disposition of homogeneous units by the laws of chance, the result is assumed to satisfy the claims of equality in the following ways: First, an equality of possibilities is realized, i.e., every conceivable distribution of the elements is held to have a chance of occurring and to be equally likely with every other. This means that "every fellow has his chance," or title, to vote and is theoretically free to vote on either side he pleases (being guaranteed protection at the polls); hence one outcome is as possible as another. Although often overlooked, this equality of possibilities is really of more fundamental importance in democratic method than the actual equal enumeration of the votes cast. If, for instance, a financier and a hodcarrier have not precisely the same freedom of opportunity in casting their ballots (i.e., if the vote of the second is controlled by special circumstances, whereas that of the first is not), it is obvious that, although their votes are counted as equal at the polls, they are not really so, since they do not spring from an equality of chances. Secondly, the method in-

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sures that all the units shall be actually accounted equal in the computation of results. In democratic elections this is expressed as the familiar axiom, "everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one." Thirdly, the method assumes that if, instead of a single compound event, a series of independent events is considered, all possible dispositions of the elements will be realized in the long run an equal number of times (or nearly so). Thus, in calculating what would happen in a series of elections we assume that (just as in a single election one outcome is equally likely with another) in the long run all possible arrangements of votes will occur in approximately equal numbers, granting that the same voters vote in the same numbers each time. In a multitude of elections justice will be done to all possible combinations of interests; all lost causes will triumph and forlorn hopes have their innings. Lastly, the theory is able to furnish a satisfactory explanation in accord with its equalitarian presuppositions of the fact that certain dispositions of the elements appear to occur more frequently than others; that, for instance, a "tie" is more likely in elections than a unanimous vote. The explanation of this seeming inequality of chances is to be found in the fact that in counting the number of similar combinations of votes possible in an election, the order or permutations of the votes is disregarded. Thus, in the instance cited of an election in which four voters participate, there are sixteen possible ways in which they might vote on a dichotomous issue, but whereas six of these ways would record a tie, only two would represent unanimity; so that the probability of the first would be three-eighths as against that of the second as one-eighth.[4] Though at first glance it might seem that the

[4] Although in the theoretically possible dispositions of the votes of a group of voters in an election, each of whom may vote negatively or affirmatively, each arrangement is allowed for *once and only once*, the result discloses six possible ways out of sixteen of getting a tie (i.e., two negative votes as against two affirmative), and only two ways of possible unanimity (i.e., one way all negative and one way all

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assumption of the equality of chances would require that tying and unanimity should be equally probable, closer inspection shows that this would contradict the equality of chances.

Thus it appears that mathematics offers the elements of a mechanism agreeable to reason by which the one and the many may be reconciled without destroying the freedom and equality of the individuals concerned. But historically the process by which men have come to apply such rational methods to the constitution of the state has been very slow. Only gradually have men come to ask for a *quo warranto* of the established order; only by imperceptible degrees has the demand arisen that governments and laws should constrain men to obedience not merely through superstition and force, but through the convincingness of their claim upon them as intelligent beings.

The principle of sampling operative in democratic theory is that a smaller group, if selected impartially or by chance from a larger group, tends to have the character of the larger group; in other words, a part, if properly selected, may be truly representative of a whole. That we accept this device of substituting part for whole in democratic government is admittedly a concession to practical exigency. While theoretically the sovereignty resides in the whole people, the impossibility of learning directly at any given time what the will of the sovereign is obliges the government to accept the expression of the will of a part of the people as a substitute, with the consequent chances of error and mistake. In a word, the government finds it necessary to interpret the recorded opinion of

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affirmative). This, of course, is due to the fact that in counting the number of affirmative and negative votes in the different combinations we disregard their order.

OOOA	OOAA	OAAA	OOOO
OOAO	OAAO	AOAA	1 way all negative votes
OAOO	AAOO	AAOA	AAAA
AOOO	AOOA	AAAO	1 way all affirmative
4 ways of getting 1 affirmative vote	OAOA AOAO	4 ways of getting 3 affirmative votes	
	6 ways of getting 2 affirmative votes		

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those who vote at election as a fair and trustworthy sample of what the opinion of the general public would be if they expressed it. Throughout modern "representative" democracy (as opposed to ancient "direct" democracy) this principle of the possibility of valid substitution of part for whole is central. Of course, the theory, which rests on the use of inverse probability, does not claim that from the known disposition of a selected smaller group we can argue back with absolute certitude to the constitution of the larger group. All that is maintained is that the sampling will lead us right more often than wrong as to the character of the whole, and that the probability of correctness increases, the larger the number of samples we have to judge by. Though any given result is not entirely free from the possibility of error, the process of sampling tends to correct and improve itself.

A justification of "sampling" may be drawn from illustrations like the following, which shows that the number of selected combinations in a smaller group which agree with, or correctly represent, the proportions of a larger group is greater than the number of those which do not agree with it. If, for example, we have in a box six balls (a, b, c, d, e, f) of which three (a, b, c) are blue, and three (d, e, f) are white, the possible combinations of these balls by pairs would number fifteen, among which there would be three blue couples, three white couples, and nine mixed couples (of one white and one blue ball each). Here the combinations by pairs which correctly represent the relations of the whole collection outnumber those that incorrectly represent them in the ratio of 3 to 2 (owing to the fact that the true mixed collection [3 whites and 3 blues] forms a larger group and has thus more ways of combining within itself than the unmixed, independent groups). Hence, in case we should draw from the collection by pairs, and should have to generalize from the proportions of each draw as to the character of the whole collection, we should expect that the chances of going right rather than wrong

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would be 3 to 2, since there are a greater number of right combinations possible than wrong ones. Considering an election as an illustration of the same principle, in which a certain number of votes is "drawn" at the polls out of the total collection of possible voters, we assume that although the voting records the opinions of only a fraction or "sample" of the whole, nevertheless it will lead us right more often than wrong in regard to the constitution of the electorate. Having learned, too, from the law of error that the combinations which give us the mean character of a collection are more numerous than those which represent the extremes, we tend to assume that since the mean is the most probable result, the sample drawn (or votes recorded) is more probably representative of what there is most of in the total electorate than of any other result. Even if our result is not absolutely exact as a representation of the whole, at least the chances are in favor of its approximating to the dominant character of the collection. In the statement following, Royce well sums up the assumptions of the method of sampling. "In general, if we choose partial collections from a larger collection, and judge the constitution of the whole collection from that of the parts chosen, ... we are aided toward probable inferences by the fact that there are *more* possible 'samples' or partial collections, that at least approximately *agree* in their constitution with the constitution of the whole, than there are samples that widely disagree."[5]

It is almost needless to explain how majority voting may be interpreted as a corollary of this principle of sampling. Since it is necessary, if the state is to enjoy any efficiency in the management of its affairs, that some unified body of opinion should be discovered and intrusted with the active prosecution of the government, and as the chance of unanimity among the voters is very slight, the plan is adopted of interpreting the verdict expressed by the greatest number of simi-

[5] *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, I, 86.

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lar votes as the most representative sample of unified opinion available, and hence as authoritative for the conduct of affairs. Having learned, as has been said, that the chances which give us the mean character of a collection are more numerous than those representing the extremes, we tend to believe that the type of vote that occurs most frequently in the election is probably representative of what most of the people are like. The assumption permitting us to treat a percentage of the vote as a fair sample of the total electorate may be rephrased, after C. S. Peirce, in the following way: "If a proportion, r' per cent [i.e., a majority] of the P's [voters], have the character q [agreement on the issue of the election], and if the P's are a 'fair sample' of the large collection, M [the people], then probably and approximately a proportion r' per cent [i.e., a majority] of the large collection, M [the people], have the character q [agreement on the issue]." Although a superiority of one vote may be sufficient to constitute a majority, it is recognized that usually the nearer the election approaches unanimity, the more probably and exactly it expresses the will of the people.

But at best determination by the majority is only a device. Unanimity is necessary, at least as an underlying assumption, to a full measure of organized action. In the last analysis democracy becomes possible as a system of government only on the presupposition of universal agreement among men: a community of opinion which goes back, if I am not mistaken, to the identity of human reasons in their insight into truth. In part this consentience of the citizen comes to be realized concretely; in part, it remains a purely formal postulate. In the functioning of majority rule, for instance, unanimity may be said to be present as an accomplished fact. That is, in so far as the citizens through it place the maintenance of constitutional forms above the gratification of personal desires, in so far as they subordinate private interests to what they conceive to be the general good, the rule of the majority expresses

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a fundamental agreement and rests on a unanimous sanction. On the other hand, in regard to occasional matters there is almost constant division of opinion in democracies; so that in the realm of particulars unanimity seems to remain merely a formal postulate. The import of these conflicts and disagreements is, however, minimized in democratic theory. For although an effort is made to do justice to the various differences, the underlying assumption is that they are only temporary "appearances"; and that in the long run (or an infinity of elections) all shades of opinion may be expected to gain the day in equal numbers, thus canceling out, and leaving the field free for the expression of the fundamental popular will, which is unanimous.

A frequent criticism of majority rule and the use of quantitative standards in democracy is that they are only a polite expression for the superiority of brute force, and equivalent to the ancient doctrine "might is right," and "justice is the interest of the stronger." In the language of the day, such critics describe democracy either as government by natural selection or as mob rule, arguing sometimes that the power remains in the hands of the superiorly endowed few who control the mediocre many, or again that it has its locus in the combined pressure of the masses of men. In either case, however, such views fail to grasp the central significance of mathematical quantity in the theory of democracy; they overlook the important distinction between the logical weight of numbers and the existential pressure of brute fact. As everybody knows, the purpose of counting in popular elections is not to estimate the physical strength of rival factions, their literal force and mass; although, of course, counting may happen to render a man's ideas of them more definite. If it be true that Agamemnon could not count his own feet, obviously he could have had no very exact notion of the comparative strength of manpower of the Greek and Trojan armies. But the force of enumeration in democratic estimates is logical and mathematical;

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each personal identity being treated as a numerical unit, and the differences of "more and less" being interpreted, not in terms of physical force or mass, but strictly in terms of the number of numbers. Thus, it is quite conceivable that the majority (or greater number) intrusted with the execution of affairs in a democracy should be at the same time in all other respects than number a minority: for instance, as regards money, brains, social prestige, culture, and even physical strength. None of these qualities plays any part worth mention in the requirements for democratic citizenship; the basis of the latter being rather in the logical identity of "persons," each of which is taken formally as a numerical unit. Not, of course, that the mere dead reiteration of units is the essence of counting. Dulness alone requires repetition in experience to make clear the implications of the process. The significance of the procedure is rather in the one-for-one relation of correspondence which holds, or fails in part to hold, between the groups compared. If one side has units to which the other side has none corresponding, the first side must be assumed to be "more" numerically. Accordingly, when the reins of government are put in the hands of the party with the largest sum of elementary units, it is clear that its sanction of authority is logical and formal, and not one of brute force.

The critics of democracy also constantly challenge its emphasis upon the number of votes rather than the quality of the votes cast. Such a system, they aver, inevitably raises mediocrity to the seat of political authority and makes for "a cult of incompetence." Moreover, they urge, where authority is accorded to whatever there is most of numerically, what occurs oftenest comes to be regarded as qualitatively superior and to be evaluated highest as well. The approval of the majority comes to confer a sacred sanction, as expressed in the democratic dicta "the general will is always right" and *vox populi vox dei.* Thus, in the popular election we are faced with the paradox that, although the voters aim to select an "average

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man" (and not a superior one) as best representative of them, this same mediocre individual becomes suddenly and miraculously "superior" once he is anointed by the sacred authority of popular will.

In response to the foregoing it must be admitted that democracy does apparently call to the foreground of operations the "average," or, better, the "modal," man. Not only does the principle of majority rule seem usually to insure that the reins of government shall remain with the type of voter that occurs most frequently in elections, but it follows that to a large extent the officeholders who are selected by this majority belong also to the same average type. According to the general assumption, an average or mediocre man is the kind of "sample" that most truly represents the public; at least his selection guarantees that the power will remain in the hands of the people and the government will enjoy stability. In short, what there is most of in a collection is again held to picture it more accurately than any other part, while along with this goes a tendency to place greater reliance upon the *aurea mediocritas* of "common" sense than upon rarer qualities or professional expertness in government. As for the presumed connection between the majority and incompetence, time may prove it to be in its essence wholly accidental. There seems no good reason why the type of voter which occurs in greatest numbers should be necessarily, or in any absolute sense, incapable, dull, or worthless. Indeed, one of the chief concerns of democracy for the future is by education and practice to demonstrate the masses' competence to govern. "But," says the critic, "the rule of every Tom, Dick, and Harry cannot be the rule of the best. Yet why should anything short of the rule of the best be accepted?" For answer we can only inquire how "the best" are to be found? What is to be the basis of division? How, barring the fallacy of initial predication, is a standard of valuation to be agreed on? Shall birth, special talents, strength, wealth, or what not be made the

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basis of computation? Assuming that most thinkers are today agreed that the aim of the state is the good of all, we may further ask whether it is altogether likely that by trusting to the few we have the "best" means of realizing the good of the many? While the individual man may not be the best judge of his own interest, it is another question whether all men may not be the best of that of all. At any rate, only by allowing all a chance to rule, as it seems to us, do we obtain a method of seeking the "best" that welcomes all possibilities on the same terms and gives true superiority, if there be such, a chance to win in a fair field with no favor; whereas other methods would seem by initial predication to compromise the issue.

The practical purposes served by popular elections in a democracy would seem to be several. In the first place, they are a record of public opinion, and as such claim to be directly mandatory in certain respects. In the second place, elections serve to select persons to administer on their own responsibility different departments of the government, for which business the general public has no time. Here again statistical sampling plays a part as the basis upon which officeholders are chosen. In other words, elections are held for the more or less conscious purpose of choosing for office men to represent "fair samples" of the public in general. President Lowell, in his admirable volume, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, has emphasized the large part which public opinion by sample plays in democracy. Many (if not most) public officers are selected, as he says, "to use their judgment as fair samples of the people, on the supposition that their opinion will be the same that the public itself would form if it could spend time enough to examine the matter thoroughly."[6] No special training or qualifications are therefore deemed necessary for eligibility to most of these offices; the incumbent is chosen simply as an example of "everyman's common sense," and is expected to function in this universal representative capacity. That

[6] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, p. 240.

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the system works as well as it does is due to the fact that "a large part of the work of men in legislative or executive positions . . . . consists in dealing with the questions presented to them as any other sensible man might do."[7] Illustrations of various means used in modern government for sampling public opinion come readily to mind: rotation in office, the use of lots, committees in legislatures, public hearings. One of the best examples is the common-law jury, since here the use of the lot and the protection of the jury from outside influence so as to guarantee its fairness as a sample makes the device doubly clear. As President Lowell puts it, "jury-men are a sample of the great and general public, whose verdict may be taken to express what the opinion of the whole people would be if everyone heard the evidence; and they are drawn, as we draw a sample from a bale of merchandise, by a process designed to secure average, not selected, specimens."[8] A third function of elections is the choice of (or at least the selection of those deemed competent to appoint) persons especially fitted by experience or professional skill for certain specialized affairs of government. For even democracy is not wholly without recognition of the necessity of special qualifications and training for the administration of certain departments of state. In some cases additional requirements are laid down for eligibility to these offices; yet even where this is done, effort is made to see that the value set upon technical skill and specialization of function shall not encroach upon the fundamental equality of the citizens. To this end the theory of sampling is again invoked. Even in the case of the expert or specialist, the assumption implied in his selection is that he represents a fair sample of what the ordinary good judgment of the community would be if it had the requisite knowledge and training in that particular field. Just as the scientist, in claiming "objectivity" for his results, implies that they are

[7] Lowell, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

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precisely what *any* normal person if provided with the proper instruments, technique, and experimental conditions would necessarily observe, so, conversely, the plain man in selecting a specialist to fill his place in the government assumes that the specialist's judgment is representative of what any citizen's verdict would be under similar circumstances provided he were equipped with the requisite training and experience.

But why, the critic of democracy persists, should the opinion of the people be evaluated highest? Why should it be assumed that the judgment of the entire public is more likely to be right than that of the intellectual minority, the men of talent and expertness? Why, in short, does quantity take precedence over quality? And the only hint of an answer apparently is that in modern thought since the Reformation, as in ancient Greece, the ultimate authority recognized in human affairs has come more and more to be that of individual reason. Consequently it gets to be believed that where there is a monopoly of human reasons there is also a surplus of value and authority; and in this sense *vox populi vox dei*. Moreover, since a modicum of reason is common to all normal human beings, whereas special capacities or talents seem more variable and infrequent, democracy tends to accept (within certain limits) rational consciousness or personal identity as the unit of political power and computes the quantity of this power in terms of the number of persons. Thus, although the possibility is not excluded that at any time the people may be mistaken in their expressed opinion, it is none the less believed that on the whole the totality of human reasons, if enlightened, must constitute the ultimate authority from which there is no appeal; and in this sense the general will is right.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE. By H. Krabbe. Authorized translation with an Introduction by George H. Sabine and Walter J. Shephard. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1922. Pp. lxxxi+281.

The author of this highly suggestive treatise is professor of Public Law in the University of Leyden. His clarity is such as to render possible a summary of his comprehensive thesis in a single sentence: *Political power is subordinate to the sovereignty of law, and the validity of law is found to reside solely in the ethical consciousness of men.* But his treatment is worth following more in detail.

Beginning with absolute monarchy supported by a theory of sovereignty that made the state an original manifestation of power, Professor Krabbe hits off in a few bold strokes the gradual re-emergence through constitutional government of an equally original manifestation of power, the law. Since the eighteenth century, when the unlimited ruler met this impersonal sovereign, the mind of political theorists has been in a predicament not unlike that occasioned in youth by the hypothetical collision of an irresistible force with an immovable object. Out of the conflict, however, has slowly evolved the modern idea of the state, an idea that "recognizes the impersonal authority of law as the ruling power"; an idea that insists, not "that the state subordinates itself to the law, but . . . . that the authority of the state is nothing other than the authority of the law"; and that "hence there is only one ruling power, the power of the law" (p. 2). Political theory can get clear on the subject of sovereignty only by recognizing this change that has actually come about.

But this recognition is not more urgent than is the related need for legal theory to recognize the new basis upon which law rests. For, even admitting the sole sovereignty of law, the persisting tendency has been to read into law the connotations that it caught when, in actual historical situations, it was the expression either of the arbitrary will of a personal sovereign or of the equally arbitrary power of an impersonal state. But instead of being an expression of the will of anybody, law purports to control the will of everybody (the term "will" is here given a shaded connotation). And instead of law's being an expression of power, arbitrary power has itself been outlawed by the human "sense of right." In that last phrase, indeed, is to be found the differentia of law: it is the "feel-

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ing or sense of right" at work among human relations. That this is so is indicated by the fact that without the support of such moral approval no would-be law—though heaven sent—can ever in a democratic age become more than a dead statute; and with such approval obligations are admitted whether ever enacted into law or not.

But if the sole validity of law arises from a sense of right, is not law then binding only upon those whose consciences approve it? As regards both customary and statutory law (and he finds no place for a law more "fundamental" than these), our author thinks that this question must be answered in the affirmative. But he sees that the fate of any democratic community itself is put in the balance by that answer; and the acuteness of his argument advances *pari passu* with the precariousness of his situation. Since law presupposes a community both as a source and as an end, a sense of right that cannot approve a law because of its content will obey it, if the majority approves its content, because a single rule is the *sine qua non* of a community, and the wish of the majority is the only available principle of social unity among free people. "Consequently, for those whose convictions accord with the rule, the obligation to obey . . . . rests upon the value of the *content* of the rule; for all others it is based upon the value of having a *single rule*" (p. 75).

With the community securely based upon the right of the majority, our author then grows more specific in discussing the demands that his theory makes upon practice. To discover and to declare what the community approves as right is the work of judge and legislator alike. But upon the legislator, of course, falls the primary task of harmonizing the interests upon which men's sense of right diverges. *Impartiality* has been traditionally regarded as the supreme qualification for this task. The Platonic ideal sought to attain impartiality "through a destruction of interests"; the ideal of monarchy has been to attain it by elevating a family above society and giving it "a preferred status with reference to honors and property"; the democratic ideal has been to reach the same goal either through training the intellect into independence of the emotions or through neutralizing conflicting interests by setting them sharply over against each other.

But Professor Krabbe doubles the difficulty of lawmaking by calling us to witness that not less urgently needed than impartiality is *knowledge* of all the interests involved. "A thorough-going impartiality would result in a stoical indifference to social interests; politics based solely upon interests and lacking a sober impartiality would issue in revolutionary passion. Therefore we can neither separate the two requirements nor attribute to one a greater weight than to the other" (pp. 162–63). But

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since to impartiality we have traditionally given much greater weight, he is especially concerned to do justice to the knowledge requirement. His constructive suggestion here runs in the direction of guild socialism. How far he would go is not certain; but it is clear that since there is a limit to the number of interests that a man can understand intimately enough to legislate for them intelligently, there must be a radical decentralization of legislation. Those whose interests are directly at stake must do the legislating. Against those who see knowledge thus attained to the dangerous disregard of impartiality, our author argues that "we get much more certain guaranty . . . . by intrusting legislation to those who live in the midst of social conflicts and who have the need for compromise clearly before them than by trying to have the law handed down from the heights of neutrality" (p. 169). Nevertheless, Professor Krabbe is quite modern—I had almost said American—in that he turns over at last to education the task of producing the type of person who alone can maintain impartiality while his own interests are in the balance. Let only the wiseacre cavil at such a procedure; for since self-government presupposes such citizens, and since they do not grow wild, there seems no alternative between surrender and the author's conclusion that "the watch-word for democracy, therefore, lies in strengthening the moral capacity of the mass of the people" (p. 163).

A separate review were necessary to do justice to the admirable and comprehensive historical introduction by the translators. Their excellent work in bringing over into idiomatic pointed English this treatise, important from so many points of view, deserves the gratitude of all English students of the social sciences.

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION. By Paul Périgord. D. Appleton & Co., 1926. Pp. 339. Price, $3.00.

The labor sections of the Treaty of Versailles and the creation and work of the International Labour Office has given rise to almost as many books as conventions. Lowe, Hetherington, Solano, Ayusawa, Miller, Chisholm, and Behrens have all written treatises describing various aspects of the situation, and this volume by a former member of the French High Commission, who is now a resident of this country and a member of the faculty of the University of California, is the latest addition to this list.

As M. Périgord shows, it is international trade which primarily necessitates international labor legislation. When the products of two coun-

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tries, whose wage levels, standards of living, and conditions of work are appreciably unequal, come into competition with each other, the immediate victory will go to the low-wage country unless the higher wages are compensated for by correspondingly greater efficiency. Ultimately, to be sure, the movement of gold to the low-wage country to pay for the exports of goods will tend to equalize wages in the two countries, but this is a slow and long-drawn-out process. Meanwhile the wages of those in the better-paid countries are likely to be forced down in the attempt to compete.

One method of temporarily protecting the workers is to erect a tariff wall, but this shuts off a country from the advantages of the international division of labor and encourages uneconomic production as well. A better way is for the countries to agree on certain minimum standards of wages and employment which will prevent the keenness of international competition from lowering them. The argument for international labor legislation is therefore fundamentally the same as that for either federal or uniform state legislation on such matters in this country. Modest beginnings had been made in this direction prior to the war through the International Association for Labor Legislation, and draft conventions and a few separate treaties upon such questions as the use of white phosphorus and night work for women had been ratified. Fear of Bolshevism and the rise to partial power during the war of the pro-war socialists and workers led the framers of the peace to draft a more ambitious program for the protection of labor. This was designed to improve the status of labor as a whole, and not merely to protect the more advanced countries against the competition of the more backward. An International Labour Office was set up as the administrative agency, while periodical conferences were to be called to draft conventions upon specific problems. Representation in this conference was unique in that the employers' and workers' organizations in each country were each to choose a delegate in addition to the two appointed by the national government. Since the delegates were to vote as individuals, economic groups were thus represented as well as political states.

What, then, were to be the powers of these international conferences? The Italian delegation proposed to make it obligatory upon all member nations to enact as law the conventions drafted by the conferences. The British proposal, which was favored by the majority of the commission, was to give such conventions the power of law unless the legislature of a nation specifically dissented. But even this was bitterly opposed by the American members of the Commission, who were afraid of the added opposition to the League of Nations which the creation of such a semi-

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superstate would occasion in this country. They, moreover, pointed out that in such a federalized country as our own, the separate states were the bodies to act in such matters, and not the national congress. Although a precedent to the contrary existed in the treaty regulating migratory birds, Messrs. Gompers and Robinson were in the main correct in their contention. The anxiety to secure our entrance led the Commission therefore to reject even the British proposal, and merely to provide that the governments of the member nations would agree to submit to their legislative bodies any conventions which were arrived at.

But despite this concession America did not ratify the treaty, and the European working classes found that they had been sacrificed to no end. For the tide of labor sentiment began to wane as the war receded more and more into the background and the governments became more unwilling to ratify the conventions. Thus the eight-hour convention, which has been the chief step taken by the conference, has not been ratified unconditionally by any of the great industrial nations. The topics which have been considered at the conferences have in the later years tended to be minor problems. This does not mean that nothing has been accomplished, for not only have there been 146 ratifications, but the International Labour Office itself has done excellent research work. But it seems clear that however correct the American policy at Versailles may have been, it did prevent the workers in Europe from enjoying the full fruits of that protection which they would otherwise have received.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE ETHICS OF BUSINESS. By Edgar L. Heermance. New York: Harper & Bros., 1926. Pp. x+244.

Whether the increasing attention recently given to "business ethics" is significant remains to be seen, but there is no denying the fact that symptoms of business decency and fairness have become increasingly evident of late. Among these symptoms are the many "codes of ethics," "standards of business conduct," and "principles" formulated by various trade associations. Mr. Heermance published several hundred of these two years ago in his handbook, *Codes of Ethics*. At that time he promised a volume that would take into account the social philosophy involved, and this we now have in his *Ethics of Business*.

A brief but excellent historical introduction is followed by the main body of the work, an analysis of present-day business standards as they are disclosed by codes of ethics; and the significance of this movement

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is then indicated in a few concluding chapters. The author does no "preaching," as the prospectus states, and his book is not involved in academic thinking or expression; so that the business man may approach it with confidence and read it with pleasure.

The more penetrating reader will find an appreciable amount of valuable material, but will be disappointed if his expectations have been greatly aroused by the author's promise of "a new introduction to social ethics." Mr. Heermance has confined himself too closely to the analysis of codes of ethics. True, these codes may be the "precipitants of existing ethical sentiment," but they may also in many cases—as the author admits—be hypocritical camouflage or well-meant but ineffective attempts at expressing or controlling business practices. The best parts of the book are those which deal with the actual standardizing of practices under the urge of business convenience. The book could have been vastly improved by still further matters of this sort: the work of practice committees and case materials, agencies and instruments not only for making the codes "work," but indeed for making them intelligible.

Furthermore, if this sort of work is to expand into a "social ethics," it must be related to the more important social movements. Reference is made in this work to the similarity of business associations to medieval guilds. Just what is the similarity, not only as regards social relations, but perhaps also as regards philosophical and ethical ideas? And what has happened between these two periods to make the interval so unlike either? The two great social events that happened—nationalism and the institution of the common law—not only destroyed the older relations, but have, by their weaknesses and disagreeable elements of strength, engendered the newer period. To regard the field of business ethics as indicative of a new social order, as symptomatic of a new social ethics, requires either that the field itself be shown to be sufficiently important to carry this burden, or that its context be interpreted as having been vitally affected by it. The author has not stressed the latter point; while as for the former, the analysis of mere codes of ethics is not convincing evidence. But Mr. Heermance has called attention to a most significant social event, and he has presented the situation in a lucid and informative manner.

C. F. TAEUSCH

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

HUMAN EXPERIENCE: A STUDY OF ITS STRUCTURE. By Viscount Haldane. London: John Murray, 1926. Pp. 229. Price 5s.

Lord Haldane is well known as a Hegelian, and in this book he states once again his view of "the nature and meaning of human experience."

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He says in the preface that "the forms that are inherent in our experience mould the world which is disclosed in it"; and the assumption here implied naturally makes it impossible for Lord Haldane to accept the theories of Professor Dewey in *Experience and Nature*, with which Lord Haldane's book is largely concerned. Lord Haldane seems to make the mistake common to other idealists, of supposing that the new mathematical theories of relativity support subjectivism. He avoids the old difficulties in regard to the particular and the universal by saying that they are "aspects," although the particular is said not to be "reached" in the actual. We are told again that the subject cannot be an object, and that personalities are "more than merely natural"—which may mean anything or nothing. Thus the new material to which Lord Haldane refers has not modified his original view of the structure of reality, but modern science is adjusted to the Hegelian absolutism which was expressed some time ago in the *Pathway to Reality*. It is, of course, possible that new facts may not render a reconsideration of old theories necessary; and logically the idealist can give as consistent—and perhaps, as in Lord Haldane's excellent manner, as poetical—an expression of philosophy as the realist. But the two views are not to be reconciled; still less is it possible to allow for all the realist means in giving the conclusions of an idealist. For a realist the facts of mental life do not warrant the conclusions to which Lord Haldane thinks they point.

C. D. BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM. By James B. Leuba. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1925. Price, 15s. net.

Professor Leuba's interesting study of those aspects of human nature expressed in mystical religion is an effort to remove that part of the religious inner life from the province of the occult and to incorporate it in that body of facts of which psychology takes cognizance. Religious experience is thus interpreted "as any other experience"; the "unknowable" transferred to the knowable. The book is based on long and solid research; indeed, two published studies date from 1902: "Les tendances Fondamentales des mystiques chrétiens" and "Les tendances Religieuses chez les mystiques chrétiens" in the *Revue philosophique* for that year (in which also appeared William James's *Varieties of Religious experience*).

Professor Leuba is in agreement with Henri Delacroix (whose stud-

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ies in the history and psychology of mysticism appeared in 1908) and with George A. Coe with regard to the illusory nature of the mystical claim. The latter writes in the *Hibbert Journal* (Vol. VI, 1907–8) that the "mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical neighbor does, namely, through tradition and instruction, auto-suggestion grown habitual, and reflective analysis. The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience, he does not derive them from it." He will not admit that his certainty of spiritual things is self-produced; he insists that it is inspired. To a modern leader of contemporary religious mysticism who writes that "to the mystic himself the *experience* is evidence enough . . . . such experiences minister to life, construct personality, and conduce to the increased power of the race-energy," the author maintains that "a line of demarcation between influxes of moral energy which are from God, and those which have an ordinary natural origin, has never been satisfactorily drawn."

Of those who are called mystics, specialists in a life of devotion, there is much to be said. There is necessarily no attempt to estimate the total value of the mystic's contribution, though it is pointed out that the life of the great mystics culminates normally in active proselytizing, not in contemplation. The book is concerned with the peculiar characteristics and symptoms of the mystic experience as described by the mystics themselves or recorded by contemporaries. The writings and biographies of the great mystics form a curious literature, and have been, during the twentieth century, exposed to the scientific psychologist, some of whom treat mysticism as pathological. The stress laid upon neurotic symptoms by the author of the present book, the juxtaposition for purposes of comparison of Catherine of Genoa with a defeated modern mystic (Mlle Vé) and the absurd Marie Alacoeque, indicate his position. In addition, the descriptions of the ecstasies of the great mystics are compared with non-religious ecstasies and with those of epileptics and of normal persons. The conclusion is that the mystic experiences reveal, not the Christian God, but "the lawful workings of our psycho-physiological organisms." Thus, for the psychologist who remains within his own proper province, "religious mysticism is a revelation not of God, but of man."

E. F.

LONDON, ENGLAND

WAGES AND THE FAMILY. By Paul H. Douglas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. xiv+290. $3.00.

This book is a very careful study of the economic influences which play upon the family in our industrial civilization. The first part of the

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book, chaps. i–v, gives a successful attack on current proposals to pay a minimum "living wage" for a family of five to all wage-earners: $1,700 is accepted as the figure necessary to provide a "subsistence-plus" scale of living for a family of five in American large cities. The author shows that such payments would be impossible on a national scale. Moreover, he makes the important point that such pay would result in providing for forty-eight million nonexistent persons, if it were given to all adult male wage-earners. If the slogan of equal pay for equal work were followed, the pay would provide for seventy-two million nonexistent persons. The average number of dependents of male workers is 2.35 persons. Moreover, many have less and many have more. So the current measures of reform are neither desirable nor possible.

In this first part, the author gives an especially interesting study of wage-earners in Philadelphia. He shows that if $1,700 were paid to all adult male workers there, with less for women and children, there could be no savings by industry for development, no interest or profit on investments, and no higher pay for the more skilled workers or for special talent. Such a scheme seems utterly impossible in our type of civilization.

In the second part of the book, chaps. v–xi, the author gives a valuable picture of what is called the "family allowance" system in Europe. This scheme, which was required by the impoverished conditions in Europe, involves a fund to which a group of employers contribute, and from which an allowance is given to each worker according to the children or other persons dependent upon him. For example, from one French fund a worker who has two children gets an additional sum equal to 7 per cent of his regular wage.

In the third part, chaps. xii–xvii, the author presents a modified plan to suit our American conditions. The plan deals only with industrial wage-earners. The sum of $800 is taken as the minimum annual wage for male or female adults. Juvenile wages are ignored. To this minimum wage should be added a yearly allowance of $240 for a wife, $200 for each child under fourteen, and about $400 for each aged dependent actually living in the worker's household. These allowances are to be paid out of a fund to which groups of industrial employers contribute in proportion to the number of employees. It is estimated that this plan would require $1,500,000,000 yearly less than the present total of manufacturing wages in 1919. Unfortunately no very careful study is made concerning the adequacy of this margin for differential wages to the superior workers. The difficulty of deflating the wages of single workers is recognized with the suggestion that it could be accomplished in a period of rising prices.

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The first two parts of the book deal primarily with the presentation of economic facts. As far as the reviewer can judge, these parts of the book are excellent work. The third part of the book is successful in presenting a definite economic plan for the preservation of the family in an industrial civilization. But the presentation of this plan raises many questions of ethics with which the author does not deal adequately. The practicability of the plan is only partially treated. To say that single workers can have their wages deflated in a period of rising prices ignores both the question of justice and the question of the probable time of such a change. To limit the family wage to those who are paid $2,800 or less ignores the fact that the cost of a family in professional and other groups where the income is frequently above this figure may be nearly as serious as it is in groups with lower standards of living. It may not be good economics or ethics to pay all wage-earners so comfortable an amount that there is no adequate margin for higher wages for the superior workers who accomplish more than the others. The most serious defect, in the opinion of the reviewer, is the presentation of this plan as the only possibility that can deal with the family. There are other plans which should be considered before we make our final choice. For example, the system of income taxes with exemptions for dependents is a plan that is now in operation for the more prosperous one-sixth of our workers in this country. This system could be a supplement to the allowance system, or it could be a substitute for the allowance system, provided we are willing to extend that form of direct taxation. But the only point to be stressed here is that any such system as our author presents must be judged comparatively. It must be placed alongside other solutions so that the more desirable one of the possible systems can be adopted.

A. P. Brogan

University of Texas

SHORTER NOTICES

Wealth, Virtual Wealth, and Debt: The Solution of the Economic Paradox. By Frederick Soddy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1925. Pp. 320. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Professor Soddy is professor of chemistry in the University of Oxford and won the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1921. In this book he gives a full account of his economic theory, which seems to depend upon a reinterpretation of the meaning of the word "wealth." Professor Soddy is impressed by the importance of what most economists would call utility, but he mistakenly seems to imagine that economists neglect "utility" or "well-being" because they say it is not their business to discern it. Indeed, Professor Soddy in part of this book is discussing a *moral* issue, which is subject matter for ethics and not for economics; but he does not seem to allow for the existence of a science called ethics. The book ends with suggestions for a practical program which imply

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assumptions in political science; but Professor Soddy does not seem to have analyzed the facts of political science. It is, of course, very useful to have the mind of a physical scientist applied to psychical facts; but the danger is that the physical scientist is so unaccustomed to psychical facts that he does not see them clearly and tends to omit or to forget many of the valid conclusions which specialists in the social sciences have already reached. C. D. B.

PERSONALITY AND REALITY: A PROOF OF THE REAL EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME SELF IN THE UNIVERSE. By J. E. Turner. London: Allen & Unwin, 1926. Pp. 190. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

This is not exactly a proof of the existence of "God," since the author is not concerned to say whether the Supreme Self, which he concludes must exist, can be identified with what the theologians call God. Still the whole proof hangs on the meaning of the word "self," which is said to "dominate" the mechanical world. The world of physical science, however, shows no trace of a self operating, except in so far as the "mechanism" of nature shows traces of "evolving." But evolving is a sign of mind; witness the dominance of the human self in regard to its "mechanism." Therefore there must be a mind for the universe at large. Evolution is, of course, so vague a word that philosophically it could, one supposes, be reconciled with "fundamentalism"; but this reviewer, at any rate, cannot see why the evolution assumed in the biological sciences (and still more that other evolution assumed in astronomy) should be regarded as sufficiently *like* the growth of a human being's activity to warrant the analogy on which rests Mr. Turner's proof of the existence of a self for the universe at large. C. D. B.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN CAPITALISM. By J. A. Hobson. (New and revised ed.) London: Walter Scott Publishing Co.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. Pp. 510. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

This new edition of Mr. Hobson's analysis of "machine production" contains a supplementary chapter dealing with the situation since the war. It therefore brings up to date the book originally published in 1894, which has already gone through five other reprints and new editions. The new chapter contains a description of the growth of industrial combines and trusts, and the advance of the United States as a creditor nation. The second part of the chapter deals chiefly with "labor" problems and the action of the state. Although the book naturally relies chiefly upon examples drawn from British experience, the supplementary chapter contains a large proportion of non-British evidence which has recently become available, and the outlook for international developments in the economic sphere is broadly summarized. The new edition will be essential to all students of economic and social theory, and it should displace the older editions in all libraries. Mr. Hobson's "humanism" in economics makes his work specially valuable to students of moral theory. C. D. B.

HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. By R. de Wulf, Professor of Philosophy at Louvain and Harvard universities. (Translated by E. C. Messenger.) Vol. I, *From the Beginnings to Albert the Great*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926. Pp. 416. Price, 15*s*. net.

The first volume of the translation of De Wulf's enlarged history of Scholasticism is very welcome. It will prove useful in giving at least the names and dates of the philosophers; and at the end of each section is a good bibliography, including articles in periodicals. The translation is good and the form of the book attractive. There can hardly be any excuse now for philosophers

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and historians to ignore the contribution of the Middle Ages to our knowledge of the world. The statements of the doctrines of medieval philosophers are abrupt, and their arguments are hardly given sufficient prominence by De Wulf; but it may be allowed that this is really a summary introduction to a large field of investigation. The rendering of the problems, however, is somewhat childlike, not to say childish. We read, for example, that Albert the Great "subjected Aristotelianism to a doctrinal purification." There is, in fact, no critical appreciation of Scholasticism in the book, and, as in most neo-Scholastic writing, there is an amusing atmosphere of omniscience. The author seems to say: "We know what is correct and we dismiss anyone who does not agree with the emasculated Thomism of Louvain." There is, nevertheless, no reason to quarrel with him. He has given us a very useful collection of names and dates and facts which may be material for a future critical history of the medieval thinkers. C. D. B.

PRESENT-DAY THINKERS AND THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM. Edited and augmented by John S. Zybura. St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1926. Pp. 543.

Part I of this work contains letters from thirty-three non-Scholastic philosophers of America and Great Britain in reply to a questionnaire asking for the attitude of non-Scholastic thinkers toward Scholastic and neo-Scholastic philosophy and the reasons therefor. Part II consists of essays by neo-Scholastics on the nature, aims, and methods of the new Scholasticism. Part III is by the editor, Dr. Zybura, and outlines the course of Scholastic philosophy during the Humanistic Renaissance period, its present view and status. J. H. T.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE RECENT PAST: AN OUTLINE OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY SINCE 1860. By Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926. Pp. viii+230.

The leading tendencies since 1860 are objectively presented: "I have aimed to set forth each philosophy with sympathetic understanding rather than to argue my own opinion about it." The summaries are brief and are intended to serve as a guide rather than as substitutes for the originals. They include French, German, and Italian as well as British and American writers. It is a highly opportune and serviceable volume which reflects wide reading and the power of lucid exposition. It is also attractively printed. J. H. T.

MYTH IN PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. By Bronislaw Malinowski. (Initiating the "New Science Series.") New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1926. Pp. 94. Price, $1.00.

Professing loyal discipleship to Sir James Frazer, Professor Malinowski claims in this little popular book only to document with intimate details gathered from anthropological fieldwork in northwest Melanesia the larger insights and hypotheses of the revered author of the *Golden Bough*. Replete with varied samples of Melanesian stories, from those affording amusement at the end of the day up to the great myths of life and death and the practice of magic, the volume enforces the close relation of the stories with "their ritual acts, their moral deeds, their social organization, and even their practical activities." This close functional relation of the myth as a cultural force with the urgencies of life and the demands of hope contrasts, as the author thinks, with the view that makes it "a rhapsodic rendering of natural phenom-

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ena," as well as with the view that gives it the intellectual standing of "a sort of primitive science." Not exclusively, but primarily, the myth is a sociological modus operandi for feeling more at home in an environment none too friendly to human longing. As such it has light to throw upon its philosophical and theological counterparts in societies more advanced. T. V. S.

SCIENCE AND POETRY. By I. A. Richards. (The "New Science Series.") New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1926. Pp. 96. Price, $1.00.

Science represents only knowledge of the "how." But man cannot live by how's alone. Still, science, which cannot furnish us with life, has covered so much of the field of living, and in doing so has destroyed so many of our beliefs, that it is now next to impossible for poetry to perform the function that has crowned it in other days. This function was the release of energy through suggestion and the consequent fuller harmonization of personality. With the neutralization of nature on so grand a scale, poetry, in order to serve its beneficent function at all, must either present this barren world for belief, or it must eschew the realm of belief altogether. Thomas Hardy is the outstanding poet of the scientific age who has risen to the level of this hard first demand. Not many can follow him, and the difficulty progressively increases. With the constant advance of science, can others, without the aid of belief, still stimulate divided souls to unity? Or is mankind, through the deepening of knowledge, foredoomed spiritually to starve to death? Such is the dilemma which this thoughtful booklet presents. T. V. S.

RELATIVITY IN MAN AND SOCIETY. By Arthur F. Bentley. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926. Pp. xix+363. Price, $3.00.

The author has been impressed with the simplification of mathematical and physical problems by the concept of relativity. Older fixities—space, time, force, atoms—give place to more fruitful points of view. He would carry a similar relativity into social concepts and dissolve the opposition of individual to society and various other fixed conceptions or "clots." It is a good lead.
J. H. T.

THE THREE CONVENTIONS. By Denis Saurat. New York: The Dial Press, 1926. Pp. viii+128.

In this book Professor Saurat, author of a well-known book on Milton, ascends into the farthest reaches of metaphysics. His fundamental thought seems to be that reality is constituted through the determination by forms of vague, indeterminate being. The creative forms may be divided into the language of matter, constituted by the convention of the universes; the language of morality, constituted by the convention of men; and the language of metaphysics, which has yet to be established. Since no one could have the strength or time to build an independent universe, each individual by being born adopts the language of matter. But matter is merely the first convention. Reality is formed by a collaboration, by a convention. That which many accept is true, and there is no other kind of truth. New reality is constantly being formed by concentration of the inexhaustible inactual into the actual. By forming the convention of metaphysics men will create new truth and reality which will correct the imperfections of the first two conventions. In the creation of new ideas and of new reality the masculine Actual fecundates the feminine Inactual. "The feminine element is as necessary for the creation of ideas as it is for the creation of physical life. The mechanism of creation is the same in both cases; the appeal of an intense Actual to the vague possibilities of the Inactual, which, responding, crystallise into an expression." C. M. PERRY

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MODERN SCIENCE AND PEOPLE'S HEALTH. Edited by Benjamin C. Gruenberg. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1926. Pp. xi+250. Price, $2.50.

This is a collection of six intelligible essays by as many scientists upon the contribution of science to health. It is an imposing picture that is presented. The volume will certainly serve to indicate the achievements of curative science in the past, and may well arouse expectation of and inspire co-operation for the greater preventive work that lies ahead. This aspect is emphasized in a closing essay upon science and the public health movement.

T. V. S.

THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL WORK. By Arthur W. Proctor and Arthur A. Schuck. With a foreword by Mortimer L. Schiff. Chicago: A. W. Shaw & Co., 1926. Pp. xiii+260. Price, $4.00.

The technique of raising money to carry on what in America is now about a billion-dollar enterprise is here considered. To put large-scale charity upon a sound business basis is the objective of this highly detailed study. No method of achieving financial means for social work seems to be omitted, and constructive suggestions for greater effectiveness are here found in abundance.

T. V. S.

THE FACTORS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By Theodore de Laguna. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1926. Pp. x+362.

Taking as his field the borderland between social philosophy and sociology, the author approaches in a conciliatory mood the various explanations of social change. His materials are drawn more from the "higher, rather than the lower, levels of culture." The social technician will find no new contribution here, but he will find an earnest attempt to harmonize in a thoroughly readable style the various emphases upon physical environment, upon contact between peoples, upon internal organization as outstanding factors in social evolution. The ethicist will find well marshaled the sociological data that his own judgments presuppose and the reasoned conviction that the most significant changes in morality in modern times have been "in great part of a nature to encourage a further advance." It is refreshing to see a new publisher doing such excellent work as is mechanically represented by this volume.

T. V. S.

NATURAL LAWS AND HUMAN HOPES. By M. C. Otto. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1926. Pp. 97.

Those familiar with Professor Otto's *Things and Ideals* will find here a pleasing, if brief, sequel to the chapters in it which deal with the relation between science and the deeper purposes of men. Starting with a historical explanation of how the conception of natural laws and the ideals which found traditional expression in religion came to appear inconsistent, the author goes on to show that the inconsistency can fully disappear only in practical commitment to the task of socializing our aims and realizing them by the aid of the natural laws on which they depend. The closing chapters attack certain evils in popular contemporary ideals, such as make for irrationality and commercialism.

E. A. BURTT

CHRISTIANITY AND NATURALISM. By Robert Shafer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926. Pp. viii+307.

Dr. Shafer collects in this volume a group of critical and very readable essays on the thought of several outstanding men of literature in England who

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wrote during the last century. The thinkers treated are Coleridge, Newman, Arnold, Butler, Huxley, and Hardy, and are selected because of the light their intellectual development throws on the perennial conflict between authoritarian religion and naturalistic philosophy. The earnestness of the author's own stand for the validity of a religious (though not authoritarian) metaphysic lends dignity and power to his style, while it encourages certain prejudices which infect especially his criticisms of Huxley and Arnold. Withal the essays are scholarly, the treatment live and timely, and the conclusion challenging.

E. A. BURTT

MYSTICISM OF EAST AND WEST. By William Loftus Hare. With an Introduction by J. Estlin Carpenter. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Pp. 356.

A leisurely treatment, and singularly unpointed, of the general subject of religion. The title is misleading if one seeks light on mysticism in any except the vaguest sense. The various great religions and the best-known philosophies are discussed as they come to mind. The volume does conveniently gather together many translated passages from sacred and philosophic literature, but there is no definite clue as to what one would find, or not find, in the book. The author closes with an eloquent word upon the subject of forgiveness as at least a supplement to the modern emphasis upon justice. T. V. S.

THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND. By John Herman Randall, Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926. Pp. x+653.

If philosophers publish when angels would confine their speculations to classroom use, it must be remembered that to philosophers has been assigned in the intellectual realm the path that leads where danger lurks. The fascinating though baffling task which Professor Randall sets himself is that of describing the great waves of thought and aspiration that have left the successive deposits which constitute the modern mind. Starting with the *Intellectual Outlook of Medieval Christendom,* the setting forth of which involves a reference to Hebrew and Hellenistic components, he attempts to characterize the elements and the logic of the caldron in which have boiled for six or seven centuries the various sciences, technical philosophies, religious beliefs, economic and social conditions, class standards and demands, social, economic, and political interpretations and rationalizations, and various other mysterious ingredients. He does not attempt to show how from this mixture has been distilled an essence which constitutes a unitary modern mind; but he does attempt, if the figure may be continued, to enumerate all the important ingredients that have been thrown into the pot, to indicate how various ingredients have reacted upon each other to produce new mixtures and compounds, and to show how certain elements have disappeared in the steam of the boiling.

The immensity of the task makes inevitable questionable generalizations and doubtful interpretations. Undoubtedly, however, the author was equipped with an unusual store of knowledge as well as an unusual ability in synthesizing and interpreting knowledge from various fields. He is more critical and scholarly than certain contemporary historians who have undertaken similar studies; and the study which he has produced makes a decided contribution to our understanding of the background of modern beliefs and problems. Since there is no doubt of the value of such interpretation and synthesis, it is to be hoped that Professor Randall's success will encourage other men to undertake similar but less ambitious studies. C. M. PERRY

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The International Journal of Ethics

Vol. XXXVII APRIL 1927 No. 3

CONTENTS

PAGE

PROGRESSIVE MORALITY 225
By C. Delisle Burns, London, England

BEAUTY AND MORAL BETTERMENT 239
By Louis Arnaud Reid, University College of Wales

THE TOTAL-SITUATION THEORY OF ETHICS 258
By Charles W. Morris, Rice Institute

AN APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 269
By C. F. Taeusch, State University of Iowa

PLATONIC IMMORTALITY AS THE HIGHEST GOOD 288
By Rupert Clendon Lodge, University of Manitoba

BOOK REVIEWS

Hocking, William Ernest, The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights; and Man and the State 307
By George H. Sabine

Bready, J. Wesley, Lord Shaftesbury and Social-Industrial Progress . . 311
By M. Jourdain

Whitehead, Alfred North, Religion in the Making 312
By Henry Nelson Wieman

Smuts, General the Rt. Hon. J. C., Holism and Evolution 314
By C. D. Burns

Adams, George P., *et al* (editors), Studies in the Problem of Norms . . 314
By A. P. Brogan

Dickinson, G. Lowes, The International Anarchy, 1904–1914 . . . 317
By Eugene N. Anderson

Bouglé, C., The Evolution of Values 321
By Charner M. Perry

Margold, Charles W., Sex Freedom and Social Control 323
By T. V. Smith

Birdseye, Clarence F., Arbitration and Business Ethics 324
By C. F. Taeusch

SHORTER NOTICES 326

BOOKS RECEIVED 334

NOTES 336

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXVII APRIL 1927 Number 3

PROGRESSIVE MORALITY

C. DELISLE BURNS

A man who thinks that he is all that he ought to be is obviously not what he ought to be. Anyone who has reached his ideal has no ideal; and a man without an ideal is not a man, for the world of moral action is as inexhaustible as the world of knowledge. We must therefore in our philosophy allow for two aspects of the moral world: in acts which express the good already achieved and in acts on the frontier. Some good acts have been done and are done daily; but other good acts have not yet been done, and among these there are probably kinds of good acts which are quite new. In other words, some acts are good because they maintain an ideal; others are good because they develop it. Not only is the ideal never reached, but the ideal itself changes; and the acts which develop the ideal are frontier acts, for they go beyond the area of experienced good.

We are not concerned here with the increase in the knowledge about good acts or the science of ethics, but with good acts themselves. It is assumed for the present argument that there is a distinction between good and evil which is found in fact and is not arbitrary or imaginary. But of course the good is "relative" in the sense that good is a quality of a relation between a man and other men and perhaps also the circumstances of the moment. There could be no good or evil unless there were a particular kind of relation of men; but that relation may exist and the good in it may exist without anyone

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"knowing" it. Good, therefore, is relative to human beings, but not relative in the sense of "subjective" or relative to their opinions as to what is good. Good, therefore, with respect to knowledge, is absolute. Those who are unable to accept such a view of good must grant it for the purpose of the argument in order that we may explain what is meant by the frontier in morality.

Morality is the attitude out of which arises right action or the good intrinsic in certain acts; or morality is the series of acts which make up good conduct and good character. Now such conduct and character is partly the result of established experience or the calculus of consequences. Some good acts are done because they belong to a class of acts the results of which have been found to be intrinsically good. The Utilitarians seem so far to be correct. To know the good is necessary, in this sense, in order that good acts may be done; and in this sense "virtue is knowledge." Good intentions are not enough for making good acts, although a man may be "good" or virtuous if his intentions are good, even if his acts are bad. This is discussed in ethics, and it may be assumed here that certain classes of acts are known to be good. But it has always been a difficulty for the Utilitarians to explain certain good acts which did not seem to have good consequences as far as we can make out in our range of vision; and, further, it is undeniable that some acts which most men would recognize as good are not done after any calculation of their consequences. Morality is not all based upon a calculus. This, of course, does not imply that morality is altogether intuitive or that a "moral sense," in the traditional meaning of the phrase, must be supposed to exist; for some acts may be based upon artistic inspiration and some upon scientific calculation, or there may be an element of each of these in the sources of any good act. The acts of morality are much more subtle than is implied in the crude doctrine of either school (the Utilitarians or the Idealists). There are, however, some acts, generally recog-

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nized as good, which are not done because of already acquired experience that that class of acts has good consequences.

The acts which thus break new ground are frontier acts. They may be said to express the sense of the frontier in morality rather than the sense of acquired experience. They are acts which are sometimes called revolutionary or heroic, because they are not found in the class of acts which are normally regarded as good. They are the acts of moral genius: they may break the established "law" just as a new discovery in science may refute the accepted view of the laws of nature; but in this sense the "law" is only a statement that, until the heroic act was done, all good acts were thought to be of a certain kind. There is no moral law, as will be argued later, in the sense of a command or obligation: but there is of course a natural law, a general fact in regard to the consequences of classes of acts; and this "law" is broken only as an exception breaks a rule. The general sense of agreement with others in regard to classes of acts already proved to be good in their consequences is the probable source of the sense of obligation which some writers regard as fundamental to morality.

Clearly the act which does not fall within the old class of good acts may be a bad act; but we are assuming here that we are discussing the various ways of being good. That a madman may contradict established science does not indicate that a genius who does so is wrong. Also a man may be deluded when he thinks he has made a subversive discovery; just as in morals a man may be mistaken in doing some subversive act which he thinks right. But the possibility of error does not prove that all truth is already known, and the possibility of evil-doing does not prove that all morality is within the established order. Our theory of morality therefore must allow for the frontier as yet unexplored, beyond which moral genius may go. Among the real facts of which we must take account are moral possibilities which are not yet actual.

Can we then speak of moral progress? Is the morality of

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one group of men or of one stage in history better than that of another? The ordinary man would answer in the affirmative; but he would find it difficult perhaps to explain his meaning, for he would also say that a man in the past might be just as virtuous as a man in the future. There is, however, no contradiction between the two beliefs, (1) that morality itself improves and (2) that a virtuous man in any age or in any society has reached an "absolute" perfection which is not to be surpassed as the ancient poet is not to be surpassed. Morality, in this sense, is obviously an art.

We may omit for the moment the discussion of the virtuous man and consider only differences in morality, that is, in attitudes or groups of acts. Now members of some families or small groups of friends differ from members of other families or groups in their relationship. In one family may be found an ease of contact between the members and a vivid interchange of ideas, a vigorous sharing of feeling, and a continuous co-operation in acts: in another family the members may be morose, unsympathetic, and isolated. The former family obviously has a higher morality. Similarly friendships differ, as Aristotle has shown. Groups of men differ in the same way in different parts of a nation; for in some places the social atmosphere is calm, clear, and invigorating, in other places the reverse. Whole nations may differ in this way, one being superior to another in morality, although within any nation the varieties of morality in different groups is so great that it is difficult to condemn or to praise any nation as a whole. Such statements as that the English are honorable or the French witty or the Germans industrious rest upon inadequate evidence; and the evidence is weaker still for the bad qualities of any one nation taken as a whole, since the assertion that any nation is bad is usually the result of transitory annoyance at being thwarted by some group within that nation. It is, however, clear enough that the morality of nations in which economic credit is secure is better than that of nations on

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whose promises it is practically impossible to rely. A nation in which it is recognized as normal that its members should fight out their differences is less moral than one in which the duel or the blood-feud does not exist. All this is generally agreed. We speak of progress in this sense.[1]

But it is implied in all this that morality has not reached its final development and, therefore, that all groups of men may yet have a much finer morality than any now has. The self-satisfaction of the nineteenth century should by now be obsolete. We have hardly begun to be civilized or cultured.[2] Most men still lack subtlety in their contacts with other men: they lack feeling for the experience of other men, and they find it difficult to co-operate with other men. In some societies the law or organization of industry and culture is such that men can hardly help their acts being of assistance to others; but in some societies, and certainly in international relationships today, even an intelligent man tends to injure or obstruct others because the organization of their relations is so inadequate. Thus, if one does not know what another is doing, each may be working at cross-purposes to the other. Moral progress takes place when the two co-operate.

But the lack of co-operation in society, the lack of adjustment in the acts of any one man, are due to a more fundamental moral defect: it is that the established order of morality which is too narrow is not broken to make a new step forward. Many areas of life are left outside the conventional morality, and there is not a sufficient sense of what lies on its frontier. Moral progress may be achieved when a new adjustment is reached; but what causes the achievement is the sense of the unexplored. It is heroism and not daily duty which is the source of moral progress, although daily duty is its basis. Now morality naturally grows as knowledge naturally develops:

[1] Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* contains the evidence.

[2] "Civilization" may mean the apparatus, "culture" the quality of life expressed in the use of the apparatus, as in MacIver's *Modern State*.

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the frontiersman in morality is as important as the discoverer in science, and the good act which does not fit into any experienced class of good acts is more important than the well-known good act. But clearly our moral progress is not as rapid as our progress in knowledge, and perhaps this is partly due to a false idea of morality. The frontier element in it has been neglected. New generations have been modeled upon the old; and in individual life men have become more conventional as they grew older. An intellectual mistake, however, is not enough to explain moral inertia: for indeed it seems that older races and older men tend to lose moral pliability and moral vigor. Moral excellence, on the contrary, ought to be always releasing new abilities for moral creation.

There is, however, a very good reason why the emphasis upon conventional morality obscures the frontier and distracts attention from acts which may displace contemporary proprieties. Conventionalism in morality corresponds to dogmatism in beliefs. Men do not like to act as if their acts were quite primitive: they are uneasy if they feel that they are really not quite civilized. But if the possible area of moral acts is very much wider than the actual area now covered, our morality seems to be more trivial than we should like to think it. If acts in the future are likely to displace entirely the acts believed to be good today, then neither constituted authorities nor moral obligation have quite the weight which many prefer to think they have. Now the desire for moral absoluteness is like the desire for medieval certainty in beliefs: it is pathological. The normal moral attitude implies only a certainty of the moment in an action so far good as men of our moral ineptitude can make it. That does not involve moral carelessness, just as the knowledge that our science is limited does not involve skepticism. Our morality is so feeble that we must care for it the more earnestly. But to suppose that we act morally in the full sense, while we maintain the praiseworthy but rather pitiful institutions of today in politics, in-

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dustry, and religion, is to imply a very narrow view of what morality may be. The conventions would not be insecure if men were strong enough to see that they were conventions: the contemporary proprieties are necessary only so long as men cannot replace them, although they may destroy them. There is, therefore, a good ground in an uncivilized society for emphasizing conventional morality rather than the adventures on its frontier. Nevertheless, in a philosophy we must allow for the importance of this frontier. For many men, even in our own uncivilized society, it is easy to see that to live up to one's ideal is not so difficult as it is to find an ideal that is worth living up to. But that requires expeditions beyond the frontier.

This view of morality requires a description of the ideal for which the metaphors of equilibrium and harmony are inadequate. Still more inadequate is the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, even in that restricted area of moral acts to which Aristotle confined it. In all such doctrines the frontier in morality is not effectually expressed, even if it is implied. With regard to the Aristotelian "moral" virtues, such as courage, acts of this virtue are not good *because* they are "in the mean," although being a mean may be a sign useful for indicating good; just as pleasure is not identical with good even if every good act is pleasurable. Courage is good in its consequences and in that "frontier" element which exists in all courageous acts. The "moral" virtues are not simply the measured supply of certain energies: they are, at least in part, creative and exploratory acts. Aristotle's psychology misled him.

As for equilibrium or harmony, the conception implies completion and fittingness; but one of the qualities of good acts is that they disturb. To be consistent is, no doubt, desirable, but not at the cost of refusing to acknowledge new discoveries; and, similarly, to adjust all one's impulses and acts so as to give place to each is excellent, but not at the cost of

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sacrificing the great illumination of one moment to the candlelight of other moments. A good man is less likely to think himself good in proportion as he is good, for he will be more aware of the possibilities of greater goodness. But if the good man is thought to be one in whom all impulses or tendencies to act are adjusted so that none interferes with the other, then established morality becomes the test for morality not yet experienced. In such a world order seems the highest good and freedom only a variation within order; progress seems an increase of order rather than a displacement of all orders in new liberties. The word therefore which expresses most of the moral ideal is "freedom," not "harmony": for harmony is an ideal only as a stage on the way toward freedom.

It is not argued here that the ideal of equilibrium or harmony is static; for we may accept the plea of its advocates that they are describing not a goal but a mark of direction. It is irrelevant as a defense, however, to say that harmony or equilibrium is never reached; for the point of the argument against harmony is that it indicates the wrong direction. Plato and Aristotle were gravely mistaken: they underrated the moral value of freedom and overrated order. Since then, moral philosophers have been too much influenced by the sciences and not enough by the arts; and obviously order is the first requirement in ethics, which is a sort of science, just as it is in aesthetics. But the desirable quality in a science need not be an important quality in an art, as we shall explain later. Morality is an art, not a science; and ethics has no more bearing upon morality than logic has upon reasoning or aesthetics upon art. The "sense of direction" therefore which should be present in a moral act is not the sort of sense which we have in science. It is a "sense of direction" much more like the creative sense of the artist than like the imitativeness of the copyist.

It is not denied that harmony and equilibrium express one of the characteristics of a good act; but another characteristic

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is the originality or breaking-away in such acts. The moral ideal, therefore, is freedom. The more free a man is the better he is, as Spinoza argued: and an ideal society would be one in which the contacts of all the members were spontaneous. If one act should leave place for another, or one man play into another's hands, these aspects of harmony would clearly be present; but far more significant would be the individuality of each and the originality of his acts. In such men and in such a society the sense of the frontier would be acute and vivid. There would be a moral reaching out toward goods not realized and perhaps not yet even imagined. Moral genius would be more easily distinguishable from moral insanity than it is in a society where being moral is thought to be identical with being conventional; and moral progress would be at least as rapid as scientific progress. But this cannot be, so long as we are dominated by the ideal of harmony. This contrast has been called by Nietzsche and others the contrast between Apollo and Dionysus. It is supposed that Apollo stood for the popular Greek ideal of harmony, the golden mean, the "nothing too much." The good man in this sense would be the man with perfectly adjusted impulses; and it is sometimes said that the impulses are so adjusted by "reason," which is thus imagined to be the impulse to fit one thing with another. A people which tends to extremes, as in the ancient Greek appetite for στάσις, would naturally see the advantage of the middle way; and the god whom they preferred to worship would actually be a power which established order and overcame chaos. But what for the Greeks may have been the expression of a hope may be for us the excuse for inertia.

On the other hand, Dionysus is supposed to have stood for the inspiration of the moment, which disregards the other part of life. The good man who worships Dionysus would not be a balanced or harmonious person, but an enthusiast, an explorer, an adventurer. The source of his action is not reason, but, in one sense of the word, "revelation"; and in an age of com-

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promise and respectability, no doubt, such a man would seem more excellent than the traditionalist. Thus it is said that the Dionysiac element in morality is that pressing forward beyond the established experience which we have here called the passing of the frontier.

A similar contrast may be found between the Hebraic and Hellenic conceptions of morality. The Decalogue was believed to contain a law which the good man obeys. Morality was thus conceived to be an adjustment of personal acts to a rule already known; and since the Decalogue consists largely of prohibitions, morality was conceived to be an avoidance of certain acts. Confused with this primitive view of moral life was the equally primitive view that law consisted in the command of a superior, which misled even political theorists as lately as the nineteenth century. The moral law appeared to arise somewhere outside human society and to be imposed upon it from without. The source of morality was not thought to be social. Decalogue morality, however, is chiefly of interest to us here because it implied that the main features of the moral life were already known. It ignored the frontier. It was indeed wholly ludicrous, if the statements of the content of morality in the Decalogue be considered as a rendering of the chief features of morality; for to say that a man is good if he does not steal or lie or kill is as primitive as to say a man is a scientist if he knows that the earth is spherical. It is difficult to understand how able men in the past can have believed that their Deity, who was supposed to know all, knew so little about morality; and if the defects of the Decalogue were believed to be due to concessions to the moral incompetence of the Hebrews at the date of the episode on Sinai, how can able men have supposed that no further revelation of the details of morality was made except the very indefinite statement that one ought to love others? But the really serious defect of the Hebraic tradition, embodied in some forms of Christianity, is the assumption of moral omniscience. The main lines of moral life were supposed to have been already laid down.

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In contrast with this, the Hellenic conception of morality does not imply the existence of an established moral law; still less the command of a superior. Indeed some commentators have noticed with surprise that in Plato and Aristotle, moral "obligation" is not emphasized, for the Greeks seem to have felt that morality was natural and that there was no more need for a sense of obligation to be kind than for a sense of obligation to eat or drink. The pressure which is felt in regard to duty would to the Greek seem to be social pressure, for morality was life in society; and since man was essentially social, it was his nature which flourished in doing right actions. The important point, however, for our argument is that the Hellenic conception of morality seems to imply that the good man is an artist in actions: he is not a technician, following a plan already laid down, but a creator of a new product—himself idealized. Moral acts were therefore original. No one could tell beforehand what was the right act to do when the circumstances should arise. The sense of the frontier in moral experience was obvious.

It would be unnecessary to discuss these old contrasts between Apollo and Dionysus, the Hebraic and the Hellenic, but that the moral ideal of harmony seems to be too much influenced by Apollo and the Hebraic. Kant is generally acknowledged to have been obsessed by the Hebraic tradition of morality in his view of "the moral law within," the categorical imperative, and the disagreeableness of duty. He was also limited by the Hebraic tradition in his inability to perceive the social aspects of morality.

But even now Kantian philosophers seem to overrate the importance of adjustments in morality; and this may be due partly to an unnoticed assumption that the moral life implies completion according to pattern, although "harmony" as an ideal appears partly to be due to biological metaphor. It seems to have been believed by biologists that life consists in adjusting the environment to the organism or the organism to the environment. "To fit" seems to have been the assumed

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ideal, partly, no doubt, because of the prevailing obsession with machinery—since a good machine has parts that fit. It is quite outside our scope here to quarrel with the biologists; for they are free to use whatever metaphors are most useful for their purposes. They took over an unconsciously assumed ideal of respectability from the society of the middle nineteenth century. The world they tended to admire was the Victorian drawing-room. The irreverent might say that no man could understand nature by looking at it through lace curtains; but that is no business of ours. When, however, this same ideal comes into moral philosophy *via* biological metaphor, then we protest. The chief characteristics of the moral life are not those of the "man machine" as conceived by a mechanical biology. A man is not morally good in so far as he "fits" his environment—indeed the contrary is often true. A man's acts are not integral parts of a whole, as a hand is, or a leg. Society is not a mechanism; and its members are not component parts. Moral acts, indeed, can be more readily understood by psychological metaphor than physiological, for the characteristics of psychic events are more closely connected with "values" than are those of "nature." Even reason is misrepresented in the doctrine of harmony, for it is made to consist rather in adjustment than in imaginativeness. In fact, however, a rational good should be considered a good of creative imagination, not of calculation, for the most significant element in reasoning is that it breaks new ground.

The conclusion is that as in fine art, so in morality, originality and experimentation are superior to technical skill or academic tradition. To maintain an established morality is only a step toward its supersession by more subtle action. We do not *know* all that it is right to do; but that is a minor point. The main point is that we have not so far done the sort of actions which would form a finer morality. The horizon of experience tends in morality to be stationary. In our day we have vastly extended the horizon of knowledge in the sciences,

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we have much more power over nature and even a little more power over men through the social sciences; but the use of all this is still crude and unskilful, and there is little enough evidence of any heroic experiment on the part of a group or a nation. No group or nation will risk any adventure of which the past lacks experience: human nature does not change in so far as it is prevented by moral ineptitude from undergoing its natural changes.

The sense of the horizon in morality, if it were more acute, might induce men to be explorers who would otherwise be only weeding the garden of established order. Of course there is a place for gardeners. Indeed the man who goes exploring without having done his share of weeding the garden is generally a moral lunatic who excuses his instability by vague references to the "artistic temperament" or "the return to nature." Such explorers usually discover—platitudes. But if there are fools who pretend to be artists, there are also some real artists. And so in morality some men, or at least some men at some moments, genuinely originate action of a more subtle kind than is common. They are the geniuses of morality; and indeed the spark of genius may be found sometimes in the acts of an ordinary man. This is being above the average, and too little attention has been paid to this possibility. We have treatises on criminals and lunatics; we have new methods for treating crime and lunacy—so much so, indeed, that men begin to believe that everyone is somewhat mad or criminal. In a society conscious of the frontier of morality, education would be the most important social function—not the education of the defectives, but the production of new moral abilities in the exceptionally endowed. But in such a society the training of character could hardly be conceived. It would be impossible to imagine training a boy to be a Michelangelo, for who could do such training without being a Michelangelo himself? The true function of a teacher is to allow something better than himself to develop. The true

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value of any morality is that it can be transcended. The frontier draws the acts out of one who has moral genius. But we have no methods of treating our exceptional men except the old-fashioned mixture of adoration and obloquy. First, it is "roses, roses all the way . . . . ," and then "there's nobody on the housetops now. . . . ." We treat moral genius as primitive parents treat their children, passing suddenly from blows to caresses. But the intellectual results of this are more important for our argument, since philosophy must depend at least partly upon the assumptions and the conclusions of the science of morality: ethics. Our ethics, however, has not enough place for the frontier.

If, however, the frontier be expressed by some restatement of the moral ideal in ethics, if the assumptions of ethics cease to be those of medieval dogmatism and become those of modern science, then philosophy will allow for the achievements not yet accomplished as parts of the world we inhabit. Human actions in society form only one of the many classes of facts of which philosophy must take account; but it is a primitive mistake to suppose that they are less significant for the philosopher than the vast spaces or long durations of astronomical science. Savages are impressed by size: scholars by intensity. Now whatever the relation of our peculiar race to the world we inhabit, we are facts. Our actions move in a sphere extraneous to the motion of stars: in that sphere purpose has meaning, but it probably has none outside that sphere. It is as foolish to seek the purpose of a thunderstorm as it is to seek the cause of a triangle, for the factors of fact within any one sphere may not exist outside that sphere. But the sphere of morality so far achieved, that is to say the life of institutions, states, families, and the rest, has its frontier; and the actions that are upon the frontier point to the unexplored world of the possible acts, not done or never to be done, of which philosophy must take account.

LONDON, ENGLAND

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BEAUTY AND MORAL BETTERMENT

LOUIS ARNAUD REID

In these days, when complaints of excessive specialization and "compartment thinking" are common, no special explanation or apology is needed in opening up a plea for unity of outlook in the moral life—whatever that vague phrase may mean. There is no doubt at all that in spite of steady growth of communal sense, of social, national, and international consciousness fostered by the complex mechanical, political, and spiritual developments since the war, the divisions of labor and multiplication of occupations have made it more and more difficult for the plain man to achieve the always difficult task of "seeing life steadily and seeing it whole." Perhaps it is the very development of these complications, advantageous in so many ways, that has wrought the evil of making the unity of things thus difficult to grasp. However that may be—and this in itself is a complex problem for investigation by the student of affairs—the fact remains that it becomes harder and harder for the aforesaid "plain man" to pick his way about amid the overwhelming maze of facts and values presented to him in everyday life.

What I propose to discuss here is not, however, the general conception of the "unity of life." I propose to treat only of one means by which a sense of unity of things may be developed, a sense without which the creation of true original moral character is impossible. The means referred to is the cultivation and training of aesthetic understanding and insight—one might almost say aesthetic wisdom. It is a trite saying that Greek speculation on morals was greatly sweetened and enlarged by the profound insight of the Greeks into aesthetic wholeness. I propose to ask whether a development of the same insight might not, if properly employed and guided, be

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of great value in grappling with moral problems today. In one sense art and beauty are no doubt in a classified compartment by themselves, and may not be approached by meddling "morality." In another sense art and beauty may have a lesson to teach "morality," and it is this possibility which we shall consider.

To be less vague: of the traditional trinity of goodness, beauty, and truth much has been said and written. Perhaps most of the interest has centered in the relation of truth, knowledge, intellect, to goodness, though the problem of the general relation of beauty to goodness has received a certain share of attention. Our purpose here is not general, but quite definite and explicit. I propose (1) to examine the effect produced upon the mind by the experience of things which can quite definitely be called beautiful, (2) to inquire whether this effect is valuable, and (3) if so, whether (and how) it can be turned to good account in the organization of moral character and moral life. I shall then (4) very briefly point out one or two more or less obvious reforms which would make this desirable aesthetic training and experience more possible than it now is; reforms which would, producing greater moral stability and truer individual happiness, in turn help to make for a better society, national and international.

I

To speak of the effect of beauty upon the mind is slightly ambiguous, particularly in view of the fact that any discussion of its social effects immediately calls up Morris' ideas on craftsmanship. We may be affected by beauty in two ways: (*a*) We may contemplate and enjoy it as something finished and complete, as when we listen to a symphony, look at a picture or a Chippendale chair, read a poem. (*b*) We may enjoy it as something which we are creating or have created ourselves. There is a very special kind of joy in this artistic creation, whether it be the creation of art in the narrower sense

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(e.g., music, painting, sculpture, etc.), or the activity of artistic[1] craftsmanship. The artists and the craftsmen have a joy of their own which is different from, and more complex than, the joy which we get in contemplating the finished work. The artists and the craftsmen discover beauty (as Professor Alexander in his recently published Adamson Lecture rightly insists) in the actual manipulation of the material, a discovery not possible in the same way to the mere spectator. Although the two experiences are thus distinct, however, we must not make an artificial separation between *a* and *b*. It is true that to look at a finished work of art or craft is a very different thing from making it, and that the spectator cannot share the full joy of the discovering creator. Nevertheless, the joy of creation is probably to a very large degree extra-aesthetic (though awakened through an aesthetic desire), consisting of the satisfaction of sublimated and transformed instincts of self-assertion, pugnacity, constructiveness, etc., and the *aesthetic* joy of the maker at the sight of the finished or finishing work is probably very much the same as that of the discerning spectator, although it may very well be more intense. And on the other hand appreciation is probably not possible to the highest degree without some practical apprenticeship to the processes of the art. There are not therefore two *kinds* of beauty, one the beauty we contemplate and the other the beauty we create. There are two ways of coming to experience one beauty, the way of creation being a means, if not one of the indispensable means, to contemplation.

It is the *contemplation* of beauty with which we are at the outset concerned. This is significant, for although, as we have said, some practical experience may be necessary in order to appreciate adequately, and although arts and crafts do give a special satisfaction, the practice of them to any extent is possi-

[1]It is necessary to distinguish between artistic craftsmanship and any expert individual skill in any process of manufacture. Artistic craftsmanship is more than intelligent dexterity and insight. It is skill of a certain sort. In the following article, by "craftsman" I mean "artistic craftsman."

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ble for only a limited number of persons. The world would certainly be a happier place if more of us were able to indulge our innate tendencies to artistic construction, though it might not be the utopia of William Morris. But for very many good reasons we cannot all do this beyond a very limited extent, and it therefore becomes all the more important to develop and train the aesthetic susceptibilities which nearly all of us, at some time, to some extent, and in some direction or other, do possess, though we may be unaware of it.

In speaking of aesthetic experience in order to discover its effects upon the mind, it is important to begin by saying distinctly what we mean by aesthetic experience,[2] and the first part of the paper will be occupied by an account of this, which will be made as brief as is consistent with clearness and precision.

By aesthetic experience is meant not any vague, pleasurably tinged feelings in general about anything, but a definite kind of experience which arises directly out of the perception of an object of a certain sort presented to perception. It is an object of a certain *sort*. Not all perceived objects are objects of aesthetic experience proper, but only certain objects. The differentia which is accepted here between objects of perception generally and objects which give rise to aesthetic experience is the very old one of "variety in unity." Every object presented to perception contains variety and is in some sense a unity, but not every perceived object can be said to possess variety in unity. The characteristic of the aesthetic object which possesses variety in unity is that its structure in space or time is such that each part, each quality, has a peculiarly intimate relation to the whole, and has a meaning therein which by itself it does not possess: this may be called an aesthetic relation. Such a general formula cannot, of course, in itself give anyone any insight into the aesthetic experience.

[2] I have analyzed the experience rather more fully in a recent paper, "The Nature of Beauty," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1925–26.

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It is rather a generalization which is arrived at after the examination of many particulars. In order to realize what aesthetic variety in unity means in actual fact it is necessary to go to the beautiful thing itself, which in its turn is produced, not by means of any formula, but by some sort of intuition. The formula is only mentioned here at the outset in order to make it clear that it is a quite definite class of experience which is referred to when aesthetic experience is spoken of. To defend this limitation of the form as against those who would give to it a much wider connotation, who would, e.g., include anything from simple sense-pleasure to profound mystic experience, is not possible or desirable here. I can only say dogmatically that the limitation of the term "aesthetic experience" to experience of unified complex objects of perception, to experience of such things as pictures, statues, architecture, poetry, music, seems to me, after careful consideration, both justifiable and desirable, and that it is consonant with what experts in beauty, namely, artists, are accustomed to think of as beautiful things. And I may further observe, in passing, that it seems to me preferable in any short discussion of aesthetic experience to choose as examples of beautiful things works of art rather than natural objects, not because natural objects may not, in very many cases, possess unity in variety, and so be beautiful, but because aesthetic appreciation of nature is apt to be complicated and even replaced by other factors, from the love of fresh air and the life-impulses of spring to the deepest religious feeling. I do not suggest that these factors may not enter into and enrich the aesthetic experience itself, but they must be gathered up into it, so to speak, and it seems better to try to grasp the experience in its essence before introducing complications. It seems to me wiser to risk being too narrow than to risk vagueness by being too wide. And, although the formula of variety in unity is *in itself* of course empty and barren, its actual realization in works of art is by no means so, and no kind of experience is too pro-

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found or too high to be expressed in aesthetic form. It is just the special magic of beauty that makes it possible for a few daubs of color or a few vibrations from a string to convey the deepest kinds of spiritual meaning.

The aesthetic object, we have said, is always an object of sense perception. It is true on the one hand that ideas and moral character are sometimes called beautiful, but this in the end is a metaphorical usage, and need not detain us. It is true, on the other hand, that arts such as poetry contain strictly non-aesthetic factors, e.g., ideas; but it is also true that the ideas in poetry are as nothing apart from their verbal expression; that the aesthetic experience of poetry arises through and in the experience of sounds. One of the chief problems of aesthetics is how, not in poetry only, but in music, sculpture, architecture, painting, perceived physical things can come to mean so much more than perceived physical things.

The question *how* colors, shapes, and sounds should be able to convey to the spectator experiences which transcend sense as far as mind transcends body is one of the greatest importance in aesthetics, but we shall not treat of it here.[3] The fact itself is indisputable, and may be taken for granted. What I wish to concentrate upon here is the *wholeness* which is experienced when the colors and shapes or the sounds have been fashioned by the artist into a work of art. The sense qualities and forms are the raw materials of art, and the beauty of the work of art consists in the unification of the parts of which it is made up, so that the parts are no longer detached entities but are organically—or rather aesthetically—related to the whole. The picture or sculpture is "composed," the poem is unified by prosodic devices, the symphony and the drama alike have "a beginning, a middle, and an end." Within the limits of space and time, within the space-limit of the picture or statue or the time-limit of the music, we experience a per-

[3] I have briefly considered it elsewhere in two papers: (1) "The Nature of Beauty," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXVI; and (2) "Artistic Experience," *Mind, New Series*, XXXV, 138.

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fection such as belongs to nothing in ordinary experience, where the "torn edges" are constantly appearing. This aesthetic perfection is in the first instance a sensuous perfection: the colors, masses, and lines of the picture, the tones, cadences, the themes of the music, are organized into a whole which is perceived and is pleasing as such. But beyond the unity of the perceived whole is the unity of the symbolic meanings which by his skill and intuition the artist has been able to weave subtly together.

It is the experience of just this unity and perfection—sensuous, but far more than sensuous—which gives to aesthetic experience its unique and striking character, that character which has made utopians of poets, which made Schopenhauer believe that in aesthetic experience lay one of the temporary escapes from the misery of existence. To have aesthetic experience intensely is to be in a state of exaltation in which there is not only an experience of perfection, but an extraordinary feeling of *reality,* of conviction that somehow or other we have penetrated into the innermost secrets of truth in a way which makes philosophic and such like methods seem tedious and pedantic. I am not arguing that this conviction is a justifiable one, but only that the feeling of superior insight which high aesthetic experience arouses is a fact. Because our aspirations and endeavorings are symbolically brought home to satisfaction in beauty, because in art the symbolized problems of life and experience have, if not solution, at least a satisfying culmination, we feel that here is an ideal world of perfection, which is not only ideal, but somehow, strangely, more real than anything else. In beauty, intellect and desire and feeling receive both the stimulation and the satisfaction which they require. In common experience the stimulation comes often enough and is in itself pleasing to vigorous minds. But perfect satisfaction is not for everyday life, and only the finite-infinity of the beautiful thing which is utterly self-contained, implying nothing beyond itself, can yield, if only for

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a moment or two, that ineffable joy of which Schopenhauer spoke.

II

This experience, like many other good things, is an end in itself and is pursued for its own sake. It is most worthy and noble that artists should spend their lives in the making of beautiful things, and even that they and we should for a time think of nothing beyond the joy of so contemplating them for their own sakes. Yet it does not at all follow that the contemplation of beauty, good in itself, may not have good results beyond itself. A value may be both intrinsic and instrumental. Whilst not urging that beauty is a mere means to anything, I wish to consider almost immediately the effects which experience of beauty might have if integrated within the moral life to the best possible advantage.

For the moment, the *immediate* benefits of aesthetic experience and training are fairly easy to see. On the one hand, there must be produced a fine discernment and discrimination of parts within what at first presentation may seem a vague whole. Music, for example, beyond the simplest kind, is to most untrained minds just a muddle of sounds. But to the expert it contains a wealth of significant detail. On the other hand, and most important from the aesthetic standpoint, there is the developed sense of the *relation* of part to whole, the sense of aesthetic function, which means that the smallest detail is perceived to be charged with a meaning which belongs to it, not *qua* detail, but as a member of the whole. Aesthetic training, more perhaps than any other, is valuable in producing a balance of mind which can at once perceive details and at the same time never lose sight of the whole. Aesthetic insight is an intuition of proportion, an intuition neither of mere diversity nor of mere unity alone, but of unification and organization of diversity. Moreover, there is no *trick* by means of which it can be done. There is, in aesthetic appreciation, no discoverable *end* the knowledge of which will render the inter-

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pretation of the whole easy. There is no end beyond the whole; there is no key which will unlock its mysteries save the complete whole itself. Nothing beyond the aesthetic whole, and even no single thing within it, can explain its meaning. Only the trained apprehension of the whole as a whole of parts, only an intuition of integrality, can reveal its meaning.

III

If these things are true, a trained aesthetic intuitiveness might be an asset of very great value in the moral life. It is true that the moral life is not a mere matter of aesthetic contemplation, but much more. But it is also true that so far as the cognition of life's guiding moral principles is concerned, moral valuation consists mainly of a discernment and weighing up on the one hand of the various values which experience offers, and on the other hand of a choice of or self-identification with certain of these in the light of some conception of ideal wholeness. The business of selecting some and rejecting other values may be, at this point, perhaps, more akin to the active work of the artist than to that of the aesthetic contemplator, who sees the beauty there already complete. But in any case it is the artist's ability to think ahead of the partially finished work and (to some extent at any rate) to visualize it as a complete whole, which guides him. Or, if he does not actually visualize the completed whole, he has a pioneer "instinct" which guides him and which amounts in the result to very much the same as if he had seen clearly ahead each step of the way. In a similar way we may say that in the moral life an intuition of wholeness and unified perfection, or at least an experienced "instinct" *toward* this, is the only real guide to moral choice in cases of difficulty. And if this is so, it will follow that anything that aesthetic training can do to develop this power of wise, proportioned discernment of values will be of the greatest possible moral value. If the same sensitivity to the values of the parts of a picture or a symphony can be

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applied to the weighing up of the conflicting values, ends, good things, which experience constantly presents, if the same vision of wholeness as pervades in aesthetic activity can somehow be made to influence the handling of each significant moral choice, then an important condition of the creation of a good life will be already fulfilled.

This condition will be a condition of *knowledge*. Generally speaking, it may well be argued that aesthetic training helps *all* systematic knowing. The ability to see part in relation to whole is invaluable, e.g., in mathematics and philosophy. Mathematicians frequently speak of the almost aesthetic thrill which they get from their subject. Philosophy is perhaps less "aesthetic" than mathematics, for the philosopher cannot frame and limit his picture neatly like the mathematician. When he tries to, as he often does,[4] he is apt to catch sight, with the tail of his eye, of awkward lumps of reality that ought to have gone into the picture but have inadvertently got left out. Still, however this be, the general truth remains that the ability to think *sub specie universitatis* is the chief condition of the philosopher's existence.

The point here is not, of course, the importance of aesthetic training for knowledge in general, but its importance for the knowledge which conditions virtue. There is no need to labor the point nowadays that intelligent knowledge is a necessary condition for virtue. Granted that it is, the argument put forward here is simply that aesthetic training is extremely valuable for the knowledge or insight which conditions virtue.

The special value for moral insight of aesthetic training is somewhat overlooked if the moral life is thought of as being reducible to categories of means and ends. If the end or *summum bonum* of life is conceived either as a far-off utopia or a measurable quantity of something, say of pleasure or happiness, then the knowledge of what is right or wrong becomes mainly a matter of calculation of the best means of attaining

[4] Indeed, he *must*, for perfect unity is his impossible ideal.

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it. If, on the other hand, the moral *summum bonum* is (more truly) conceived as a personal *life,* in which every good thing shall have a due and proportionate place—or, better, where things shall be good or bad according as they have or have not a place in the system of a whole good life[5]—then there is simply no other way of deciding whether this or that thing is good, except trained insight, insight into the relation of part to whole. Furthermore, there is no way of telling, in actual practice, what is the best and completest possible kind of whole, but trained insight. Philosophers may say that the best and completest moral wholeness is the wholeness which is coherent with the nature and purpose of things in the widest sense, and this may be true enough. But it is upon trained insight that we must rely to tell us whether this or that wholeness is really valuable for *us*. There is in existence no formula, however perfect, which will solve all our *practical* personal problems, though the more general thinking we do within reason, the better; and many of the current *rules* of conduct are valuable crystallizations of the moral experience of the ages. Our practical moral life is a life of discovery, very like the artist's. We have a general conception of the end, but our practical business is to try to realize it as best we can by making experiments with as much discernment as we possess, by manipulating the materials which experience presents, and so discovering, by way of expression, more and more of the content of that end, which is concretely different for each person. Concretely, the end for us is *made* as we live it. It becomes more and more real for us as our intuiting and experimentation discover the things that are likely to be of true value in the life of the whole.

The moral life is in this respect very analogous indeed to the work of art. We said that there is no key or formula either to the making or to the understanding of a work of art, except an intuition of the concrete complex whole itself.

[5] Lived, of course, not for or by itself only, but in a society.

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Its explaining principle, we said, is not outside it, but is itself the concrete whole. So in morals, knowledge of the best is more than calculation. No formula is adequate to fit concrete moral problems. Calculation and intellectual analysis may be involved, formulas may be useful, but only practical wisdom, insight, sanity, and the breadth of vision which is the result of trained experience is properly competent to choose. Like each work of art, each good life is an individual thing, and its goodness is not precisely definable or analyzable before it is made, any more than the beauty of this or that picture is definable before it is finished, though a general formula like "variety in unity" may be of some value. Goodness, like art, is a discovery through creative expression.

But because knowledge is not the whole of virtue, it follows that the wise judgment which is aided by aesthetic training will not in itself produce goodness of life. The criticism so often cited against the artistic life, that it makes for immorality rather than for morality, has some bearing on the question. Artistic and aesthetic experience is intensely valuable in itself, but just because the artist is supernormally sensitive, just because his sense of values is keener than most people's, just because his vision is a vision of perfection, there is a strong tendency in the artist to reaction. To be translated suddenly from the sublime and the ideal to the common imperfect world of affairs is something of a jar. The artistic frame of mind not only is transient in itself, but may lead to moral instability. It is the same with those who appreciate art's beauty. When the concert ends, or when we leave the picture gallery to go to lunch, we may, not at all impossibly, find ourselves in an extremely irritable frame of mind. Or our next-door neighbor at the tragedy may be the innocent object of our un-Christian feelings.

But all this, though it has a bearing on our problem, is not quite our problem itself. So far as the argument which has been put forward recommends aesthetic training and experi-

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ence, it is but just to point out what the immediate results of this may be. But our concern is, not with the immediate results of artistic or aesthetic intuition, but with the results of the *moral* intuition which has been helped by aesthetic training. Now the immediate results of this moral intuition of wholeness of life are likely to be much less dangerous than the immediate results of aesthetic intuition, just because the aesthetic sphere is a *department* of life and is in a way cut off from the rest of life. The moral sphere, on the other hand, is not a department of life, but the whole of it; there is no sudden jolt from true moral vision to practical affairs, because true moral vision not only has the most intimate bearing upon practical affairs, but is itself, as we have seen, developed only out of much experience of practical affairs. The insight into good arises from the development of practice, and can be acquired through no other medium than actual practice itself. If the insight is profound, as in the moral sage, we may be certain that the character is strongly and harmoniously organized, and if this is so, there is the less chance of hiatus between the ideal vision and the actual. Mature moral vision is unlikely to lead to unfortunate practical reactions just because it is a function of character and built up as the result of practical tussles in the world of affairs. We may forgive the aesthete for bad temper, but we expect from the moral sage not less, but more, calm balance of wisdom in the administration of his practical life.

This fact, however, that insight is the outcome of action and character, that his character will safeguard the action of the moral sage, should not blind us to the fact that insight is apt to forge ahead of practice, and that most of us see ideals which we are not strong enough to pursue. The ideal which we do see is, it is true, the result of our practical experience, but our desire after it sadly exceeds our capacity to follow it. The question then is, How are we to develop this capacity?

The only possible answer is, of course, by the creation of

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the character, which, like Rome, is not built in a day. That knowledge may aid virtue, virtuous character must keep pace as nearly as it can with knowledge. (If such a sentence sound paradoxical, it is only the paradoxicalness of the moral life, which is a constantly reciprocating growth, action and reaction.) The creation and organization of character is a subject upon which many wise things have been said, particularly perhaps within the present century. I have no intention of discussing it, but a few remarks may be in place.

It is clear that, in addition to a knowledge of the value of wholeness in life, and of the place which this or that valuable thing may have in relation to it, there must be a passion for unification and perfection, a strong, formed, dispositional desire, sufficient to overcome the rulings of this or that impulse. There must be a sentiment to create the moral life as a worthy, almost as a beautiful, whole. The unworthy impulse must, in the truly moral life, be rejected, not because it is conventional to reject it, not because any general moral "rule" commands us to reject it, scarcely even because habit impels us to reject it. It must be rejected rather because the adoption of it would destroy the beauty and harmony of the whole, and we have grown to love the realization of the ideal and to hate its violation.

I have just said that the unworthy impulse must not be rejected because habit impels us to reject it, but because of something deeper, namely, a sentiment for an ideal of wholeness. It is true that it is the repetition of an emotional attitude to an object or idea, and so to some extent habit, which forms this permanent disposition of mind which psychologists since Mr. Shand's *Foundations of Character* call a "sentiment." Nevertheless, sentiment is much more, and much more profound, than habit; and it is important to realize this if we would understand clearly that the moral attitude is a living attitude of mind and not a mere mechanical reaction. McDougall expresses the distinction between habit and sentiment thus:

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A mere habit of action is specific, peculiar to the particular circumstances under which it has been induced. A sentiment for a particular quality of conduct or character is perfectly general in its application and influence, for language and the powers of abstraction and induction here perform for the moral nature a service similar to that rendered by them to the intellect.[6]

In illustrating this he refers to an interesting experiment[7] which

consisted in developing assiduously, in a class of school children, a habit of neatness and tidiness in respect of one particular task. The habit was readily acquired in various degrees by all the children; but it was observed that, as might be expected, it had no spread; the quality of tidiness did not transfer itself to other tasks and daily actions. In respect of these, the children remained as untidy as before. Then a sentiment for tidiness as a general quality was cultivated in them, and soon its effect was manifest throughout a wide range of behavior; for the average child can readily apply for himself such an abstract term to kinds of behavior and to situations to which he has not heard it applied, and so can bring his growing sentiment into play.[8]

Exactly the same truth applies to the sentiment for moral wholeness. This sentiment is the supersentiment which must rule and control, in the mature moral life, the existence of all other sentiments. It alone can determine what is good, what is in place in the whole. This attitude of mind, this permanent disposition of feeling and desire progressively organizing the fullest wholeness and unity of life, is the best, and indeed the only possible guaranty of right living.

IV

If what we have said is true, if aesthetic training and development can be an aid to moral insight and character, it follows that aesthetic training and development should be put into practice as far as possible. The ways in which this might be done are legion; we may simply allude to one or two more obvious ones, not because the idea of them is at all new, but be-

[6] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 438.

[7] By W. C. Ruediger, *Educational Review*, Vol. XXXIV.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 438.

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cause it is as well to think of them in definite connection with such a moral theory as has been put forward. We often support reforms in a half-hearted sort of way because we believe them vaguely to be of "benefit to mankind." But if, in the light of what has been said, we can convince ourselves of the really important—if subtle—effect upon moral betterment of association with and enlightenment concerning beautiful things, our support of reforms which make such association and enlightenment more possible is likely to be stronger because it has a more definite meaning.

The most obvious and most frequently urged of these reforms is, perhaps, the greater encouragement of arts and crafts. Contemplation of beautiful things is good, and satisfying to many. For others—probably for many more than is commonly realized—the necessity to create is deeply rooted. And even (as we said at the outset) for those who contemplate, some slight apprenticeship to art or craft seems necessary in order to appreciate fully. On the one hand, then, everything possible should be done to encourage craftsmanship in industry, as well as the "purer" forms of art, for through the making of beautiful things, both "functionally" beautiful and beautiful in and for themselves, there is to be found a satisfaction and contentment of soul which is an ideal first condition for the development of the balance and harmony of character so desirable. On the other hand, the practice of arts and crafts in leisure time should be encouraged where possible. One has only to come into contact with the self-respect and joy of the artist-craftsman to realize the profound influence which interested craftsmanship, with its continual seeking after perfection, harmony, beauty, may have upon the whole personality.

Such encouragement of craftsmanship need not imply any condemnation of machinery, but only a recognition of its place and so of its limits. The mechanical and electrical age has come "for good" in both senses of the phrase; it is beyond question that enormous classes of things are best and most effi-

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ciently produced by machinery. Where this is so, a very great deal can be done to improve the conditions of mechanical work by providing beautiful surroundings. That this is not only morally desirable, but economically worth while is shown by the fact that experiment has proved that in a certain factory where the manager allowed the walls to be decorated by an artist, the output automatically increased by nearly 25 per cent.[9] Nevertheless, the field for craftsmanship, both for the making of things of use that shall be beautiful because fitted for their function, and for decorative art, is wider than is often recognized. Pottery, china, metal articles of many sorts from spoons to candlesticks, fire-irons and coal-scuttles, chairs, tables, leather work, embroidery, cushions, carpets, smoking requisites—all these things of common use give satisfaction of a very profound sort, both to the makers and to the possessors of them.

The satisfaction of the possessors is scarcely less important than that of the makers. To encourage arts and crafts by buying arts-and-crafts products (where possible and desirable), rather than machine-made articles is not an act of self-denying altruism. It benefits the artists and the craftsmen, but it also benefits the buyer. Machinery may imitate beauty successfully up to a point, but it cannot go beyond the point, and the possession of articles of use which have been made, not by machines, but one by one by human beings with an interest and creative joy in their work, is a satisfaction to the possessor as well as to the maker, because the interest and individuality is stamped upon the work. To live constantly with furniture that is beautiful because it is the individual expression of a proud and delighted craftsman is not only to benefit the craftsman, but to receive constantly, though for the most part unconsciously, the influence of harmony and beauty into the soul itself. The same things are true of "art" in the more usual sense, of encouragement of good work (whether recognized or not) in music, painting, architecture, etc. Intimacy

[9] See a very interesting article by a business woman, Mrs. Dorothy Leigh-Bennett, on "Business and Art," *The World Today*, January, 1926.

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with all such has a refining influence upon personality which is unquestionable, though it is difficult to define.

There are, of course, practical difficulties in the way. The poor man, loving beauty, is often enough compelled to buy trash simply because he cannot afford what is good and beautiful. As things are, craftsmen-made articles are more expensive, and because they take longer to make, they are always likely to be so. Restraint and asceticism on the part of the buyer may lead him to prefer rather too little of the best than a plenitude of the inferior, but the difficulty still remains. We may well suppose, however, that both with the encouragement of craftsmanship in industry itself and the consequent reduction in costs of appliances and overhead charges, and with the encouragement of leisure-time craftsmanship for a profit, the high charges for handmade goods might be considerably reduced. Encouragement of home craftsmanship, on the other hand, would make it possible for many to make some of their own articles of use and beauty, with the treble joy of having created, of possessing, and of living with their own works.

These things, coupled with many reforms which would make for greater health[10] and beauty—the abolition of smoke, improvements in lighting, in town-planning, in designs of dwelling-houses and public buildings, in lettering and display of advertisements, etc.—must all be of value in the production of harmonious conditions which make the harmonious and balanced moral life more possible, even though they do not in themselves necessarily insure everything which is required for that moral life.

Drudgery and sheer monotony are likely to be necessary even in a very well-organized society, where machinery is used to the best possible advantage. But they can be reduced, and to argue that this is desirable is not to preach that *work* is an evil thing to be avoided at all costs. Work is not a necessary

[10] Whether health is, or is not, as the ancients thought, a proportion or harmony of the body, it is obvious that nothing more effectively prevents aesthetic and moral balance of outlook than ill health.

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evil; it is not evil at all. But it is so important that work should be, as far as possible, a satisfaction to the soul, and not a mere means to an end, that the elimination of unnecessary drudgery *in order to make room for the right kind of work* which everyone needs, becomes morally imperative. This work might be done, it is true, in leisure time; but the recognition of this makes it all the more needful to reconstruct our ideal of leisure, not as idleness, or doing nothing, but as leisure *for* something. The Greeks thought of σχολή, not as amusement, but as a life of intense activity, aesthetic as well as intellectual. The opportunity for leisure is the opportunity for *schooling* one's self in something.

To conclude: in all these and many other ways society may help toward the formation in the individual mind of a sense of the true values of transient things in relation to a larger whole. If it can do this, if by one means or another it can educate the personal felt insight into the real Worth of living which puts the rest of life's ends in their proper places, and if it can encourage the conditions whereby this insight may be integrated into character, it will have done a most important service, not only to the individual, but to social, national, and international life. The subtle results of an educated sense of proportion with regard to life's ends may seem at first or second sight quite academically unimportant when compared with "getting on with the job" in science, business, or politics. In very truth this ethical balance is not only of great importance; it is all-important. Schemes of national and international reforms are without it of less value than the paper upon which they are written. Moral insight only means insight into the structure, plan, and meaning of life. Without it man is like a blind beast, rushing purposelessly hither and thither, fighting, disputing, greedily seizing, but without even the more certain instincts of the animal as to what he really wants. Where there is no vision the people must certainly perish—of sheer moral incompetence.

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THE TOTAL-SITUATION THEORY OF ETHICS

CHARLES W. MORRIS

There is no need to point out that the psychological attitude is effecting a transformation of the social sciences. It is important, however, to take stock occasionally of the impact of this psychological material upon these studies. In this article an attempt will be made to outline briefly, and therefore dogmatically, a theory of ethics consonant on the one hand with major psychological conceptions and on the other hand with ethical history and problems. The psychological basis—or bias—will be that of a functional psychology where psychology is conceived as the study of the interaction of the human being and his environment, together with the place of private experiences in this adjustment. The ethical attitude basic to the discussion is similar to that found in the works of Dewey and Tufts, and, to a lesser degree, in the writings of Aristotle. It is further assumed that an adequate account of ethical behavior can be given on a naturalistic or empirical basis.

I

Since moral behavior is a phase of behavior, it is intimately related to all other forms of behavior, and so to the total cultural complex in which it appears. Roughly—and circularly—speaking, it is that phase of behavior capable of being judged right or wrong, good or bad. As behavior, morality falls within the evolutionary process and can be discussed, in part at any rate, in terms of psychology, sociology, and biology. Moral behavior is one witness to the value of social organization in the evolutionary process. This selective process is not merely between individual organisms, but between groupings of individuals as well. Morality arises out of the need of co-operative life. In origin it is a phase of the internal

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organization of groups, just as language, religion, and customs in general are other aspects of such organization. From first to last, morality is social, reflective morality as well as group morality; for the stimulation of individual initiative is itself a potential means for the perfecting of social organization. The group character of morality is illustrated by the common restriction of moral attitudes to members within the group in question. In morality the members of a group at large gain consideration for themselves in the behavior of each individual member. The prototype of moral behavior is the objective situation in which members of a group approve or disapprove, encourage or restrain, the behavior of some individual because of the real or imagined consequences of such behavior upon the group. The internalization of this objective situation as expressed in the phenomena of conscience can be best approached through a brief consideration of the psychological development of moral personality.

II

Primarily the learning process is one of continually effecting a co-ordination of behavior and of connecting behavior with new aspects of the environment by the process of the substitution of stimuli. A stimulus present along with another stimulus that releases a certain act may in time acquire the function of releasing the same act. The possibility of learning is dependent upon the ability of making such substitutions.

The other members of the group are part of the environment of the growing child. The parent produces the stimuli which are to become substitutes—primarily sounds, gestures, facial expressions, and bodily contacts—at the times when acts which are felt to be desirable are to be continued, and those felt to be undesirable are to be restrained. The word "fire," spoken when the child burns himself, can, when it has become a substitute stimulus, call out the withdrawing reaction previously initiated by the fire itself. By rewards and punishments,

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that is, by conditioning the positive and negative responses, the group gains control of the behavior of the young. Those actions which the group cherishes become connected with social praise and approval, while actions felt to be socially undesirable are linked with blame and disapproval. As mind—the capacity to use bits of the experienced environment as symbols of other parts—develops, group praise and blame become internalized and taken into the individual's own behavior. Foreseen and anticipated consequences in the form of possible social praise or blame become stimuli to present behavior. This internalization of the objective social situation of praising or blaming expresses itself in conscience. It is partly the existence of this phenomenon which gives rise to the view that morality is somehow an affair solely of the individual.

As a result of the learning process, the behavior repertoire of the individual takes on a dual aspect. The social self and the non-social self appear, the former being all behavior conditioned by social stimuli, and the latter being all other behavior. Ideally, these two phases of the self should function harmoniously; actually, they are often in conflict, and particularly in moral conflict. It is for this reason that the thought-process in such situations is often of a conversational nature. Many of the major conflicts of personality disturbance which lead to the various insanities are based upon the conflict of the same two factors of the self or upon a conflict of various portions of the complex social self. This is partly recognized in the psychoanalytical account of the basic struggle between the sex and herd "instincts."

The moralization of an individual, then, is one phase, psychologically, of his socialization. The conditioning of the positive responses by social stimuli leads to the rise of the virtues and to many of the major values of the individual; the conditioning of the negative responses leads to the designation of the vices and to the major negative values. The variations of moral behavior from group to group depend upon the differ-

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ent cultures and methods of socialization of the various groups, and these in turn depend for the most part upon the specific problems of adjustment that must be met in each case.

III

Before turning to the relation of the preceding analysis to ethical theory, one other psychological factor deserves notice. No attempt has been made to discuss the nature of reflection in this paper. The general pragmatic position, that intelligence consists in the functioning of ideas—representative portions of experience—in situations where instinctive and habitual behavior is inadequate, has been assumed. Or, if intelligence be defined as the capacity to profit by past experience in meeting new situations, then intelligence at the symbolic level is reflective thought. For the present purposes it is necessary only to add that freedom, in a psychological sense, is found solely in such reflective processes. Until there are symbols there is no freedom. Freedom is the capacity to direct one's own behavior by absent stimuli operating through symbols. One whose behavior is directed entirely by non-representative immediate stimuli is capable of direct responses only, and in no real sense can be said to be free. Freedom comes with the capacity for delayed responses in which there is self-direction by symbols. Freedom, then, is something that is acquired, just as mind and conscience are acquired. Freedom is not the negation of causation, but a particular kind of causal sequence. Symbols are acquired, but when acquired give the organism a capacity for self-direction by self-stimulation that breaks the chains of slavery forged by what is only immediately given. Since the major symbols are language symbols, it is fair to say that on the whole mind and freedom are social products.

IV

The previous considerations are closely related to an ethical view which might be called the total-situation theory of

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ethics. On this view a moral situation is one in which there is a conflict in the individual between tendencies to behavior which will have different social consequences. A moral situation is always a specific problematic situation. Various factors assert themselves in the situation. Usually there is some interest of the non-social self in conflict with social sanctions which appear in the demands of the social self. Or one phase of the social self may be in conflict with other phases or with the social self as a whole. At any rate, there are competing factors. The moral act is the act which best meets all the demands of the total specific situation. Means, as well as ends, are susceptible to moral judgments, for all behavior affecting others gives rise to a potential moral situation. Since the factors of the situation can be considered only in so far as they are related to interests of the self, the moral law might be stated, to use a Kantian form, *So act as to do justice to the total self.* But since this may appear "subjective," and since, after all, the polarization within the self is a reflection of the original polarization within an objective social situation, the moral law had better be phrased, *So act as to do maximum justice to all the personalities involved.* In so far as any factor is slighted or neglected, the decision is not fully moral. The individual is one factor in the total situation, and as such is to receive due consideration. In attempting to do justice to all factors of the total situation the moral problem becomes not simply a *choice* of certain interests, but the task of evolving a constructive synthetic act that liberates—and transforms, if necessary—the totality of interests. Moral behavior is pre-eminently positive, giving rise to a more complex self at a higher level of integration on the one hand and to a liberated social situation on the other. Since the problem has arisen just because traditional behavior is inadequate, intelligence becomes the great crucible out of which a moral life is poured. Moral life is intelligent socialized life.

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V

The total-situation view leads to a reinterpretation of certain ethical categories. The *standard* becomes the situation itself, and not some external measuring rod to which all moral acts must conform. Past moral formulations and solutions enter only as suggestions for dealing with the specific present problem. Convenient as they are, customary moral formulations are never beyond reflective interpretation and criticism. *Right* is the act appropriate to the situation. Right breaks up into specific right acts. *Good* refers to the doing of the right act, and to the disposition to find such an act. *Duty* is the control of partial by total interests, the obligation to take account of the total self and all factors of the total situation. The *end* becomes the solution of the problem. Ends, like other moral factors, are specific even though summed up under a universal (general) symbol. And so on for the other categories. The main point in every case is that the meaning of moral concepts is to be found in some phase of the total situation or in the situation as a whole, and not in external dictums by which the specific act is to be judged. Granting the relativity of morality to specific situations, within each moral situation the demands are "absolute." The moral life consists in meeting, as they arise, the specific situations involving social consequences. A moral life, breaking up into specific moral acts, is not a means to anything: it *is* the very harmonization of interests that the growing and expanding self and society demand.

VI

From the point of view here presented the standard ethical theories are for the most part partial and incomplete rather than wrong, emphasizing one aspect of the total situation and neglecting others. Self-sacrifice—aside from the fact that it cannot be universalized as a principle of behavior—errs in failing to consider adequately the individual in whom the problem has arisen. It is pertinent to ask which self is to be

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sacrificed. If it is merely meant that the non-social self is to be restrained in the light of the entire self, well and good. But if it is meant that the entire self is to be sacrificed, then such counsel is simply immoral. An individual who sacrifices all interests, social as well as non-social, is of no value to society and has been inadequately socialized. Likewise theories based on self-assertion are partial and ambiguous. If the *entire* self is to be asserted, again well and good, but if the non-social self alone is meant, then it must be insisted that this self is only one factor in the total situation. Self-realization is a more adequate theory, since it implies recognition of both aspects of the self, and so of both aspects—individual and social—of the total situation. It is inadequate if self-realization is set as *the* end of moral behavior. There is a self-realization paradox as well as a hedonic paradox. Utilitarianism attempts to take account of most of the factors, but its psychological basis is inadequate, as has been pointed out many times. Like theories based on self-realization, self-preservation, happiness, and the like, it has failed to realize that behavior is directly initiated by *many* and various stimuli, and that the relation between the stimulus and the response is direct. Pleasure doesn't always intervene between situations and response as the motive of response. It may, of course, come to do this; that is, pleasure, originally the result of realized desires, may later function as a substitute stimulus in arousing behavior. But this is quite different from the generalized doctrine of psychological hedonism. A corresponding fallacy of many contemporary ethicists is to believe that moral behavior can arise only from social instincts. Socialization, and hence moralization, can be accounted for by the social conditioning of infant behavior without postulating unlearned behavior inherently connected with social stimuli. Ethics of the Kantian type is inadequate, not only because of the metaphysical conception of reason, but also because the moral life becomes a choice between certain factors in the situation rather than the devel-

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opment of behavior capable of synthesizing the conflicting tendencies. On the total-situation view moral behavior always springs from *mixed* motives; on most ethical theories the attempt has been made to find *one* motive determining behavior. For this reason traditional theories tend to be partial and to overemphasize some one aspect of the total situation.

VII

One result of the total-situation theory is important enough to be generalized, and that is the complete correlativity of individual and society. The relation of the individual and society is as close as the proverbial hen and egg. Rational self-conscious individuals flower only in a social soil; society is nothing but the interactions of individuals. Through social processes an individual may come to oppose himself to society; through the development of individuals of initiative society evolves a technique for its own reconstruction. Only individuals can act, but society supplies the conditions without which intelligent individual action is impossible. Neither the individual nor society is subordinate to the other, nor is either a means to the other, but each is the condition of the other. The moral obligation of the individual is to act in the light of the social consequences of his proposed acts; the moral obligation of society is to prepare the conditions under which moral behavior of the individual is possible. One is responsible only in so far as one is free, that is, intelligent—and the tools of freedom are for the most part socially acquired. The ideal society would be that which contains within itself the principles of its own reconstruction. This demands moral individuals of freedom and initiative capable of guiding the multifarious interests of a complex society along the channels which best synthesize these interests. The moral life is a positive and strenuous life carved by intelligence out of the demands and resources of the individual-social nexus.

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VIII

In concluding this essay certain aspects of the relation of the total-situation theory of ethics to contemporary problems may be pointed out, not as solutions of the problems, but as illustrations of the attitude involved.

Morally, democracy may be stated as the belief that every member of society must receive moral consideration. Each member of society must be equally considered—which is not the same thing as being considered equal to every other member. There are moral problems set by the rich as well as the poor, by the idle as well as the industrious, by the psychologically superior as well as the psychologically inferior. Democracy involves not merely a leveling up or a leveling down—though it does involve both—but primarily the right of all to moral consideration.

Historically, however, democracy is simply the rise to power of the middle class. In America the absence of any earlier complex social organization made possible in this rise the avoidance of the peculiar compromise with an aristocratic régime that characterizes the rise of the English middle classes. The principles of toleration, liberty, equality, and the like were primarily battle cries of the rising middle classes, and were not seriously thought of as applicable to the lower classes. Evidence for this statement is to be found in the conservative reaction of the intrenched victorious middle class in the nineteenth century and its repudiation of its earlier doctrines in order to avoid the use of these by the newly emerging proletariat. How far can the moral implications of democracy offset the tendency of all successful groups to grow intolerant and conservative? How far can the rational moral attitude supplant the appeal to force and self-interest? There is a hardening of the historical democratic arteries; a rich blood may still flow in the arteries of a moral democracy.

A social problem is solved morally when the resulting action does the maximum justice to the various factors in-

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volved. This means that all the interests must be able to make themselves heard and to receive consideration. This demands an ear for the voice of minorities and individual dissenters. It demands a maximum of morally exercised civil liberty, "morally exercised" because the moral obligation of the radical is as imperative as that of the man in power. It demands social participation to devise ways of conciliating conflicting interests and of making possible an ever greater degree of moral behavior in individual members of society. Collective acts are not necessarily moral, but when moral there is no conflict between governmental participation in social affairs and individual freedom and initiative. The two, rather, are correlative. On the negative side of crime, if responsibility is determined by freedom, society must devise ways of estimating freedom and of dealing with individuals on the basis of degree of effective freedom involved. A moral view demands that labor and capital both transcend self-interest and develop a rational technique for handling their problems. War, morally, stands condemned because it involves an amputation of certain factors in its ultimate appeal to force and provides no rational consideration of the conflicting interests. And so one might continue in the listing of present problems, but morally the issue is always the same: the moral attitude demands an intelligent consideration of the competing factors and the attainment of a way of acting that best meets the demands of the total situation. The problems themselves must be met and solved on the battle-front of action.

It has frequently been remarked that the early American competitive individualism is being increasingly tempered by a rising co-operative socialism. There arises, then, the possibility of approximating to a significant moral society by the American people; of attaining that rare combination of individual initiative and concern for social welfare.

As intelligence increases, the consequences foreseen become more extensive. Each specific situation becomes focused

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against a larger situation, and in the long run this is the life of man on earth. History reveals the ever increasing size of human groupings and the subservience of morality to non-moral relations between groups. As the human race begins to emerge as the ultimate group (ultimate for all practical purposes), the possibility arises of the control of an ever greater area of life by moral considerations. How far can moralized intelligence supplant non-moral forces in the direction of human affairs? This is the moral problem of the present and future. Morality is life conscious of its social problems and resources—life organized co-operatively and intelligently—life aware of the need of concerted strength.

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AN APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

C. F. TAEUSCH

A science defines itself by choosing distinctive materials and by employing methods that are adaptable to these materials and productive of interpretable results. The natural sciences have established themselves more securely than have the so-called "social sciences" partly because their materials are relatively more stable and partly because they are in a relatively better position to utilize that fruitful instrument, the experimental method. Inasmuch as this method requires for its successful use indifference to materials and often their wastage and destruction, the "social sciences" are considerably restricted in its employment. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the development of methods available to the social studies may secure for them the right to be regarded as scientific.

Not the least simple of the social sciences is ethics, which for convenience may tentatively be defined as the science of right human conduct. The materials of ethical inquiry are human beings—their thoughts, emotions, and actions—in their natural and social environments. Historically, sociological investigation discloses, the group preceded the individual as the unit of human conduct. Consequently, recent ethical studies have directed their initial and even major attention to group conduct, the individuality and personality of the human being then being regarded as a derivative of this group conduct. Ethical principles have recently engaged the attention of professional and business groups, the resultant materials affording a fruitful basis for further ethical inquiry.

Ethical behavior has been traditionally regarded as arising from the conflict between the developing individual and the inert group, from the standards of which that individual is

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ever attempting to depart. Ethical "systems" have been formulated on the basis of this problem and have confined themselves largely to the question as to what the individual *should* do under such circumstances; although the "group" has varied from the well-defined circle of the Epicureans or the city-state of Aristotle to the modern nation; and has even, in such systems as the Kantian and the Utilitarian, been regarded as an indefinable totality of all human beings. The ethical situation has throughout been resolved to a relationship between the individual and his "world," the former being the source of "conduct" and the latter of "standards."

The fact that ethics has confined itself largely to this problem is the basis for most of the dissatisfaction with traditional moral inquiry, especially as this has been pursued without much apparent progress by philosophers. Since Plato so ably and beautifully expressed the moral problem in the Socratic Dialogues, especially in the *Apology* and the *Crito,* very little change has been perceptible in what has come to be regarded as the major social-ethical situation. In these dialogues the standards are formulated by the state in legislative enactments, while Socrates exhibits the extremes of individual reaction against, and loyalty to, these social standards. Ethics has paid little attention to the later qualitative and functional differences among social groups, but has abstracted "the social group" as a prevalent and uniform factor. Furthermore, there can be no agreement as to the preference for "conformity" or "revolution" in individual action, but only temperamental sympathies for one or the other of these extremes or for moderated intermediate courses of conduct. And seldom has ethics recognized the peculiar pluralistic difficulty presented by social groups intermediate to the individual and this abstracted "humanity," those *imperia in imperio* which find no place in the relatively simpler philosophy of the state.

It is proposed in this paper to regard professional and business ethics as a source of social materials which is coming to

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be of increasing importance and which is fruitful with implications and amenable to a strict methodological treatment.

I

The term "ethics" has thus far, and in philosophical parlance generally, been used interchangeably with "morals." It would be difficult, perhaps, to distinguish philologically between the connotations of these two terms, even though they are derived from different languages. "Morals" is derived from the Latin term *mores*, which indicated those social standards that were recognized as beneficial to the group—the breach of the *mores* arousing a social resentment which gave to the term its peculiar connotation. The word "morality" still carries those meanings which we associate with the stern old Roman and involves problems of loyalty and duty, obedience and forbearance, devotion and rectitude, and those profounder personal virtues which the earlier Puritanism accentuated. "Ethics" is a lighter word, less emotionally colored but involved more in rationality and expediency. Ἔθος is a Greek term, also like the Roman *mores* meaning custom; but the Greek was less resentful over the breach. He was confident in the working out of a natural justice that would rectify any ὕβρις, or excess, while in his contemplation of the more immediate resultants he was secular and opportunistic. He had another word, το δέον, for those additional Roman connotations of *mores* which later became designated in Christian ethics by the term "duty." "Social expediency" practically exhausted the meaning of the term for the Greek, provided we recognize such rational extensions of "expediency" as were emphasized by Antigone and Socrates and later by Aristotle in his distinction between the "good citizen" and the "good man." The term *ethos*, it must be admitted, however, has been just as narrow in its social applications as has the term *mores*. Neither recognizes the additional problem presented by various kinds and sizes of groups, especially when the relationship of an *imperium in imperio* exists. But

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the secular and rational character of "ethics" becomes apparent when the historical and present-day uses of the term are contrasted with the more religious and personal meanings of "morals."

Inasmuch as there are two dignified words available for designating practically the same field of inquiry, economy would justify their use in distinguishing within that field two possible kinds of activity, even though we disregard usage or the historical connotation of the terms. When a man faces a "moral" issue, his personal interests are in conflict with social standards. It may be merely a matter of convenience, as in the case of obedience to traffic laws or the observance of a sexual code; or of honesty in the handling of money, the loss of which to the group would be less felt than would the personal gain; or of service to country, martial or civil; or of charity. Whether the matter be resolved to an issue between altruism and egoism or take the larger forms of social loyalty and service, the situation is the same, it has been recognized for centuries as the typical moral situation, and as such has either been arbitrarily settled in the demands for immediate action or been delicately formulated after long spiritual struggles into the more complicated patterns of thought and conduct. It is in such moral situations that the *personal self* has developed as a recognized interest and agent, while the social interests have generally become abstractly idealized or formulated into custom and legislation. Wherever the individual clashes with a group to which he belongs this same problem arises. The term "moral" has generally been used to designate it. To use for the same situation the term "ethical" merely provides us with a synonym but makes us lose sight of another set of situations and problems that would be better attended to if they were distinctly designated.

When an engineer discovers that a piece of work is being constructed uneconomically and perhaps without due regard for human safety, just what should be his course of conduct?

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The moral issue is: Shall I pass by on the other side, not intruding in some other man's affairs, and thereby conserving my personal convenience; or do I owe an allegiance to all men, especially such as are likely to be in the vicinity of that building and those who are paying for the work, to expose the fault? If the latter, shall I report the matter to the civil authorities, and in my capacity as a citizen shall I previously have exerted myself in behalf of legislation on just such matters and kept constantly before me and others the necessity of electing capable administrative officers? The political and legal organization of society has, as a matter of fact, relieved the individual of much of the burden of such moral watchfulness. It provides a lever for the otherwise intermittent and ineffective attentions of the individual to his social obligations and encourages him to exert himself in behalf of those persons and situations that he otherwise might not or could not with economy be interested in. Clearly the situation has its *moral* phase, whether the decision of the man as to what he will do is *moral* or *immoral.* Nor does the moral decision necessarily always require extreme altruism, as Spencer has pointed out, for the requisite sacrifices are apt to destroy too many morally minded agents to warrant the act.

There are, however, two factors at least which define this situation more narrowly than is recognized in the moral analysis. The man is an "engineer," hence the member of a restricted group within the human circle; and the situation has arisen in the course of an "engineering" project with which he is functionally, even if indirectly, identified. There is an interest in engineering projects which is vitally shared by all engineers, no matter how indirect the relationship appears to be, and the failure of any engineer properly to perform his functions reflects on all engineers in a way which only the professional experience of these men can appreciate; while the interest and reflection vary with the distinctiveness of the professional function. So vital can this situation become that

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the issues involved contend with the moral issue which appears at first glance to be the dominant or exclusive one. The balancing of these two major issues is so unique and complicated as to warrant the distinctive use of a term which has become practically and extensively, even if only recently, employed; a use which must be recognized by social philosophy. It is this use of the term "ethical" which is here suggested.

Two psychological factors are apparent in the ethical situation which are not present, or at least not prominent, in the moral situation. There is first the interest of the individual of a particular functional type in preventing the casting of any reflection on his own group and, more positively, in attracting to his functional group respect for its dignity and confidence in its efficacy. He projects as his ideal not a glorified humanity, but the functions of the particular group to which he belongs. The act of projection, of sublimation, is the same as occurs in the idealization of humanity, but the product is different. Whereas the ethical projection competes with other ethical projections, the moral ideal is humanly all-embracing, its competitors being natural forces and inertia and the unwillingness of individuals to conform. Furthermore, the ethical projections, or ideals, differ in content, which in some cases is bound to have an effect on the formal relations involved. It is with such distinctive and particular interests that the professional or business man identifies himself. In this he is not selfish. Any such direct charge would involve the fallacy of division. His interest is intermediate to his selfish desires and the welfare of humanity or of a political group. The moral problem of his relation to his own functional group is not different from that of his relation to humanity or to a nation or to the legal order. But there is the additional, ethical, problem distinctively generated by the particular character of his functional activities and by the relations between his group and other groups and society.

Not only is the ethical problem different from the moral,

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but the ethical solution may at times appear to be immoral especially if the solution is judged on the basis of traditional moral views. Instead of a relatively homogeneous situation, in which the moral problem comes to be a matter largely of greater or less, and not of different, interest to be conserved, the ethical situation presents a pluralism of values in which incomparables and incommensurables appear. The engineering profession is no less real to the engineer than is a country to its citizens or humanity to a human being. In proportion as the functional interest is identified with economic income, it may be more real and vital. And when an engineer is faced with the necessity, imposed by the moral or legal code, of exposing the mistakes of another engineer, it is conceivable that his interest in preventing such a disclosure might outweigh his human or patriotic interests. His interest in conserving the good will of society toward his profession may dictate concealing its defects within the confines of the profession itself. And such a course would be ethically justifiable in case the professional group assumes the responsibility of correcting the difficulty; and morally justifiable if the national or the human interest be subserved better by these intermediate functional activities.

The second psychological factor which generates the ethical situation is again involved in the fallacies of division and composition, but is nevertheless practically quite real. When an engineering project is discovered to be menacing human life or to have wasted investments or public expenditures, the consequent public resentment and that of the owners of the property are not directed with any appreciable degree of accuracy against the responsible individuals. The failure of certain engineers to check over building plans with due professional care has resulted, not in the avoidance by clients of those particular engineers, but in a virtual cessation since the war of consulting any engineers at all in such matters. So likewise the failure to anticipate the final total expenditures for such

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projects as involved municipalities in utilities ventures and rural districts in drainage projects has aroused the suspicions of communities to such a point that necessary engineering work can no longer be even suggested. Functional, especially professional, groups are constantly subjected to criticisms and boycotts because of the unscrupulous acts of certain individuals. Consequently the older professions are constantly on the lookout to prevent such unfair reflections. The professional activities of these men are not measured according to the anticipated participation in a possible social reaction, for there is no anticipating or measuring either the amount of social irritation or its particular incidence. The interest is an objective one, contending with other objective social interests such as patriotism and law enforcement. Indeed, when social hostility, aroused by the unprofessional acts of certain men, expresses itself in unfair legislation which curbs the rightful exercise of professional functions, the ethical course may be directly opposed to the legal or to the political. And when the social interest is propelled by religions such as Christianity or by humanitarian ideals such as democracy, the "leveling" influence may conceivably be looked upon with hostility by individuals who through superior endowment or persistent energy have become members of a limited, skilled, and economically favored group. It is the conservation of this particular group that marks the ethical interest. This is as much an objectification of the personal interest as it is a restriction of the social-moral interest. Incidentally both the moral and the individual interests are thereby conserved, for the virtual identification of the projected individual interest with the restricted social interest makes possible a much greater degree of effective realization of ethical purposes than is possible in the moral realm.

II

Illustrative of the ethical situation is the matter of criticism among professional men. Morally, the objection to crit-

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icism is the humiliation of the individual, whose rights are a derivative of human dignity. Ethically, the objection is based secondarily on consideration for the individual; primarily the interest is the dignity and respect of the profession itself. Ethically, doctors are forbidden to expose the mistakes of fellow practitioners to anyone other than members of the profession; practically, such mistakes are dealt with only, if at all, by the older and established practitioners; even differences of opinion in consultations are not communicated to laymen unless all the consultants agree to this. Teachers are developing an ethical sense in regard to criticism in the presence of laymen, especially of pupils; included in the term "criticism" is the blaming of the earlier education of the pupil for his present short-comings. The lawyer's interest in criticism is exhibited in his attitude toward the judge. Although the professional restrictions are based on a respect for the legal order, unquestionably the sanction for his attitude is also psychological: every lawyer is a potential judge and every lawyer is interested in the dignity of his chosen profession and in the respect shown toward it. Among ministers, religious controversy is an interesting mixture of zeal for the truth and denominational rivalry. Where this controversy has taken the form of mutual recriminations, there has resulted a loss of respect for religion and its advocates. Group solidarity is maintained by conserving the confidence of outsiders in its functional capacities. This requires negatively the suppression of all exposures of the mistakes and weaknesses of its members. When accompanied by methods which sanction internally—within the group—the ethical standards, the moral interests of society are thereby conserved.

The ethics of advertising is another case in point. Doctors and lawyers are quite punctilious in the matter, anything more than the insertion in papers and periodicals of a professional card being regarded as unprofessional. A lawyer may not ethically include a statement as to his nationality, nor may a doc-

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tor indicate the presence of his office other than by a sign attached to the building in which his office is located. A prominent engineer recently submitted his letter head to a committee on ethics, a question having arisen as to the professional propriety of including a statement as to the most important projects completed by his firm. "Complimentary press notices" are condemned in most teachers' codes. Morally, advertising would be dictated by the need of some medium for making available to all the knowledge of obtainable goods and services, while advertising would be morally restrained by the dictates of truth. But ethically, other considerations enter: of professional dignity and propriety and of the reduction of professional competition along lines other than that of a deserved reputation.

The most interesting ethical situation is to be found in the problem of "privileged communications." A rule of law prevents a lawyer from testifying in behalf of his client even to the extent of asserting his own personal belief in his client's cause. The reverse of this rule allows a lawyer to defend his client without being compelled to disclose any confessions which the latter may have made to him. The justification of this rule is both legal-political and social-ethical. Not only are the rights of persons, especially of defendants in law, thereby safeguarded, but the facilitation of confessions enables the lawyer properly to prepare his case. The social-ethical interests in the confessional are more directly achieved by the Catholic church. Priests have relieved multitudes of the burden of a guilty conscience, and not the least of the reasons for the extent and success of this social cathartic has been the refusal of the father confessor to divulge the secrets confided to him. The church has wrested from the law the right to regard confessions as inviolable. Not so successful has been the doctor or the banker, although both regard the violation of confidences as unethical. Whether their ethical principles would prevail in the face of a legal order is questionable, for igno-

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rance could be pleaded; but certainly the ethical code is a justification for abstaining from the volunteering of information which would contribute both to political-legal and to moral welfare. The whole matter of loyalty to one's client is involved. Not only is the teacher thereby impelled to teach pupils the truth in the face of pettifogging school-boards and perverted zealots, but the engineer and the doctor are compelled to work out carefully their course of conduct when the interests of more than one client conflict or when such interests are opposed to social welfare. What shall a doctor say, for example, when approached by the prospective spouse of one of his patients and asked regarding the fitness of the latter to marry? Morally the situation is clear, but the complications of the ethical problem are confusing, to say the least.

In general there has come to be recognized a well-defined set of standards of conduct among the older professions wholly apart from the legal and political requirements and much more explicitly worked out than are most moral dictates. Solicitation of clients or patients is regarded as unethical, whether by the more direct methods of "celerity of foot" or by the indirections of advertising or social calls. When approached by client or patient, the professional man may refuse the case if he deems it unworthy of his professional attention, and the latter must state clearly any adverse interests which he may represent and advise strictly as to the merits of the case. If accepted, the case must receive the zealous attention of the professional man, who throughout, however, must be guided by his own professional conscience and not by that of his client. On the termination of his services, which must not be unduly prolonged, charges should be fair and reasonable. "Fair and reasonable" is coming to mean as much the stressing of rates sufficient to requite all items of overhead expense, including long and expensive preparation and periods of unemployment, as it does the more obvious concessions to the

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indigent prisoner, the charity case, and the pupil of limited means.

In the field of business and industry a most significant ethical contribution has been the standardization and simplification of products with its consequent elimination of waste and extravagance. Associations of lumbermen, of plumbers, of cement-manufacturers, of brick-makers, and of hardware-dealers have persisted in their opposition to the arbitrary and unfair provisions and interpretations of the Sherman Law, until recently, in co-operation with Mr. Hoover, they have effected by voluntary compliance a conservation of material resources of almost incalculable amount. The resultant profits to business have been less than the conservation of resources and economies secured to customers. The right, in pursuance of this same purpose, to gather information in regard to available supplies, transportation routes and rates, and standardized measurements has been recognized by the Supreme Court as wholly within the law so long as agreements are not entered into and coercive methods are refrained from, and as a necessary and desirable exhibition of sound business judgment and good sense. Most business failures are due to the inability or unwillingness of the business man to take into account all cost items, especially overhead expense. Price-cutting is a menace to business and the professions and to the whole social-economic order, and is ethically to be condemned.

To sanction these ethical standards there are available to the professions and to business men none of the more tangible legal sanctions, fine and imprisonment. Public opinion is a legal-moral sanction that can be utilized, but rather in the more particular form of profession respect and taboo. Medicine and law have succeeded in restricting considerably the number of entrants into these professions, engineering and teaching and the ministry to a less extent, by rigorous scholastic requirements and by licensing practitioners. The law has recourse to disbarment, suspension, fine, and censure; medi-

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cine, to censure; while both, together with various other professions, especially engineering, resort to expulsion from membership in their respective professional associations. Some business associations have surreptitiously resorted to a system of fines, although most of them have been compelled to discontinue the practice because of the Sherman Law. Rotary International, Kiwanis, and various business clubs have the same sanction of exclusive membership that is possessed by lodges.

Among the more ineffable sanctions are those of precept and example afforded by the recognized leaders of professional groups and business associations. "Framing the code" and hanging it in a conspicuous place where it may be viewed and "absorbed" by the occupants of the office, as well as by those who have dealings there, have a stimulative and deterrent effect. Although the supernatural sanctions have no place in these ethical situations, "conscience" is frequently relied on. At least "voluntary co-operation," under the urge of a desire for professional and business esteem, is the most distinctive of these sanctions. Whatever the methods employed, it cannot be denied that there has recently been a considerable improvement in the level and tone of professional and business activities.

III

Probably the most effective sanction of business and professional ethics is to be found in the attempt to clarify and define the issues. Conspicuous among these attempts is the institution of the "case method" of approach. The New York County Bar Association is the pioneer in this movement, some two hundred and seventy actual cases, submitted for analysis and advice, having been passed on by their Committee on Ethics. This committee does not assume to initiate or prosecute cases or to advise any effective agency to sanction its findings, although judges have recognized the committee's

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answers in their decisions and have quoted canons of the code of ethics of the American Bar Association. The American Association of Engineers has, through its Committee on Ethics, defined some fifty cases, while the National Selected Morticians have tentatively adopted, also through their Ethics Committee, some thirteen cases. Rotary International has been engaged for some time in the collection of cases of business conduct and has submitted these to its members for opinions and facts as to practice and desirable standards.

The virtue of these cases lies in their explicitness and in the expression of professional and business opinions which they elicit. Just as the Constitution of the United States has had to be interpreted as acts were committed, so do these cases interpret, objectify, and clarify the more general rules and standards of the ethical codes or of business and professional custom. Many professional and business men are grateful for the knowledge so made available, while the effect on the public of a frank publication of explicit problems is just beginning to be felt. The relative fewness of these cases should not be disconcerting so long as such cases are real and arise in practical experience. The ancient Druids worked out the practical implications of their legal code by elaborating hypothetical cases, but the method is questionable. At least the refusal of the Supreme Court to adopt this method has sufficient merit to warrant committees on ethical practice to consider only such cases as actually arise among professional and business men.

It occurs to anyone who has recently observed the ethics of business and of the professions that the standards are being formulated and defined in a most satisfactory manner. Just as the writing down of the law, e.g., in the Ten Commandments and in the Twelve Tables, objectified and stabilized the legal and moral relations, so have codes of ethics, although they are much less explicit than practice cases, clarified among the respective business and professional groups their stand-

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ards and indicated to an otherwise suspicious public a considerable degree of frankness. Government agents have accepted published codes of ethics as a sufficient excuse or defense of practices which might otherwise be interpreted as violations of broadly defined laws. The gain to the intelligent man, whether active member inside the particular group or prospective client or customer outside, is evident: the "shyster" and "quack" and "fly-by-night" merchant are handicapped in a situation which eliminates the most flagrant and undesirable cases of opportunism, while the encouragement of "repeat" customers and the establishment of a clientele knits society into a more permanent, and at the same time more complicated, pattern than can result from such rules as *"caveat emptor."* Since the codes and standards are formulated on the basis of business and professional experience and not dictated by authoritative pronouncements, and since they are constantly subject to change and reformation and are not fixed, they satisfy the pragmatic requirements of American social life. Empirical generalizations have not been formulated into abstractions, while the community of interest and suggestions as to conduct are still experimental and have not gone to the extremes of regimentation and persuasion and enforcement.

The methods employed by business and the professions in establishing standards and inducing conduct give the cue to methods requisite for studying them. Empiricism is the keynote of both. The immediate objective of the empirical study of ethics is the codes and standards. Not only does every one of the many hundreds of codes now in existence have a history and background of practice, with constant changes adapted to new and wider situations possible, but the comparative study of codes and standards would disclose broader and more fundamental relations. This becomes apparent not only when doctor's code is compared with lawyer's and both with engineer's and teacher's; but also when a study is made of the particular business associations that have been stimulated by

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the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and Rotary International to develop codes which follow in general the Principles of Business Conduct and the Rotary Code but which take into account the peculiar applications necessary to particular businesses. Furthermore, some thirty state teachers' associations have formulated codes, varying in explicitness and most of them inadequate but all together affording the basis for a fairly complete and detailed code. Strict empiricism does not go beyond the facts, and such empiricism is the heart of the methodology of ethics. But comparison is not thereby excluded from suggested experimental adoptions or modifications.

The question arises, Just what constitutes a fact, especially such social facts as can be made amenable to empirical and perhaps experimental manipulation? So far as professional and business ethics is concerned, a fact is a situation which can be described in print by the delegated committee of a functional group. The differentiation of a social from a natural fact thus resolves itself largely to its amenability to exact description. This definition of a social fact stresses and makes explicit a factor which is present in every natural fact by implication and derivatively, namely, expert testimony as to its occurrence. The difficulty with regarding social events themselves as facts is that the variance among descriptions of them is so much greater than the variance in the description of natural events that they are often incapable of critical reconciliation. To raise description from its accidental rôle in natural science to that of differentia in social science is to make of the latter a field in which method can be made as accurate and objective and fruitful as it has become in the former.

More particularly, the cases which arise in professional and business ethics are facts, especially by virtue of their formulation by representative members of the group, frequently by practice committees. So also can statutes be regarded as

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social facts, especially as they are judicially interpreted in the light of challenges from the events in the social order to make explicit such statutory regulations. Furthermore, the items of a code of ethics become social facts when a group commits itself to them and publishes them. It is perhaps necessary, however, to regard the "case" as the best type of fact in that it avoids the charge of hypocrisy which often attaches to the codes. Social facts, it is thus seen, are not all of the same degree of "hardness," nor are they like the data of natural science. Also, it must be remembered that physics has never effected a perfect vacuum nor are there any "pure" chemicals, while geology has its conglomerates and biology its hybrids and saltations.

The question might further arise, Is the professional interpretation of a social situation—exemplified in judicial decisions and in the advisory conclusions of practice committees —a part of the social fact? Obviously, Yes. This additional description often involving normative elements, is at once inseparable from the description of the situation and at the same time becomes a further differentia of social as opposed to natural facts. The latter at least cannot admit of normative elements, even when, as in the case of geometry, there are postulates, and when, as in the case of physics or biology, there are hypotheses which can never adequately or accurately cover the "real" implications. In brief, the *salto mortale* is more successfully bridged in the descriptions of social events by the pragmatic character of expert opinion, which becomes part and parcel with the event itself. If this appears to some to be the very source of a major fallacy in social analysis, the social fact may still be regarded as the describable parts of a social event.

Insistent on the empirical method of approach is the fact that the various professions and businesses employ such diverse methods of attaining their ethical standards. The vital unit of the doctor is the county medical association, of the

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lawyer and the teacher their respective state associations, while the engineer seems more concerned with functional than with geographic boundaries. The lawyer relies largely on legal procedure and sanctions to make his code effective; the doctor on the historic dignity attaching to his calling and to the more tangible "censorship" administered by selected committees. Both professions have made effective use of strict educational requirements in limiting the number and elevating the standards of the group. Lawyer and engineer and mortician have established practice committees to rule on specific cases. The fact that engineering societies compete for members has resulted in a less effective if more subtle method of control. The personnel of certain organizations contributes to their character and behavior: so the prevalence of women in teaching has allowed sentiment and paternalism and a low economic standard to prevail; the fact that the members of Rotary International are the "arrived" rather than the struggling business men at once makes possible the inclusion of more rigorous standards and threatens this organization with the vices of smugness and mutual admiration. The lack of educational advantages among laboring men has profoundly affected the organization of unions and their relations to the public, and to manufacturers and their associations; while the psychology of the American farmer, centering around a pronounced individualism and an economic opportunism, makes the "co-operative" in practice an altogether different affair from what the reader of Sir Horace Plunkett would expect. Lumbermen have succeeded better than plumbers in standardizing their products. Variegation is the rule of ethical conduct, not uniformity—a variegation that is determined both by the materials and by the functional activities of social groups and by the psychological attitudes cultivated in certain vocational pursuits.

Whether the social sciences or philosophy should go farther and attempt in some measure to control human behavior

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is questionable. This does not preclude the limited use of the experimental method, which too often in the social sciences is confused with "social engineering." Just as there is a realm of "pure science," distinct from its applications and eminently the field of university study, so can the study of social phenomena be pursued without necessarily directing or influencing their movements. Experimentation involves first the selection of a very limited set of materials and a restriction of the situation to permit the repetition and observation of certain circumstances and factors. In ethics this opportunity is afforded by the members of restricted groups, especially of the older professions which have a well-developed functional consciousness. The second factor in experiment consists in the repetition of certain situations again and again, this being facilitated by the degree to which economy has been achieved in the selection of materials, until the results can be identified as effects of the limited causal elements of the situation. This second factor of experimentation is difficult to accomplish in the social sciences. The moral justification of the use of human beings as instruments is questionable; the indifference to, and wastage of, human materials depends on the voluntary sacrifices made by the subjects; and the psychological attitudes of the latter—their knowledge of and interest in the situation—often vitiates the results. Furthermore, the preconceptions and objectives of the experimenter, especially if any element of moral or social reform is involved, jeopardize the results. Finally, the results so achieved must be subjected to independent experimental inquiry and checked by separate and repeated observations. The relative absence of such well-established "facts" is at once symptomatic of the unscientific status of social studies and a challenge to those who believe that human behavior will lend itself more and more to scientific observation and to a limited but justifiable measure of control.

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PLATONIC IMMORTALITY AS THE HIGHEST GOOD[1]

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE

To the average fourth-century Athenian, no less than to the average modern civilized man, life as he found it seemed good. He too had his instincts to drive him on to found a family, and to acquire a residence, fine clothing, friends, servants, a bank account, and the means to travel and enjoy natural and artificial beauty, with a dash of poetry and an interest in the things of the mind to color his otherwise sensuous disposition and make his grasping after pleasure and power seem a less crude thing than it appears to more critical eyes.[2] If he thought at all about physical death and a possible after-life, his mental processes were vague and a little discouraging. The traditions of his race assured him that there was an after-life, but so pale, bloodless, and shadowy that the gibbering ghosts in the realm of Hades would give anything for the meanest position on the "real" earth.[3] Apart from tradition, the ancient Hellene, like the modern man, had his "scientific spiritualism," particularly if he could afford to pay for it. But he found it unsatisfying, if he was of a thoughtful turn of mind. For its messages either seemed to be a naïve tribute to his position and power and supposed desires, promising an eternity of feasting and merrymaking,[4] or else were so obscure as to task the powers of trained experts to find an interpretation of them.[5] Of one thing only he was sure: that life as he knew it through his senses and emotions was good; and that, if he

[1] Studies of platonic immortality usually confine themselves to an examination of the "proofs," or else treat the evidence as throwing light on the disputed question of Plato's philosophical development. So far as the writer knows, no study of the subject from the present standpoint (which is, however, platonic) has appeared. There is a suggestive hint in Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, p. 127.

[2] *Republic* 419*e* f., etc.

[3] *Rep.* 386*c* f.

[4] *Rep.* 363*c–d*, cf. 364*b–c*.

[5] *Ion* 538*e* f.; *Phædr.* 244*c*; *Laws* 759*c* f.

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was to look for a "highest" good, it could be found only in more of what he knew to be good, i.e., in continuing to satisfy his senses and emotions, possibly in a more artistic way. Everything else was either uncertain tradition or poetic fiction, to be taken seriously only by those unfortunates who had come face to face with the thought that they must soon die and leave this pleasant place.

To the Platonist, such a view of life, whether in this world or in the next, appears grotesquely distorting. Sensuous emotion, with its many-faceted interplay of lights and shadows, even when guided by the artistry of a great rhetorician like Homer and his fellow-poets, or like Pericles and his fellow-statesmen, is, after all, a thing of surfaces: all lengths and breadths, but with nothing behind in which the intellect can rest. And the thought which cannot penetrate to something deeper than a mere continuity of such existence has hardly begun to discover the real surface of the problem of immortality. Such unreflective mental processes, in fact, scarcely reach the level one would expect of an adult human being, and represent little more than protracted adolescence posing as the central thing in life. In such matters the average Hellene, like the average modern, refuses to grow up. He remains in a play-world of images. But to the Platonist it is plain that, without sustained philosophical reflection, the true depths of life cannot even be suspected, much less scientifically sounded, and all such illusions of the image-world are resolutely put on one side.[6]

What, then, does the Platonist understand by immortality? Perhaps the easiest way of approach to the meaning of this term is to say that immortality is the kind of life lived by the "immortals," i.e., by the gods and demigods recognized by Greek mythology. We shall proceed to examine the chief characteristics of this life of the immortals, and shall then ask how far it realizes the absolute idea of immortality, and, finally,

[6] *Rep.* 476*b* ff., 505*e* f.; *Phædr.* 247*c*; cf. *Phædo* 65*d* f.

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how far human beings can partake of this life and its absolute idea.

"The kind of life lived by the immortals" is a phrase which suggests different things to different men. To the student of Homer and Hesiod, the immortals seem to live a very human sort of life, quarreling, love-making, reveling, laughing, dreading and deceiving one another, and keeping up perpetual intrigues on behalf of the causes or persons whom they regard, quite capriciously, with favor. Sometimes they resemble a group of sportive nobles at the court of some merry monarch of human history. At other times they are far more like a group of naughty children, wondering what the all-father will do to them when he finds out how naughty they have been. They are distinguished from human beings in two ways: (1) by their relatively greater power, and (2) by their being deathless and ageless, enjoying, as they do, either perpetual youth or perpetual maturity. The student of Homer has no hope that men will ever, except under the rarest of circumstances, enjoy this kind of immortality. Kings and nobles can imitate it during their life on earth; but after death the greatest and noblest of them seem to pass to the realm of pale phantoms, which appears as the fitting reverse to the picture of the immortals.[7]

To the Platonist this phrase, "the life of the immortals," suggests something very different. For him, the "immortals" constitute a perfect society in which quarrels, intrigues, and deceit, and any kind of friction are entirely out of place. Each has his own work to do, and fulfils his especial function in harmonious co-operation with all the rest. The inspiration for this work is drawn from contemplation of the eternal ideas in the intellectual place, which lies altogether outside the merely physical universe. Of these ideas, the chief are courage, temperance, holiness, justice, and wisdom. These they contemplate with a clearness and a steadiness unknown to mortals,

[7] *Rep.* 377*e* f., 379*d*–391*e*.

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and from this contemplation they derive true nourishment and spiritual refreshment. The divine essence is, in fact, precisely holiness, justice, and wisdom,[8] and the acts of such beings are consequently patterns of virtuous action. The immortals act always in accordance with the principle of the best, i.e., realize, in every situation, its maximum of possible value. The divine plan, in general, is so to act as to reduce the many to the principle of the one, i.e., to construct, out of the relatively chaotic universe, a single systematic totality of elements in which there is a definite place for each element, and each such element realizes its maximal value-potentialities in harmonious co-operation with all the rest. It is by reorganization, rearrangement of the elements in question so that barren conflict and conditions which interfere with the development of potentiality are removed, that progress is made toward the ideal value-system.[9] At the same time, while so acting, the immortals are not turning themselves into slaves to some external power, but are living out their own innermost nature in free self-determination. The living principle of justice issues, of itself and without external compulsion of any kind, in actions which are just, as the love of beauty, which guides the hand of the artist, issues in beautiful art works. So, too, the living principle of holiness issues in actions which are holy; the principle of wisdom, in actions which are wise; and, speaking generally, the divine principle of the best issues, naturally and freely in the direction of realizing the divine plan. In realizing this plan, then, the divine spirit is realizing itself, and the natural overflow of the divine spirit upon men and upon the world gradually forms men and the world more nearly according to the divine pattern and spirit. The world becomes more orderly and better adapted to be the environment and temporal home of the spiritual life; and human beings under the divine influence tend to become more holy, just, and wise.

[8] *Rep.* 378*b* f.; *Phædr.* 246*e* f.; *Theæt.* 176*b*, *c*.

[9] *Polit.* 271*d* f.; *Laws* 903*b* ff.; cf. *Tim.* 69*b* f.

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That is to say, immortality, understood as the life of the immortals, tends, in accordance with its own essential principle, to share itself unenviously with mortals, in so far as these are capable of entering upon their divine heritage.[10]

One way of regarding this is to say that the immortals are essentially creative. They create order out of disorder, beauty out of ugliness, cosmos out of chaos, and so rearrange what is without value as to bring value into being, a value which is not merely the value of the elements as rearranged, but is at the same time the divine value or an approximation to the divine value. That is to say, the principle of immortality creates or issues in immortality. All values originate with the immortals, but in proportion as men are assisted to realize the qualities of the immortal life, viz., holiness, justice, and wisdom, they too become imbued with the creative spirit and overflow naturally into actions which are holy, just, and wise, and thus themselves create creativity. That is to say, in so far as they have come to partake of the immortal principle, they tend to share this with other men, and gradually assist in winning over the world to immortality.[11]

This life of the immortals has two sides or aspects. On the one hand, the immortals contemplate the eternal ideas in the intellectual place, and so far live right outside the space-time world of sun, moon, and stars. They thus appear to be pure intelligences, spirits living a life of pure contemplation and worship, and an ingenious philologist can find, even in their human appellations, traces of a view that the chief immortals are all forms or aspects of mind.[12] It is difficult to think of such spirits as having their true home anywhere else, and it would be perfectly natural to think of them as declining to live anywhere else, as declining, e.g., to descend into the space-time arena and busy themselves with the concerns of inferior spir-

[10] *Phædr.* 247*a*; *Tim.* 29*e* f.; *Laws* 713*c* f.

[11] *Symp.* 209, 210*c* f.; 212*a*; *Tim.* 30*a* f.; cf. *Cratyl.* 403*d*; *Laws* 721*b–c*, 773*e* f., 776*b*.

[12] *Cratyl.* 396*b–c*, 398*b*, 403*a*, 404*b*, *d*, 407*b–c*; *Phædr.* 247*c* f.

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its such as human beings. But this activity in the space-time world, which constitutes the other side or aspect of their life, is not something which does not concern them, but is a portion of the "work" in doing which they realize themselves, and the *Dialogues* always insist upon this activity in the space-time world.[13] It might be thought that the whole space-time world is relatively unreal, mere appearance, entirely separable from the ideal world. But this is not really the view taken in the *Dialogues*. That view is, rather, that the space-time world is a copy or image of the intelligible world, i.e., *is* the intelligible world considered as pouring out its spirit of order and meaning upon what would otherwise be sensuous chaos. The shape of the physical universe, for example, of the planets, and of the human brain, represents the ideal form of the sphere, working in an alien medium and shaping this in its own image. The movements in the physical universe, from the apparent regularities of the starry heavens to the spasmodic movements of a dancing child or frisking lamb, all represent the ideal principle of perfect circular motion around a central point, applied to a closed group of regular mathematical solids and realized approximately in a world which is fundamentally sensuous.[14] So, too, astronomical time, with its days, lunar months, solar year, and great year (when all the cycles of all the planets are so completed that each has resumed its original position in the system), is a reflection, in the world of physical motion, of the absolute duration and the ideal motion which characterize the intelligible world. It is the nature of the divine to pour forth its own spirit, and the order, regularity, and law of the space-time world is the natural and inevitable outcome of the spiritual world, mirrored, however, in an alien medium, whose sensuousness refracts and distorts, to some extent, the divine rays.[15]

[13] *Rep.* 612*e* f.; *Laws* 899*d* ff.

[14] *Tim.* 34*a* f., 36*d* f., 52*d* ff.; *Laws* 895*b* f., 897*c* f.

[15] *Tim.* 29*d* f., 37*c* f., 39*d* f., 48*e*.

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Such, in general, is the life of the immortals. It remains to inquire how far this life realizes the absolute ideal of immortality. Let us begin by accepting the distinction recognized in platonic literature between *deus summus* and *di immortales*. The first of these terms corresponds to the idea of good, while the second corresponds to the particular ideas. *Deus summus* (the demiurge of the *Timaeus* and the idea of good of the *Republic*) represents the absolute, the *ne plus ultra* and the principle of ideality, as such. This is the ultimate source of all order, system, meaning, and value; and, in its natural overflow, it is the creative principle *par excellence*. It does not create not-being or fluctuating chaos, but creates especially the spirit of creativity, pouring out its own spirit, not only upon the *di immortales*, but also upon human beings, endowing them with the power of unifying the manifold and so creating order and value, so far as this is consistent with their finitude. This, then, represents the absolute ideal of the immortal life.[16] But the inferior deities, the *di immortales*, while thoroughly imbued with this same spirit of creativity, are relatively finite. Hera, Apollo, Poseidon, and the rest have specific and limited functions, as compared with the demiurge. These "immortals," being themselves created, are not, like the absolute spirit of creativity, immortal per se. It is the divine spirit which is the ultimate source of their power and assurance of their immortality, and they are essentially, from the lowest to the highest of them, ministers of this spirit. Philosophically speaking, they represent this spirit considered as devoted to some specific task, just as each idea represents the principle of ideality turned in some specific direction and limited and particularized by that specificity. But the living principle itself is unlimited and is absolutely universal, the eternal father of *all* that is good.[17]

How far can man participate in the immortal life? There are many ways of approaching an answer to this question. We

[16] *Phædr.* 265*d*; *Tim.* 41*a*, *b*, cf. 68*d*–*e*. [17] *Tim.* 41*c*, 43*a*, 44*d*, 69*c*–*d*.

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might say that, so far as man consciously fits himself for the place prepared for him in the ideal cosmos of spirits, he participates in the immortal life. For he is developing all his powers as far as he can, and is co-operating with other men of good will in using those powers for the common good; and not only with men, but with the higher spirits also, so that he becomes, at least to that extent, one of their fellowship, and thus directly participates in the life of the immortals, regarding himself in thought, word, and deed as the servant and minister of God, and regarding all other men as his colleagues and fellow-servants.[18]

Another way of approaching an answer is to say that man becomes immortal so far as he regards this earthly habitation with its sensuous flux as alien and evil, and seeks to fly to the true homeland of the spirit by assimilating himself to divinity, i.e., by withdrawing from a merely sensuous life and endeavoring to become holy, just, and wise, to take up these "ideas" into his nature, until he has become as godlike as a human being well can. So far as he is successful in taking on the attributes of the immortals, he rises above the level of everyday humanity and his nature participates directly in immortality.[19]

Yet another approach to the answer is to say that man's nature is complex. On the one hand, it is physical, an affair of earth, water, fire, and air mixed in certain proportions and subject to the fluctuations which are a part of the world of physical motion. On the other hand, he has in him the germ of an organizing power, which is at first overcome by the hostile influx of nutritive forces which take hold of his body and initiate a conflict which is unending while life lasts. Whether he becomes immortal or not depends upon which side wins in this struggle. If the bodily forces win, so that his actions are always a direct resultant of the fluctuating environmental stimulations, and the man is thus little more than a mere part of

[18] *Rep.* 463*b*; *Polit.* 271*e*, 275*b*; *Laws* 713*a*, 715*c* f., 907*a*.

[19] *Phædo* 107*c–d*; *Rep.* 613*a–b*; *Theæt.* 176*a* f.; *Laws* 713*a*.

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the physical world, with no real power to look before and after and direct himself according to what he thinks right, he hardly rises to the human level at all, and certainly belongs to the realm of not-being rather than to the realm of ideal being.[20] If, however, his organizing power wins on the whole, so that he becomes master of himself in the first place, and of the environment in the second, creating everywhere images of beauty, temperance, and justice, he has begun, while still living here below, to partake directly of true life. Anyone who thus succeeds in dominating circumstances to the extent of "doing his own work," i.e., performing consistently and with free self-determination some definite function which is of value to the community, so far participates directly in the work and life of the immortals.[21]

Yet another way of approaching the answer is to say that soul, as such, is immortal. Soul, as the principle of life, belongs essentially to the world of true being rather than to the world of not-being, and, as the originating principle of motion, or at least of motion of the orderly, circular, type,[22] is the source of all order and system in the physical world. Its true home is with the eternal ideas, to which it is akin, and the world-soul, which is the most perfect type of a created soul, is regarded as directly divine. Like the personified "nature" of the poetically minded scientist, the world-soul, considered as directing the motions of its body (the physical universe), is a "blessed god," self-sufficient for its own purposes, and living, like the other created gods, an immortal life whose immortality is dependent upon the all-father, i.e., is an overflow of the creative idea of good. So, too, in human beings. The essential element in their souls is of directly divine origin, a similar overflow of the creative idea of good, and containing, as its divine heritage, the germ of unity, law, and order, i.e., the

[20] *Rep.* 586*a–b, e* f.; *Tim.* 43*b* f.

[21] *Symp.* 212*d*; *Rep.* 590*e–592b*; *Tim.* 69*c* ff., 90*a* f.

[22] *Phædr.* 245*c* f.; *Tim.* 34*a*; *Laws* 895*b* f., 897*c* f.

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characteristic principle which expands into the life of the immortals. The soul is thus naturally, in its own essence, immortal, i.e., is akin to holiness, justice, and wisdom.[23]

One more way of approaching an answer may be considered. In accordance with a motif whose roots lie far back in mythology as well as in philosophy, Plato tends to regard the number of created souls as limited, and as determined by the (unchanging) number of the physical stars, the "instruments of celestial time," in which the souls were originally planted, as in their own proper bodies. The true destiny of human souls is thus to govern their own stars, as the world-soul governs the universe. That is their immortal destiny, and their sojourn in an earthly body should be regarded as pathological and temporary. This stooping from their heavenly home to put on mortality is an aberration, a disease from which they may one day recover, particularly if they live a holy, just, and wise life here below. If we regard this descent as a kind of planetary orbit, we might say that each soul has a different orbit, or rather succession of such orbits, but that a time may one day come when all the different orbits will be completed at the same instant, and all the souls will be with their stars, and a spiritual great year will begin, in which the immortal fellowship of all souls in carrying on their work of converting not-being to true being will be manifest.[24]

This view contains mythological elements which can hardly be included without remainder in true platonism. The contrast of physical stars and earthly bodies, for instance, is a distinction of degree rather than of kind. Perhaps we can, with more justice to the evidence as a whole, sum up the general platonic position as follows:

The life of the spirit is the one thing worth while, and is divine in origin and function. Its mission is to extend itself over the realm of material chaos, to reduce this to law and

[23] *Rep.* 611*d–e*; *Tim.* 32*c* f., 41*c*; *Polit.* 273*e*.

[24] *Rep.* 617*e*; *Tim.* 38*e*–39*e*.

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order and, as nearly as possible, to its own type of being. The world as we come to know it represents an original or primeval chaos overlaid with principles of spiritual origin and in process of being reduced to law and order. Human beings are partly of divine and partly of material origin, and experience directly in themselves this cosmic conflict between good and evil, between the forces of the spirit with its purposive development of all positive values, and the backward pull of matter toward disintegration, not-being, and chaos. In virtue especially of their intelligence, they are able to rise above the sensuous pressure of immediate impulse. They can look before and after and can form vague and hazy conceptions of the eternal ideas which prevail in the spiritual life. So far as they attain to sufficient clearness in this contemplation, and are able to apply the resulting insight to the making over of their own lives and of their environment, physical and social, human beings are able to participate directly in the life of the spirit. This is especially true of the trained philosophic administrator; but to a lesser extent it is true also of the priest and poet, and may be true also of the farmer, manufacturer, hotel man, and day laborer.[25] If such men use their intelligence so as to live a life which is holy, just, and wise, they can experience directly the sense of spiritual fellowship with one another and with higher spirits, and are able to play a man's part in the cosmic conflict of good and evil. Man can in this way rise superior to the materialistic life which looks askance at the thought of anything higher than the senses and instinctive emotions, and can take part in the real work of the world and thus live the only kind of life which is worth living.

Here an objection might well be raised. Men can participate in spiritual living, of course. But why call this "immortal"? It is, if we like to put it that way, the life of the immortals; but a very simple difficulty remains. Even assuming that human beings "share in the kind of life which the immortals live," surely what distinguishes a human being from an im-

[25] *Rep.* 420*d* f.; *Phædr.* 248*d–e*; *Laws* 918*b* f.

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mortal remains: the immortal is deathless, while the human being very obviously dies and is buried. Does platonism recognize human immortality in the sense of survival of bodily death?

In order to answer this question intelligibly, it is necessary first to make precise the nature and limitations of time. For, if we may assume the existence of something which in some sense is not subject to the disintegration of the body, which obviously belongs to the space-time world, it may well be that this something is not directly subject to temporal conditions at all, and that consequently an attempt, e.g., to inquire into its status five hours after physical death, as compared with its status five hours before physical death, would be a futile kind of attempt. It may well be that its status, even if admitting of a before and after, does not admit of the kind of before and after that can be measured in terms of a human chronometer, whether ancient or modern. "Greenwich time" depends upon the motions of the heavenly bodies, so far as these concern the duration of day and night, month and year, upon the earth. But the motions of these heavenly bodies are not such that one day is of absolutely the same length as another day, or one year of absolutely the same duration as another year. Consequently, as contrasted with the changing amounts of absolute duration which in reality correspond to the unchanging symbols of time-measurement which we use, there arises the thought of an absolute or perfect duration, in which there are no fluctuations of rate, but any one unit is absolutely equal in duration to any other unit, although it must come either before or after that other unit. For the Platonist, Greenwich time is thus an imperfect and fluctuating copy or image of true duration, and it is in true or ideal duration that the immortal life is lived. Spiritual progress cannot be measured by the movements of a Greek water-clock, but has its own moments, its own hours, and perhaps its own great year.[26]

Granting all this, we may still ask: If spiritual life ex-

[26] *Tim.* 37*d* ff.

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presses itself by using the physical body as its instrument for spiritualizing its environment, what happens to spiritual life when the body disintegrates, as at physical death? Dialectically speaking, there are many conceivable alternatives. The position which Plato, upon the whole, appears to take is as follows:

When the body perishes, the spirit withdraws for a period to the intellectual place, where, in company with the immortals, it renews, through contemplation unclouded by physical needs, its refreshing vision of the great ideas, and eventually descends into another physical body, through whose instrumentality it again plays its part in the great conflict between good and evil.[27] In this kind of alternation between its heavenly home and this place of mortal union with a succession of physical instruments which inevitably wear out after a while, it lives its immortal life, much as the philosophic administrator—whose earthly life is an exact reproduction of the main features of the immortal life, so far as a human being can partake of it—withdraws from administration to renew his vision of the idea of good, so as to return with renewed spiritual insight to his administrative duties.[28] It is suggested that a human being who has lived a particularly heroic and philosophical life, or succession of such lives, may be raised to higher rank in the world of spirits, and so, as a demigod, may be elevated above the necessity of further physical births and deaths; but this remains only a suggestion.[29]

In this alternative union and separation of spirit and body, just how much is mortal, and how much is immortal? The usual view of the commentators is that "the rational element" is immortal, while the sensuous, instinctive, and emotional elements of experience, and also the elements of character which, like courage and self-mastery, rest partly upon bodily

[27] *Meno* 81*b*; *Phædo* 72*e* f., 75*c* f., 76*e*; *Rep.* 611*a*, 617*d* f.; *Phædr.* 248, 250*b*.

[28] *Rep.* 498*c*, 520*e* f., 540*b*; *Phædr.* 248*b*–*c*.

[29] *Rep.* 521*c*, 540*b*–*c*; *Phædr.* 249*a*, *c*.

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dispositions, are all evanescent. When once the organizing spirit which stooped from its heavenly home and called them into some semblance of being has departed on its further way, all these elements of empirical experience sink back again into their original state of not-being. Some commentators believe that the spirit retains something from its sojourn on earth, retains, e.g., the cognitive essence of all its experiences. The details of this type of view are worked out with great clearness and ingenuity by St. Thomas Aquinas.[30] But all seem agreed to make a somewhat sharp distinction between spirit and body, and to regard everything bodily as falling back again into the not-being which is its original and only home. For this distinction and this conclusion there is undeniable evidence in the *Dialogues*.[31] But if one is willing to consider the whole of the evidence, it is perhaps possible to go a little deeper.

The function of spiritual experience is to convert not-being into being, to change chaos into cosmos, to transmute fact into value, to rearrange material conditions in such a way that the germ of the spirit which is overlaid and overwhelmed by unfavorable conditions may develop and flower into perfect spiritual life, and may play its part in the work of spiritualizing the universe.[32] Groups of pioneers go out into the wilderness, and, in less than two full generations of men, where the ox-trails used to meet at the junction of two rivers, there is a large city, not only growing grain for trade with the motherland, but with schools and colleges of its own, which send out teachers, preachers, and other pioneers of the spiritual life in their turn.[33] This is the work of the human beings who participate in the immortal life, and it is a growing thing.

[30] *Tim.* 69*c–d*; cf. *Summa Theologica*, Part I, QQ. LXXVI, LXXVII, LXXXIV, LXXXV.

[31] *Phædo* 64 ff., 75*c* f.; *Rep.* 609*e* f.; *Tim.* 41*c–d*; *Theæt.* 172 ff.

[32] *Rep.* 518*c* ff., etc.

[33] *Rep.* 501*a* f., 540*b*, *e* f; cf. the treatment of education in the "Cretan or Cnosian colony," in the *Laws*.

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The work done by one generation makes it easier for the next generation. For the second generation finds farms where the first found only homesteads. The rising generation finds banks and schools and a municipal organization where the old-timers found nothing beyond their own loose agreement about leadership, and some roughly organized vigilance committee.[34] The spiritualizing agencies thus do something more than just mark time in an eternal conflict with forces which can be neither converted nor destroyed. It is conceivable that there is an ultimate limit beyond which the chaotic element will always remain chaotic, making life, to that extent, precarious.[35] There may be in humanity some ultimate residuum of selfishness, of barbarism, which the process of hellenizing may not succeed in overcoming.[36] But until that limit has been reached, what would usually be called "materialistic" agencies can certainly be harnessed in the service of idealism and can thus contribute very directly to the process of spiritualizing the universe. Food, exercise, and rest, for example, can so strengthen the body as to make it a useful instrument in studying philosophy and in carrying out philosophical purposes.[37] Money and material possessions can be used for directly educational purposes, and in the model city a certain minimum of such possessions is regarded as a *sine qua non* of the life of ideal citizenship.[38] The view, then, that these material elements are merely humble contributors which, at best, cancel out and leave the way clear for higher, spiritual forces, is perhaps not true to the whole of the evidence. On the contrary, bodily health and strength can enter directly into the higher life of service; the material conditions which make

[34] Cf. *Laws* 683*d* f., etc.

[35] *Rep.* 472*e* f., 519*a–b*; *Tim.* 30*a*, 52*d* f., 69*b*, 71*a*; *Theæt.* 176*a*; *Polit.* 273*b*; *Phileb.* 65*c–d*; *Laws* 645*d* f., 782*e* f.; cf. E. Frank, *Plato u. d. s–g. Pythagoreer*, pp. 99 ff., 104, 372, n. 295.

[36] *Rep.* 442*a*, 571*b* f.; *Tim.* 70*d* f.

[37] *Rep.* 498*b*, 591*c–d*, cf. 410 f.

[38] *Laws* 744*d* f., 746*a*.

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health, strength, and education possible also enter directly into the higher life; and the self-interest incident to humanity can be identified with the interest of the group or of the ideal life, and so put to work in the service of spiritual ideals. That is to say, the spiritual principle so reorganizes material elements that it converts them into agencies which are, in their turn, instrumental in carrying farther the work of spiritualizing the universe.[39] Health, once established, goes on of itself. Educational institutions, or sound civic constitutions, once firmly rooted, grow of themselves. While such institutions continue to need a guiding hand from time to time, they really have taken on ideal coloring and belong no longer to the realm of not-being, but henceforth to the immortal realm of true being. The temporal world can thus take on eternal attributes and what is mortal can, to that extent, put on immortality.[40]

If, then, we ask how much of a man's nature can share in immortality, we must answer, not merely "the intellectual element," but also as much of his nature as can be so reorganized as to serve as the instrument of the immortal purpose. This includes his moral dispositions, his courageous, temperate, just, and pious tendencies, which are, indeed, partly physical,[41] but can be redirected by wisdom or philosophical insight. It includes also his physical activities, the "necessary appetites" on the wise satisfaction of which his health and strength so largely depend, if these are used in the service of moral and intellectual improvement. The elements, then, out of which even the physical universe is constituted, can themselves enter into the higher life, and so far there is nothing in the world, whether psychological or physical, for which there is not some place in the eternal plan, a place the filling of which means sharing in the purposes and work of the immortal life.[42]

Put briefly, then, platonism maintains that immortality is

[39] For discussion of the evidence for this, cf. this *Journal*, XXXV (1924), 16–23.

[40] *Rep.* 590*e* f.; cf. *Symp.* 206*e* f., 207*d* f., 209*c* f., 212*a*.

[41] *Rep.* 518*d–e*; *Laws* 963*e*.

[42] *Rep.* 498*b*; *Laws* 903*b* f.

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identical with spiritual life, i.e., with the function of hellenizing a barbaric world and converting the material into the spiritual. The spiritual or immortal life is realized through finite centers of experience, all endowed with the characteristic power of making one out of many. The union of such a center with any given material body is a transitory affair; and the eternal function of the spirit in such a union is to turn its temporal body into a more perfect instrument, and to use this for spiritual purposes. A single such center can convert a succession of material bodies to such purposes, much as a teacher can awaken spiritual insight in a succession of pupils, with whom his temporal contact is even more transitory.[43] But, whatever the fate of the bodies with which the organizing center is associated for a time, the center itself endures throughout all temporal changes and is creative and divine, not, of course, per se, but in virtue of the outpouring of the divine spirit which called it into being and continues to constitute its essence.[44] In the intervals between its separation from one body and its reincarnation in another, it passes through a contemplative phase in which it renews its vision of the ideal world, which was perhaps growing dim in its latest incarnation.[45] Its rebirth is a fresh "descent into the cave," in which it has a further opportunity to live out and realize in this mortal sphere the ideals with which it has enjoyed communion in the intellectual place, and thus to continue playing the part prepared for it in the immortal plan for spiritualizing the universe.

It remains to ask two questions: (1) How far is this view philosophically satisfactory? (2) How far is immortality in the platonic sense a highest good? To the first question, the answer is difficult. Plato's view, while persuasive and acceptable, perhaps, to the moral consciousness, is not the only hypothesis dialectically conceivable. Granted, for instance, that

[43] *Phædo* 80 ff., cf. 87*b* f.; *Phædr.* 278*a–b*.

[44] *Tim.* 41*c*, 69*c–d*. [45] *Phædo* 74*e* f., 76*c* f.; *Phædr.* 248*c* f., 249*e* f.

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spiritual life of itself overflows in the direction of spiritualizing the universe, there is no sound logical reason for regarding the number of finite centers as fixed, either in relation to the number of stars—which also does not need to be regarded as fixed for all time—or in any other relation. If this assumption is given up, then the further assumption of a succession of incarnations for each permanent center of experience ceases to be either necessary or even plausible. There still remains as reasonable the platonic contention that the living outpouring of the divine spirit cannot be conceived as dying or coming to an end; for what is genuinely creative cannot well be subject to its logical contradictory, not-being. As the *Dialogues* put it, the cardinal point of any faith in values *überhaupt* is a belief in the priority or independence of spiritual life, as compared with material conditions conceived as essentially and per se inert.[46] But this faith is dialectically compatible with the complete extinction of the finite center, as such, at bodily death, even though its "work" survives in the whole; and although the whole would be the poorer for the extinction of one such finite center, it might well be enriched by the creation of another center, which, working with virgin energy upon the basis erected by past generations, might well carry farther the work in which the life of the whole expresses itself. The specific doctrines of the *Dialogues* are thus not dialectically compelling, even though we concede the general position as a matter of reasonable faith. In platonism, however, it is this general position which is important. The emphasis in the *Dialogues* is not upon the persistence of the finite center, but rather upon the work, i.e., upon participation in the ideal life of the immortals.[47]

Thus understood, how far can immortality be regarded as the highest good? The answer to this question is not hard. To develop one's powers to the utmost in co-operation with other spiritual agencies in raising the whole world to a higher level

[46] *Laws* 966*c*, 967*d*; cf. *Phædr.* 245*c* f. [47] *Phædo* 107*c–d*, etc.

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is to realize one's self and at the same time to make one's greatest possible contribution to the whole. It is not possible to conceive of a good which could be higher. Platonic immortality and the ideal life thus coincide in all respects, and as far as a finite center of experience can participate in the immortal life, so far it succeeds in realizing the highest conceivable good.

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND OF RIGHTS. By William Ernest Hocking. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926. Pp. ix+97.

MAN AND THE STATE. By William Ernest Hocking. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926. Pp. xv+463.

These volumes form a partial statement—later to be completed by a work on liberty and democracy and one on the rights of men and nations—of an ethical and metaphysical theory of the state and of law; their general thesis is that no naturalistic or factual account of the state, depending primarily upon psychology, can be sufficient, since the whole of human nature includes reason and conscience as well as stimulus and response. Professor Hocking aims accordingly to state the most general principles of political society, its universal and necessary ethical foundation; the term "a priori" would, I believe, be not unacceptable to the author as a description of the principles which he aims to discover. Though his method is nowhere described, it is in general dialectical; his conclusions are offered as a synthesis of the traditional Hegelian view that the state is objectified reason and the positive view that it is merely overmastering force. The peculiarity of Professor Hocking's middle position may be described as an idealism of rationalized will.

The risks encountered by a priori theories of the state are so familiar that the briefest allusion to them is sufficient. In the first place, they commonly turn upon a conception of what the state ought to be, and consequently they lend the prestige of the universal and necessary to what the author regards as right and proper. Their supposed generality is usually imaginary. When the a priori yields anything definite at all, this commonly turns out to be no more than a conspicuous feature of some type of state which the author is chiefly interested in. Finally, the attempt to cast results in the form of the universal and necessary tends to reduce to a minimum the concrete issues about which discussion might turn. It neglects the significant historical fact that, from Plato on, the most effective works on political philosophy have belonged almost to the class of controversial—even occasional—literature; their problems were the vital issues of contemporary political life. Professor Hocking has undoubtedly tried to meet all these difficulties, but for the most part he has been unsuccessful because they are really inseparable from what he tries to do.

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The volume on the philosophy of law is an essay on the relation between justice and social utility as principles for the guidance and criticism of law. After comparing the formal or Kantian standard set forth by Stammler with the evolutionary or Hegelian standard set forth by Kohler, Professor Hocking concludes that a deliberate sacrifice of justice is never sanctioned by a higher good, either in administering the law or in legislation. This leads him to formulate four principles of what may be called "natural justice." First, legal rights are presumptive: they belong to persons simplified for legal purposes by the omission of irrelevant differences always to be found in concrete individuals. Second, the presumptions are creative: they aim to bring about a condition, not to state what conditions are. Third, presumptive rights include the conditions under which individual powers normally develop. And fourth, the right to develop the powers that are in him is a man's only natural right. The closeness of their bearing upon the development of mental powers determines the place of particular rights on a scale of values.

This reasoning is an example of the back-handed nature of a priori argument. The right to a "normal" development can be nothing except an oblique reference to something that is customarily taken to be proper for a person born in a particular station and in a particular society. So far as natural powers are concerned, every individual obviously was able to become whatever he did become—including all that he had no right to become—and in addition he had an indefinitely wide range of possibility to become other than he was, if the conditions of growth in his milieu had been different from what they were. There are no patterns of normal human life except those set up from time to time by the ideals of individuals and groups, and these are precisely what the standard of natural right is supposed to judge. Accordingly, when Professor Hocking goes on to classify rights, we find that his list consists altogether of those which are secured to citizens by the bodies of law most familiar to us. In other words, the a priori theory of justice brings out of that conception just what has previously been put into it.

In *Man and the State* Professor Hocking undertakes to define the ultimate purposes of the state. At bottom his thesis is very like Aristotle: the state exists to satisfy the whole nature of man (p. 312). Like Hegel, he regards sociability and economic relations as offering only partial satisfactions. Like the English idealists, he considers the state to be a condition, and seemingly the all-important condition, of self-realization. Though he rejects provisionally the view that the state is objectified reason, his theory is only a variant of the type of political philosophy best known to English readers in the works of Green and Bosanquet. His

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book lacks, however, Green's vivid sense of the urgency of social problems for political liberalism and Bosanquet's deep, if misplaced, reverence for the moral nature of the state. The inherent difficulties of this type of political theory remain insuperable for Professor Hocking, as for his predecessors, though he has clearly tried to take account of the criticisms so frequently made. His work will only confirm those who have reached the conclusion that the point of view itself is wrong, that it adopts too hastily a phase of Greek political philosophy which does not at all fit the modern state, and that it carries an unescapable confusion of the state with the social community of which it is an organ. A theory of this type sets up as the end of the state what is really the end of all life and of all the instrumentalities of life. It is admitted, indeed, that the state is only a condition of this all-inclusive end; but the obvious implications of this admission are neglected. If the state is only one condition, it is one of many instrumentalities; and the theory of the state must in consequence give first place to its limitations, as a particular kind of condition or instrumentality. If the state is to be defined by its end, that end must be the end of the state specifically, that which it has as a limited agency, and not the ultimate end for which all the conditions exist.

Professor Hocking's final exposition of the state's purpose is prepared for by two preliminary parts of the book, the first dealing with the state in comparison with other groups, and the second with the psychological foundation of the state. In the first, the differentia of the state is said to be that it is universal in time and space (pp. 114 ff.). Apparently this means only that some minimum of political organization exists everywhere and that states protect their citizens' interests beyond territorial boundaries. The conclusion drawn is that the state, by virtue of its universality, "permits all other associations to assume whatever extent, world-wide or local, their nature dictates" (p. 116). This can only mean that the state ought to do this, for Professor Hocking is well aware that states have commonly resisted the formation of other associations, internal and international, that their rulers have conceived to be detrimental to the interests of the state. In the same fashion, by arguing that coresidence is "a condition of the possibility of all group ties whatever," the state is easily shown to be territorial, for "the only association which would certainly include all pairs and all groups would be one which would include the loci of all bodies of communicating persons" (p. 132). By this ingenious dialectic the author manages to miss all the important issues in the debate between the proponents of functional and territorial organization, substituting an a priori proof that what is must be. The state is, and long has been, a territorial organization; if it remains so, the reason

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will certainly not be that members of a group are in the same space and time. With reference to economic groups, what Professor Hocking urges is what everyone admits, that the clashing interests of the economic groupings need synthesis (p. 134); and like many others he believes that the state ought ideally to furnish such synthesis. The important question, to which there is no a priori answer, is how the state can be organized to reach the end sought.

The third part of the book, which leads up to the statement of the state's purpose, discusses the psychological foundation of the state. The general plan is to arrange human relations in an ascending series. At the bottom is a prehuman gregarious instinct which issues, when it attains the stage of human mentality, in simple sociability. Above this lies concrete sociability, of which the nation is the "typical domain." At somewhat the same level lie economic relationships, for economic forces cannot make the state. Above these lies the state, which, as has been said, exists to satisfy the whole man. The "instinct which is in all instincts" is the will to power (p. 310), which in its mature form is the will to power through ideas, implying love and service of mankind (pp. 316 ff.). In simpler terms, the will to power means "the desire to count for something, to be worth keeping alive as a human personality" (p. 320); in short, it is a still vaguer synonym for the already nearly meaningless "self-realization" of idealist ethics.

The purpose of the state, then, is to make it "possible for individual men to realize their fully interpreted wills to power"; it "exists to establish the objective conditions for the will to power in human history" (p. 325). These conditions include order, to secure permanence of the effects which will aims to produce in the world of persons, an adequate knowledge and self-judgment to make effort effective, and a fair and impersonal judgment of performance (pp. 322 f., 325 ff.). In developing this theory Professor Hocking rejects the group mind and substitutes for it his own conception of the coincidence of will-circuits. "The state is the circuit required by the will to power of each member, coincident for all the people of a defined territory, and including them" (p. 371). Since the state is willed by all its members, whether they know it or not, the philosophical anarchist gets short shrift, and since the decisions of the state take precedence over all other wills (p. 397), the political pluralist can be easily disposed of as a symptom of social disease. "The sovereignty of the state means the supremacy of . . . . power through ideas"; consequently a criticism of sovereignty must mean an actual reliance on a power of another sort (p. 401).

The a priori theory of the state describes something which never ex-

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isted as a political organization in heaven or earth. Its single, all-inclusive purpose, however stated, simmers down to the requirement that it shall supply the conditions of a good life, and this is likewise a requirement of everything whatsoever that fulfils purpose—all are for the sake of the good life, and the imagination of man has never yet run far enough to supply all the content which, on occasion, may be put into this formal conception. We fill in the form not with content drawn from the behavior of real states, but with abstractions from abstractions—the will to power, power through ideas. By bias rather than by logic we set down to the credit of the state an indiscriminate mass of values which could not exist without some minimum of political organization, forgetting that they could not exist without numberless other conditions which, however, lack the halo that surrounds the word "state." By this means we obscure every clue which might aid in distinguishing the state as a special kind of social organ, the first requirement for any useful sort of political theory.

GEORGE H. SABINE

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LORD SHAFTESBURY AND SOCIAL-INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS. By J. Wesley Bready. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1926. Pp. 446. Price, 16*s*. net.

The study of the seventh Lord Shaftesbury is the outcome of researches into a larger subject—the relation of organized religion to social and industrial problems. From his studies, Mr. Bready (whose Christian name of Wesley appears significant) was drawn to the conclusion that the evangelical movement, started by Wesley in the second half of the eighteenth century, was the fulcrum that moved the English world toward social reform, and that this movement "rises supremely above any other religious movement affecting the social developments of the English-speaking world." In this he follows Elie Halévy, who in his *Religion and Culture* claims that it would be almost impossible to overemphasize the influence of the evangelical revival on the development of modern England. Mr. Bready does not certainly claim for evangelicalism a monopoly of social effort. He instances Paine and Cobbett in the other camp, in England; and in France, Rousseau and Voltaire (between whom and Shaftesbury he notes an "unmistakable thread of agreement"). But he certainly concentrates and directs the light full upon that large and important movement and away from other forces. Is it possible to attribute a predominant influence to one particular color of religious thought, the evangelical movement? Shaftesbury, it is true, was warmed by that

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fire; but other influences were at work both in England and on the Continent, all converging toward a new sensitiveness to evil material conditions and to a new humanitarianism.

Mr. Bready's study is complementary and corrective to that of the Hammonds, to whom evangelicalism is "the reflection of the despair that came into men's lives with the lengthening shadows of the industrial revolution." In the case of Lord Shaftesbury ("an Evangelical of the Evangelicals," as he termed himself) there is little trace of that "despair"; indeed despair would have been unthinkable in the amazing record of his life and labors. With regard to the biographical section of the book, which is detailed and well documented, Mr. Bready interprets Lord Shaftesbury's works by his faith. His attitude is throughout sympathetic, unlike Lord Shaftesbury's most brilliant biographers, the Hammonds, who, while admitting that he did more than any single man or any single government in English history to check the raw power of the new industrial system, are impatient of certain expressions of evangelicalism. His sabbatism, his uncritical interpretation of Scripture were but superficial flaws in Shaftesbury's record and were to be interpreted sympathetically by the historian of that troubled age.

M. JOURDAIN

LONDON, ENGLAND

RELIGION IN THE MAKING. By Alfred North Whitehead. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926. Pp. 150. Price, $1.50.

The central thought of this work is best expressed by a phrase which does not appear on its pages, but is found in the author's previous book, *Science and the Modern World*. It is "the principle of concretion." It is a philosophic development of Tennyson's sentiment about the flower in the crannied wall. God is that order of the universe by virtue of which all being has some share in the existence of every flower or man or grain of sand or nation or civilization. This participation of all in each is the principle of concretion. It is the divinity which enters into the world.

This participation of all in each particular thing varies from time to time and place to place. Some conditions favor it more than others, and some happenings achieve it more fully than others. A human being brings all being to a focus more richly and concretely than a grain of sand; and a good man more than a bad one.

Badness or evil is just that condition of affairs which hinders this participation of all being in the nature of each particular thing. Whatever obstructs the principle of concretion is evil. It is not merely evil from the standpoint of human needs and desires; it makes the world less divine.

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It should be noted that Whitehead sets up an absolute standard of right and wrong which holds quite independently of human sensibilities and feelings. Of course humans may experience this divine and absolute goodness, and do so more or less. Also, the only knowledge of it we can ever have must come through our experience of it. But it is by no means a creature of human society or human life in any form. On the contrary, human nature, human society, and human life generally are but one more or less imperfect and possibly transitory expression of this divine order of goodness. There is a certain oughtness in the nature of things which is only partially actualized in our world. Evil is deviation from, or obstruction to, this rightness of the divine order of nature.

Evil is unstable because it is hostile to the sustaining order of nature. Evil may spread and flourish, like any parasite, so long as there is some underlying order of goodness on which it can support itself. The fact that evil cannot sustain itself shows the universe does have a sustaining order which can be called the right as over against the wrong, the divine as over against the evil. This instability of evil may, but does not necessarily, lead to progress. Evil may prevent increase in the good, but it can never itself fully prevail because, in the very act of prevailing, it would destroy itself. Evil is self-destructive. It is disorderly, i.e., destructive to that order which sustains the universe in existence.

"It is not the case that there is an actual world which accidentally happens to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual world because there is an order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also since there is a world, we know that there is an order. The ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world" (p. 104).

This sustaining order of the world is not merely moral. It is too rich and "concrete" to be reduced to the relative meagerness and abstraction of the moral order. It is rather an "aesthetic" order. But the moral and conceptual orders enter into it as relatively abstract aspects or features of it. Men can become morally good only in so far as they incorporate in themselves this sustaining order whereby each shares in all and all in each. And when we here speak of "each" and "all" we do not mean merely each human individual and all other human individuals. They are included, to be sure. But "each" and "all" here refer to each and all things and elements which enter into the totality of "the all-inclusive universe." To be moral, then, men must be more than moral. They must be aesthetic. And to be profoundly aesthetic, in Whitehead's sense, is to be religious.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE

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HOLISM AND EVOLUTION. By General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts. London: Macmillan & Co., 1926. Pp. 362. Price, 18s. net.

General Smuts has found time to give us in this book the results of his wide reading and clear thinking on philosophical problems. The governing idea of the book is that the tendency to form wholes, which he calls "holism," explains the structure of matter and the arising in, or through, matter of life and mind and personality. He rejects entirely the "entelechy" of Professor Driesch and the old-fashioned vitalism. The most recent ideas on space-time and chemical relations are brilliantly summarized; and the treatment of personality is certainly a contribution to psychology. But the main purpose of the book is philosophical or metaphysical. The values, "good" and "beauty," are referred to the same tendency or "holism"; but they are not discussed in detail. If personality is "the whole" in our most intimate experience, freedom and purity seem to be the two most significant aspects of the ideal. "The function," says General Smuts, "of the ideal of Freedom is to secure the inward self-determination of the personality, its riddance of all alien obstructive elements, and thus its perfection as a pure, radiant, transparent, homogeneous self-activity." Clearly the idea of a whole is useful in explaining some of the phenomena of the moral life; and General Smuts sees that the mechanistic causation of determinism is not applicable to moral acts, but he does not analyze the idea of self-determination. It may be true that a whole is self-determined; but what does that mean? How does the value "good" enter into the whole which is personality? General Smuts does not seem to give an answer to such questions. Indeed, one may doubt whether the category which is most useful in explaining the connection of matter with life will be found adequate to explain the connection of fact with value. The idea of "holism" is certainly useful over a large area of experience; but perhaps it may be stretched too far in reference to ethical problems. However, even in that field, the insight of General Smuts into actual life results in new lights being thrown upon the striving after ideas. Students of ethics will therefore have to take account of the philosophy which General Smuts maintains.

C. D. BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF NORMS. "University of California Publications in Philosophy," Vol. VII. George P. Adams, J. Loewenberg, Stephen C. Pepper (editors). Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1925. Pp. 207. Price, $3.00.

This volume contains seven papers which were read before the Philosophical Union at the University of California in 1925. It gives fresh

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evidence of the continuous and excellent productivity of the philosophy department of that university. There may be other American universities which have as much ability in their philosophical faculties, but no other university has offered in recent years such compact evidence of diversified and original philosophical thinking. The book deals with the problem of norms in various aspects, such as values, ideals, logical principles, regulative principles, and metaphysical theories. This review will summarize each paper briefly, add some slight comment on each paper, and conclude with some criticisms in general.

Mr. G. P. Adams wishes to have a prolegomenon to the normative sciences, a rational control of value judgments. He starts with a critique of the naturalistic thesis typified by the doctrine of William James that there is no value apart from preference. Naturalism can accept knowledge as showing the means to an end or to the integration of the entire bundle of interests in one person; and naturalism can recognize the existence of other interests than the agent's. But satisfaction of alien interests is miraculous. There does not seem to be any reason why naturalism should extend the logic of consistency from the theoretical sphere to the sphere of values which are partial or biased. The only function of reason in naturalism is Socratic or pragmatic. Mr. Adams then develops his doctrine of structure. The conscious process in valuation must be distinguished from the objective content. Reality holds aspects which are disclosed to interests other than cognitive. These structures are objective, relational, and constraining.

One part of Mr. Adams' thesis reminds us of the objective good and the organic unity in the ethics of Mr. G. E. Moore. In a more elaborate study, Mr. Adams might explain more in detail what he means by "structure," how it is distinguished from the realistic structures in any objective naturalism, and how it is distinguished from a scale of relational values discussed in many philosophies of value.

Mr. D. W. Prall formulates a naturalistic theory of norms. Norms are adjectives, or, in the language of Mr. W. E. Johnson, they are relational determinables. Norms are rules or laws. Norms are logical principles of the highest generality. Value is a determinable but not strictly a norm at all.

The view that logical principles can be explained as determinables deserves serious consideration. It is not so clear that Mr. Prall has explained norms or values.

Mr. S. C. Pepper distinguishes standard value from immediate value. Immediate value is the dynamics of patterns. The object valued is the pattern itself. Standard value arises from the comparison of patterns.

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Any pattern may be a standard and assign standard values. All measurements are cases of standard value.

Mr. Pepper's paper is unusually stimulating. His doctrine of patterns requires more detailed application to the problem of value. Do all relational values result from the comparison of previously given values? Is not the conception of standard value emptied of important meaning when it is equated with all measurement?

Mr. D. H. Parker criticizes the harmony principle in ethics. He discusses various interpretations of harmony from Plato to modern writers. No theory of harmony can have more than a partial truth. There must be a tragic element in life and need for struggle, destruction, and reconstruction.

Mr. Parker's paper is a good criticism of many superficial theories of harmony. One wonders whether a more comprehensive theory of harmony might not harmonize all of his destruction into a larger harmony.

Mr. V. F. Lenzen discusses regulative principles in physical science. He insists that there are norms even in mathematical physics, which is partly based on experience but partly influenced by ideals of reason. There are empirical regulative principles, such as the older doctrines of continuity, empirical causality, and efficient causality, and such as the newer doctrines which are associated with the quantum theory and which involve discontinuity, atomism, and teleology. There are other regulative principles which are purely formal. Mr. Lenzen criticizes the proposed principles of economy and simplicity. He takes the principle of unity as fundamental. Unity is achieved through universality, which involves three phases: generality, objectivity, and stability.

The summary given above does scant justice to the suggestiveness of Mr. Lenzen's paper. Its only fault is brevity. Perhaps his discussion of regulative principles should be connected with the problem of valuation in other fields.

Mr. J. Loewenberg argues that metaphysics is normative rather than descriptive. Descriptive study deals with what is objectively constitutive. Normative or critical study is "epistemic" in that it requires some explicit reference to a subject. The doctrine of Mr. S. Alexander, that reality is constitutive but that truth is epistemic, falls into this dilemma: "Either the cognitive relation belongs to reality or it belongs to truth. If it belongs to reality, it cannot be true; and if it belongs to truth, it cannot be real." Mr. Loewenberg's doctrine is that the knowledge of reality is normative, since reality is cosmic and truth is human.

This is not the place to discuss the justice of Mr. Loewenberg's criticism of Mr. Alexander. But grant that Mr. Alexander is refuted, what

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follows? Could not metaphysics be human, tentative, and selective, without being epistemic? The reviewer must confess that the scientific norms of Mr. Lenzen seem more convincing than the epistemological norms of Mr. Loewenberg.

The last essay in the volume is the Howison lecture by Mr. W. P. Montague on "Time and the Fourth Dimension." Philosophy should be concerned with vision rather than with arguments. So this is a vision of a possible world. The spatial world is a sphere which expands in the fourth dimension, which is time. "Outside the sphere is the future, inside the sphere is the past, on the growing swelling surface is the present, which is the spatial plane of possible action and reaction and of all material existence."

It is interesting to hear that philosophy is to dispense with arguments, especially as philosophy has had so many bad arguments. Are philosophical theories too sacred for proof or verification? Are they not even to be compared with other theories as to adequacy? In this connection, one wishes that Mr. Montague would compare his doctrine, which starts with space, with the doctrine of Mr. Alfred A. Robb, which starts with the temporal relation of before or after.

In gathering together the impressions of this volume, the reviewer finds that his admiration of its merits is qualified by two negative reactions. One criticism concerns the reliance in many essays on what might be called "magic words" such as "structure," "pattern," "norm," "regulative," "tragic," "determinable," and "epistemic." Sometimes these words seem to cover problems rather than to help in their analysis. The other criticism is perhaps inevitably caused by the fact that the papers were to be read. There is a danger that philosophy may consist too largely of essays or collections of essays. There is need of more detailed, elaborate, step-by-step investigation. Even such excellent essays would not compensate for the loss of more intensive work.

A. P. BROGAN

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, 1904–1914. By G. Lowes Dickinson. New York and London: The Century Co., 1926. Pp. viii+505.

With the public swamped by the vast amount of material at hand on the subject of war guilt, it is a relief and a pleasure to be able to point out such an admirable guide through this morass as Mr. Dickinson's book. Since the outbreak of the war, the author has published a number of works on this subject, among them such titles as *The European An-*

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archy (1916) and *War: Its Nature, Cause and Cure* (1923); and this present volume is the culmination of that series of studies.

The book shows the effect of the war upon our study of international relations. It is written from an avowedly pacifistic point of view and with a definite moral purpose in mind. "I believe . . . . that modern war with all the resources of science at its disposal, has become incompatible with the continuance of civilization." This is true for the first time in history; and it brings with it new problems: are wars inevitable; how do they arise; how can we prevent them from arising? Through making an analysis of the way in which the last war arose, he endeavors to substantiate the thesis of his book—that "whenever and wherever the anarchy of armed states exists, war becomes inevitable," and that the only way it can be avoided is through the abolishment of this armed anarchy and the substitution for it of the League of Nations (Preface and pp. 477–78).

So this volume is a case study to show how the "anarchy of sovereign armed states" led to the Great War. The author has based it upon the use of the voluminous quantity of documents and much of the memoir and other literature published since the war began. Moreover, he has digested that material. His ability to pick out the essential facts is almost uncanny. There is no endless string of details or minute disquisition upon minuter points; rather, a broad view and a clear perception of the goal are constantly retained. Diplomatic history is for once made interesting. The author's earnestness of purpose and his ambition to leave a distinct ethical impression upon the reader have lent to his pen an added ability for giving atmosphere and color to the pages. The irony, the pathos, the tragedy of situations and actions are always made evident. Just read those pages dealing with the Algeciras Conference or with the events of the immediate pre-war days.

The first chapter deals with the "general conditions" of that anarchy, and the author uses copious illustrations from pre-war diplomacy as proofs of his assertions. The principle of the balance of power that governs European state relations is, in an environment of armed states where each fears and suspects the other, ostensibly set up for defensive purposes. Armaments and counter-armaments result. For the object of each group is not to establish a balance, but to get the better of that balance so that all diplomatic affairs will be settled in its favor. Thus the distinction between the terms "defensive" and "offensive" breaks down, and "the ultimate issue is war." The main obstacle to disarmament and peace, however, arises from the fact that one or several states desire something for which they are willing to go to war or to run the risk of

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doing so. These aggressive motives, notwithstanding the asseverations of statesmen to the contrary, are evidenced in every peace treaty, where a division of spoils is always made. Although the originators of aggressive policies are few in number, yet they obtain the aid of others for reasons of self-interest and sweep the masses along into supporting them even to the point of war by means of an "opinion-manufacturing press." In this anarchy political and legal concepts break down. Statesmen are given to the use of cant and hypocrisy and deceit in their public declarations, in treaties and other documents, and in their dealings with each other. "The nature of their employment" forces upon them a morality all their own. Interest or supposed interest alone gives content to the term "national honor." Shifts in the relations of states are determined by considerations of temporary advantage. The one permanent fact is that each nation always is certain that all the right is on its side and all the wrong on the side of its momentary enemy.

These conclusions are tested in the remainder of the book by a detailed study of the origins of the recent war. By 1907 Europe was divided into two groups so as to maintain the balance of power. The Bismarckian system, with all the powers except France aligned either directly or indirectly with Germany, had shrunk in size. Beginning with the Franco-Russian alliance, a diplomatic revolution had occurred that ended in the formation of the Triple Entente. Serbia broke with Austria, and Italy by a Machiavellian policy of deceit and double-dealing made an agreement with France that was in direct contradiction to her Triple Alliance obligations (pp. 96–97). Former enemies became friends; and friends, enemies. England and France and Russia, who had been on the verge of war several times, now found that their differences were not irreconcilable, for a greater and a common menace had arisen to them in the form of Germany. "This is only one illustration . . . . of the general fact that, in the international anarchy, no friendship can be formed or maintained unless it be countered by an enemy" (pp. 70, 112). These alliances and ententes were all declared to be defensive and peaceful in character and purpose. Yet all looked toward war, as the military conventions show; and each party had certain hopes to realize in case war broke out. Certain statesmen did desire to keep the peace; "but in the European anarchy pious intentions, even when genuine, count for very little; and the fact remains that, from the date of the formation of the Entente, crisis after crisis supervened, that Europe was again and again on the verge of war, that armaments increased and military and naval conventions multiplied, until at last it is hardly paradoxical to say that the European

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war came of itself, although nobody at the moment wanted it" (pp. 112–13).

In a discussion of these crises, connected with the Moroccan, Persian, Bagdad Railway, Balkan, military and naval affairs, the author shows how distorted the judgment of events and of state interests had become. The Bagdad Railway, that in any healthy atmosphere would have merited only praise and support, was fought by the Entente powers. Thefts and divisions of independent states were carried out through secret agreements and by actions that contradicted public declarations of policy. Germany in particular was prevented from receiving her share in the spoils, even at the risk of war; and when she made her demands, she was accused of greed and chauvinism (p. 338). Leaders in all countries, and not only in Germany, were cynical concerning disarmament and arbitration. In a time when every power was arming, Germany was denied the right of naval armament by England. Those "barbarous little States" in the Balkans were finally able to lead Europe into war. Austria had to crush Serbia or be disrupted by pan-Serb propaganda. This Russia, who had been stirring up the Balkan states against Austria, could not permit for reasons of the balance of the power and all that it implies. The other states were dragged in by their alliances or agreements or interests. Neither side could back down without too great a loss of power and prestige. And so the war came on. Who is to blame? If one wishes to answer that question, one must decide "which has the greater justification—a state (Austria) which is defending itself against disruption, or one (Serbia) which is desirous of extending its power by the disruption of its neighbor"; and, second, whether the offense lies with Germany for backing Austria or with Russia for backing Serbia. While the author's sympathies lie with the Central powers (pp. 464–65), yet to him the more important thought to remember is that "so long as States . . . . arm with a view to war, pursue policies which can only be fulfilled by war, make alliances in expectation of war, conduct their relations in secret because of war, for so long war will come, until war shall end mankind; and for so long will every object which gives a reason why States should exist . . . . be sacrificed to that Moloch, who offers nothing in return but the prospect of sacrificing again. Is it not time we stopped our disputes about who was the good or the bad boy, and began at last to take stock of the real situation?" (p. 466).

The limitations of the book are largely set by the author's purpose and point of view. Damning the European state system as a whole, he has no eye for the delicacy of its workings, for its ability to make war or peace or any variety of shading between the two. He sees no difference

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between the manipulation of that system by that master, Bismarck, and by his epigoni. For the sake of clarity he is inclined to simplify a bit too much. Franco-German relations need not always have been so impossible, particularly during the years 1898–1902. His analysis of diplomatic crises, once they are there, is masterly; but he does not concern himself sufficiently with the task of showing definitely why and how these arose at the time they did and of explaining the intricate relationship between policies and events in their evolution and settlement. One feels that he is using those crises before the final one of 1914 as background material to illustrate the methods and conditions of international relations and that he does not give to each the importance due it because of the menace of war that it contained. One would also like to know better what the differences are in the underlying forces that caused wars, for instance, in the eighteenth century and those that caused the last war; for, although in both periods the same general condition of "armed anarchy" obtained, yet the types and causes of the wars are not the same. By failing to solve that problem, the author makes his formula somewhat too simple and undervalues the significance of nationalism. He relegates it to the general category of forces that "become operative by and through Governments" (Preface).

Nevertheless Mr. Dickinson has given us a book of remarkably sane judgment; one that is clear, factual, and extremely interesting. If pragmatic historiography can produce such works, let us have more of it.

EUGENE N. ANDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE EVOLUTION OF VALUES. By C. Bouglé. Translated by Helen Stalker Sellars. Introduction by Roy Wood Sellars. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1926. Pp. xxxvii+277.

Values, according to Professor Bouglé, exist only in relation to desires; but we cannot define values merely in terms of blind desire. Valuation contains an intellectual factor; and a value involves anticipation of future satisfaction, recollection of past sacrifice, and appreciation of present resistance. Another aspect of value is conferred upon it by the social life of which the individual is a part. With regard to values other individuals are our competitors and our collaborators; and an important if not essential ingredient in values is the memory of past co-operations and the hope of future communions.

Moreover, values are imperative and demand recognition. The existence of values, with their claim to recognition, implies a duality, an

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antithesis between the sacred and the profane; and there is justification for regarding the religious antithesis as the source of the duality reflected in values. It is true that in primitive societies, where mental and emotional indistinctness is the rule, religious beliefs are useful and almost inevitable intermediaries of valuations; but nevertheless feelings may achieve recognition without the approbation of religion; and the ideals and aspirations of societies have other means than religion of making themselves felt.

Instead of being the source of the imperative character of values, religion may be traced to a source which it has in common with other types of value. "Where shall we find the model of those sacred forces of spiritual nature by which man feels himself surrounded and dominated, if not in those special forces which are freed by the communion of consciousnesses? Is not the power they engender in assembling together and organizing themselves the type of those powers, at once restrictive and beneficent, imperious and helpful, before which people bow down with mixed feelings of terror and love?" And it is the forces emanating from society which confer their imperative character on values in general, for where else could values obtain the compelling prestige with which they seem to be invested?

Social life, however, does not create values from nothing. The forces born from the life in common have always a certain number of given forms to work on; and though no limit may be set to their power as modifiers, they are not the sole creators.

While religion is not the source of values, it is nevertheless true that in primitive life all values tend to cluster around the altar. The differentiation of values keeps pace, however, with the division of labor; and the values primitively unified by religion are made specific. This splitting-up of the ideal brings man freedom to compare values and adjust their claims; and since the tendency to differentiation is limited by the fact that the individual as member of a subgroup gives but part of himself to the activities of the partial group and to its values, a hierarchy of values is formed.

In addition to elaborating the theory of value summarized above, Professor Bouglé discusses the nature of some of the special types of value, their relations, and problems connected with them. Some of the chapter headings are: "Economic Values and Ideal Values," "Value and Science," "Social Conditions of Scientific Progress," "Esthetic Values," "The Nation and Moral Teaching." While to some of us the special forces arising from society may seem more mysterious than values them-

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selves, Professor Bouglé's work is valuable both in itself and as representative of an important school of thought. The translator has succeeded admirably in translating the work into lucid and graceful English.

CHARNER M. PERRY

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

SEX FREEDOM AND SOCIAL CONTROL. By Charles W. Margold. With an Introduction by Edward T. Devine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926. Pp. xi+143. Price, $2.00.

There are no good shibboleths in science. Even the best of concepts become inhibitory as shibboleths: they endanger open-mindedness and thereby impoverish observation. It is certainly time for those who have struggled against "individualism" as a ubiquitous epithet to look to the equally ubiquitous use that is now being made of the concept "social." Ubiquity easily becomes iniquity.

As Exhibit A consider the book now under review. It emphasizes as data "(1) the inherent social nature of man's mental life, and consequently of all his acts and practices; (2) the invariable presence of social control in man's sexual life; (3) the intrenched reality of group sex standards." The general validity of these contentions may be admitted. But what of the admission? All men eat food, necessarily eat food, and so the fact of eating is unquestionably a reality, even an intrenched reality. But there remain to be settled inside the domain of these profound truths, in their own right and on their own ground, questions as to what food is preferable, how it shall be prepared, when eaten, how much, and with whom. Even if we go on to admit that man is a social animal and that therefore eating is of social concern, we have not settled the issues as to where and when and how and why social control could be best invoked for the amelioration of man, the eating animal. To admit, even to prove, that man is social settles nothing save the philosophic mind—nor that for long.

Still from just such data our present author seeks to deduce conviction on error of Havelock Ellis, Ellen Key, and other moderns who argue not that man is not social, not even that sex is not social, but that, however social man and sex may be, the social order is enriched by rich individuals and that individuals can be enriched by a social extension of freedom to all sex expression that does not, for instance, eventuate in reproduction. The data here relied upon, however incontrovertible they may be, would as easily prove that all sexual intercourse should take place on July 4 as a public national rite as it would disprove the position assailed.

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If being social *is* a natural necessity, then we may forget it in our effort to discover in what form it is also a virtue. Tolerance is as social as espionage; unobtrusion as social as obtrusion. If sociality is *not* a necessity, then we may still inquire when it is a virtue. To use a truism as a shibboleth to justify the *status quo* does more harm to the truism than service to established values.

Whether greater freedom in sex, even if socially accorded, as Havelock Ellis proposes, rather than surreptitiously snatched, as has been the civilized wont, is desirable remains an open question. If it be noticed that the opponents of greater sex freedom seem weak when unsuccored by appeal to sacred custom, it must also be remarked that the proponents have no certain way of making out their case for greater freedom except a hazardous adventure across the moral frontier so well described in the large by Mr. C. Delisle Burns elsewhere in this issue. With the intrinsic positive sanction for sex expression undiminished in its urgency and the negative sanctions for repression growing less strong through every advance of venereal prophylaxis, contraception, and economic freedom for women, it will take arguments stronger than insinuations or shibboleths afford to inhibit eventual moral change in this field through the old and only human avenue—initial personal adventures. A new content for "social" will be easily acceptable if and when men wake to find already achieved a new *status quo*.

A redeeming feature of this book is a selected bibliography of some five hundred titles.

T. V. Smith

University of Chicago

Arbitration and Business Ethics. By Clarence F. Birdseye. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1926. Pp. 305. Price, $2.50.

A contribution to the growing field of business ethics, and an admirable one, this volume is packed with usable information for practical men and is at the same time scholarly enough to satisfy the exactions of teachers and students. The author takes the position that commercial arbitration affords the best method of securing a certain amount of order out of the chaos of the "domain of the unenforceable." He puts his best foot forward at the very start, Part I dealing with "Commercial Arbitration," while the rest of the book holds that, by comparison, all other forms have been found wanting.

Part II is an indictment of "Common Law Arbitration," which, although outgrown in England a generation or more ago, has been slavishly

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followed in America. The Rosenbaum report of 1916 is stressed to show how in England a tremendous amount of litigation has been avoided by keeping commercial disputes out of the courts. The co-operation of the American Bar Association with the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York to establish a similar condition in America—virtually a suicidal pact for the former—is dealt with skilfully and tactfully.

Part III deals with "Statutory Arbitration," which emancipates business from the inertia consequent on the diversity of our judicial system and from the amateurishness of the courts in commercial disputes. At best, however, legislation is negative; the history of arbitration in New York has been made by two vigorous personalities: Judge Fancher and, more recently, Charles L. Bernheimer. One suspects a bit of hero-worship in the author's recital of their achievements in educating business, in effecting modifications of the law, and in the more direct activities of fact-finding and arbitration. One wonders, also, whether the author has kept clear of enthusiasms for things: the seller is quite vociferous in condemning "cancellations" in a falling market; but will he be so interested in securing "deliveries" in a rising market? There are "bulls" and "bears" in ethics as well as in markets.

In Part IV and Part V, dealing with "Industrial and Other Examples of Arbitration," the author draws largely on his *Encyclopaedia of General Business and Legal Forms* for references. One gets the impression that our older and crowded Eastern states and cities are experiencing the pressure that England felt several decades earlier, and that the "friendliness" in labor relations effected by arbitration more than compensates for the lack of "advanced legislation" which is the pride of the West. The whole development of business ethics is regarded as arising from the same conditions as previously held in post-Crusade Europe: a faster rate of development in business complexity than in legal forms and processes. The author's faith in the inevitability of conditions to work for good is, however, as questionable as his optimism as to the benignity of self-made men toward their former associates.

A lucid style and an abundance of concrete material quicken the author's thesis. Helpful suggestions for improving conditions culminate in an excellent Appendix, containing the actual arbitration clauses and forms together with several state arbitration laws and the United States Arbitration Act. Throughout the volume, there is convincing evidence of the author's historic and social insight and of his philosophical soundness.

C. F. TAEUSCH

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

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SHORTER NOTICES

HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY. By M. de Wulf. Vol. II, from Thomas Aquinas to the End of the Middle Ages (English trans.). London: Longmans Green & Co., 1926. Pp. 336. Price, 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

The first volume of this translation was reviewed here a short time ago. In this second volume there are the same characteristics that were noted in the first. The book is valuable as a record of dates and of the names of medieval thinkers and because it contains a fairly full bibliography of the subject. Professor de Wulf promised us, in his Preface, a volume of extracts from medieval writers, which should be useful, if it is selected with a view to rendering the valuable part of the work of these thinkers available. Perhaps it is impossible for a summary of a thousand years of thought to be illuminating; but it must be confessed that the book reads as if it were a schoolboy's textbook of names. Professor de Wulf may know the Middle Ages; but he shows very little sign of knowing philosophy. We are told that "the use Roger Bacon made of experimental methods was better than his theory concerning them": which is indeed possible, if nothing could be so bad as his theory. As for Occam—who, by the way, does not come from Ockam in Surrey, but from Oakham in Rutlandshire —Professor de Wulf seems not to understand at all Occam's theory of universals. It is very improbable that Occam was a subjectivist. And Occam's theory that "*substantia* is *quantitas*" was surely worth some attention. Again, Professor de Wulf either has not read Nicholas de Cusa or has missed the point completely. One would not suppose, in reading Professor de Wulf, that Cusa was a mathematician of great subtlety. Any old word such as "God" or "substance" throws Professor de Wulf completely off his balance. He puts the terms down in a list as if they meant the same thing in the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. The whole work has, indeed, the defects of the Louvain school of apologetic neo-Scholasticism. No one really cares, as the Louvain school seems to imagine, what the "doctrine" of Aquinas or Occam was: the only importance of these men as philosophers is in the few points in which they were not absolutely mistaken as to facts. There *is* a criterion of philosophical common sense; but Professor de Wulf, if he is aware of it, does not apply it. However, it is useful to have a list of the works which no philosopher need trouble to read; and in that immense list are a few illuminating passages of forgotten works. The Middle Ages did indeed make a very important contribution to our knowledge of the world; but what that contribution was, it would be difficult to discover by reading Professor de Wulf's book.

C. D. BURNS

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF MIND. By Alexander A. Jascalevich. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926. Pp. 107. Price, $2.00.

In this well-written, interesting, and unpretentious volume Dr. Jascalevich has provided a welcome supplementation to the present avalanche of books on mind. Unlike the analytical volumes by Russell, Broad, and Drake, this volume is largely historical and deals with the conceptions of mind of Aristotle,

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Augustine, and Descartes. It is helpful to approach modern theories of mind through a comparison of the views of Aristotle and Descartes, and in this connection the present volume will be valuable to teachers and students alike.

The naturalistic aspect of Aristotle's view receives the major emphasis in the treatment of this ever modern thinker. In harmony with the Greek discernment of the "consanguinity of human life with the outward spread of the cosmos," the Aristotelian human mind is "the perfect realization of an organic body." Uninfected with subjective categories, it is inextricably linked with the world as a whole, with the objects of its operations, with these operations in relation to each other, with the human body, and with the social environment. But for Augustine the "human mind is an incorporeal and self-known substance which governs the bodily and rational activities of men," halfway between the corporeal and incorporeal realms, and consorting with both. And with Descartes the denaturalization of mind is complete: mind now essays its adventure toward truth in proud disdain of corporeal body, a substance complete in itself, while "the natural world sustains the meaning of what mind is not." Although the author believes that historically "each conception is best in its own time and place," his personal sympathies lie with the naturalistic accounts. In this respect he is in agreement with the contemporary tendency of philosophers and psychologists alike to drag mind down from its ivory-tower isolation from mundane affairs, and to put mind back into the press of natural events and processes.

CHARLES W. MORRIS

THE ZOROASTRIAN DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE: FROM DEATH TO THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT. "Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series," Vol. XI. By Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926. Pp. xxviii+119. Price, $2.50.

This is another contribution toward intercultural appreciation. The doctrine of man's freedom to choose between good and evil in this life which characterizes the Zoroastrian religion is here matched by its counterpart and sequel in terms of the ensuing responsibility in the future life. In this study the author has projected three volumes dealing respectively with the three parts of future life, namely, (1) the period from death to individual judgment at the Chinvat Bridge, (2) life in heaven, hell, or the intermediate place, and (3) the general judgment. And the present work constitutes the first of the three. The treatment is historical, tracing under each topic its development through the literature of the various periods. Quotations are translated and embodied in the work, and conclusions indicated. Most readers of this volume will look forward to the appearance of its two companions.

Y. P. MEI

HAVELOCK ELLIS: A BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY. By Isaac Goldberg. London: Constable & Co., 1926. Pp. xiv+359. Price, 18s. net.

It is in America and in Germany, as Mr. Havelock Ellis' biographer points out, rather than in England that the subject of this study has his due measure

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of appreciation. Of the six volumes of his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex,* one alone was published in England; and after the sale of this work was suspended, Mr. Ellis decided to publish in America, while regretting that his own country should be almost alone in refusing to him the conditions of reasonable intellectual freedom. He was able to write in his postscript to the *Studies* in 1910 that the effort to crush his work had not resulted in any change in that work by so much as a single word. "With help, or without it, I have followed my path to the end. He who follows in the steps of Nature after a law that was not made by man is above and beyond man, has time as well as eternity on his side and can afford to be both patient and fearless." The *Studies* are Mr. Ellis' central work and have a permanent value for physicians and scientific men. A part of modern psychoanalytic theory is hinted at or contained in these *Studies,* and it is significant that Freud, in his *Interpretation of Dreams,* points to Ellis' "happy anticipations" of his theory that "primitive modes of work suppressed during the day participate in the formation of the dream." The now familiar terms "auto-eroticism" and "Narcissism" were adapted from or coined by Ellis; and still more important is the anticipation of what is now called in psychoanalytic language "sublimation." The originality of Ellis' thought may be gathered from the fact that the first of the *Studies* was published in 1897, thirty years ago.

But Ellis' work is not only matter for the specialist. Regarding sex as "the central problem of life" (Preface to the *Studies,* 1897), his studies are throughout related to life in this encyclopedia of experience and speculation. To Freud, Ellis has applied the name of "artist" (a title disclaimed by the Viennese scientist); and to Ellis himself the term would be properly applied, for there is a blending of art in his science. To this artist, to live "remains an art which everyone must learn and which no one can teach," and it is significant that he has chosen *The Dance of Life* for the title of one of his books.

E. F.

U.S. A Second Study in Democracy. By H. E. Buchholz. Baltimore: Warwick & York, Inc., 1926. Pp. vii+400.

Under the conviction that "some one should review the trails already traveled by the American republic, take stock of the present and make plans for the future," Mr. Buchholz presents in a very striking manner the criticism that the American citizen has taken advantage of the government to relieve himself of responsibility for "such non-governmental activities as transportation, agriculture, industry, moral guidance, and what not." He looks forward to the establishment of a "pure democracy"—a complete feeling of responsibility by the individual—as a solution not only of these evils, but of political bossism and machine-made statesmanship, which he thinks can never be eliminated from our system.

A feature of the work is the attempt to cite specific examples purporting to establish his thesis. But one is disappointed by the unscholarly attitude at times reflected in extreme statements, in apparently deliberate attempts to con-

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fuse the study through atypical instances, as well as in laying himself open to the charges of being naïve, prosaic, and even reactionary. Nevertheless, the book is well worth serious consideration.

THEODORE T. LAFFERTY

THE METAPHYSICS OF EVOLUTION WITH OTHER ESSAYS. By Thomas Whittaker. London: Williams & Norgate, 1926. Pp. 480. Price, 16*s*. net.

Mr. Thomas Whittaker is well known as an authority on Plotinus and the neo-Platonists. This volume contains a collection of essays which he has published in various periodicals, some of them as far back as 1881 and 1884. But it is useful to have them collected together; and there are some long essays included which have not hitherto been published, although written in 1913. There are some historical studies of Bruno, Origen, Scotus Erigena, and Apollonius of Tyana—all interesting and illuminating. These are well "documented" and are thorough examinations of the theories of the philosophers named. The conflict between Celsus and Origen is well rendered. It is shown that the theocracy which Origen stood for was victorious for many centuries, but that the tide turned and the modern world is consciously or unconsciously on the side of Celsus. Similarly in all Mr. Whittaker's studies the relevance of old controversies to our present problem is kept in view. This makes the whole book more than a mere record. It is real historical interpretation. But besides the historical essays are others of a purely philosophical kind. There is a long and valuable study of the philosophy of history. The argument goes to show that the movement toward rationalism in Europe was a much more fundamental and "intrinsic" tendency than the lapse into the Dark Ages. In the philosophical essays, and especially in the long and most recent essay on "A New Metaphysic of Evolution," Mr. Whittaker has a real contribution to make to our knowledge of the nature of things. His views are colored by neo-Platonism and by the idealism or absolutism of the late nineteenth century; but he gives its due place to science. There are important appendixes: one on the Eleatics and one on the "*de Aeternitate Mundi*." Altogether Mr. Whittaker's work is of the greatest importance for scholars. The opinions of obsolete philosophers such as Plotinus are occasionally illuminating. Some insight into reality survives even the most ungovernable imaginativeness of the mystic. But it is also useful to have full historical studies of older points of view than our own, because so many of our contemporary beliefs are unconsciously formed by forgotten influences. The problems dealt with by Mr. Whittaker are not specifically moral problems, but the world-view of any age has great significance as affecting moral action. Moral philosophers therefore cannot afford to neglect the metaphysics connected with religious experience.

C. DELISLE BURNS

THE PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. By Roy Wood Sellars. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926. Pp. xiv+517.

Meant as a textbook for students beginning the study of philosophy, this latest literary production from Professor Sellars represents a restatement with

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supplementations of his earlier text *The Essentials of Philosophy*. It purports to cover the entire field of philosophic speculation under three approaches: the epistemological, under which the history of philosophy is treated more fully than elsewhere in the volume; the ontological and cosmological; and, finally, the valuational, in which ethics receives primary emphasis. As a text the book will almost certainly prove to have at least two outstanding merits: (1) a challenge to the student's interest and (2) a challenge to his intellectual endurance. The first challenge will arise not from a felicitous literary style or a sense of the dramatic in philosophy, but rather from a personal way of taking the problems on the part of the author. Knowing its disadvantage, he has nevertheless elected—wisely, I think—frankly to memorialize his "own ascent to the 'hill of vision.'" The second challenge will arise from the author's genuine attempt to present the real problems in philosophy in spite now and then of their technicality. Instead of writing down to the student, Professor Sellars has deliberately tried to stimulate the student to come up to a new level of mastery. To compare this text with only two that have recently appeared in America, it is not as comprehensive nor as balanced nor as clearly and beautifully written as Professor G. Watts Cunningham's *Problems of Philosophy;* but it has more the element of personal adventure and a more definitely espoused partisanship. It is not as generously oriented in the total world of appreciation as Professor G. T. W. Patrick's *Introduction to Philosophy,* nor as deftly done; but it is more systematic in its analyses of philosophic problems and more rigorous in its demands upon intellectual energy. It would admirably supplement, or be supplemented by, either of these texts.

Its treatment of the problem of values will be of more specific interest to readers of this *Journal*. One may suppose that this section represents more than either other division Professor Sellars' recent thought. The metaphysical position is that of his earlier realism, and the epistemological position is that made well known by him in the same connection. Here more adequately than elsewhere he has indicated the value implications of his general philosophy. He accepts what he describes as one of the "great discoveries of recent philosophy"—"the realization that living, and not knowing, is the primary fact and the proper point of departure for a philosophy of values." Value is tied up indissolubly with the human enterprise, does not exist apart from approval or disapproval, and can be objective only in a social universe. "Values are objects valued." One misses here the Platonic emphasis upon subsistences that are eternal, an important emphasis of other modern realists of this critical school. As an implication of his strict naturalism, Professor Sellars is commendably frank, though delightfully undogmatic, in dealing with the fate of values in the cosmic hazard. The student will here get a chance to take his universe straight, undiluted by any wishful thinking regarding the traditional values of God, freedom, and immortality.

T. V. S.

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FATALISM OR FREEDOM. A BIOLOGIST'S ANSWER. "The New Science" Series. By C. Judson Herrick. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1926. Pp. 96. Price, $1.00.

Banishing at the outset "metaphysical" categories and the concept of uncaused action, Professor Herrick attempts to discover whether freedom cannot be defined in terms that may be justified by the postulates and methods of verification of the natural sciences. Though thinking is a function of the body, the exclusion of the conscious processes from the biologist's view of life is scientifically inadmissible. That which is known introspectively as thinking would to an external observer with adequate technique appear as complicated protoplasmic activities; but the external account cannot express the whole of the situation. Thinking as known introspectively is a natural event and is an element in an orderly system of natural causes.

Mental processes with their related bodily changes enable man to predict the future and choose in the light of consequences among the alternatives presented by a given situation. The choice is causally determined, but it differs from a reflex in that prediction, a function of an elaborated cerebral cortex, is one of the causal factors determining choice. "An intelligent choice is a freer choice in contrast with unconsciously determined processes in that one looks ahead to the consequences of action and this prevision is a real component of the causative complex."

In another sense also we may say that man is free. Any organization is free to operate in accordance with its own inner nature in appropriate situations. A locomotive is free to make sixty miles an hour on the track but not across country; and in the same way man is free to unfold and develop his original nature unless this process is restrained by atypical or unfavorable external conditions. An aeroplane may be said to have more freedom than a locomotive, and man has much more freedom than either, since a larger and better internal apparatus makes possible a wider range of behavior.

Professor Herrick's style is straightforward and readable; and whether or not we agree with his views, the issues are clearcut. If we accept his description of human behavior and its causes, shall we say that such behavior is free? Can we, for purposes of scientific explanation, distinguish between an "appropriate" environment and one which is not appropriate? Is it necessary to use prediction as a factor in our explanation of human behavior? If the introspective account and the external account of human behavior are both essential, how do the two accounts fit together?

CHARNER M. PERRY

PURPOSE THE VARIANT OF THEORY. By Julius Temple House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. viii+80.

This is a doctoral dissertation in sociology. It is devoted to the thesis that all theoretical systems grow out of, and vary with, the purpose of the thinker. In the background is the view that the purpose of the thinker, more-

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over, is the product of the social and physical environment. It is, therefore, a study of the individual mechanism through which social changes take place. Illustrations are found in the lives and philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and J. S. Mill.

T. V. S.

SOME EARLY TRACTS ON POOR RELIEF. Edited by F. R. Salter, Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge. Preface by Rt. Hon. Sidney Webb, M.P. London: Methuen & Co., 1926. Pp. 128. Price, 5s. net.

This is a translation of five European tracts on poor relief of the sixteenth century, including Luther's *ordinance* and Zwingli's *ordinance*. There is a valuable Introduction explaining the situation in the sixteenth century and a summary with extracts of the English *Beggars Acts* of 1531 and 1536. The book will be most valuable to students of the history of social reform, for not only does it take the history back into the sixteenth century, but it also provides material for comparing the English development with that of the Continent. The policy of the reformers in regard to the poor is an interesting phase of their general policy in regard to the practical effects of religion. But the course adopted almost everywhere in the sixteenth century has now left us face to face with the problem, not only unsolved, but actually much greater. The fundamental issues implied in the existence of widespread poverty are hardly understood even today.

C. D. BURNS

EVOLUTION OF IDEA. By Oren Byron Taft. Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1926. Pp. 152.

This volume is devoted to an elaboration and reiteration of the thesis that everything exists in infinite mind as its reflection, and that everything sensed by human consciousness is reflection of infinite mind in a consciousness which itself is reflection of infinite mind. The recognition of this truth marks the distinction, in the evolution of idea, between man and animals, and lays upon man the duty of demonstrating his reflected power over the ideas which constitute his own body and environment. When man substitutes for false belief the knowledge that everything is the reflection of a creative spirit whose law is love, then error, sin, and sickness pass into the oblivion of nothingness precisely as do mathematical errors.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THINKING ABOUT THINKING. "Today and Tomorrow Series." By Cassius J. Keyser. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1926. Pp. 91. Price, $1.00.

As distinguished from organic thinking, which is the response of an organism as a living whole to a stimulus, and from empirical thinking, which introduces a conceptual or logical element but does not give a dominant part to this element, autonomous or postulational thinking is thinking par excellence. Though no doctrine can without circularity define all its terms or prove all its

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propositions, postulational thinking attains the maximum of clarity and cogency by selecting the minimum number of undefined terms and the minimum number of undemonstrated propositions, and demonstrating all the propositions that are logically implied by the postulates. While empirical thinking is perhaps a condition of postulational thinking, postulational thinking is science at its best; and this type of thinking, according to Professor Keyser, is available for all fields of thought, ethics as well as physics.

CHARNER M. PERRY

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By Clement C. J. Webb, Oriel Professor of the Christian Religion in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926. Pp. 217. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is not a mere summary of Kant's theory. It is a valuable and interesting reinterpretation, and a most urgent criticism of certain limitations of Kant. Kant's position is explained historically, and his attitude treated sympathetically. The attempt to draw a distinction between "ethical" religion and the less "pure" forms of religion is well stated; but Professor Webb points out how Kant misinterpreted the history of the church as a corruption of an ethical doctrine and how blind Kant was to what may be called the "mystical element" in religion. This is, no doubt, to be connected with the limitations of Kant's experience in art and with his disregard of history in general. The evidence now available in regard to non-Christian religions was not available for Kant; but his emphasis upon the moral elements in the religious experience is of permanent importance. Professor Webb's book is important for all who are working on moral theory as well as for students of religious experience. It is definitely Christian and even "catholic" in outlook, but not irrationally so.

C. D. BURNS

FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES: THEIR BASES AND DEVELOPMENT. By James Quayle Dealey. New York: Ginn & Co., 1926. Pp. viii+402. Price, $2.80.

This book is intended primarily for advanced classes in American history and diplomacy. It presupposes an acquaintance with the events and details of American history. The discussion falls into two parts: (1) a general account of the conditions basal to policies (geographic, climatic, economic, racial, etc.) and the agencies through which they get formulated (governmental, military, naval), and (2) an outline of American policies themselves with detailed discussion of the more important ones. The author claims to give a balanced, fair exposition of background, agencies, and policies. Certainly such manifest biases as those here found for Pan-Americanism and the League of Nations are not necessarily connected with the premonition contained in the dedication of the volume to the staff and graduates of the Naval War College. There is a selected bibliography. The book is worth reading by public-spirited citizens as well as by college students.

T. V. S.

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NOTES

The publisher of the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* is Longmans, Green & Company, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York City, and 39 Paternoster Road, London. The price of the volume in paper covers is $5.00; in cloth binding, $6.00. Every active member will receive a copy without cost as soon as the book is off the press. Associate members are entitled to purchase one copy at the special price of $3.00. It is planned to publish the book in the late spring of 1927. Orders should be sent to the publisher, at New York or London, and not to the Editor of the *Proceedings*. It is requested that orders be sent in advance as far as possible, to facilitate an accurate estimate of the edition needed.

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN, *Editor*

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OF "RIGHT" AND "GOOD" AND OF MR. ROSS'S VIEWS

JOHN LAIRD

Good ethical argument is so rare in these days, and so few attempts are made to expose the essential anatomy of the subject, that the appearance of a notable contribution like Mr. Ross's in the January, 1927, number of this *Journal*[1] is something of an event, and worthy of much closer attention than is usually accorded to the ephemeral, if honorable, performances which provide the fodder for philosophical congresses. The symposium, in a word, might be continued with advantage; and, if the same level of excellence could be maintained, there might even be a hope that the present age would return to the earlier tradition of our moral philosophy and find both fascination and utility in the keen and resolute analysis of moral notions. Accordingly, while acutely conscious of the improbability that I shall, in fact, sustain this high level of achievement, I should like to continue the debate, and to dwell for a space upon the one part of Mr. Ross's arguments to which I cannot wholly subscribe. This is his account of the relations between "right" (or "duty") and "good." It is needless to point out that the analysis of this relation has always been one of the cardinal points in any ethical theory that has any pretensions to clear-headedness. Therefore it is unreasonable to expect that anything will emerge from the discussion that is entirely new. Mr. Ross, however, despite the brevity that was

[1] XXXVII, 113–27.

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forced upon him by the iron circumscriptions of a congress, has contrived to bring forward arguments that at least have a novel appearance, and so to leave no excuse for threadbare and limp repetition.

Assuming, then (as Mr. Ross has shown so concisely but with such admirable pointedness), that "good" is a predicate which really does attach to certain actions and conditions of soul, that we have a certain assured knowledge of its meaning and application, and that the same remarks apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to "right" or "duty," it has to be considered whether "right" is equivalent to "good" (when the latter conception is qualified in some determinate way) or whether, on the contrary, there is something distinctive in "right" which forbids us from being satisfied with any proposal to regard this as equivalent. Mr. Ross's considered opinion is that the only plausible form that the equivalence theory can assume is to hold either that "right" *means* "productive of maximum good," or that it is coextensive with anything so designated, that neither of these contentions can be substantiated, and that there are definite and sufficient reasons (which he enumerates in outline) for coming to a contrary conclusion. The object of this paper is to examine (also, I am afraid, to traverse) this conclusion, and, more particularly, the reasons adduced in support of it.

It is a pity, in many ways, that Mr. Ross has had to be so very brief, since the effort after compression has led him, at odd times, to say something that he really cannot mean. To be candid, we cannot quite accept the phrase "productive of maximum good" as being precisely what he has in mind, since it is evident that "right" could not mean precisely this on any legitimate theory. For inanimate agents may produce good, and few things can have a better claim to "productive of maximum good" than sunshine and fresh air. Without palpable and violent metaphor, however, neither the sun nor the atmosphere can properly be said to be doing their duty. The phrase

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"productive of maximum good" therefore requires an essential qualification if it is to become capable, even remotely, of bearing the burden that some would like to thrust upon it. "Right" and "duty," we may say, apply only to the will, and are only to be predicated of those who may be commanded (or who may command themselves) to do the right or to perform their duty. Hence what Mr. Ross ought to have to deal with is the assertion that "right" means or is coextensive with "productive of the maximum good that can be effected volitionally by any agent capable of responding to the good that he sees." And we might go farther. Since, for the greater part of moral affairs, it is unlikely that most moral agents would claim that they are able to see the good with complete certainty in all its effects and ramifications, it would be prudent to amend the above definition by saying "probably productive" instead of "productive" simply. So amended, this definition is a good deal more plausible than "the only plausible" one with which Mr. Ross is dealing ostensibly. I believe, however, that it is what he really has in mind; and although a full discussion of the definition would require an elaborate investigation of "volition," "probability," and "seeing" (with all the perplexities attending innocence, purity of heart, and the "unconscious"), I shall ask the reader to assume for the purposes of this continued symposium, that these investigations could be brought to a conclusion without essentially transforming the definition itself.

Since I am disposed to argue that this amended definition indicates what is indicated by "right," and therefore is at least coextensive with "right" if it is not precisely the same notion, I have to show, if I can, that this account of the matter is able to withstand the general criticisms and the special strictures which Mr. Ross deploys against it.

On the general point, then, I do not think we should be greatly moved by the objection that many people do what they take to be right, using the word "right" with propriety

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and with some intelligence, but without thinking about "maximum good" at all. The matter of fact must be conceded, but I do not think we need find it disturbing. Most of us, after all, have relatively little acquaintance with moral theory, and are not very expert in stating our own meaning clearly either to ourselves or to others; and the use of a word with approximate correctness is no convincing proof of any genuinely accurate acquaintance with its strict meaning. What I suggest, then, is the possibility (and indeed the likelihood) that "right" really does mean the foregoing, even if many people who use it correctly to designate what it does in fact designate, have not pushed their analysis of its meaning so far as the point deserves. They might be brought to see that this is what "right" must mean, for them and for everyone, if they thought it out. I may add, perhaps, that the type of difficulty (if it is a difficulty) that comes to the foreground in this instance is really quite general and should not be taken at its face value. It is entirely possible for a man to act virtuously without thinking of virtue at all, and sometimes it is better for him *not* to think about his virtue. On the whole, therefore, this formal contention seems of very little moment.

Mr. Ross contends further (although still in general) that if "right" meant what on this view it strictly does mean, the thing would have to be intuitively evident; and he, with excellent qualifications for speaking, does not find it so. In debatable matters, however, intuition can hardly be expected to resolve all our perplexities with a single piercing glance. The perspective has usually to be laid open by small successive clarifications. As a first instalment, therefore, we may fasten upon Mr. Ross's admission (which, as far as I can tell, he makes throughout his argument) that, *when nothing else enters,* the probable production of maximum good *does* justify our action, and therefore determines our duty. "Maximum good," accordingly *(when qualified as it must be qualified),* is admitted to be a *relevant* consideration which *may* be suffi-

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cient. Admitting its relevance, therefore, we have now to ask whether it is always necessary and always sufficient; that is to say, we have to examine the view (which I take to be Mr. Ross's), that it is *sometimes* unnecessary and *often* insufficient.

Before proceeding with this inquiry, we should do well to remember yet a further point. There is a certain ambiguity about the word "productive," and this may be mischievous if it is left unheeded. When anyone makes a resolve, he resolves to *do* something, and his resolve, when effectuated, may be said to be productive of the effect it aims at. This *might* be taken to mean that the resolve itself is a mere means toward the production of the effect. If so, there would be a gaping lacuna in moral theory. For plainly the qualities of the resolve (and more generally of the "motive") *do* affect the worth of moral action. It is *something* at least if a man is careful and scrupulous before he acts. Accordingly, if we speak of duty as being equivalent to volition directed toward the attainment of the (probably) maximum good, we must be allowed to include the qualities of the volition as a part of the total good that may be produced.

But to return. Our first main question is whether this reference to maximum good is *necessary,* or whether "duty" may dispense with it.

We may reasonably hold, I think, that at least *some* reference to the production of good *is* necessary, for every moral action is an attempt to bring something about, and it is beyond all reason to assert that what a man aims at is of no account in the ethical assessment of his action. His *success,* to be sure, is another thing, and may not always be commanded, although (even here) a failure that is due to avoidable misconceptions of the situation respecting which he acts is properly reprehensible in a moral sense. Yet Kant himself (who would have the "matter" of our action entirely subordinate to the law of our self-adjustment toward it) holds that it is not

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"wish," but "will," that is in question, and that "will" includes "the summoning of all the means in our power." These means are our capacity to produce an effect; and since it cannot be maintained that this summoning of the means in our power is morally indifferent to its end (for the end, e.g., might be another person's happiness so far as this depends on us) the obvious conclusion is that the production of good (so far as this is within our power) is always required.

I cannot satisfy myself whether Mr. Ross expressly means to maintain that, in certain restricted cases, it may be right for us to do this or that without thereby doing any good at all, but sometimes he gives me this impression; and certainly it *seems* as if we might construct instances in support of this contention (e.g., repaying a rich creditor who may spend the money on his seraglio). However that may be, Mr. Ross, at least, is not entitled to adopt this position. For he holds (rightly, I think) that virtue itself is a good, and he even maintains that virtue, insight, and pleasure are the only goods. If so, since paying one's debts is *ex hypothesi* virtuous (or so I understand him), it is plain that a man who pays his debts necessarily produces the good contained in the performance of that virtue, and this necessity is not at all overborne by the fact (if fact it be) that in some cases the action which produces good in this respect produces harm in some other way.

The very terms of this criticism may seem to involve both Mr. Ross's argument and my own in a certain unenviable circularity, but if either he or I attempted to avoid all appearance of circularity we should have to maintain, like the Utilitarians (except in so far as Mill stultified himself by including virtue as a "part" of happiness), that the only "production of good" which is relevant to moral action is the production of *non-moral* good. It should not be denied, of course, that the production of a non-moral good sometimes justifies moral action—at any rate, in so far forth. Thus, assuming man to be a moral agent and the other animals not to be, it is still man's

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moral duty to prevent needless suffering among the animals so far as he can. Again, it is plain that some part of the justification of certain virtues may have regard to non-moral effects. When we commend the virtue of temperance, for example, we may defend it in part on the ground that it increases our health, happiness, and everyday efficiency; and very often we do defend the virtue in this way. It would be outrageous, however, to assert that, in order to avoid circularity, we must confine our defense of temperance to arguments of this species. If we maintained that gluttony is beneath man's dignity or that (apart from all other considerations) temperance implies a certain poise and proportion which is morally good (as well as useful or beautiful), we should surely be arguing with entire legitimacy. In short, the production of *non-moral* good is *not* a sufficient reason for *all* that we properly call our duty. But then, we are not asked to maintain that it is. As we have seen, the qualities of resolve, "motive," and the rest must be included in the "good" that may be attained, and these qualities are not non-moral. As for the appearance of circularity, it is mere appearance. There is complication only, and not circularity, when we say (as we must) that although a moral action may be directed toward a non-moral end outside itself, it may also be directed toward an end entirely moral.

Therefore we have to conclude that a right action always endeavors to produce *some* good. But must it always aim at the maximum good? If not, one has to hold that an action might be one's plain duty, although, under the circumstances, some other action, not one's duty, might aim at producing something better. A man's duty, in other words, may *not* be the best use he can make of his opportunities. This, as I understand him, is what Mr. Ross holds in certain assigned instances. The opposite view, he maintains, is too simple-minded to be true. In endeavoring to defend the simple-minded view, I must therefore begin by examining his in-

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stances. These are: paying debts, keeping promises, telling the truth, repaying services, effecting just distributions.

Regarding all these cases there are two initial difficulties in Mr. Ross's position to which he has paid little attention or none at all. His specific claim is that these duties imply a prior claim in regard to assigned persons, and that the production of maximum good has to give place to this prior claim. In saying so, however, he has neglected the important circumstance that every one of these duties is governed by a consideration still more fundamental, viz., that they should not be disgraceful and (if "harm" be taken to include moral degradation) that they should not aim at anything destructive or very harmful. The duty of paying one's debts is perhaps a special case, since in strictness a man does not possess what he owes, and the pleasant idea of being benevolent or "producing good" with somebody else's money has a different appearance from the one it tends to assume in Mr. Ross's account of it. Keeping a promise, however, is a clear instance, and manifestly is not a duty if the promise is a promise to sin, or (unless for the gravest independent and counterbalancing reasons) to wreck domestic felicity, or, let us say, a man's career. Telling the truth, again, is plainly circumscribed by this governing consideration. For example, many would doubt whether it is justifiable to tell the truth to a financial magnate who is bent upon a "corner," or some attack upon the currency that would lead to widespread suffering. Similarly, the repaying of services means, I suppose, the requital of *good* with *good*, and the same considerations apply to justice in the sense of equity. Impartiality in the causeless infliction of suffering has no proper priority, but, on the contrary, is a monstrous thing. And, as before, equal distribution of goods is a distribution of something *good*.

This first and governing consideration passes easily into a second. With regard to all the obligations which, apart from grave and quite special reasons, we should all accept cate-

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gorically, a certain doubt creeps in when they seem plainly contrary to something that is manifestly very good. Mr. Ross, to be sure, does not hold that any of our "duties" is absolute in the sense of never being rightfully overborne. He holds, instead, that they *tend* in this direction. Granting his explanation, however (perhaps with a shade of dubiety), it tends to be a serious objection if we are almost always most doubtful of these categorical tendencies when, in particular cases, they tend toward something worse than the good may seem generally to aim at. Jeannie Deans, for example, refused to perjure herself in order to save her sister's life, and would probably have refused to perjure herself had the point (as in a way it was) been quite technical. Queen Anne enabled her to retain her sister. If the jury, however, had refused to convict on the ground that the penalty entailed wasteful suffering, I do not see that we could be certain they had done wrong.

We may add, perhaps, that we do distinguish (and, I think, correctly) between the more important and the less important cases of performing such "duties" as are here in dispute. A promise to marry is neither more nor less of a promise than a promise to go out to dinner. Formally, therefore, they are on the same level; but while the breaking of the second is comparatively venial, the breaking of the first is seldom so. It is difficult to see what ground there is for this discrimination, except the ground of producing much good or much ill; and this in itself seems to me a serious objection to Mr. Ross's view.

Let us, however, consider his special arguments. In substance, as I understand it, his contention is that "maximum good" must be taken to mean "good irrespective of persons," whereas the majority of our duties depend on special relationships to particular persons. This contention plainly implies that the conception of maximum good cannot (or cannot sufficiently) take account of these special relationships, but that "right" and "duty" do. We may reply, I think, that there is

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no convincing reason why "good" should be irrespective of persons in the sense alleged.

Manifestly there is an important sense in which "good" is *not* a respecter of persons, for, when there is no relevant difference between the persons, X's good should be considered as much as (and no more than) Y's; X's good at one time as much as (and no more than) his good at some other time; and so forth. Often it is of the first importance, and very necessarily, to remember this. Nepotism, the "sinister interests" of powerful persons, and many forms of very ordinary selfishness are examples.

On the other hand, there *may* be relevant differences, and if these relevant differences can be stated in terms of good (or maximum good), then, in default of further reasons than those Mr. Ross has shown, I think we are entitled to infer, not only that the reference to maximum good is necessary for the rightness of any action (as I have already tried to argue), but also that it is sufficient.

Let us take, for example, the duty of educating one's children. Obviously this duty implies a special relationship, and under existing social conditions, it may be regarded either as a duty *ad hoc,* or as a consequence of the more general duty of providing for one's children, or as tacitly implied in the promises made at marriage. If we sought, however, to justify these or similar duties on the score of probable good, it is surely not to be supposed that special social relationships are irrelevant to this line of argument—that in terms of this argument our children have the same position regarding ourselves as anybody else's children. Certainly, in terms of the argument, if our children were *very stupid,* and if some musical youth of our acquaintance showed promise of great attainment and would not be trained for humanity's benefit unless we put our hands in our pockets somewhat to our children's detriment, it might conceivably be better worth our while to give *him* the expensive training and to send our own children to a state uni-

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versity. If so, might it not also be our duty? For the most part, however, when we argue on these lines, we maintain, very properly, that the general welfare of the community is best served under the family régime *with all its admitted consequences;* so that, if each man looks after *his own* children in certain specified ways, greater good will be produced than if people attempted indiscriminately to benefit *anybody's* children. If in particular cases, such as education, it is held that the state can and should perform this function more efficiently than the parent, so that it is *better* that no parent should have any care or expense of the kind, then we are logically prone to deny, and I think with justice, that there is *any* private duty to educate our own children. The same argument seems to hold quite generally. I do not say that the sole justification (say of promise-keeping) lies in social stability or in a system of credit; for questions of dignity and other moral qualities may also be at stake. But I do say that social credit and social stability are or may be productive of good, and that they are nonsensical unless they imply special relationships between determinate persons. The greater part, indeed, of what Mr. Ross treats as an element of "duty" to which "maximum good" is irrelevant belongs to the natural logic of social good, with special regard to the point of time. A transaction in which there is delay implies something like a contract or a promise in order to make its continuity effective. *Because* of this, there is sufficient reason why a man who has made a promise is in a different position with regard to his fellows from that of a man who has promised nothing. The former is a participant in a continuous transaction, while the latter is free to initiate something entirely new. To do good without any regard to the logic of our position, just as the whim happens to touch us, is an unreasonable project, and it is not the less unreasonable if, in particular cases, the logic of the situation seems to be something strait, and we sigh for what we might do if we had not committed ourselves in this or the

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other way. The answer is, of course, that the logic and stable relationships of a systematic good come themselves *sub specie boni,* and not the less effectively because they do so in the large.

Of this moral logic, as I have ventured to call it, the supreme example (if one can call that an example which includes almost all the examples) is justice itself. As I have said, equity applied to some bad end need not redeem that end. If a tyrant, disliking all his red-haired subjects, made them suffer in strict proportion to the redness of their hair, or, as in Sidgwick's suggestion, recruited his entire army from this source, the logic of the situation thus created would not save the situation itself from being thoroughly bad as a whole. A beneficent scheme, on the other hand, or a scheme as little noxious as the circumstances permitted, would be immensely the nobler if equity prevailed over all distribution of goods and of opportunities. In this wide sense, and assuming the justice to be boniform, most men of good will would probably prefer a just scheme of things to one more felicific but also more capricious and eleemosynary. But they would also hold, I think, that this system implied, possessed, and afforded a *greater good,* and therefore I cannot help thinking that the important considerations which Mr. Ross has put so tersely and in such stimulating fashion in his admirable discussion do not, in this particular, prove what they purport to prove, but call our attention to something else in its stead.

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

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ETHICAL BASES FOR ECONOMIC REWARD

ERNEST N. HENDERSON

"Hard-boiled" business is wont to say that in its realms the question of what one *ought* to get for his goods or his services is beside the mark. In business we get what we *can* and pay what we *must*. *Ought* has nothing to do with it. Yet people who pride themselves on being "hard boiled" are quite prone to snivel when the economic shoe pinches their own sacred feet. Such an individual may feel that he *ought* to get a certain price, a *fair* price for his property. To be driven to take less is to be cheated, to be treated unjustly by the buying public, and the owner feels a moral obligation to do all he can by protest and by deed to prevent so unrighteous an eventuality. So too the average business man feels that a clerk's services should be paid for at a certain rate. To be compelled to pay more is to be forced to stand and deliver by economic necessity. The clerk who demands more is a bandit who ought to be resisted and even punished on the score of principle.

Is this ascription of an ethical foundation to economic value a mere inadvertence or figure of speech the impropriety of which is easily revealed by analysis? To believe so is certainly to run counter to prevailing habits of thought and modes of expression. If there is no justification in saying that prices ought to be thus and so, then the popular mind is victimized by a constant illusion. Would it not be quite as likely that the cynical conviction that ethics has nothing to do with economic value be itself an illusion, a bit of unconscious deceit behind which he who wishes to justify a shabby transaction hides himself from his conscience?

Let us see whether analysis can do anything to clear up the matter. First, we notice that men do not content themselves with saying *ought* in reference to prices, but they also

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try to justify themselves in so doing. The crux of our problem will be found in these justifications. If they have genuine ethical import, then we are not utterly silly when we talk about what it would be *right* for us to get or give for services rendered or received. To limit a little our treatment, I propose to consider only the value of services. The considerations which apply to them will *mutatis mutandis* be pertinent to the value of goods.

Among the reasons which men commonly offer as a basis for what they declare labor of any sort ought to be worth there are six which may, perhaps, be declared of major importance. These are: (1) custom, (2) the productivity of the labor, (3) supply and demand, (4) the disagreeableness, danger, or difficulty of the task, (5) the needs of the laborer, (6) that which will best promote the welfare and progress of society.

1. Undoubtedly the most influential consideration that affects the judgment of men as to the value of services is custom. Whether it be a washerwoman or a bank president, the customary wage will commonly be regarded as right. A departure from this wonted payment surprises us. If we buy labor more cheaply, we feel guilty of harming our helpers even while we get relief—indeed, elation—because of our enhanced purchasing power. If labor costs us more, we are irritated, outraged, scandalized. Men's emotions are stirred in much the same way about that which they receive. They are enraged at the injustice of reduced salaries. They are ashamed to ask more than the accustomed fees.

What rationality is there in this feeling that custom is right? The natural first answer is that it was a sense of justice that led in the beginning to the establishment of the custom. If this were all, we should now be able to defend the custom because of its obvious justice, which should be as apparent today as when it came into being. However, men do not usually justify the customary by proving that it is right.

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Rather, they feel that it is right because it is customary. Can this attitude be said to have any ethical justification?

At this point the psychologist is apt to interpose. The feeling of the rightness of a custom, he will say, is due merely to the fact that what is habitually done is normally easy, pleasant. Other things being equal, it is more agreeable to do things in an accustomed than in a new way, and this feeling is then interpreted as conscientious approval. Thus we justify to ourselves, or rationalize, our tendency to follow our inclinations. We further assure ourselves that our feelings are not deluding us by falling back on an *argumentum ad verecundiam*. Our wise and just ancestors, we are sure, knew what is right when they established this custom. Or, it has stood the test of time and is thus of proved rightness.

Is this a complete account of the derivation of the feeling that the customary is right? A little analysis will, I think, show much more to it. Custom represents stability, uniformity. Where custom prevails we can predict and fashion our conduct to realize our purposes. We can *count on* a society that respects its customs. These common practices of men are implied promises to all who would enter into social relationships and do for others services for which they expect the customary return. A society that does not respect its customs is in so far an unreliable, a faithless, society. It is certainly fundamental in morals that men keep faith. A man who has prepared for a vocation in which the customs of society assure certain rewards has a right to feel aggrieved when this vocation is destroyed or rendered of less importance by changes which society voluntarily brings about. A naval officer deprived of his calling by a "peace wave" may well complain at the reform that pays its costs largely by breaking its implied promises to him. So, too, we cannot help feeling that there is a certain rightness, albeit narrowness, in the hostility of workmen to labor-saving machinery and devices which to them are the parents of unemployment. The nation that repudiates its

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debts by inflating its currency is universally condemned as betraying the faith of its people. Yet implied promises are here not more shamelessly broken than in a multitude of other cases where the change in the custom is hailed as an economic reform.

Customary wages and prices mean simply that our labor will buy what we understood it would when we undertook to perform it. They mean that we live in a society that gives to us what it has led us to expect. It will be objected that custom perpetuates abuses. It pays many too much and very many far too little. All this is most true; yet respect for the right of custom remains. The Russian princess enjoying arrogantly and selfishly wealth and power which she did nothing to produce or deserve we may, in our anger, wish to see brought by first-hand experience to realize how the other half lives. Nevertheless, when a revolution drives this princess to scrubbing floors to get the barest necessities of life, we cannot but feel that an outrage has been committed. The princess has been unjustly deprived of her birthright. The average man felt great moral indignation that during the war workmen earned so much that many wore silk shirts and drove to their work in automobiles. So unprecedented a situation was regarded as positive proof of a lack of conscience on the part of the men who had forced their wages to a monstrous figure. What people have been accustomed to from childhood they are apt to feel they have a right to expect and even to demand.

This right of service to its customary reward is based on the necessities of intelligent planning. If one is to work for a long while to master a craft or to learn a profession, he should not have the cup dashed from his lips as he is about to drink. We feel mistrustful of the maxim "let the buyer beware." Shall we not even more deplore that rule of caution in a changing world, "let the producer beware"?

2. Those who think about the justice of economic rewards agree almost, if not quite, universally that men should get

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what they produce. Such a criterion can be easily applied when life is close to nature; and today we unhesitatingly fall back on it in cases where the product is the unquestioned result of the unaided effort of an individual. If a child constructs a toy, if a girl makes a dress, if a pioneer builds a log house, if an inventor constructs a new device, if a poet writes stirring verses, or a dramatist puts together some clever ideas into the plot and dialogue of a play, each should have for his own that which he is solely responsible for bringing into being.

But while most agree on the essential justice of this principle, they will with almost equal unanimity pronounce it difficult, if not impossible, to apply in modern life, where nearly all products are a result of co-operation of many agencies. In the case of a shoe, how much of the value of the finished article is the creation of the cattle-raiser and of each of his various employees, of each of the score or more of factory workmen who actually participate in the construction of the product? How much shall be attributed to superintendent, to wholesaler, to retailer, and to all those who assist in handling and transporting the bit of merchandise? What part of the profit should be regarded as the rightful reward of capital, and what should be assigned to labor? One often hears that a manager is worth the sum by which the addition of his services increases the profits of an enterprise. If the same principle be applied to labor, the workmen should get all of the product, for without their effort production would be impossible. Indeed, has not labor commonly made this claim? Whenever the factors in production are so necessary to each other that none can be dispensed with, it would seem that each is entitled to claim all. Hence the principle that we should give to each all that is made possible through his help leads to an absurdity.

Quite as serious a difficulty springs from the almost, if not quite, unmeasurable character of the value of some services. The value of teaching, of advice and exhortation, of amuse-

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ment, and the like—who can estimate these? A court would hesitate to award to a physician the sum at which his wealthy patient values the life which his skill has saved; and this is among the easiest of such services to evaluate. Where the service depends upon the response of the recipient, where its results are realized only in a more or less remote future, where there may be difficulty in determining the difference it has made in the life of the one upon whom it is bestowed, there the principle that each should get what he produces seems hardly to be available.

But a more serious defect in this criterion remains. It is a question whether, as the sole means of determining economic reward, it is ethically sound. A society in which each gets what he produces would hardly be an ideal one. The productive power of men varies widely both as to quantity and as to quality. Would a community in which what each receives varies as much be satisfactory to the conscience? Or would we be offended at the crass selfishness of such a condition? It would certainly be the extreme of individualism, and it would seem foreign to the social nature of man. It would run counter to the idealism of service, whether to family, or state, or humanity, or religion. Imagine even a primitive society in which there was no sharing with the weak and the needy of what the strong and the clever produce. The only ethical principles which we can discern in such a social condition are those concerned in the protection of personal and property rights and in inspiring the individual to do the best he can for himself.

Some may think that this is as far as ethical demands go. Looking at the matter from one point of view, for a man to share in what he did not produce would seem like giving him more than he has a right to demand or even expect. It is the kindly or charitable disposition of those more fortunate, rather than their sense of duty, which enables him to fare so well. Yet a society in which this kindliness, this wish to see others

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share in the goods which one has created, is lacking would appear to be a very bleak and cheerless affair. Can it be that so un-ideal a condition is ethically satisfactory? Or must the ethically perfect be 100 per cent ideal?

The unsatisfactory character of a society in which each gets just what he produces is even more evident where men inherit from others. Man owes much to humanity. As a rule, the greater his capabilities, the more he needs social co-operation to use them. All the instrumentalities created by social evolution come to his aid to produce that which would have no value to him except for its social demand. For him to monopolize this product looks like ingratitude. It can be justified only on the ground that he has a better claim on it than others with whom it might be shared. This purely negative defense can hardly be regarded as satisfactory from one who is himself so largely a beneficiary.

It might be argued that in a co-operative society each produces by simply occupying a place in the order that exists and by which as a whole production goes on. By a kind of fiction, each is a producer because he is a member of a society which is the great adjunct of production. However useful this fiction may be as a means of reconciling the doctrine that each should have only what he produces with the notion that men should serve and not be selfish, it is evident that through it we can get no definite criterion for determining just what pay each should receive.

Much of the force of the idea that each should get what he produces is due to the assumption that production is in proportion to zeal in work. The lazy have no claim on the rewards of industry. If this were all, the principle in question would ethically be much more satisfactory, although it is possible that even the lazy deserve some consideration on the score of being abnormal or diseased. But production is not a result of industry alone. Some put forth great effort to no avail; others easily bring into existence that which has extra-

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ordinary economic value. The ethical distribution of the products of unequal ability is by no means as simple as is the justice of the rule of John Smith that "He who does not work shall not eat."

3. "Good old supply and demand," the principle of valuation so resolutely insisted on by the classical economists, has commonly been thought to have no ethical quality, but simply to be the natural, inevitable law of economic life. Nevertheless, curiously enough we sometimes hear men berate as quite unjustifiable the endeavor of their fellows to get more or give less for services than the law of supply and demand warrants. Interference with free competition in supply by labor unions or by capitalists who corner a commodity is commonly looked upon as reprehensible. If obstructing the operation of the law be wrong, there must be something righteous about the law itself.

Moreover, the existence of such interferences with supply and demand shows that it is hardly as inevitable as some economists have assumed. If it could not be in any degree set aside, then, of course, it would be futile to talk of any obligation in reference to it. Values would be settled not by an *ought,* but by a *must.* If, however, we can by our wills control either demand or supply or both, then moral considerations such as are wont to affect decisions have a share in determining the values established by the law itself. It is quite possible that at times it is wrong to interfere with free competition in the fixing of values by supply and demand, while at others such interference should be regarded as the only means of securing justice.

Wherein is the principle of supply and demand an ethically justifiable criterion to determine what reward services should receive? Those who have especially championed the idea that economic life should be left to the free operation of this law of "get what you can and give what you must" are the individualists of the later eighteenth and early ninteenth centu-

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ries. They were most concerned in the removal of the tyrannies of government, and paid little or no attention to those that are due to accidental or natural advantages. They believed in the natural. Economic demand, or that which the individual was willing to pay rather than be deprived of what he wanted, they held to be the natural, and consequently just, way of determining prices. It was also thought fair for one to get all he could for his services. To safeguard against the extortions of monopoly, the individualist relied upon the capacity to shift freely from one employment to another.

We are today prone to look with suspicion upon the assumption that because a practice is natural it is right. Morality has been too often compelled to restrain and, indeed, to reverse human nature for us to feel content uncritically to indorse the natural. Especially is this true of economic rewards, where "natural" supply is so often determined by accident or by clever overreaching rather than by deserving effort, and where demand is frequently the harsh call of a vital need instead of a want easily modified or suppressed. Nevertheless, we are ultimately driven, when we seek a basis for valuation, to the wants of human nature. There is no other way of finding out how much a thing is worth except by the discovery of how much men want it—that is, how much they are willing to sacrifice to get it. It is true that men can be induced to modify their wants. Experience and reflection, the suggestions that come from others, may lead certain desires to shrink and others, at first weak, to come into authority. But at the last there is no escape from the proposition that the instincts, the interests—in a word, the demands of human nature determine the worth of things.

But if reward according to the law of demand has an ethical quality, what shall we say about its determination according to supply? In general, supply is correlated with productiveness, the ethical merits of which as a criterion we have already considered. As regards services, supply may be said to

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be available capacity for production. These available resources may be monopolized either by accident or by design, and in such cases we feel that undue rewards are being exacted. Economists commonly assume that such monopolistic profits are short lived and that in the long run what each supplies is what each produces in the occupation in which he can most profitably employ himself. This assumption can hardly be granted.

4. It is very common for us to feel that where the tasks involve more difficulty, more disagreeableness, more danger, more responsibility, they should be paid better. A washerwoman commands more pay than an ordinary seamstress, although the latter is possibly a little more skilled than the former. Switchmen, electric linemen, and the like are thought to deserve more because of the risks they run. A workman or a salesman made a foreman or a manager is paid much more because of greater annoyances and responsibilities. The white-collar occupations are frequently today paid less than those involving hard manual toil, because they are cleaner and easier. They maintain their ascendency only in case they involve long preparation, apprenticeship, or the like. Such elaborate preparation may be regarded as increasing the difficulty of an occupation, and so properly balanced against the labor which it enables those who undertake it to escape.

The practice of paying more for more difficult or disagreeable tasks may be regarded as due to economic necessity rather than to the feeling that a greater reward is deserved. We have to pay more to induce people to take greater risks, to do harder work, to make long preparation, or to incur heavier responsibility. In general this may be true. However, even when the supply of those who are ready to undertake the heavier task greatly exceeds the demand, it is commonly thought to be worthy of a remuneration in proportion to its difficulty. A dozen men equally fit for the job might be candidates for a responsible position, and even willing to take it

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without additional compensation, yet we should feel that it should command a salary commensurate with its responsibility. We ought to pay more, and do so even though we do not have to.

5. When we take up our fifth basis for economic reward, namely, the needs of the individual, we seem to have departed from the realm of duty and entered that of charity. What obligation is there on any of us to see to it that others are paid what they need? To carry out such a principle would be to give little or nothing to many whose services are of the greatest value, and much to a number whose labors are insignificant in results. The conception of the socialists that we should get from each according to his ability and give to each according to his needs is looked upon by many as a sort of feeble-minded idealism. Nevertheless, the Christianity that is so loudly professed by not a few of these scornful ones has preached throughout the ages the *duty* of charity. It is perhaps true that the world owes no living to the idler; but how about him who has done his best to contribute to production? Has he no claim to a living wage? The ideal of a minimum wage maintains that he has such a claim.

It is especially interesting to note that our principle is invoked not only to justify the payment to those by whom little is produced of enough to meet the needs of the lowest decent standard of living, but also to defend giving large compensation to such as are placed in positions which are presumed to demand a high scale of expenditure. We assume that leaders in the professions, directors, managers, presidents, judges, diplomats should be paid so that they can maintain the position appropriate to their vocational rank. It is felt that people of higher ability and breeding need more than the stupid and uneducated, and that in consequence they should receive more.

A very troublesome problem arises in connection with the burdens involved in supporting families. Shall men with fam-

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ilies be paid more because law and custom require them to maintain their dependents, or shall there be "equal pay for equal work"? It is worth noting that the women of New York City, who made so much of this slogan in their campaign to have the salaries of women teachers placed on a parity with those of men, felt it necessary to point out that many women teachers supported dependents. Apparently this concedes the ethical merit of considering need in fixing pay.

The principle we are considering is plainly somewhat idealistic. Practical men will urge the difficulty or impossibility of settling satisfactorily how much each needs. Once grant the criterion as a basis for payment, and each person will promptly insist that his necessities are as great as those of anyone. Who has a right to determine what one needs except himself? Despite this difficulty, those who have it in their power to fix compensation are constantly influenced by their judgment as to what the recipients need. Practically we assume that we can, at least for the time, arrive at an objective standard in such matters.

6. Our final principle, that men should be paid such incomes as will result in the greatest amount of welfare and progress in society, is in a manner a synthesis of the other principles. Whatever of ethical merit there is in the stability of custom, in the natural right of the producer, in the democratic and stimulating appeal to free competition, appears in the value of these factors as contributing to the total well-being. Even the merit of recognizing need seems to rest back considerably on the idea that only a beneficent society is a truly prosperous one.

But the comprehensiveness of the criterion makes it difficult to interpret and apply. Shall we follow the guidance of the Utilitarians? The calculus of happiness, hard where the individual alone is concerned, is vastly more difficult when we are compelled to consider the happiness of all. Shall some Nietzschean ideal of a superman or a superstate of being de-

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termine our method of distributing our wealth? The idea is too nebulous to do much more than inspire. Nevertheless, we do feel ethical satisfaction in an economic order which, according to our lights, seems most conducive to the general good. Such a principle, vague and uncertain at first, grows constantly more definite with reinterpretation. This defining process utilizes everywhere the other five major principles which we have outlined, as well as a number of minor ones.

The problem of the distribution of wealth rests back on the proper payment of services. This is the most fundamental, the most persistent, social problem of the age. Can we doubt that there will be a constantly increasing demand that justice shall determine its solution? The world must find what justice is in such matters, and it ought to get some help from the philosophers.

ADELPHI COLLEGE
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

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PRIVATE VIEWS OF THE LAST *FIN-DE-SIÈCLE*[1]

C. WILLIAMSON

We are told that at the end of the nineteenth century, between the first and second jubilees of Queen Victoria, there was considerable discontent seething in the minds of young English artists. The Queen ruled not only the waves, but the Muses; East and West met at her footstool, and the boyish masqueraders found themselves surrounded by a self-satisfied commercial society, "in which," as Mr. Burdett says, "the pressure of numbers had become so great that the needs and standards of the multitude necessarily dominated everything." Writers like Macaulay (in high places) and Samuel Smiles (lower down the board) had preached to millions a gospel of commercial prosperity as the salvation of humanity. The successful citizen toiled at his office all the week, and marched to church on Sundays, in top hat and white waistcoat, with a little file of family behind him, the apparent apotheosis of the domestic virtues. The temptation to youth to "'eave 'alf a brick at him" was irresistible. What so easy as to shout that his morality was half-humbug and his very business honor a fraud! What an effective counterblast to proclaim that all this pretense was really starving the national intellect! What a natural corollary that, since to repress the normal impulses was manifestly impossible, it was more honest and healthy to let the inclinations have their way, and to satirize the corruption of deceit by a genial celebration of the delights of "sin"! Such was the genesis of the Beardsley period—"an unashamed precocity," protesting against the shifts and subterfuges of a mammon-hearted middle age in the patois of suburbia, which is the English language filtered through steak, toast, tea, and marmalade.

[1] Osbert Burdett, *The Beardsley Period*, 1925; Richard le Gallienne, *The Romantic '90's*, 1926; Thomas Beer, *The Mauve Decade*, 1926.

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One result of this, as time goes on, will be to show that "Victorian" must be used of time only, not of character. A Victorian writer, in short, is merely a writer who "flourished" in the spacious days of that admirable monarch, not one who wrote in a particular way. There is no Victorian type of literature, as some modern textbooks vainly imagine. There are no "set forms" of Victorian poetry, against which the neo-Georgians can lead a "revolt." To some extent, doubtless, all or nearly all the Victorians were bound by the same conventions. There were certain things which, having clear ideas about the limits of decent behavior, they would not do. That may not have been a disadvantage. Apart from this, however, in no period of English literature was there such amazing variety as among the Victorian authors. And as for the imagined "set forms" of poetry, never were there bolder or more diverse experiments in the manner of English verse than those made by Tennyson, Swinburne, Browning, Arnold, Morris, Christina Rossetti; never was there more freedom, more metrical invention.

The anti-Victorians find it convenient to forget that Oscar Wilde, Aubrey Beardsley, and all the other pioneers or "decadents [so called] of the nineties" were entirely Victorian, however hard they strove to create a new earth—and a new hell. Oscar Wilde, the apostle of beauty, the John Baptist of aesthetic clothing and blue china, spent his youthful and most impressionable years in the early sixties, when crinolines and chignons were most exorbitant, pot-hats and peg-top trousers most pestiferously predominant, in rooms ornate with gilt consoles and glass shades and hung with heavily corniced and festooned curtains of rep or plush.

The truth is that under the falsetto and the flaunting color of the *Yellow Book*[2] masquerade there ran a deep, strong

[2] The *Yellow Book* was started with the idea of giving opportunities to those who sighed for greater liberty. Most novelists used asterisks when a situation became delicate or veiled it in cautious phrases. The idea of using the South Sea Islands from Honolulu downward had never occurred to those who were trying their

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stream of artistic impulse and of keen literary sincerity. Whatever were its crudities of youth and arrogance, it started the reformation of the English short story by setting its feet upon the right path. These young men were out to shock the middle class, no doubt; but they enjoyed the escapade because they believed it to be a sort of revolutionary crusade. They did not assume their tone for the sake of "circulation" and a full purse; the commercial reward of their work was their very last concern. However "mad, and sad, and bad" they were, they were artists, one and all, at heart.

The horizons of literature and art, however, are distant, while the products of thirty years ago are still so close to us that it is not very easy, and perhaps not very salutary, to try to see them in perspective. Here seems to come in again that doubt about the propriety of writing this book at all which we have just dismissed. Let it, then, be admitted without demur that Mr. Burdett had a right to essay a labor which two or three writers before him had conspicuously failed to perform to our satisfaction.

The nineties in the arts, especially if we confine them rather severely to their action in London, do constitute a province which is worth exploring. It embraces a group of poets, novelists, and draughtsmen who interacted rapidly and forcibly on one another, and who have contrived to retain the attention of the reading public.

In spite of his title, Mr. Burdett explains at the very start that "the nineties is not a period, but a point of view," and it is this point of view which he endeavors to expound and explain. Many great artists were living in the "Beardsley period" who cannot be said to have belonged to it, though the influences which played upon it moved them also. Dr. Bridges, Mr. Kipling, Mr. Hardy, Henry James, Meredith, lived through the

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hand at fiction: how opportune it was for a young man and his lady-love to be shipwrecked, not likely to attract the notice of the police or a passing ship for a number of years! *De l'audace.*

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time, but are hardly kin to Beardsley and Ernest Dowson; Mrs. Meynell may, as some have suggested, be linked to them by her fastidious prose, but she is poles apart in temperament and opinion. In a series of very brilliant chapters Mr. Burdett examines the background, the French influences at work, Beardsley, Wilde, the lesser poets of the movement, the prose-writers, and the periodicals. Here and there one is inclined to protest that he has underrated the poems of a John Davidson or overrated the drawings of somebody else. But in a general way he is both just and illuminating; better criticism of Beardsley has never been written, and nowhere is there to be found so sage or so elegant an appreciation of Wilde. And in the end, after all his descriptions of Beardsley and Wilde, Crackanthorpe and George Egerton, Le Gallienne, Henry Harland, Francis Adams and Mr. Symons, Ella d'Arcy and Dowson, the early Max and Whistler, he summarizes the whole movement as a continuation of that reaction against modern society which was expressed by Swinburne and the pre-Raphaelites. It was the culmination of the movement to escape; and it represented an attitude of mind which, in varying degrees, must exist in all societies, since all societies are imperfect. He says:

> The Aesthetic temper is mainly one which enjoys without creating anything more permanent than conversation, which is content with all that has been already done in art, and dreads the conditions out of which all new art, except pure poetry, is produced, however much they may be capable of appreciating the results attained by it. Unfitted for commercial pursuits, which it is their point of honour to despise, and imperfectly endowed with creative imagination, these men fall between the two worlds of art and industry.

Usually good advice falls flat on the ears of the rising generation because the older folk do not really know how things are today; because their ways of looking at things are out of date, so dimmed by the dust of wornout traditions and conventions, so distorted by the old fastidious dread of horrid and

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indecent realism. But when a novel is written by someone who knows all there is to know about the world's shady places, who is familiar with the steps of every dance and the taste of every cocktail, and the meaning of every word of slang, and the pace of those experiences in ignorance or disdain of which a healthier happiness lies, then youth will listen at any rate, even if it is too young and too wilful to learn. Never too old to learn, but very often too young, alas!

After thirty years the younger generation still chants the rosy vesperals of Ernest Dowson, and apes (with inferior prowess) the subtle and insinuating suggestions of Aubrey Beardsley. And now Mr. Burdett comes forward with an erudite monograph, designed to put the *Yellow Book* movement into its proper perspective in literary history, and solemnly begins his analysis with references to Dante, the Council of Trent, and the so-called Reformation of Martin Luther. It may be, perhaps, as the Somerset miner remarked, "rather a heavy funeral dinner for such a little corpse," but it is a vastly edifying undertaking none the less. For, after all, "nothing in this world is single"; every new movement keeps touch with an old one; and it is no fresh task to trace the dust of Alexander, until one finds it filling a barrel's bunghole.

In Beardsley there was a real passion of rebellion; his cynicism and his satire have some elemental force behind them. He is our English counterpart to Baudelaire, and he has his share of Baudelaire's classical restraint. But in the rest of the shadowy and already half-forgotten figures the rebellion was so feeble that it strikes us now as indistinguishable from pose. It may not have been pose, but we cannot tell the difference. Who, if we look back, struck the really telling blow against Victorian complacency? Was it not Thomas Hardy, when he published *Jude the Obscure?* And the more rigorous are Mr. Burdett's critical standards, the more patent becomes the ineffectuality and the lack of real achievement in the movement he admires.

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A strange chance brought the names of Wilde and Beardsley into contiguity, although they had very little in common, and but faint interest in each other. Mr. Burdett speaks of "the historical accident which decided the pitch on which their work was done," and that pitch, the *Yellow Book* falsetto, was all they had in common. The difficulty of treating them in concert consists in the fact that (if I am right, and in judging matters so close to us one should not be too dogmatic) their difference as executants was positively startling. Aubrey Beardsley had a mind of profound originality and a capacity for handicraft in which he had no rival. Oscar Wilde had little originality, and suffered from a technical imperfection which he never overcame. It might be extravagant, but would indicate the truth, to say that Wilde never wrote a poem that was quite his own, and that Beardsley never made a drawing which was at all anyone else's: we recognize the sharp decision of his lines, and the extraordinary distinctive quality of his designs, his uncanny power of expressing a temperament in a face the size of a dime or sixpence, or a world of charming invention in the sweep of a dress.

The art of the nineties, so far as it was able to shock and therefore fascinate its contemporaries, did so by its appeal to consciences which had ceased to be stirred by theoretical precepts and shrank from no errors of experience. The poets and illustrators were, as Mr. Burdett ingeniously points out, "impelled on every side to concentrate on the hidden and the evil." His reflections on this subject are valuable.

A recent writer has suggested, as an explanation of the hero-worship of the Victorians, that the more the scientists shed their faith in God, the more did they invest their contemporaries with divine attributes.

Whether it is to our credit or no, there is no getting away from the fact that we are incapable of regarding the leaders of the Victorian age with the same uncritical hero-worship as

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inspired their contemporaries, or even of accepting them at the valuation which they set upon themselves.

> To what was due this apparent preoccupation with diabolical manifestations, with an extremity of beauty that infused malignant forms? It was partly an accident, partly a criticism. . . . . Through the oppression of popular standards of the crowd upon each man, the imagination of the time became preoccupied with the sport of sin, which Blake had been the first to identify with virtue. . . . .

The art (or craft) of prophesying after the event is always with us. Not long ago I heard an address on deserts given by a geographer (new style) who, knowing as ascertained fact that Sahara and Gobi stood (like Scotland) where they did, was able to prove conclusively that they must be where they are, and could not be anywhere else. This is gratifying, but it seems to leave things much as before, especially the deserts. Historians, too, as well as geographers, indulge regularly in the habit described by Disraeli as discovering the future when it has taken place, and literary critics make no bad third.

Peacock predicted men of letters "roving severally over the universe in search of new subjects and sensations, cut off from their fellows and from reasonable society." So admirable an artist thought he walked along the tight-rope of conjecture —but in reality he moved along, with admirable ease, the old street called straight. Each group, having its own chosen idol, independently contributed to the creation of the *fin de siècle*. Himself a member of the group, Richard le Gallienne rightly says that "it is plain that here was not so much the ending of a century as the beginning of a new one. Those last ten years of the nineteenth century properly belong to the twentieth century, and, far from being 'decadent,' except in certain limited manifestations, they were years of an immense and multifarious renaissance." As often happens, the pioneers were bigger men and women than those who have since entered into the new world they opened up, and who, in many cases, it may be thought, have pushed their conclusions to a *reductio*

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ad absurdum. After all, a *Sieges-allee* has got to be filled. The available supplies of normal men who figured honorably in significant literary movements are often hastily looked over and re-dressed to play impressive parts of which they knew but little themselves. The primary ingredient is so often a quite ordinary person, but the pot is often stirred by greater forces in search of unknown soldiers in its claim for Valhalla.

The danger of selecting a number of prominent books and minds as typical, and of drawing general conclusions from the works of men whose essential characteristic is their individuality and genius, is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the history of English poetry in the nineteenth century. It is the habit of many a "primer" or "manual" to treat the poetry of the century as if it were dominated by Tennyson or Browning, or even as if it were stifled under the tyranny of the school of Arnold. This is like making universal history merely *histoire de battailles*. The history of literature is not identical with the history of individual literary genius. The history of literature is the record of the sum-total of what has been written duly co-ordinated on a central plan. All that happens in the world of letters is part of the voice of mankind preserved for later generations. The homely letter of a simple peasant, the brilliant epigram of a wit, the scurrilous pamphlet of a political hack, the profound reflections of a philosopher, the wild prophecies of a visionary, the sublime epic and the deft sonnet, the rambling novel and the neat essay, all that has been written of man's life is part of the history of the literature, which is the study of life in words.

If all the books that the vaults of the British Museum, the Vatican, and the Congressional Library contain have their place in the history of literature, then surely all the rejected and unpublished manuscripts, all the letters burned and unburned, have their place in it also. All the ear-splitting discords emitted by English children chained to the piano-stool have their place in the history of English music; all the draw-

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ings made by reluctant scholars at the bidding of the art-master their place in the history of English art. If the merciful finger of destiny has wiped the greater part of these from human memory, and so ordained that the history of literature and music and art shall be forever incomplete, why should we not accept the precedent, and make our contribution toward the destruction of the useless by declaring that a bookful of rubbish is still rubbish even though it has been saved from not being by an act of Parliament and the steely vaults of Gower Street?

The only condition on which we will really listen to those who come forward to challenge the values we have is that they should submit others of their own discovery. Whether nature does or does not abhor a vacuum, we, her children, certainly do; and unless a writer satisfies that instinct of mankind, he sacrifices his chance of universality. Most writers do it by instinct; and if they have passed through a period in which the instinct itself is called in question, they reach a conviction, in the light of which systematic doubt appears hardly more than a youthful amusement. Consciously or unconsciously, they make the *salto mortale* of a great assumption.

The title of the chief book we are considering, though borrowed from Mr. Beerbohm, is infelicitous. For the "Beardsley period" lasted through no more than one year. It began (to be precise) in April, 1894; it ended in April, 1895. The former of these dates saw the first issue of the *Yellow Book,* before which, as Mr. Burdett admits, Beardsley was almost unknown. And in April, 1895, he was compelled to withdraw from the art-editorship of that periodical. A violent outburst against the decadent school was provoked by Oscar Wilde's downfall, and as Mr. Beerbohm—quoted by Mr. Burdett—observes, from that date the Beardsley period was over. There can be no doubt either of the genius and decorative power, or of the evil in his drawings. But we cannot share Mr. Burdett's view that the evil was merely faithful portraiture; we admire, for

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the most part, the nineties far less than he does, yet we should be loath to believe with him that "the evil that informs the Beardsley drawings was an evil that informed the typical soul, and so the typical face, of his contemporaries." Whatever her faults of face or character, we are positive that the average woman of this period did not look at all like the female of the Beardsley drawings—the "Cussed Damosel," as Sir Owen Seaman described her:

> Hers are the bulging lips that fairly break
> The pumpkin's heart; and hers the eyes that shame
> The wanton ape that culls the coco-nuts;
> Even such the yellow-bellied toads that slake
> Nocturnally their amorous-ardent flame
> In the wan waste of weary water-butts.

Indeed, *Punch*, with Sir Owen Seaman's parodies and Mr. E. T. Reed's wonderful caricatures of the Beardsley drawings, did much to laugh the *Yellow Book* out of court—as *Patience*, in the previous decade, had helped to slay the aesthetic movement.

For the most of them merely played at naughtiness. On paper they were terrible fellows; in real life they were—except in talk—fairly normal. Now and again some weaker character allowed the pose to become reality, living the kind of life it was the fashion to pretend to lead. Hence such tragedies as those of Ernest Dowson and Lionel Johnson and John Davidson.

Perhaps the best point of the *Yellow Book* group was that all its members cared for form, and bestowed pains upon their work. Their affectations, often irritating, were at least well meant; they had tricks of style, but they had style. They were resolute to write English as well as they could. And this ideal they shared with another group of the same period—the group which centered round W. E. Henley and the *National Observer*.

There is a great deal to be said for the view that intellec-

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tual subtlety is socially safe only when it is employed for a definite and recognized end. The most casuistical lawyer is in private life generally a pillar of society. He knows where to draw the line. The people who are rather less certain are rounded up safely into the category of professional philosophers on the sound theory that any specialist, even a specialist in crime, is relatively harmless.

So tolerant have we grown nowadays that we treat the absurd conventions of the past with mere ridicule. Yet we must not forget how serious were their results, how irreparable the losses they inflicted on our literature. Thus the artificial code of the nineteenth century did not merely weaken books that were written, but hindered many desirable books from being written at all. In our own more enlightened time we may marvel indeed at the theory deterring a wife during her husband's lifetime from putting an intimate description of him into print! He might be a person of some official standing, like a prime minister, or a man of real importance, like a popular novelist. The public would feel that it had a right to the fullest information about him. But really the best thing that could happen to such books would be that they should be read by his political opponents and avoided by his friends, for they always contain aspects of the truth and aspects commonly avoided.

Why should our conception of genius be bounded by the lonely figures of Nietzsche and Strindberg (who both answer almost exactly to Mr. Rubenstein's description of his Paul), and the isolated madman be taken as typical? Genius has no "type," or, if it had, Leonardo, who could bend a horseshoe in his hands, and Rubens, who went through life in full enjoyment of the privileges of an ambassador, could as well serve for it. Against every Nietzsche there can be set a Wagner, against every Strindberg a Browning, against every Rousseau (who could face no responsibility) a Danton (who could face all responsibility), against every Marie Bashkirtseff (for

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whom life was empty) a George Sand (for whom every moment of it was adorable). And then—when each of the half-dozen neurotic geniuses of the world has been matched with an eminently sane and vital genius and canceled out—the main artistic output of the world still seems to have been left in the hands of people who ate and talked and shouted their way through life with more than normal gusto and a capacity for enjoyment unequaled by ordinary men. The characteristic of genius is vitality.

Passing to social aspects, the full shaft of disdainful criticism is launched mainly against the women of early and mid-Victorian days, the attacks emanating, it would seem, principally from their tubelike and "shingled" successors of today, aided by journalistic young men who admire the feminine modes and "manners" of the present period. The grandmothers, or great-grandmothers, of these young persons are stated, without reservation, to have been collectively a poor, anemic set of girls who lived mainly by the fireside of airless, sheltered homes; who fainted on every conceivable occasion, ranging from the appearance of a mouse to the proposal of marriage, which was their only aim and object in life. In reply, we may point out that some proportion of women have fainted all through the ages and (whisper it not!) they do so even in 1927.

The Mauve Decade is Mr. Thomas Beer's name for the temperament of literary America—or the fashionable part of it—in the corresponding decade of last century. *Fin de siècle* it liked to call itself on both sides of the Atlantic until the parrot-word became unbearable, but the period was more interesting as beginning our succeeding generation than as closing the former. The color-symbol would be puzzling if Mr. Beer were not good enough to explain it on his title-page: "Mr. Whistler said, 'Mauve is just pink trying to be purple.'"

Seen in its present perspective, the decade of the nineties has few admirers; the tender grace of a day that is dead has

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not had time to settle on it, and its ornaments and furnishings are being so thoroughly turned about and examined and appraised that it looks as if cynicism would not give place to sentiment for some time to come.

The spirit of revolt is common to the ages; but what distinguished the movement of the nineties from so many less effectual outbursts was the downright sincerity and artistic purpose of its leaders. Whatever may be urged against the decadents of the *Yellow Book,* one thing is certain; they were all, as Mr. Burdett insists, "distinguished by a scholarly respect for English and an intense desire to write well." The best of them took Walter Pater for their model: Sir Edmund Gosse says that he remembered hearing Lionel Johnson once declare that all modern prose must mold itself upon Pater's principles. They met together in taverns and saloon-bars to read their verses, some of them accompanied by tangle-haired wenches, some of them celibate votaries of the vine. Their company and their haunts were a childish protest against conventionality; they are scattered now, and the atmosphere of gaslight and tankard is blown to the winds. Yet in changing their vices they did not change or improve their characters altogether.

The nineties saw the dissipation of the Romantic movement; its vision of life, which had touched the top of the hills with morning a century before, and had risen, says the writer of one of the books upon which this disquisition hangs,

> to dominate the meridian of the long Victorian day, had reached the term of its impulse. Men believed indeed that it was lifting the fringe of the horizon and prolonging the cycle of its hours, but the new rays that it was shooting along the heavens, if rich in their veins of colour, or mysterious in the shadows that they cast, were the signals of a setting sun, the dissipation of an energy which could not survive the limits of its period. The glow seen at dawn becomes a wound in the heart of the evening, and the inverted energy of decay can deceive contemporaries into thinking that the slanting rays that spread towards their horizontal rest are replicas of

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those others which, occupying a similar point in the eastern sky, are travelling vertically towards the zenith.

We are told:

Satisfactory explanations of anything proceed either in terms of the familiar or in terms of the simple. The two types are often regarded as the same, but in fact they are very different. Most people when they ask for a "simple" explanation mean an explanation in terms of entities with which they are familiar. These entities are usually very complex, and truly simple entities are usually very strange. One of the merits of Einstein's theory, for instance, is the simplicity and precision of its necessary assumptions. They are certainly not familiar, and for that reason most people find them very difficult to grasp.

Victorianism was a growth or attitude which had no psychology; indeed, it can hardly be explained otherwise, and it was the quality of sanctimonious success that gave to every branch of life its pomp and form.

The effort to catch the spirit of the Victorian age is not likely to succeed in our time. We are too close. We are really, in spite of our determination to disown and our tendency to denigrate, too fond; and every man who writes of the period from knowledge or research is found by others who know the age to be writing only of one aspect, or one rather special group.

We talk of the Victorian period as a something that will pass in its turn. It will never pass away from human annals. It is by far the largest experiment in all literature of a whole nation moralized in thought, feeling the way of life by the fiat of a child not yet in her teens, with "I will be good" for her motto. She divined that "my people" hungered and thirsted for the righteousness of respectability, in the persons of a middle class rising to wealth and power.

From socialist clergyman, and pre-Raphaelite art for the slums of Whitechapel, from dashing posters to gaping crowds, there is scarcely one among the spirited performers whom time

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has not justified. The manufacture was unceasing, but who was great?

To conclude, these books are an amazing *tour de force*, so amazing that at a first reading one wonders how much longer the balls can remain poised in the air. When they drop a little in their rhythmical motion you think they must fall; but the fountains are equal to it, and spurt strongly all through, reserving for the last pages a final triumphant jet to send the fantastic sphere out of our range of vision. They might almost be a period from one of Enoch Soames's unpublished works, in which he brings individualism into line with universal impulses and tendencies of human life; not along the tight-rope of conjecture, but with the admirable ease of action along the broad High Street, "with the intention and determination to escape from the deadening thraldom of materialism and outworn conventions, and to live life significantly"—that is Le Gallienne's phrase—"keenly and beautifully, personally and, if need be, daringly." The aggregate of the nineties makes awkward fashions; great events are often quite independent of great men. Though there is rarely a great man, there is sometimes a great age.

LONDON, ENGLAND

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CHRISTIAN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: ITS MORAL BASIS

DONALD A. MACLEAN

Some years ago the Roman correspondent of the *London Times,* obtaining a draft copy of a papal encyclical and realizing the importance of the document and the widespread interest it must necessarily create, cabled to his editor for instructions. Although its transmission would cost in present-day American currency value around $10,000 (£630 in 1891), instructions were forwarded to cable the whole encylical at once (cf. *Christian Democrat,* Oxford, December, 1926). Its appearance created no little sensation. The *Times* declared that "the encylical was written with all the knowledge of a statesman, and that it breathed the spirit of Christian charity and good will, which, if widely accepted and imitated, would go far to solve the industrial question of the day." The late Anglican bishop of Manchester, Dr. Moorhouse, in a public address stated, "The Pope has put his finger on the sore spot of our social system, and either his word must be listened to or the world will have to expiate its neglect by terrible calamities." In France, Maurice Barrès, Socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies, declared that the priest could no longer be considered as an enemy of democracy, while in his work *Leo XIII and His Contemporaries* he exclaims, "Wonderful audacity, unforseen *volte-face,* suddenly to alter the mental outlook on the social forms of Europe of hundreds of thousands of the faithful. I am filled with admiration and astonishment at the new policy." In Germany a chorus of approval greeted its appearance. The chief organ of the Socialists, the *Vorwärts,* in an editorial, stated: "The Pope has gone in advance of all princes and all governments

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of civilized States, and has resolved the social question in so far as it is given to any existing power to solve it."

That document, the encyclical *On the Condition of Labor* of Pope Leo XIII, constitutes, as it were, the Magna Carta of the Catholic program of industrial democracy, and will form the basis of my brief treatment of this vital social question.

In that papal document, with which many of my readers no doubt are familiar, Leo XIII challenges the attention of the world by pointing out that "the condition of the working classes is the pressing question of the hour, and nothing can be of higher interest to all classes than that it should be rightly and reasonably adjusted." To the solution of the problem he fearlessly summoned the rulers of states, employers of labor, and the wealthy, urging as a religious and moral obligation that they co-operate with the church and the working classes in the task of freeing the masses of the workers from "a yoke a little better than slavery, which," he stated, "a very small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the laboring poor."

Throughout the various phases of the encyclical he stresses the moral obligations of justice and charity involved in the problem, and indicates the fundamental moral basis requisite to any sound and permanent solution. For the establishment of a harmonious and beneficent social and industrial order no mere surface measures will suffice. The causes of social unrest being deep-seated in the social and industrial organism, to be effective it is imperative that the remedy be applied to the seat of the trouble. Any proposed solution which ignores the basic social principles of Christian justice and charity, without which self-aggrandizement, rather than humane considerations, must dominate social relations, will necessarily prove deficient as well as disastrous. For as John Stuart Mill has said, "The political and economic struggles are in the last analysis religious struggles," and so all attempts to prescribe

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a remedy for our social and industrial ills which ignore their vital moral and religious aspects are bound to prove disastrous. Well has Pope Leo XIII pointed out that the social question, instead of being merely an economic one, is in point of fact "first of all a moral and religious matter, and for that reason," Pope Leo stated, "its settlement is to be sought mainly in the moral law and the pronouncements of religion." With this view the late British Socialist chancellor of the exchequer, Philip Snowden, apparently agrees, stating that "the Carpenter of Nazareth has the future in his hands," as also when he states, in the closing chapter of *The Living Wage*, that "all true economic reform has a moral basis."

In order that a harmonious and beneficent social and industrial order be established, it is vitally important that both employers and workers, as well as all others interested, have an accurate conception of the proper function of industry and of the right relations that should obtain between the different classes. Let it first be noted that, according to Catholic social ethical theory, there is nothing inherently sacred in the modern capitalistic system. The merger, the combine, and the supertrust are in no way sacrosanct; in fact, their purposes, as well as their methods of organization and of operation, evince much that is ungodly. Capitalism as we now have it, far from being the fruit of Catholic social doctrine, results from the rejection of the social ethics of Christianity in the period following the Reformation, when, as Bruno Schoenlank, a great non-Catholic authority, states, "the golden age of labor was coming to an end, capitalism began to bestir itself" (*Sociale Kampfe vor 300 Jahren*, p. 51).

Professor R. H. Tawney, of the University of London, in his recent scholarly historical study, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, has ably demonstrated that Puritanism and individualistic philosophy form the natural progenitors of the modern capitalistic system. "The individual congenial to the world of business became the distinctive characteristic of a

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Puritanism" (p. 234). "Discarding the suspicion of economic motives, which had been characteristic of the reformers as of medieval theologians, Puritanism in its later phases added a halo of ethical sanctification to the appeal of economic expediency, and offered a moral creed, in which the duties of religion and the calls of business ended their long estrangement in an unanticipated reconciliation" (p. 239). On the other hand, as Tawney states in the opening chapter, "The Medieval Background": "When the sixteenth century opens, not only political but social theory is saturated with doctrines drawn from the sphere of ethics and religion and economic phenomena are expressed in terms of personal conduct as naturally and inevitably as the nineteenth century expressed them in terms of mechanism."

Largely because of this divorce of economic and social processes from their divine purpose in life, human welfare and social order are gravely menaced rather than promoted by modern large-scale industry. As long as employers, industrial operators, and financiers continue to regard accumulations of wealth as an absolute personal possession involving little or no social responsibility, serious social disorder and industrial unrest are certain to germinate, no matter what economic transformations are effected. When financial profits rather than human welfare are made the supreme, if not the sole, test of industrial success, an inversion of the rational divinely constituted order results. And any constituted social system whose basic principles involve a practical denial of life's rational purpose as well as of Christian justice and charity infallibly finds itself, sooner or later, facing not only moral and spiritual insolvency, but also economic bankruptcy.

Economic crises of major magnitude such as England and other European countries are now experiencing are inevitable in America unless a considerable transformation in the orientation of our industrial processes is speedily undertaken. A re-humanizing and a re-Christianizing of industry is of vital

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importance to all mankind. Human rights and the rights of God must be again accorded their due precedence over the "rights" held sacred by "greedy speculators" who, as stated by Pope Leo XIII, "use human beings as mere instruments of money-making."

Centuries ago the greatest Catholic medieval moralist, Thomas Aquinas, pointed out that "according to the order of nature instituted by Divine Providence, the goods of the earth are designed to supply the needs of men." Human welfare, then, rather than financial dividends, urgently demands due recognition as the chief aim of our industrial endeavors. Employers and laborers as well as statesmen should recognize the incontestible fact that an institution or industry which fails to keep in view as its final goal the promotion of human welfare—social as well as individual—lacks any rational justification for its existence. While industrial and financial leaders continue to use our great national resources as means of serving almost solely their own unnaturally stimulated personal, private, and financial interests, instead of promoting the larger rational natural human interests, chronic social and industrial unrest is inevitable.

"The unrest of today is the voice of a grief-stricken humanity calling for justice in the relation of industry," as Premier Mackenzie King of Canada has well stated. It is a cry for the recognition of human personality, sadly outraged by our industrial system, where profits and financial advancement rather than human welfare are regarded as the supreme value of values to be secured at all costs. It is this cry, that human values be not sacrificed for mere financial gains or extra stock dividends, surging up from the heart of an outraged humanity striving for liberation from what Pope Leo XIII has termed "a yoke a little better than slavery," that continues to manifest itself in the rumblings of discontent, in the shiftlessness of industrial communities, and in the spasmodic outbursts of industrial strife, all of which constitute an

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incessant protest against the injustices of an unnatural and un-Christian industrial and social order.

Let it not be thought, however, that labor and capital are necessarily and naturally antagonistic. Such a conception is not in accord with sound economics or Christian morality. Nature never intended that the wealthy and the laborer should live in continual mutual conflict. On the contrary, as Pope Leo stated, "each needs the other. Capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Religion is the powerful agency in drawing the rich and the breadwinner together, by reminding each class of its duties to each other, and especially of the obligations of justice. Religion teaches the laboring man, the artisan, to carry out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely arranged, to refrain from using violence and creating disorder. It teaches the owner and the employer that the laborer is not their bondsman, that in everyone they must respect his dignity and worth as a man and as a Christian; that labor is not a thing to be ashamed of, if we listen to reason and Christian philosophy, but is an honorable calling, enabling man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way; that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels, as means for making money or as machines for grinding out work."

The antagonism manifested between capital and labor finds its chief source in a struggle for control of the industrial process and for a larger share of its product. Harmonious humane relations in industry would be promoted considerably through the adoption of an eight-hour day in all industries, with a five-day week where practicable, the adoption of proper shop conditions as to safety of life and limb, sanitation and moral safeguards, and above all through the payment of decent and just wages. The fundamental obligation of an employer to pay at least "living wages" to all from whom he receives a normal day's service is unquestionable. This obligation, which, as Leo XIII writes, "is a dictate of natural jus-

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tice more imperious than any bargain between man and man, namely that the remuneration should be sufficient to maintain the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort," arises chiefly from the fact that the employer has obligations of justice as the beneficiary of the service rendered and also as the distributer of the common heritage of nature. The employer should remember that "living wages to his employees are a first charge on industry, and should receive due consideration before stock dividends are paid."

But the adoption of any or all of these measures does not constitute, according to Christian social ethics, an adequate solution of our problem. As long as the instruments of production continue as at present, in almost all industries except agriculture, owned and managed by one class and operated by another, antagonism must necessarily germinate and divergent personal interests are sure to clash. Under such system, failing as it does to provide adequately for the normal development of man's personality, the great masses of society are largely subject to the sway of economic conditions over which they can exercise little or no determinative control. Man's freedom of action and moral responsibility is not properly safeguarded in any social system where autocratic control is not proscribed. Inherent in every normal person is a desire for the exercise of some control over the material environment in which he must fulfil his life's purposes. This calls for satisfaction. That man may fulfil his individual and social responsibilities he must be afforded some considerable measure of control over the economic and social conditions and institutions under which he earns his living, in accomplishing which he spends a major part of his conscious daily life. There is also inherent in every normal man—including the workers who provide the human energy requisite for economic functioning—a natural instinct for property, the denial of the legitimate gratification of which must in large measure be held responsible for present-day social and industrial unrest. The

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satisfying of the normal instinct for property and of the latent or active desire for some considerable control over one's earthly condition is requisite that personal mastery over one's life-activities may be realized.

How may this necessary change be secured? A sound and stable social and industrial order must primarily give due consideration to the securing of the fundamental basic needs of all and the safeguarding of the human personality of all members of society, no matter what their status may be. A comprehensive remedy and social adjustment, to function with any degree of success, must also rest on universal and fundamental economic motives. Men will exert their greatest productive efforts and attain the maximum degree of contentment only when they become personally interested both in the product and in the organization which functions as a productive agency. A considerable measure of this essential control and interest can be secured in the first place through labor participation in the management of industry, which, if really genuine, will afford the laborer interest in his task by providing an outlet for his directive and creative energies. Adequate management representation by the workers in the field of production and distribution in the industry in which they pursue their daily toil constitutes a primary requisite in any system of Christian industrial democracy. Employers who have had any considerable experience with this limited measure of democratic control are practically unanimous in testifying to its manifold advantages. It pays, as experience proves, even as a mere business proposition in real dollars and cents, not to mention its manifold social advantages. Many intelligent labor leaders, as well, are beginning to realize the value of such a step. Even the British Socialist member, Philip Snowden, profiting by the experience gained through the recent general strike, pleads with the English trade unionists to revise the conception of their task and to adopt the partnership ideal. He states that

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the pre-eminent need of today is to get employers and employees to realize the fact that the trade-union workers and the employers must get together, examine existing conditions, and arrive at some means by which through party co-operation a new era of industrial prosperity may be secured for this country. I would like to see the trades-union policy changed so that trades-unions are not merely concerned, regardless of the condition of an industry, in getting the highest possible wages they can screw out of an industry, but rather in helping make the industry thoroughly efficient so that the most will be there out of which wages can be paid (*Montreal Star*, June 24, 1926).

A further necessary step in the direction of industrial democracy is the sharing by labor in the surplus profits of industry for the production of which efficient labor service is largely responsible. In the annual December division of the spoils, in the form of extra stock dividends, the human agencies involved in the productive economic processes should receive primary consideration. In this manner, coupled with a considerable measure of management participation, human relations between capital and labor are initiated which, establishing quasi-partnership relations, remove many of the causes of unrest and antagonism at present operating in our social system.

However, we must not rest satisfied here. To effect the complete regeneration and reorganization of our economic system in accordance with Christian democratic principles, a very considerable transference of ownership of the means and the instruments of production and distribution from the possession and the control of a few to that of the masses of mankind must be effected. During the period when the Catholic religion exercised its most potent social influence, the workers—the masses of the people in rural as well as in urban communities—were the owners themselves of the economic productive instruments. Where individual possession was impracticable, the guild system secured for the laborers the actual ownership as well as the management of the industry in which they toiled. To this goal of widely distributed owner-

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ship—the democratic control of property—Catholic social doctrine now points, as in the ages past, as the ideal to be achieved.

This then forms the third and the final, as well as the most important, stage in the gradual process of reorganizing the economic and industrial system in accordance with Christian democratic principles. A necessary change in the status of the workers will be secured through the transference of the ownership and control of the industrial processes from the few to the masses of the people. In the words of Pope Leo XIII, "As many as possible must become owners in our industrial field." The majority of workers must again be put into possession or become at least part-owners of the economic instruments of production and distribution. In this way alone will men obtain that degree of personal security and social power which are generally necessary for the majority of men to insure the full normal development of human personality. This end can best be attained in modern large-scale industry through associated efforts and co-operative methods, which, like the medieval guilds, embody the fundamental principle of ownership and management by the workers.

Not only is the idea of co-operation in accord with basic human instincts and Christian morality, but it is also thoroughly practical. Consumers' co-operatives, producers' co-operatives, marketing co-operatives, credit co-operatives, co-operative banks, etc., have already amply demonstrated their worth and should no longer be regarded as experimental. The Canadian Wheat Pool affords incontestable testimony of the effectiveness of co-operation as a solvent of the farmers' problem, and, providing the panacea for the ills of a languishing agricultural industry, is placing the Western Canadian farmer in a position of solvency and independence. Consumers' co-operatives, purchasing directly from the farmer co-operative marketing associations, would make possible a much higher standard of living for the workers at no additional, if not a

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lessened, cost. Co-operative credit associations, *caisses populaires,* and co-operative banks, where judiciously managed, render invaluable financial service at much lessened cost to their members.

The history of co-operation in Europe, especially in Great Britain, shows that the successful operation of large-scale industry co-operatively by the workers is possible, because the men in England, Wales, and Scotland who own the co-operative enterprises that have been a tremendous success are the ordinary wage-earners. The capital and directive ability necessary to carry on the retail and wholesale stores, the factories and the steamship lines, the wheat fields and the tea plantations of the British consumers' co-operatives, the English Co-operative Wholesale Society, are supplied by the laborers themselves.

May not what they have so successfully accomplished be done in other countries and in other departments of industry? A considerable percentage of failures in the attempt cannot be any more disastrous to humanity than a continuance of our present capitalistic system, which, judged by its fruit in terms of its success in promoting human welfare, is well-nigh bankrupt. Besides, it is fast transforming society into a state of feudalism in which the masses of the people are dominated by the economic and political control of a comparatively small number of industrial and financial barons. In this task of reorganizing, the state has an especially urgent duty to perform. In the words of Pope Leo XIII, "The law should favor ownership and its policy should be to induce as many as possible to become owners." In this way the state will also best insure its own stability for, as stated by Wilford I. King, of the National Bureau of Economic Research, at the recent convention (December 28, 1926, St. Louis) of the American Statistical Association: "The fact is generally recognized that the country in which most of the wealth is in the hands of the few, while the great majority of the people are prop-

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ertyless, is one in which it is easy to incite the inhabitants to revolution; for under such circumstances the masses feel that they have little to lose through any political upheaval that may occur. On the other hand, in the nation in which the greatest majority of the inhabitants are property-owners, governments tend to be unusually stable."

The establishment of Christian industrial democracy does not, however, imply the entire disappearance of all previous economic institutions. Co-partnership and co-operative arrangements, providing for a very considerable extension of private ownership, allow for the continuance of individually or corporatively conducted enterprises as well as for the public ownership of certain types of public utilities; but only, however, when demanded by the common welfare. But in every case it does require the regeneration of all economic and industrial institutions, the imbuing of our social and industrial order with a new spirit—industry for humanity, the existence of each social institution justified and perpetuated only in so far as it contributes to human welfare—the individual and social well-being of mankind, a type of industrial organization which Tawney characterizes as "functional," where economic interests no longer ocupy "a position of exclusive predominance among human interests" (*Acquisitive Society,* p. 241). As the same author points out in his *Acquisitive Society,* "the medieval church had asserted the whole compass of human interests." The spirit of Christ, yet active in that selfsame church, still forbids moral or religious indifference to any human interest and especially to one so fundamental, so universal, and so inseparably connected with the moral and spiritual as well as the physical, intellectual, and cultural well-being of the masses of mankind.

The aim of Christian democracy was then, as now, to quote Leo XIII, "to make the condition of those who toil more tolerable, to enable them to obtain little by little the means by which they may provide for the future; to help

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them to practice in public and private life the duties which morality and religion inculcate; to aid them to feel that they are not animals but men, not heathens but Christians, and so enable them to strive more zealously and more eagerly for the one thing necessary—the ultimate good of life—eternal salvation" (Encyclical, *Christian Democracy*).

That the foregoing program briefly outlined is in full harmony with the social teachings of the American Catholic Hierarchy is evident from the following passage of the Social Reconstruction Program, where it is stated:

> The full possibilities of increased production will not be realized so long as the majority of the workers remain mere wage-earners. The majority must somehow become owners, or at least in part, of the instruments of production. They can be enabled to reach this stage gradually through co-operative productive societies and co-partnership arrangements. In the former, the workers own and manage the industries themselves; in the latter they own a substantial part of the corporate stock and exercise a reasonable share in the management. However slow the attainment of these ends, they will have to be reached before we can have a thoroughly efficient system of production or an industrial and social order that will be secure from danger of revolution. It is to be noted that this particular modification of the existing order, though far-reaching and involving to a great extent the abolition of the wage system, would not mean the abolition of private ownership. The instruments of production would still be owned by individuals, not by the state.

Thus, while the dangers of state bureaucracy are avoided, the general interest stimulated through the functioning processes of Christian industrial democracy will go far to insure the promotion of the common welfare of the masses of mankind.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

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MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL'S ETHICAL BELIEFS

OLAF STAPLEDON

Mr. Bertrand Russell can afford to fling us his belief like a crumb from the rich man's table.[1] Reasonably he hopes, not only that we may be interested in his taste, but even that we may accept the largesse without asking to inspect his bakery. Eminent men, no less than popular actresses, may persuade us by merely pronouncing their opinions. And Mr. Russell's manner when he speaks to his wider public is hypnotic. So swift, eager, and assured a gesture must, we feel, convey the truth, and nothing but the truth. We, however, who are neither eminent nor eloquent must do more than express our tastes; for no one is interested beforehand in us. If we would persuade, we must therefore attempt to present reasons of a universal nature even for our ultimate value judgments. But this task, Mr. Russell says, is futile.

Yet consider the content of his most recent declaration of faith. With the usual stripped beauty of style, he tells us what he believes, or rather what he thinks he believes. Tersely he describes our world as it seems to him, and tells us what kind of world he desires it to become. This ideal of his, he says, might be achieved if we would all live lives "inspired by love and guided by knowledge."[2] Such a manner of life he calls the good life, assuring us, however, that he calls it good only because he himself happens to desire that it should be practiced. He insists that there is no "ought" in the case. "What we 'ought' to desire," he says, "is merely what someone else wishes us to desire."[3] Either you want to live this life that he desires, or you do not; and if you do not, there is no more to be said.

[1] Bertrand Russell, *What I Believe* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 28. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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Strictly, however, Mr. Russell should have said this, not about the good life, but about the goal of the good life. For he does give his reasons for calling the life of love and knowledge good. It is good, he says, because "in a community where men live in this way more desires will be satisfied than in one where there is less love and less knowledge."[4] Thus, what he really desires for its own sake is not the good life, but the satisfaction of as many of men's desires as possible. But is even this his ultimate and unreasoned desire? Surely very much reasoning has gone to the making even of this. But before passing to this matter, I gladly agree with his criticism of current morality. He condemns the fear and cruelty and superstitious stupidity that make our moral fetters, and in contrast he outlines the life of love and knowledge. Mr. Russell's moral criticism is always as wholesome as the drawing up of blinds after a funeral. Rightly he traces much of our moral perversion to fear, and says, "*All* fear is bad, and ought to be overcome, not by fairy tales, but by courage and rational reflection."[5]

True, it is *bad,* and *ought* to be overcome. But do not such phrases as these, and the general tone of his accusation, and indeed the tone of his whole life, give the lie to his theory that goodness and rightness are only a matter of taste? Is our disgust at current moralism (and, if Mr. Russell insists, at many moralists also) to be traced to nothing but our own or Mr. Russell's whim? Of course he assures us again and again that he is only telling us what *he* happens to desire, and that there is nothing "virtuous" in the good life or "sinful" in its opposite. For, he says, "these are conceptions which seem to me to have no scientific justification."[6] Yet somehow I cannot help suspecting that he believes far more than he has confessed. It is difficult to believe his assertion that there is for him no absolute "good" and "ought." Though he cannot find room for such concepts in his metaphysics, must he not admit that in

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 42. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 21. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

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some obscure but important sense the good life, or the goal of the good life, has an absolute *claim* on him and on all of us?

Having an intellectual as well as a moral conscience, and failing to integrate his moral experience with the rest of his experience, he very properly tries to refrain from saying that we "ought" to live the life of love and knowledge. But he has not quite succeeded. And this, together with the general character of his life, suggests that he really does still believe in an "ought" which is logically prior to his desire. He thus finds himself in the same dilemma as John Stuart Mill; but he has made a different choice. Neither his theory nor Mill's can assimilate an "ought"; yet both he and Mill are striking examples of conscientiousness. Mill strained his theory to suit his conscience; Russell, though equally conscientious, preserves his theory by denying moral obligation and assuring us that he behaves morally just because he likes that sort of game, or at most because he likes to have a rational goal.

He states the matter thus: "If I say that the legislative authority has bad desires, I mean merely that those desires conflict with those of some section of the community to which I belong."[7] Thus good and bad refer always to someone's purpose or point of view. Of course Mr. Russell's point of view is not egoistical, but social; and "'bad' desires, when we are speaking from a social point of view, may be defined as those which tend to thwart the desires of others, or, more exactly, those which thwart more desires than they assist."[8] Desires, or their satisfaction, are all equally good; they can only be bad instrumentally. Such, then, is the social point of view which Mr. Russell has made his own. And though he himself has come earnestly to desire this social end, he refuses to admit that it has a claim on him or on anyone.

It is tempting to suggest that, if Mr. Russell had experienced more bad desires himself, he would have felt more vividly the difference between good and evil. Those wicked moral-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 40. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

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ists whom he so justly condemns have the pull over him here; for though their natures may be so vile that they cannot appreciate *what* it is that is good and what bad, their experience of sin has evidently been enough to make them aware that in sin we are disloyal, not merely to our own most considered desires, but to something universal.

Mr. Russell, by a process of hard thinking, has discovered an ideal. Why has he chosen this ideal rather than, say, imperialism? Or how is it that he has become such that only this ideal, and not another, can satisfy him? Surely, after long study of this actual world, he has come to believe that *it* needs certain conditions for *its* fulfilment. He has not merely studied himself, and discovered in greater detail his own desires. Nor has he discovered more accurately how to satisfy his desires. On the contrary, he has discovered how to satisfy the world. And, whereas at one time perhaps he might have found satisfaction for himself without the satisfaction of the world, study of the world has now remade his desires so that he demands world-satisfaction. He found himself in a world wherein there were desiring beings; and these desires he found to be often incompatible and unsatisfied. He has discovered that much of this conflict might be avoided, and many more of these desires satisfied, if men would live a certain kind of life. If, that is, some desires could be altered and others resisted, a greater total satisfaction might be gained.

But not only has he discovered this possibility; he has also come to desire its fulfilment. How has this happened? Why, for instance, has he not rested in a childish egoism? Some would answer, because he is a social animal, and has a herd instinct. But such an answer is futile, since we can call him a social animal and credit him with a "herd instinct" only *because* we see him desiring social ends. Others would say that it is by virtue of his rational nature that he desires a social end. But to behave rationally is not to be impelled by a mysterious force or to crave abstract rationality. It is simply to be

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aware that a cake cannot be both kept and eaten, and to take such facts into account in behavior. If it is as a rational being that a man chooses a social end, evidently he does so because he sees that even the most "consistent" egoism defeats itself in internal conflict. He must have found that a merely private end, when it is examined closely, leads on to something beyond its private aspect. And this is true. In desiring only a private end and letting society go hang, a man is not merely violating his own social nature; he is desiring something which contradicts *itself*. Even a being with no social dispositions whatever could not, if he were capable of rationality, rest in egoism. For, while as egoist he would reject all but private ends, as rational he must accept only values of universal validity.[9] Experience of private values forces him to admit the validity of other people's demands, and even the possibility of absolute values in relation to the demands of the universe.

Thus, in so far as the advance from egoism to a social ideal is rational, it results from the discovery of the fuller nature and further implicates of the objects of desire. It is not the nature of the subject, but the nature of the object, which forces the rational being to accept a social ideal. Whatever a man's outfit of dispositions, rational study of the objects which are required by those dispositions may thoroughly remake his desire. His desire may be rather the outcome of his world than of his innate character.

Of course unless a man is such that he *can* desire, he will never desire the good, nor anything else. But only in this very general and unimportant sense is moral desire the outcome of the nature of the subject. It is doubtless true that we come into the world with certain more specific dispositions to desire certain kinds of things; and it is also true that each man's desire is likely to be prejudiced, by his specific dispositions. But it does not follow that, because we have prejudices, there is no

[9] Cf. Professor Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, pp. 82 ff.

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absolute standard by which our desires may be judged, nor that "good" is merely relative to private desire.

It is tempting to define *the* good as that which the fully rational being, with full experience and the general faculty of desiring, needs must desire. But this is not to say that the good is good just *because* such a being would desire it. On the contrary, he would call it good *because* he would see that it was demanded by the nature of the universe. And, not being limited by specific prejudices of his own, he himself would desire only that which he saw to be the rational fulfilment of his world. And if we recognize this hypothetical being's right to make the final value judgment, it is simply because we recognize that he would be in a better position to judge than we in our naïve ignorance.

The egoist, having discovered that what he desires is unreal in abstraction from ends that are social, may behave in either of two manners: He may cling to his abstract egoism, and to ideals which he knows to be ragged though he still feels them to be sound; or, like Mr. Russell, he may take all men to his heart, enlarging his desire to include the needs of his world. Most of us vacillate between these two courses. And when we are pursuing ends which we know to be petty, we feel that αἰδώς, or shame, which Professor Gilbert Murray has singled out as the root of conscience. We feel in fact that we are *disloyal* to something that has a claim over us.

Mr. Russell's ideal is social, but not cosmical. He believes that in such a universe as the actual universe there is nothing better than the satisfaction of human desires. But in spite of his denial I venture to think that he also believes that in this actual universe the satisfaction of human desires is the goal that he *ought* to seek. Human beings, he thinks, are the only desiring beings in the universe; and therefore there is nothing else that has a claim on him. But he implicitly admits (I suggest) that these *have* a claim on him. Striving to transcend his private standpoint, and to regard his total object of knowl-

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edge, as it were, from all points of view, he judges that there are no demands in that object save human demands. But these at least are demands, and the satisfaction of these demands is the best for the world.

I have argued that the demand arises in the object of knowledge, not in the subject. Do not idealist philosophers give a wrong stress when they derive moral obligation from the need for self-fulfilment? They seem to hold that a man desires his ideal to be realized because, desiring primarily self-fulfilment, he finds that the only true fulfilment of himself entails the fulfilment of his ideal. For, they say, the self that he must become, if he is to attain self-fulfilment, must embrace all selves; must, in fact, be no private self, but the universal self. Now if it is true that the ground of moral obligation is this desire for self-fulfilment, it follows that a man is subject to moral obligation only if he really does desire self-fulfilment as the universal self. If he does not, he is free from the claim. Idealists assert that every man has this "real will" for self-fulfilment, and therefore for all that is necessary for self-fulfilment. They say that, whatever a man's actual will be, this "real will" is involved in the very nature of manhood. I will not discuss this point. But, whether we all have this "real will" or not, it is no adequate ground for moral obligation. If there were no better ground than this, Mr. Russell would be justified in refusing to admit an ought.

Psychologically it is of course true that a man cannot *feel* moral obligation unless he feels within himself a conflict between private desire and the desire for the universal good. Further, we are perhaps entitled to say that, whether a man feels obligation or not, he cannot fulfil his true human nature unless he does feel it. But it seems to be a perversion to say that obligation is logically derived from this fact that you cannot fulfil yourself without fulfilling your world. This is surely to put the cart before the horse. Or, at best, it is to substitute psychology for ethics. The *feeling* of obligation, certainly,

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arises out of a felt discord in the self; but the *fact* of obligation arises from a discord in the world, which, obviously, can be *felt* only as a discord in the self. The claim which we feel is not primarily the claim of our own nature demanding realization, but the claim of the world's nature.

It may, however, be objected that no claim of the world's nature can move us to action unless it is also a claim of our own nature. Unless we have a moral nature, unless we ourselves make a moral demand on ourselves, no "claim of the world" can (it may be said) have any meaning for us.[10] But this has already been admitted. We cannot feel obligation unless we do desire the good. On the other hand, the goodness of the good does not lie in its contributing to our satisfaction, nor yet to the fulfilment of our true nature; it emerges from the nature of the world. It is doubtless true that most of us have "moral natures." But in what does a "moral nature" consist? We have no special moral faculty which distinguishes intuitively right and wrong. The moral man is, as the idealists say, one who refuses to let a minor factor in himself rule the whole, or refuses to let a minor desire thwart a major desire. But the one is minor and the other major just *because* the one is private and the other primarily not his, but the world's, and not particular but universal. And his obligation is logically based, not in the fact that this major demand must be fulfilled in order that the man may fulfil himself and be the universal self, but in the fact that this major demand is the world's, and the only finally coherent demand. The moral man is one who, having embraced within himself the universe, discovers therein new demands. But whether he admits them or not, he ought to admit them; and whether he discovers them or not, he ought to discover them. For they are universally grounded, and his other desires are not. Psychologically, indeed, he is a moral being just because he cannot rest content with purely egoistic desires. But this is not the last word in the matter. This moral

[10] Cf. Mr. G. C. Field's *Moral Theory*, chap. v.

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nature of his is no innate angelic character struggling within the bonds imposed by the world, the flesh, and the devil. On the contrary, the objects of his desire, by more fully revealing *their* nature to him, have themselves given him a new and richer nature.

Are we perhaps justified in saying that in all desire, therefore, there is a certain loyalty to the object itself, a certain sensitivity to the progressively discovered nature of the object, and so the possibility of a progressive change in the desire? We do not only desire things for the satisfaction that they give; we may desire them for their own sakes. And when we come to know them more fully, we often desire, not merely what first attracted us, but the whole revealed object—unless, of course, the newly discovered elements conflict with other objects of desire. It is usual to explain this loyalty to the object by saying that the new characters are "associated" in our minds with the originally desired characters. But the new characters are prized, not merely for their mental associations, but as parts of the same existent as the originally desired characters. And we may value the whole more highly than the original part. It is often the beloved who, after the original attraction, creates in the lover new capacities of love.

If, discovering more of the nature of the object of our desire, we do not after all enlarge our desire, it yet is true that the originally desired character *is* bound up with the others; and, in desiring merely one aspect of the object, we desire something unreal. We desire, in fact, an appearance, not a reality. In the same way, then, the being who does not *feel* obligation is subject to it, since obligation also consists in a response to the fuller nature of the object of desire. It is, in fact, absolutely true that, in given circumstances, a certain course is best, and ought to be taken. The world demands it. I shall not *feel* the obligation unless I have taken the world to my heart. But whether or not I have done so, the obligation is there for me to feel if I can. Professor Hobhouse has distin-

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guished between the psychological and the logical aspects of obligation by saying that even when, psychologically, obligation does not hold *for* a man, logically it still holds *of* him.[11] Thus, starting with desire as the source of all value, we are yet forced, on logical grounds, to admit a "rational good" which is *the* good even if no one desires it.

Even in Mr. Russell's ideal, actual desires may have to be changed or thwarted in order that the total satisfaction may be as great as possible. But should he not go farther than this? It is well known that the fulfilment of some desires gives far greater satisfaction than the fulfilment of others; and that in some cases no satisfaction ensues, but only further desire. Moreover, we all know the state of not knowing what we want. At such times we desire one thing after another, but nothing satisfies. That which as a matter of fact would give a man satisfaction, whether he desires it or not, would (we may say) fulfil his *need*. This distinction between desire and need is very important for ethics, and I suggest that, in Mr. Russell's view, what is best is not the fullest possible satisfaction of human desire, but the fullest satisfaction of human need. We have immediate awareness of our desires, but not of our needs. Of course we are aware that we need *something;* but what we desire is not necessarily what we need. Desires are, as it were, felt approximations to needs, and often seriously in conflict with needs.[12]

We have, then, in some sense needs which are more fundamental than our desires, and may be said to constitute our nature. When a man recognizes that his desires have been foolish, he does not mean merely that what satisfied him in the past fails to satisfy him now. He means that in the past he mistook his own nature or the nature of his objects of interest. Idealist philosophers tell us that we all have the same fundamental need, namely, the need for self-fulfilment as the uni-

[11] *The Rational Good*, pp. 86, 87.

[12] Cf. C. D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 370.

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versal self. I have suggested that such a need, if it exists, is not the ground of obligation. One ought, not because his need is for self-fulfilment, or because *his* need is for world-fulfilment, but because the need of the world itself is for fulfilment. The logical basis of obligation is thus the needs which we cognize in our environment.

This view is not unlike Mr. Russell's. But while he takes desires at their face value, in this view they are taken rather as signs of needs. And, moreover, by ignoring that his major needs are primarily needs of his world, he fails to find a basis for moral obligation. Mr. Russell, as a pluralist, does not admit that the nature of man affords any evidence as to the nature of the universe; and therefore he denies that the desires or needs of men are in any sense related to needs in the rest of the universe. But whether or not the universe is pluralistic and alien to man's needs, the *ideal,* even for such a universe, is monistic. For the ideal, even in Mr. Russell's view, is the greatest possible fulfilment of whatever needs there are. It would seem that even in a pluralistic universe, the beings of that universe, if they are capable of rationality, must rise out of their separatism and admit the claim of a good that is universal.

What the good is can, admittedly, be determined only by examining the desires of all beings in order to discover all needs. We are very far from being able to perform such a task. In fact, so very rudimentary is man's knowledge of the universe as yet that Mr. Russell's confident judgment that the rest of the universe has no bearing on values seems only one degree less naïve than the contrary view that there is a God who is necessarily our well-wisher. Mr. Russell is very sure that in making his final value judgment he has only to take into account the existing desires of men. He demands no more than that these desires should, as far as possible, be satisfied. In his view, as we know, a man is not intrinsically better than an amoeba. And, indeed, a harmoniously satisfied world of

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amoebae is better, in his sense, than a discontented world of men. It is only from the human point of view that a man is a finer fellow than an amoeba. From this it follows that it is only from his present point of view that Mr. Russell's present desires are better than his own earlier and cruder desires. I find it hard to believe that he really believes this. Yet if in any sense whatever his desires have progressed toward his present ideal, goodness is to be judged, not from the private point of view, but universally. And then it follows that man has a better claim than amoeba to be a judge of goodness; for he has more data and more intelligence with which to judge. But if this be admitted, man himself is seen to be no final arbiter of value, since even his data and intelligence are after all rudimentary.

He is no final arbiter in Mr. Russell's sense, namely, that he *creates* values which, though merely personal, are the only kind of values. But he is the best *judge* of value, as far as we can tell. For, as far as we know, he embodies more of the universe than does any other kind of being. He is a greater self than amoeba. His content is greater, not merely in quantity, but in diversity. He is, so to speak, more intricately keyed into the universe. Consequently his needs more nearly "voice" the needs of the universe than do those of amoeba. If the universe is pluralistic, there may be needs which are quite irreconcilable with man's. Even so, there must be some condition which would give the greatest possible harmonious satisfaction; and for such a universe this condition would constitute *the* good, independently of anyone's opinion.

If the universe is monistic, it is possible that all needs and desires are in some sense expressions of a universal need. Even so, however, many beings, even perhaps all existent beings, may be so distorted that their needs are irreconcilable. And yet it might be that, by throwing us all overboard (as it were), the universe might reconstitute itself so as to express its nature truly and satisfy itself fully. And in such a universe such

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a consummation would be absolutely better than any mere compromise of existing desires. Within the universe of discourse of human affairs the change from a petty conflict of barbarous national ideals to a cosmopolitan culture would be (I submit) absolutely good. It might not harmoniously satisfy existing persons, for we may be past mending. But it would make possible a richer kind of human nature, and selves which embrace more reality and "voice" more nearly the needs of the universe. For what is intrinsically desirable (on this view) is the fullest possible expression of the capacities of the universe, whatever they may turn out to be. And to every judging mind, even to the universal mind, if there be such, these capacities are objective.

WEST KIRBY, ENGLAND

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THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MORAL EVOLUTION

ALBERT G. A. BALZ

I

Moral evolution is frequently described in formulas built upon the contrast of the group and the individual. This is particularly true of the change from savagery and barbaric life to civilization. The distinction between the grouping of men and their life as individual entities is at once the most obvious and the most important thing to notice concerning the pattern of human life. When we observe savage life, the functioning of the group as a group seems virtually to exhaust the content of that life. When we observe "civilization," the career of individual lives as individual lives causes us to lose sight of the group. So we come to characterize the evolution of morals as a movement "from group morals to individual morals," "from custom to conscience," "from custom morals to personal morality," "from freedom for the group and the suppression of individuality to liberty for the individual and the subordination of the group." Phrases such as these seem to imply that there are life-systems dominated by the group as a group. This primacy of the group is expressed in the fact that morals for such societies are custom morals. The moral life in such cases is exhaustively described when the life of the group as a group is described. Custom morals, so these statements suggest, are indifferent to individual choice and self-expression. They reflect living processes only in so far as these processes pertain to the group as a group. They manifest common concerns, common interests (real or imagined), where by "common" is meant pertaining to the tribe or the folk, shared by the human unit primarily because this unit is an element of the group. Group—or custom—morals thus ex-

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clude the inner life, personal choice and responsibility, and self-expression.

On the other hand this group stage, so the formulas suggest, must be contrasted with a succeeding stage in which life-patterns are flexible, group activity is subordinate to and an expression of individual functioning, and morality centers about an individual's free choices. Personality, rather than the collective life, is the primary force. In the stage of group dominion, conscience, as the functioning of individuality in the moral life, is virtually nullified, if not absent. The decline of the overwhelming influence of the tribal interest and function means the passing of custom morals, and this in turn spells freedom for the individual. Personality, hitherto virtually non-existent or at least effectively suppressed, now defines the very meaning of the moral life. The group in its organization as a group is in this later stage, i.e., in civilization, an instrument of independent selves. Savage life and group morals meant the nullification of individuality as a differential factor, and so morality in this stage of life meant the collective life as such or it meant nothing at all. With civilization individualities operate freely as differentiating forces, and the group is a vehicle for generalizing the achievements of individuality.

There may be many evolutions in morals, or there may be but one great evolution. This question may be neglected.[1] The question to be examined is whether or no the type of description of moral evolution just set forth is adequate to the facts. These characterizations, at first sight, are suggested by the facts—at least they have some measure of truth. The purpose of this paper is to question the adequacy of such formulations. Although suggested by the facts, I shall maintain that these characterizations are one-sided. In order to establish this statement, it may be well to begin by inquiring why

[1] The writer has discussed this question in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, No. 13.

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the description of moral evolution as a movement from custom to conscience, from group to individual morality, should *appear* to be a satisfactory formulation of the facts. Having pointed out the naturalness of this interpretation, its incompleteness will be indicated by an analysis of the alleged factual basis.

II

Why, then, does the survey of the history of morals suggest that the historical process is a movement from group-custom morality to the morality of the person? Two considerations may be advanced in reply. On the one hand, savage and barbaric societies (or "early civilizations," whether existing in the past or existing today) seem to be custom-ridden. The submergence of the individual and so of individual differences appears to be the most striking characteristic of such life-systems. Now it is easy to think, and presumably we commonly do think, that civilized society, "later" or more highly evolved civilization, develops out of earlier stages of savagery quite analogous to existing savage and barbaric societies. Thus the Egypt of Thothmes III and the Greece of Pericles were later moments in historical processes that "began" with savage conditions. Thus the contrast between the savage society, with its group or custom morality, and "civilized" society, with its expressions of individual differences in ability, interests, and aims, is employed in characterizing an evolution from earlier to later stages. There are obvious criticisms applicable to this mode of interpretation, but we need not enter into them. The point is that a contrast not necessarily involving temporal process is used in the characterization of historical movement or evolution. The contrast of savage custom and the individualism of civilization provides the chief description of moral evolution.

The previous contrast partly overlaps another contrast, that between the relatively static and the relatively dynamic society. The savage and barbaric systems in which custom

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is regarded as the primary moral phenomenon are static. Changes in savage civilizations are either exceedingly slow, and therefore negligible, or else catastrophic, brought about by sudden impacts from without. In neither case could savage life with propriety be called dynamic. Such systems therefore must be included in the class of relatively static life-systems. On the other hand, there are dynamic and highly evolved civilizations, marked by some freedom for the individual. Thus the contrast between custom and personality as chief characteristics of the moral life falls within the contrast of the static and dynamic societies.

The latter distinction is broader than the former. For there are high civilizations, or civilizations in the sense in which they are opposed to savagery, that are static. China, India, Japan (before the influence of the West, or neglecting that influence) are examples commonly cited. This staticism must be of a character really quite different from that of savagery. The life-pattern of the savage alters imperceptibly, or violently, but in either case the alterations are effected by forces which the savage neither welcomes nor seeks. The savage's system of life does not contain a principle of organized change or of reconstruction. Neither does he deliberately seek to maintain the existing conditions. Containing no principle of change, the savage's life owns no purposes and ideals exciting a dissatisfaction with existing conditions, nor provoking the delineation in imagination of possibly better conditions. The savage's activities are therefore not future-minded and reconstructive. Now in such advanced but static societies as those of India or China the situation must be radically different. Ideas and ideals are certainly present. The social system, rightly or wrongly, like other social systems, is supposed to uphold many ideal values. The differences involved here are assuredly not differences of degree—it is not that savage life is just a bit more static than great oriental societies. The dif-

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ference is qualitative and profound.[2] It is worth noting that the difference justifies skepticism concerning our Western (largely tacit) assumption that dynamic character in a society is a criterion of height of development. Cultural egoisms welcome such a conception. It is obvious that betterment and achievement imply alterations in the life-system. Since this alteration is a principle of our social organization and an element in our characteristic ideals, and since these things are foreign to savage peoples, the principle of change and reconstruction becomes in our eyes a condition of progress, a proof of progress, and the final test of the worth of a life-system. And so we come to interpret the qualitative differences between West and East as differences in degree of civilization—vastly to our credit, of course. It is worth recalling, however, that much of our dynamism and "progressivism" was and is forced upon us. An invention forces upon us changes and reconstructions never dreamed of, and we accommodate our ideals to meet the situation. On the other hand, oriental staticism may be in part voluntary, in obedience to ideals shaped by great religions and moral leaders, and not just blind submission to external pressure. Oriental staticism is, in part at least, due to conscious conviction. In the savage society the individual seems to be submerged. Superficial observation of advanced static societies seems to suggest the same thing. We identify, with savages, the moral life with rigid custom patterns, and these with the life of the group as a group. But in advanced static societies we find many rigidities. India's caste system comes to mind. So we again conclude that the individual is subordinated to the group. Here, then, is an apparent double reinforcement of the position that moral evolution proceeds from the dominance of the group to the achievement of personal morality. The movement is from a state in which the

[2] This fundamental difference between the staticism of primitive civilizations and advanced civilizations such as those of the Orient deserves further discussion than the limits of this paper permit.

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moral life is overwhelmingly the expression of the group as a group to a state in which the group is a subordinate (or largely negative) element in the moral life, while this life can be defined as the expression of personality, of conscience and the inner life.

III

The preceding section offered suggestions in explanation of how we come by our favorite formulas for moral evolution. We may now turn to inquire whether these formulas are adequate. Are they not one-sided? Would it not be more adequate to regard moral evolution, in later stages just as much as in earlier stages, as a matter of the group as much as of individuality? If there has been moral evolution, hasn't morality as group phenomenon evolved equally with morality as a phenomenon of individuality?

Savages are, after all, individual human beings. Customs may be co-extensive with the social group; they may be rigid, a "hard crust of custom," permitting little variation. But the group is made up of living human beings, and the life of the group is lived by human individuals. If the savage is dominated by custom, then he is in one sense dominated by the group. But in a sense equally valid he is dominated by himself, that is, by an inflexible self, and this self dominates the group. The rigidity of life does not come upon the group wholly from without: it is equally an expression of lack of plasticity in the group. Moreover, the rigidity of the group life is not external to and imposed upon the individual unit. It is equally imposed upon the group by the inflexibility of the habits, attitudes, and aims of the several constituent individualities. The savage might vary more in conduct had he more opportunity: in a measure he is powerless as against the fixed pattern of group life. It is equally true, however, that the group life follows a constant scheme because individuals resist change. The group as a group would probably reveal more fertility in its career if its members were more plastic. Cus-

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toms, after all, are to be found in the habits of individuals just as truly as the habits of individuals are to be found in group-customs. The savage, cited by McDougall, who falls flat on his face before his mother-in-law is doubtless constrained by custom. But it is probable that this custom expresses his deepest feelings on the subject of mothers-in-law. He probably sees to it that every other son-in-law follows the practice. There is a sense in which custom is a group phenomenon. It molds the individual. On the other hand, the individual cherishes the custom, reinforces its authority, and perpetuates it. Custom and invariant selves are aspects of one fact, joint effects, and not cause and effect.

In short, and laying aside the possibility that Bagehot's crust of custom may be somewhat exaggerated, we may conclude that the "backward" character of savage life is not more the result of the subordination of the individual than of the inadequacy of the group principle itself. When we turn to an advanced static society, we become still more skeptical as to whether the contrast between the static and dynamic society warrants the formula "from group morality to individual morality." Does the rigidity of the life-patterns of the Orient mean subordination of the individual? It may perhaps mean a different sort of individuality, the expression of individuality in other ways. The Orient might assert that these rigidities are outward phenomena. He might assert that in point of fact this rigidity is precisely what secures to him a vast realm of freedom and free expression of his individuality. He might be mistaken in believing that the finest personal development can accompany the fixation of so many aspects of life by custom. But his case affords no proof of the soundness of the generalization we are examining.

IV

But all of this may seem a play on words rather than a serious correction of an alleged one-sided generalization.

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What is needed, it is clear, is an analysis of the relation between the two notions in terms of which moral evolution is formulated. The descriptions of the facts in moral history, as well as in ethical theorizing, reflect the various ways in which "society" and the "individual" have been understood. What, then, is the fundamental fact concerning individuals, groups, and their relation?

Human life, it seems clear, is a life that is led by individuals, and equally a life that is led by groups. Is there any greater significance in the assertion that human life is necessarily a group life than in the assertion that human life is necessarily a matter of individual lives in the plural? Where we find human life, there we find a group and many individuals. We are just as certain to make the one as the other discovery. Ethical theories have more than once involved such questions as the question whether logically (not to say historically) the group is prior to the individual or the individual to the group. But all such questions can be recognized for the abstractions they really are. The point is that the *subject matter* is not the group, nor individuals, but *human life*. It is a simple natural fact that human life is a matter both of groups and of individuals. By asserting that it is a "natural" fact, what is meant is that our subject matter is human life. That there are individuals, and that individuals live in groups, are statements describing important but derivative facts. They help to characterize the human kind of life. There is in this no mystery, other than that which confronts the scientist when investigating life in general and in its special forms.

In view of this, it is idle to ask whether men are fitted for group life. The only kind of men we can ask questions about is the kind to which group living is as natural as breathing. Men do not constitute society. Nor does society produce men. If we find men, then we find the fact of group life and the fact of individualized animal bodies, going concerns, or agents. To inquire as to what makes men social, what holds society to-

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gether, what are the "social" instincts that serve as cement, is to raise an artificial question. At least, it is artificial if the question assumes the human individual only to ask how they happen to be in groups. It is like inquiring why a certain kind of tree grows only in a given environment. The question is not why a known entity, the tree, takes to this environment. To study the nature of this species of tree is to study this kind of environment. Here is really one fact, not two. Men live in groups because that sort of thing is part of what is meant by the human kind of life, very much as bees live in groups because such a form of existence is part of what the bee kind of life means. We may, of course, inquire concerning the operation of this or that instinct or this or that capacity. But the inquiry falls within the fact of human life: it is from the first as much a group as an individual fact. When we are examining an inherited power, or the operation of habit, or custom, our subject matter is neither the individual, nor the group, nor individuals in relation to groups or groups in relation to individuals. The subject matter of investigation is human life. Individuality, grouping, and relations between groups and individuals are distinctions within the subject matter, aspects of the facts, not constituents of the subject matter. If we ask why individuals unite to form family groups, we may point to sex, co-operation in caring for offspring, parental instincts, etc., in answering. But these forces or causes are not things somehow external to the subject matter. They are part of the description, not of individuals or of groups, but of human life. To form such unions, to possess such impulses, is not something characteristic of "individuals": it is something characteristic of the human kind of life. We may analyze human life in order to segregate various factors. This means, however, not the discovery of forces in the individual that cause individuals to live group lives, but rather that we are getting clearer ideas as to the sort of thing human life is. In just the same sense the discovery that the cuckoo lays its eggs in the nests

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of other birds is the discovery of something about the cuckoo type of life. Again, it is not habit that holds men together in groups, nor is custom a "group" phenomenon. It is equally idle to ask what individual lives would be like if there were no group, as to ask what group life would be like if there were no individuals. The habit principle may be traced from the side of the group aspect of human life or from the side of the individual aspect.

The point of this is that the individual and the group, the facts of individuality and of grouping, are inevitable terms of analysis. The student of the life of the bee, for example, will discover that his description involves the existence of bees in the plural and the existence of the hive. Descriptions and investigations concerning human life, however, are likely to begin either with individuals and pass to the group, or with groups and pass to the individual. In the first case search is made for elementary forces that cement individuals into a whole. We may get the impression that there is more reason for beginning with individuals than with the group. Or we may commit the opponent fallacy, and beginning with the group seek to explain its proliferation into individuality of function and interest. But the fact is that we are in either case taking in a primary and substantive sense what is really and generically *adjectival.* If human life be the subject matter (for anthropology, sociology, psychology,[8] and morals), then neither the individual nor the group is logically, not to say historically, prior. Rather there are two primary adjectives relevant to the description of this subject matter. Human life being naturally congregate, any fact of it will have its congregate aspect or meaning: and being naturally a matter of a plurality of beings, every fact of human life bears a corresponding significance.

These considerations suggest that the adjectives charac-

[8] In collaboration with W. S. A. Pott, I have tried to set forth some of the consequences for psychology of these views in *The Basis of Social Theory* (Knopf, 1924).

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terize all human phenomena, and that it would be hazardous to apportion the facts to one or the other considered as a principle. We may incline to regard the group as more important in one case and the individual in the other. But what does "more important" mean? If the above contentions are sound, both adjectives are indispensable for concrete adequacy of explanation. There may be, of course, a host of problems concerning the specific meaning of the one adjective or of the other in this or that situation presented in human life. It is difficult, however, to understand how there can be a general or universal problem about them.[4]

V

These considerations may now be applied to what is called the evolution of morals. It has been urged that the fact that human life is a group life and that it is a life led by individual organisms are pervasive characteristics not to be interpreted as elements of composition. These facts represent universally prevalent adjectives descriptive of a subject matter, the primary fact, which is human life, and neither group nor individual life. In view of this, it may be asked, how is moral evolution to be interpreted? Does moral evolution mean an advance from a condition in which the group is supreme to one in which the individual is free? Does it mean a change from group to personal morality, from subordination of the individual to the group to subordination of the group to the individual?

If, however, previous contentions are sustained, any and every moment in moral history represents group *and* personal morality, subordination of individual to group *and* subordination of group to individuality. The aggregate and the unit, group organization and individual will, are the inevitable terms of description for every concrete moral fact. What we

[4] Another way of expressing the same point is conveyed by the assertion that there is no problem of the relation of the individual and society, but only a multitude of problems involving individual beings and groupings.

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interpret as the subordination of the individual to the group in savage life is equally the subordination of the group to the individual. If it be objected that savage mores appear to be an erasure of individuality, a wooden leveling of variable units, and consequently a suppression of individuality, there is a ready reply: these units are themselves leveling factors. The statement that the individual is to be regarded as the differentiating factor is but a half-truth. The principle of grouping is also a differentiating factor. That is, human life is incessantly differentiating and making uniform. The lack of vigorous individuality in the units of savagery means the suppression of the tendency to vary in groupings. Human life in the conditions of savagery, that is, does not permit the free development of the possibilities of individuality: but with equal force it prevents the free manifestation of the possibilities of group organization. We tend to think that the rigidity of the group, expressed in the universality and immutability of the custom code, is an insuperable obstacle to the appearance of vigorously differentiating agents. But it is equally true that these relatively undifferentiated and undifferentiating agents force the uniform extension of the code throughout the group. The code applies uniformly to everyone because everyone is born a unit of the group. But there is this uniform application of the code because the group is a grouping of very similar units. Is it not one-sided to assert that the group forces every newborn unit into conformity with itself? Does not every unit force the group into conformity with the self of that unit? Each individual is born in a group: but he is also born in the midst of many separate individuals. Would it not be more accurate to state that the total conditions of human life in savagery (whatever these conditions may be—environment, tradition, physiological and psychological heredity) prevent the differentiation of life, *both* with respect to grouping and with respect to individuality?

It may be said that the natural tendency of human life is

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toward a complexity of system, this complexity being doubly manifested: on the one hand, by the multiplication of groupings and their intricacy; on the other hand, by highly individualized units or persons. "Natural tendency" is, of course, a tricky expression. The rigidity of savage life is as much the result of a natural tendency of human life as is European life today. The point is that human life tends to become varied, complexly organized, highly differentiated, wherever conditions permit. Among these conditions must be reckoned the previous history of human life itself. But human life in certain conditions seems, by contrast, to lack the richness of variety. In savagery there is a double lack of the realization of possibilities inherent in human life. The groupings of the units are relatively mechanical. They may reflect relatively external conditions. The political and religious groupings, for example, may coincide. On the other hand, there is a parallel externality in the differentiation of one individual from another. In the circumstances, individual differences are superficial rather than reflections of profound differences of inner organization, and consequently the units cannot determine the differentiation of groupings and its multiple manifestation. At the same time, the groupings bear so unilaterally upon the units, present so monotonous a stimulation, that the groupings cannot encourage the differentiation of individuality.

This will be more clear if "advance" to a "higher" form of life be considered. This advance is the expression, not of the freeing of the individual from group pressure, but of the freeing of human life from some of the incumbrances to varied expression. Advance implies multiple groupings, resting less on relatively external conditions and more upon the resources of life itself. And equally it implies that life has opportunity for deeper individualization. It is life that secures some measure of relative independence of external circumstances (which is expressed in the phrase "control of nature"). The groupings are not limited to layers, or wholly determined by inheritance,

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but represent functions, interests, preferences. Perhaps there are a dozen religious groups, not one. Then these groups stimulate the individual unit in varied ways. He may choose between the religious groups: but this means a richer inner experience for the unit. The groupings force the differentiation of individualities. The individual, on the other hand, actively selects and rejects, hinders and supports, the groupings. His personality demands new groupings, the break-up of old ones into many new ones, and so a continual reorganization of life. The individual agent, as his differential individuality actively selects and rejects, participates in multiple groupings while tending to re-shape them: and groupings, feeling the impact of variant individualities, resist, yield, dissolve, change, and go through myriad transformations. What we have is not the grouping over against varying personalities, but rather tendencies toward generalizing (to adopt Baldwin's phrase) over against differentiations, with groups and individuals as vehicles of both processes. Thus the principle of grouping as well as that of individuality is found on both sides of these oppositions. In the pre-dynamic, not to say savage, society, the hard crust of custom is no more the hard crust of group supremacy than it is the hard crust of settled passive individualities. Individual agents quickly settle into molds demanded by circumstances, failing to react with the intention of mastering them, and so groupings remain few in number, fixed in character, functioning as adaptations to conditions rather than as organizations re-shaping conditions. The lack of vigorous initiative is a characteristic of human life in such conditions: whether the group or the individual shall be blamed for it is a matter of convenience of description in concrete circumstances.

In a dynamic society the individual is not subordinated to the group. But neither is the group subordinated to the individual. In a particular set of circumstances, with a given grouping and a given individual, one or the other statement

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may be true enough. Compulsion of one sort or another may be exerted to keep a variant individual within the pattern of action set by a particular grouping. Or the group may be dominated by an outstanding or even truculent personality and coerced by it. This, however, is just another way of asserting that there is no problem of the relation of Society and the Individual, but that every problem in human life will involve groupings and individuals. In the dynamic society both the principle of grouping and the principle of individuality are agencies of change. Each individual is caught up in many groupings. But groups seek out certain individuals while remaining indifferent or hostile to others. Jones and Smith may be co-members of many groups, extensive or limited, and at the same time each may possess and be possessed by groupings from which the other is excluded. Both Jones and Smith are subordinated in uncountable ways to their groups. But in ways equally uncountable they influence and bend or may even control their groups in overt or covert ways. The groupings in savage life seem rigid primarily because individualities are not sufficiently differential to be effective agencies of alteration—and this in turn is a condition of the perpetuation of the rigidity. The groupings of the advanced dynamic society are less rigid primarily because there are so many of them that they compete one with another. In a savage society there are no heretics. But in a dynamic life everybody is a heretic—in the eyes of the other religious group. In principle this statement can be extended to every form of grouping.

VI

The formula for moral evolution, "from the group to the individual," is then but a half-truth. The evolution of morals, if there be any evolution at all in the history of morals, is marked at every stage by changes that will be incompletely described unless both groups and individuality are equally employed in the description. What evolves is neither the

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group nor the individual, but human life. If changes occur, there will be changes in groupings and in individualities. If these changes be moments in a growth, in evolution, such growth will be reflected not alone in the functioning of personality, but equally in the functioning of groups. If, as a matter of psychological analysis, the "group" and the "individual" must be taken as primarily adjectival, then this adjectival meaning is primary for the description of moral evolution. At a relatively late stage in human life particular minds become aware of society and its groupings as obstacle and instrument, means and end, condition and fulfilment, and so individual minds become aware of harmonies and oppositions between persons and groupings. Persons discover that the problems of life demand recognition of the fact that in every case both persons and the groupings of persons are involved. And every group, acting as a group, finds that it must reckon with personalities in determining ends, in devising means, and in fulfilling functions.

It may be admitted, in conclusion, that these contentions, if they be sound, do not make simpler the description of moral evolution. Nothing, however, is gained by oversimplification, while a recognition of the richness of the facts with which the historian of morals must deal may make for a more intelligent process of social discovery.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

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DETERMINISM AND MORAL EXPERIENCE

J. E. TURNER

Professor A. E. Taylor justly calls the problem with which he deals in his contribution to *Contemporary British Philosophy* "the most important in the whole range of moral psychology"; and it is because I share this conviction that I venture to offer a criticism of his analysis. For it seems to me that his contention "that the combination of a *genuine* libertarianism in ethics with a *thorough* determinism in the realm of natural science is not really feasible"[1] does full justice neither to science nor to ethics.

While accepting then without any reservation Professor Taylor's insistence on the factors essential to moral experience as moral, I think his description of the nature of "free choice" ignores the fundamental element in the entire situation. "When I am 'deliberating' between *A* and *B*," he maintains, "while I am still making the comparison of their respective goodnesses .... my will is indetermined to either alternative. When the comparison is over and the estimate '*A* is better than *B*' passed, this indetermination ceases; my will is *now* determined .... *I* am determined to take *A* and leave *B*, and what I am determined by is this judgment of relative worth."[2] This appears to imply that the resultant action *is* determined, although the precedent deliberation is *not* determined; but in any case this argument is plainly fallacious. For at no stage in the process—and whether it is brief or prolonged does not alter the logical issue—is the will (or the self) actually indetermined in any literal sense of this term; at no point, in other words, does indetermination cease and give place to determination. On the contrary, determination operates from begin-

[1] Second Series, p. 278.

[2] P. 283, interpreting Thomas Aquinas.

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ning to end unceasingly; nowhere is there any hiatus or any interruption of its activity.[3] This principle remains unimpaired even by our acceptance of Sidgwick's assertion that "the judgment that an act is *per se* the right and reasonable act to be done is an adequate *motive* to perform it."[4] This I hold to be unquestionably true; but again it by no means implies the cessation or absence of determination.

Rather does it establish equally its actuality and its importance. For what is the essential nature of the preliminary deliberative process, and of its final culmination in choice expressing itself in definite action? It is throughout (as Professor Taylor of course insists) thoroughly rational in spirit and tendency; so that to identify it in any degree with the always coexisting non-rational factors, intricate and powerful though these often are, is radically to confuse the real issue. All deliberation, strictly as such, consists in the interaction of purely rational entities or elements—of ideas or concepts more or less systematically organized into unities;[5] and in comparing these contrasted factors among themselves—in judicially weighing one against the other—the individual appeals (consciously or unconsciously, instantaneously or slowly) to previously formed judgments and truths which not only exist in his mind but (still further) make his mind and indeed his personality what they are. For to the degree that these accepted principles become modified, his personality is modified, as is obvious in that thorough transformation which constitutes religious or political conversion. It is true, of course, to say that the individual himself judges—reasons—deliberates. But this must not be taken to mean, as is so often

[3] It may be noted that Bergson explicitly appeals to indetermination as characteristic of vital and mental processes (*Mind-Energy*, pp. 13, 14).

[4] P. 285.

[5] Such a brief statement fails to do justice to the extreme complexity of the phenomena. The rational elements may be actually illogical; but they appear logical to the deliberating mind; and emotion and feeling always play their part, good or bad as the case may be. These qualifications, however, do not invalidate my position here.

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the case, that the self is some kind of unique entity which contemplates *ab extra* the contest of ideas, like the spectator of a baseball match; any such standpoint, natural though it is, simply revives the false notion of the "soul" as a separate being whose nature cannot be understood. On the contrary, all reasoning consists in the activity of the organized ideational elements of personality itself; and these are literally *identical* with, in the sense that in part they constitute, the self; so that to alter them is to alter it; for there is, of course, no absolutely "pure" thinking, divorced from experience as a whole.

The entire process of deliberation, then, whether this occurs in the realm of "abstract" or "pure" theory, or is concerned with pressing "practical" affairs,[6] is governed by a thoroughgoing determination. Each argument or idea contributes its quota and performs its part in precisely the same way that the mass of each planet, or the skill of each player, influences the changing systems which include them; while in every such instance alike—that is, throughout the worlds of matter, life, and mind—the action of each separate element is continuously determined by a persistent and dominant factor—by the solar system, or team, or self, as the case may be. But, to revert to deliberation, this general principle becomes increasingly obvious as thought becomes "purer" or more abstract. For in every scientific demonstration or legal proof the determinative influence of each factor as it successively emerges is unmistakable, until in mathematical or legal certainty such determination acquires an almost absolute character; for no matter what his inclinations may be, the individual *must* accept the demonstrated result. Not to do so is to cease to be rational; that is, since man is "an *intelligent* animal" with a bias "in favour of the reasonable," to cease to be human.[7] All thought is therefore determined, and in essence

[6] But this distinction is usually pressed much too far; it is never ultimate.

[7] Pp. 287, 288. I may suggest that "intelligent animal," like Aristotle's "social animal," is a self-contradictory description of man. Man, as such, is not an animal, though there are animal elements in personality. To become rational is *eo ipso* to cease to be an animal.

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absolutely determined, by logical necessity, just as great art, in its own realm, is equally determined by artistic necessity. The greater the individual thinker or artist, in fact, the more clearly he recognizes this principle and the more unhesitatingly he submits to it; so that the more thorough such absolute dominance becomes, the nearer the self approaches the level of genius.

But exactly the same holds true of moral judgment, so far as this is really deliberative and not simply impulsive.[8] For even if we accept the prevalent superstition that the "pure" thinker never actually does anything, still artistic judgments, like ethical, find ultimate expression in definitely ordered activity. But here my own argument may cease, since Professor Taylor himself agrees that the ultimate decision and action *are* determined: "my will is *now* determined . . . . *I* am determined." The fallacy of his position consists in asserting that determination *begins* only with decision and action; against this view I have maintained that it *precedes* decision, and characterizes every phase of the rational deliberation which originates this. Introspection, in itself never an infallible guide, seems to confirm this conclusion. For we are often directly aware of our final choice being gradually formed—differentiating itself more and more definitely from the entire mass of conflicting tendencies, often, indeed, with intense effort on our own part. If, then, the fully formed decision is determined (as Professor Taylor admits), when, in the slow process of its prior crystallization, does this determination first arise? If we consider any instance of painful and alternating deliberation on some obscure moral issue, it is impossible to indicate any point before which determination is absent and after which it operates. Rather does it influence the deliberative attitude throughout its entire course; and Professor Taylor misrepresents the issue in supposing that deter-

[8] I fully accept Professor Taylor's position on this too frequently misunderstood issue.

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minism is necessarily limited "to the 'scientific' suggestion that every judgment of good is based in the end on mere *libido*."[9] *Libido* may influence moral decisions, just as it may aesthetic judgment, or even, on rare occasions, mathematical demonstration. But this means, not that as *libido* diminishes determination disappears, but only that it becomes more purely rational.

But, as he himself implies in the succeeding paragraph, it is obligatory not merely to select and realize the good, but still further to desire and love it; and thus *libido* appears as completely transformed. Nevertheless, unless we arbitrarily limit its meaning to desire for what is bad only, it remains at the end what it was originally—*libido*. For both animal and human desires for food and shelter are directed toward low forms of the good;[10] while so far as mankind is concerned, their satisfaction is not only a preliminary, but also a necessary, condition of the attainment of higher ends alike in knowledge, art, conduct, and religion. Thus, as consciousness transcends its earliest forms in the animal, savage, and child, *libido* obviously becomes transformed by the slow rationalization of the whole of experience. But what is this age-long yet inexhaustible process except the purely determinative influence of evolving reason, first upon non-rational factors, and then upon these as imperfectly yet always progressively rationalized? This conclusion is not disproved by the fact that animal appetition remains confined to animal wants;[11] for this is but the result of animal life's being dominated by instinct, while reason reveals spiritual goods of ever higher orders. To deny this universal determinative action of rationality is to destroy the unity of

[9] P. 287.

[10] In animals, again, instinct makes their abuse impossible; but man (again because he is not an animal) has lost this automatic safeguard, and must therefore replace it by rationality.

[11] *Cf.* p. 288. Actually, however, as in mutual assistance, sympathy, and affection, even animal *libido* rises above the bodily level; and this is still truer of savages and children.

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experience by divorcing its rational aspects from the non-rational, and thus to render impossible systematic moral training, since in this sphere we must plainly rely on the principle of causation—that is, of determination.

The origin of this fallacy, which (in my opinion) vitiates Professor Taylor's position, lies in his confusion between will and action. For throughout the deliberative period all action is obviously suspended, and so may be described as "indetermined." But this by no means implies that *will* is indetermined; rather is it being formed or modified, and always determinatively so. The entire process consists in the unceasing modification of the conative tendencies by intellective elements—by reason and knowledge—all alike inseparably bound together within a unified experience. It is impossible therefore to separate reason from will; both are always active, even in the "purest" thought, the finest art, the most "practical" activity, and the highest mysticism. Their differences arise from the predominance now of one element, now of another, combined still further with the more or less intrusive influence of other factors. Thus, reason and will are two distinguishable aspects of a single developing experience; will may therefore be defined as reason concerned with the various modes and conditions of action, so that deliberation constitutes the formation of will, or, more truly, its reformation or redirection toward some new specific end; and as soon as this process finally completes itself, the definitely formed will manifests itself in equally definite action. Such definiteness is of course seldom attained; nevertheless it is the perennial ideal of all conduct, and is actually achieved, e.g., in careful scientific experiments or the lives of saintly people. In "pure" thought, similarly, action is never completely excluded, but only implied or deferred, just as "practice," if it is to be effective, must not sever itself from reason, but rather express it.

This fundamental issue is similarly misstated in Professor

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Taylor's discussion of selfhood. Again I unreservedly agree that the higher the self rises, the more it shapes its own course, and in so doing remakes itself and determines its own destiny, not in moral conduct only, but equally in knowledge and art—these being indeed only highly specific types of conduct which, as such, are always indelibly moral.[12] "Morality demands" (in short) "that the *present* perception of an act as good and obligatory should be a sufficient condition of its execution."[13] This present perception, still further, is to some degree, at least, influenced by previous decisions and actions; what has hitherto been regarded as good tends anew to be accepted as good, and only thus can good habits be formed.

It is here, I think, that we find the clue to Professor Taylor's unfounded repudiation of determination. For just as he has previously confused will with action, so at this point he fails to distinguish between habitual acts and deliberate acts. If all action were purely habitual and nothing more, then it would be necessary to regard the self as fettered to its past almost to the same degree as an animal, or even a magnet; this is in fact expressed in the low valuation of a person who does good, but always habitually and mechanically rather than deliberately; to some extent even he is the slave of his own past, since the requisite "*present* perception of an act as good" is dim or perhaps extinct. But it by no means follows, as Professor Taylor maintains, that because habitual action is determined, deliberate action must be indetermined; its indubitable difference arises rather from its being equally determined, but determined by completely different elements and in a different way. For purely habitual conduct is unthinking —independent of the rational factors present in the mind, just

[12] This becomes obvious as soon as the maxim "art for art's sake" is taken as seriously as it deserves to be, which unfortunately is too seldom done. Only shallow art can be non-moral, in the same way that shallow knowledge is almost non-rational; and knowledge, again, merges into art, as in delicate scientific work.

[13] P. 290.

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as the movements of my watch are independent.[14] Deliberate action, on the contrary, is continuously influenced by those factors—that is, *determined* by them as present, just as habits are determined by the past. This difference, however (once again), arises not from the absence of determination in the one case and its operation in the other, but simply from the contrasted factors whence the ever-present determination emanates; and since the rational factors present in the mind make personality what it is,[15] deliberation means that the self is no longer the slave, but the master of its own past, in the sense that it either approves or condemns that past, and in so doing incessantly remakes or even (as in conversion) re-creates itself anew;[16] to deny this is to hold that the past is completely forgotten and never brought into consideration at all. This re-creation of the self's own nature, however, is never indetermination, but rather an approach, which may be endlessly pursued, to the highest type of determination, that can indeed become, as in deliberately accepted sacrifice or martyrdom, almost as absolute as that of the physical universe. In essence therefore the self's own past remains ever operative, since during that past the self has itself constructed its present nature. But selfhood is always dynamic, and the more so the higher its level; only when it reverts to its more rudimentary and quasi-animal stages[17] does its past begin to operate through mechanical habits, and so become the Frankenstein's monster pictured by Professor Taylor. In so doing, however, selfhood plainly negates its true character as manifested in rational deliberation, wherein, as before, the past again enters

[14] Whenever, on the other hand, a habit is pursued after some deliberation, it is to that degree less purely a mere habit, and so less mechanical and more explicitly rational.

[15] *Ante*, p. 420.

[16] *Cf.* p. 293: "Every fresh act of choice seems to be something akin to a new creation."

[17] It will be recalled that Professor Taylor regards man as "an intelligent animal" (*ante*, p. 421).

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as a factor,[18] only no longer as the sole and dominant factor. Rather is it confronted by the entire apprehended content of present and future, and in this light accepted or repudiated, becoming in either case the basis for the self's further advance. Thus the conclusion "that the whole and sufficient" motive "for any act can be found in its now-discerned goodness and reasonableness *per se*" is not "precluded on principle by determinism," as Professor Taylor maintains,[19] but is thoroughly consistent with it.

His conclusion, then, "that moral responsibility demands as a condition of its genuineness that human acts shall be genuinely contingent"[20] must be categorically denied, although this denial by no means contradicts the existence of a real, and in no sense or degree illusory, freedom. Professor Taylor's position at once involves three fundamental difficulties. In the first place, moral freedom admittedly becomes an inexplicable paradox, while (secondly) actual contingency, having thus conquered the ethical and aesthetic spheres, proceeds to invade the realm of nature; and (finally) moral judgments are placed on an entirely different plane from self-evident intellectual judgments.[21] But this means, in principle, that *all* moral (and equally aesthetic) judgments, such as "this is good (or beautiful)," differ essentially from *all* intellective judgments, since the latter, because of the very nature of knowledge, irresistibly tend to become ever more and more self-evident. It is, in other words, a radical error to restrict self-evidence to relatively simple truths; since under proper conditions highly complex truths may become equally self-evident.[22] The assertion "this is good," continues Professor

[18] *Cf.* "You have already exercised moral choice throughout the process by which you become good" (p. 295); "man, dependent as he is on his own past" (p. 301).

[19] P. 291. [20] P. 294.

[21] We are precluded, i.e., from putting "choice of the apprehended good on a level with assent to a conclusion validly inferred from self-evident premisses" (p. 295).

[22] As, e.g., the binomial and exponential theorems to an expert mathematician.

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Taylor, "involves an act of faith of a moral character"; if this actually is the case, then "this is beautiful, or ugly" similarly involves "an act of faith," and is not self-evident, as, e.g., "twice two = 4" is self-evident. But surely, on the contrary, "this is beautiful" is just as self-evident as "this is red or sweet." Precisely so with "this is good"; an "act of faith" is actually involved only in those obscure cases where beauty and goodness become dubious, exactly as it is if we believe uncritically that the square of 39 is 1,521.

Before considering the second difficulty which attends Professor Taylor's position, I may point out that the principle of universal determination only implies that there exist for each individual "unattainable virtues, unavoidable sins, and irresistible temptations," which might be predicted in advance,[23] in the same sense that there are truths he can never understand and artistic triumphs he can never achieve; all alike are on the same footing. I shall never understand the mathematical theory of relativity, or compose a fine symphony; similarly I shall not live through next week without fits of irritability; all these are certainties too obvious to discuss.[24] But they do not constitute the really crucial difficulties in either the cognitive or the aesthetic, still less the moral, sphere. The fundamental issue turns, not on these natural limitations of human nature, but on our efforts to overcome them together with our attitude toward repeated failures. Fatalistically to accept these, as Professor Taylor suggests might be done, is deliberate spiritual suicide, while contrition and renewed endeavor constitute moral, precisely as they do artistic (or even athletic), development. So long as real personal freedom is the natural evolutionary result of universal determination, as I believe to be the case, it remains not merely possible, but necessary, to "think nobly of the soul"; nor do I find myself compelled to exclude any of the higher religious influences to

[23] P. 302.

[24] "There are some things which we are good for and others that we are bad for" (Inge, *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 384).

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which Professor Taylor refers, nor to hold "that the natural order is the only order there is,"[25] if by "natural" is meant physical. Quite the contrary.

I have already observed that while I seek to universalize determination, Professor Taylor would universalize contingency; "on a clear inspection contingency is found to be a universal character of whatever is temporal and mutable";[26] and as before, so this contention rests on confusion between the nature of finite knowledge and the nature of reality. To argue that because innumerable phenomena must inevitably appear to be contingent to man's limited faculties, therefore contingency is universal and ultimate, is precisely the same as asserting that because the movements and sounds of a clock must appear contingent to a young child, therefore they actually are contingent.

This argument, in these general terms, is patently fallacious; and the reality of contingency thus becomes a question of observation and logical inference. My own opinion is that "a clear inspection" is amply sufficient to disprove Professor Taylor's contention here. As man's knowledge of nature increases, contingency steadily disappears. "No science," he maintains, "can ever claim to be able to calculate any concrete event in the whole of its concrete individuality."[27] But any efficient tidal machine will predict tides at ports all over the globe; the actual existence, properties, and combining capacities of chemical elements can be theoretically predicted, together with the course of evolution of stars and of star clusters; similarly with regard to the highly complex phenomena of heredity and sex changes.[28] These possibilities of prior calculation are as yet only in their infancy, and are rapidly becoming applicable to events more and more concrete; and though the "whole concrete individuality" must for long, and

[25] Pp. 303, 304. [26] P. 301. [27] P. 296.

[28] *Cf.* "Noteworthy is the degree in which the fortuitous has shriveled in biology. Variations are often definite and congruent with the past; the random is rare" (Professor J. A. Thomson, *ibid.*, p. 330).

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perhaps forever, remain unpredictable, this is due not to the reign of contingency in nature, but simply to the intricacy and minuteness of its structure, confronted with which man is in the same relation as a child to a world-broadcasting station.

There always exist, of course, some "given" factors, some reals which are the ultimate data of all investigation, such as the heterogeneities of the space-time continuum.[29] But even these need not be regarded as contingent in themselves, though they must be so for finite knowledge. But to the "clear inspection" of an infinite intelligence, whose real existence I believe Professor Taylor would agree with myself in accepting, nothing whatever is contingent, but rather determined by its relation to and within the actual Whole. Real contingency, in short, is only camouflaged chaos.

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[29] Here regarded as an actual existent, not merely a conceptual schema.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PURPOSIVE EVOLUTION, THE LINK BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION. By Edmund Noble. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1926. Pp. xi +578.

There is in this book a sweep that reminds one of Spencer and a speculative daring worthy of the Ionian "nature philosophers." In addition there is an impressive marshaling of facts and a style which, while it would gain force by concentration, is notably fluent and genial. And the high argument which the book unfolds is one to which other philosophers and thinking men generally would do well to give heed.

The major theme of the book is the nature and origin of purposiveness. In order to prepare the way for his own view, Mr. Noble begins by criticizing various forms of interpretation of evolution and the universe at large in terms of conscious intelligence and foresight—"man-likening and mind-likening." Using a wealth of illustration, he tries to show that, while in the organism there is everywhere adaptation or "intelligence" in the broad sense, it is very different in kind from human intelligence. Man's intelligence works according to a definite and single plan; while nature works tentatively, groping for means and employing a variety of devices contrasting sharply with the human tendency toward standardization of product. This contrast between mechanical and organic intelligence is effectively presented, recalling at some points the similar argument of Bergson.

But the alternative offered by Mr. Noble is very different from that of Bergson. For whereas Bergson looks for the origin of purposiveness in a distinctive *élan vital* working in the fashion of instinct or creative genius and subduing inorganic matter to its ends, Mr. Noble discovers it in the inorganic world itself. "Intelligence," he says, "is not primarily conscious, but primordially dynamic" (p. 214). We must therefore reverse the method employed hitherto by philosophers of interpreting purposiveness in terms of its higher and rarer forms and, on the contrary, search for it in the basic reality of the ether. The purposiveness characteristic of consciousness rests on the unconscious purposiveness of organic adaptation; organic adaptation itself is founded on the ultimate, self-maintaining "power system" of the ether. This reversal of method is in accordance with three principles of interpretation of nature offered by

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Mr. Noble as defining a "relational" rather than an "absolutistic" view of things: (1) The principle of likeness. Objects which, however they may differ in superficial characters, resemble each other in fundamental characters belong to the same system and must be interpreted in the same way. (2) The principle of derivation. Wherever in local, superficial, and transitory aspects of existence we find characters that demand explanation, we are bound to seek that explanation not primarily in other local, transitory, superficial aspects of existence, but primarily in its fundamental and universal characters. (3) The principle of universality. True explanations of nature cannot be isolated explanations, explanations *sui generis*, explanations *ad rem*, but must be explanations which are themselves interrelated. In accordance with these principles it becomes then superfluous to hunt for a special explanation of the self-conservation of the organism and its utilization of variations, for these phenomena are mere illustrations of the universal tendency of all power systems to maintain their equilibrium under differential stress and to employ the most economical means to this end. Similarly, the control of the whole over the parts, supposed to be distinctive of organisms, is really a universal phenomenon, and hence needs no special explanation.

While one may be inclined to contest some of Mr. Noble's applications of these ideas in biology, sociology, psychology, physics, and theory of knowledge, the ideas themselves are stated with admirable lucidity and persuasiveness. They are, of course, not wholly new; Whitehead and Koehler, for example, have also used the notions of *Gestalt* and organism, once regarded as distinctive of life, in the interpretation of the inorganic world. For myself, I welcome this return to one of the great thoughts of the *Monadology*. I am also in hearty sympathy with Mr. Noble's reaction against the dominance of biology and psychology in metaphysics, and his recognition that the overruling destiny is the physical world-order. The day has already dawned for the recovery of philosophy from the distortion of perspective caused by *The Origin of Species*, and the recognition of the relative superficiality of purely biologic facts. Less successful, in my opinion, is the author's treatment of the origin of consciousness, which he explains, after the manner of Spencer, in terms of "shock." But his view is no worse—although no better—than the fashionable "emergence" theory, of which it may count as a variant. Yet one who, like Mr. Noble, has helped us to find purposiveness and intelligence in the physical world-system itself has surely given aid in the search for a satisfactory theory of the place of consciousness in that system.

DEWITT H. PARKER

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ARTISTIC IDEALS. By Daniel Gregory Mason. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1927. Pp. xi+201. Price, $2.50.

Written in the free, loose, aspiring style of Emerson's essays, this book, first delivered as a series of lectures at Northwestern University on the Norman Wait Harris Foundation, sets out what are taken to be the ideals of artists. It is interesting to compare them with the ethical ideals of the race. A chapter is given to each of the following ideals: independence, spontaneity, workmanship, originality, universality, and fellowship. The general conclusion may be hazarded that the total picture differs from that of any modern moralist, if at all, only in being conceived as the inheritance of a more limited number of people. The book sets for the few a way of life which, if it could be generalized, would constitute an ideal ethical society. Ethics is art generalized to the point of universality. A large proportion of the several essays is made up of quotations; but they are usually brief and are so felicitously chosen that they continue the story wherever they occur. The book is ideally adapted to be used as supplementary reading for beginning students in ethics. It will not only clarify, but also beautify, the ideals of which they learn.

T. V. SMITH

AN OUTLINE OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. By William McDougall. London: Methuen & Co., 1926. Pp. 572. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Abnormal psychology is still the battle ground of theorists, and Professor McDougall is therefore compelled to discuss at length the theories of Freud and Jung. But his book is much more valuable than controversy could make it, for he has a definite point of view and clear explanations of his own. The problems dealt with include fatigue, sleep, hypnosis, dreams, dissociation, delusions, and types of personality. Professor McDougall shows the inadequacy of Freud's theory of dreams, and very cogently argues against the exaggerated emphasis placed upon sex by many psychoanalysts. He is also critical, though less destructive than the evidence seems to warrant, of the "myth" theories of Jung. But the most valuable part of the book is the actual analysis of psychological states and the clear-cut explanations of some of them. The book, therefore, is far the most valuable introduction to the study of abnormalities that exists at present. The well-known "hormic" view of psychical experience, so admirably expressed in the first part of Professor McDougall's *Outline*, already published, is here taken as the basis for ex-

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plaining abnormalities. This is not fundamentally different from Freud's attitude, but Freud is a physician who appears to be unaware of the tradition in psychology, and therefore tends to "discover" what earlier writers knew. Professor McDougall, besides having had clinical experience, is a scholar and a normal educated man. He therefore sees abnormalities in their setting of ordinary life. The result is a theory of dreams, for example, which does not pretend to be complete, but is less fantastic than those of the professional psychoanalysts. The further result is that abnormalities can be used to illuminate the nature of normal personality. Hence the book will be very useful indeed to students of ethics. The old-fashioned pleasure-pain psychology and the neglect of the less conscious elements in psychical experience have vitiated ethics. But on the other hand, fantastic psychoanalysis is misleading in the study of normal morality. The problems discussed are of vital importance to all students of moral theory, and Professor McDougall's attitude as well as his conclusions should affect all future treatment of ethics. Naturally, he has to give much space to explaining and discussing diverse doctrines such as those of Freud and Jung. He is opposed to the main conclusions of Freud, although he acknowledges the value of his investigations, and he is critical of Jung, with whom he has worked. But the most important parts of the book are those in which Professor McDougall gives us his own analysis of facts and conclusions. His discussion of dreams and hypnosis is most illuminating. The evidence on which he relies in discussing dissociation, anxieties, and obsessions is actual clinical experience and not mere book-reading, and throughout the whole treatment the interpretation of psychological facts is vivid and vigorously expressed. The fundamental issue for ethics is personality. The old-fashioned platitudes about the good man and the ideal man will have to be corrected in view of modern psychology. The problems of morals are not so simple as Aristotle and Kant thought. The modern methods of psychotherapy have a close bearing upon what used to be called the improvement or moralization of character. But of course Professor McDougall's work is not directly a contribution to ethics. It does not pretend to be. Its value lies in its review of facts: for we cannot discuss the old Kantian view of what a man ought to be without knowledge of what a man is, as the modern psychologist sees him. Most psychology of the abnormal is written by the abnormal, but Professor McDougall has the distinction of remaining obviously normal.

C. D. BURNS

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABBÉ BAUTAIN. By Walter Marshall Horton. New York: New York University Press, 1926. Pp. xii+327. Price, $5.00.

This careful study is most interesting in two sections which are incidental to its task. In the first, the author gives a graphic survey of speculation in France and Germany in the first part of the nineteenth century; and in the other he tells a dramatic story—the story of a brilliant student, alienated from religion, extravagantly praised by Cousin and Hegel, who at the age of twenty-one made a spectacular success as a teacher; who, after a nervous breakdown, turned to a philosophy which, despite heretical tendencies, was essentially a Catholic apologetic; who as a priest dreamed of transforming religious instruction in France, seemed on the point of realizing his ambition, for a moment had all France looking eagerly to him for a new philosophy, and then passed suddenly into neglect and oblivion.

The religious philosophy of Bautain seems to contain two central doctrines. Life, which is the same throughout the organic and inorganic universe, is a process by which an external reality calls out a reaction from a vital center which receives nourishment from the stimulating object. Man's highest reaction is that to the creating and sustaining action of God. According to the second doctrine, reason is psychologically and logically subordinate to intelligence. Reason gives only inadequate and warped ideas of objects, while intelligence grasps reality immediately. Moreover, mind is the offshoot of a deeper reality, experience; and experience is characterized by the necessity for faith, the necessity for accepting beliefs in response to the needs of the soul and for testing them by trying them and seeing whether they give satisfaction. Reason itself must take its axioms on faith; but faith reaches the ultimate realities inaccessible to reason.

Though much of Bautain's thought seems bizarre, it may be that it contains valuable elements. At any rate Professor Horton seems to show that Bautain had considerable influence on French thought.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. By Edward Cary Hayes (ed.). Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1927. Pp. vii+427. Price, $3.50.

It is impossible with any show of justice to represent the contents of these already highly condensed accounts of the recent developments of various social sciences. In approximately fifty pages each, sociology,

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anthropology, psychology, cultural geography, and political science, for which latter twenty-one pages are made to suffice as a summary of an earlier book by the author, are all accommodated. Economics and history are honored with almost a hundred pages each. That such well-known American scholars as, respectively, Ellwood, Wissler, Gault, Sauer, Clark (J. M.), Merriam, and Barnes could be secured for such an enterprise testifies either to the eloquence of the general editor of the Lippincott Series in Sociology, Professor E. C. Hayes, or to a joint vision of utility that not every reader will discern in such a book. For those who can really understand so compact a presentation, it hardly seems necessary; while for those who need it, this compilation can at best be only partially available. Each of the contributors must have at times felt as Professor Clark expressed himself: "One of the developments of economics has been to make it impossible for the writer of this essay to give an adequate picture of its development."

This is in no sense to depreciate the separate chapters, even if it be taken as a question regarding the purpose of such a book. It must be admitted that in spite of the obvious limitations of such a project, the authors have achieved not a small measure of success in giving a feel for both the complexity of their several domains and the direction in which the currents drift today. For one thing there is surprisingly little technical jargon in the various chapters, and yet there is no glaring attempt to write down to popular readers. At least two of the essays—those by Barnes and by Merriam—are summaries of much longer previous treatises.

Surveying the social field as presented in these essays, the editor discerns two causes back of the present significant and highly promissory changes in the social sciences: (1) a new individualism which emphasizes the organic relation of the old individual with social welfare, and (2) inclusion in natural science of the life of man in all its aspects. Professor Barnes catches up this latter strain at the close of the volume in indicating the naturalization of what once was transcendental ethics.

Perhaps it but dramatizes the rapid change that is going on in the field of the social sciences to note that between the title-page and the contents page Professor Barnes's name changes from "Harry" to "Harvey."

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SHORTER NOTICES

PROBLEMS IN LOGIC. By Charles Henry Patterson. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926. Pp. xii+331.

In the words of the author, the purpose of this volume is "to assemble a body of material which will be representative of the types of thinking employed in the various fields of science, and which will, at the same time, be illustrative of the principles of logic." In Part I are given eight rather long selections, followed by detailed analyses, each selection illustrating a logical method. Part II presents a number of shorter selections, classified according to the sciences from which they were taken, and accompanied by questions. Although almost any one of the selections illustrates all of the "methods," most of the material is interesting, and most of it could be used to advantage by the logic teacher.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THE SELF AND ITS WORLD. By George Arthur Wilson. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926. Pp. x+383. Price, $2.20.

As might be expected from the title of the book, Professor Wilson emphasizes the self rather than the world. In fact, "the objective world is the nexus of conditions for the development of selfhood in spiritual beings." The external world is an infinite self, and we, human selves, are its copartners. Though philosophers insist upon testing to the utmost every possible substitute for the self as an explaining principle, the great lesson which the history of philosophy teaches is that all world-views which ignore the central position of the self are necessarily fragmentary and bewildering. Problems arising in connection with permanence and change, the order and coherence of knowledge, and the objectivity of values must all be solved in terms of an adequate conception of the self. In ethics self-realization is the fundamental concept; and in religion we are concerned with the self's helper and protector, its copartner in the task of self-realization. Professor Wilson's conclusions are not particularly novel; and we may even doubt their value. His reasoning, however, is scholarly, straightforward, and careful; and this should make the book valuable to readers who are able to escape his conclusions.

CHARNER M. PERRY

A GUIDE TO THINKING. By Olin Templin and Anna McCracken. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927. Pp. xiv+252.

Despite the misleading title and a slight revamping of terminology (for instance, "pathology of thinking" replaces "fallacies"), this book is an introductory text in logic. On the whole, it contains the usual material; but rearrangement, together with some supplementary discussion, makes possible an improvement over the conventional text in regard to coherence and plausibility. Difficulties and subtleties are passed over lightly, and interpretation sticks close to the common-sense way of looking at things; but this makes possible a simplicity and clarity which is doubtless desirable, at no matter what sacrifice, for beginning students.

CHARNER M. PERRY

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A CONSTRUCTIVE SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY: A SYSTEMATIC INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN METAPHYSICS. "An Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy," Vol. II. By R. D. Ranade. Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926. Pp. xxxi+438.

Professor Ranade may not take it for a compliment if we remark on his scholarship in Western philosophy in introducing a review of his work on the Upanishads. But his thorough mastery of the technical philosophy of the West will naturally inspire confidence in a lay reader in this specialized field.

This work is the second volume, but the first to appear, of the grand project on "An Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy," which is to comprise sixteen volumes. As is already suggested by the title, the method of this study is synthetic and synoptic. The task involves philological research as well as investigation into history of philosophy. The material is arranged under headings familiar to the Western public, such as "Cosmogony," "Psychology," "Metaphysics," and "Ethics." In this work the author has a threefold purpose: (1) "to put into the hands of the Orientalists a new method for treating the problems of Indian philosophy," (2) "to put into the hands of European philosophers a new material to exercise their intellects on," and (3) "to place mysticism on a truly philosophical basis" and turn rational mysticism into a truism from a contradiction in terms. At the end of each chapter are appended a number of quotations in Sanskrit.

Perhaps it is owing to a temperamental difference that all Indian scholars, past and present, tend to accept mysticism as the road to ultimate enlightenment, while most Western thinkers find the argument hard to follow. Along the same line we might further comment that all extensive comparison between two types of philosophies as different in universe of discourse as those of India and the West, or systematic exposition of one in terms of the other, is liable to suffer from arbitrary, unconsciously so perhaps, interpretation of the subject matter in order to fit it in a foreign mold. Whether or not there is such a difficulty in this case we have to leave to those competent to judge. In any event, such a treatment at least serves well as an introduction to a way of thinking which in its original garb would look too strange to induce acquaintance.

Y. P. MEI

MYTH IN PRIMITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. By Bronislaw Malinowski. "The New Science Series." New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1926. Pp. 94. Price, $1.00.

With a description of the myths of the Trobriand Islanders as a background, the author advances several propositions in regard to the nature and function of myths. Myths can be understood only when studied in their living social context. They are neither intellectual attempts at explanation nor rhapsodic responses to natural phenomena. They are linked with desires, rituals, and customs; and as literal statements of present realities they justify societal arrangements and function in various ways in the process of social and technological adjustment.

CHARNER M. PERRY

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MATTER AND GRAVITY IN NEWTON'S PHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY. By A. J. Snow. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1926. Pp. 256. Price, $2.50.

After discussing the atomic theories of Gassendi, Boyle, and various others, the author gives an account of Newton's use and modification of atomism. A survey is then made of Newton's conception of gravity and of his speculations in regard to ether and in regard to God as the all-embracing cause of motion. Newton's conception of scientific method and of the function of hypotheses and mathematics is analyzed in a concluding section. Interpolated throughout the exposition are discussions of various doctrines which were similar to Newton's, temporally adjacent, or which perhaps affected Newton's thinking either positively or by opposition.

No surprising conclusions are reached, either in regard to the content of Newton's theories or in regard to their historical relations; and it is not necessary here to summarize the exposition. It is interesting, however, to notice one point: The author shows that Newton, in contrast to many of his contemporaries, attempted to distinguish sharply between empirical generalizations and working hypotheses on the one hand and transcendental, speculative explanations on the other, regarding the transcendental or metaphysical explanations as the capstone rather than the foundation of scientific investigation.

While the study is neither very systematic nor very clear cut in its analysis, the exposition does seem to be based on conscientious scholarship, and summarizes adequately the relevant material.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN PLOTINUS. By A. G. Fuller. Cambridge: University Press, 1912.

This is not a new book nor a large one, but it is much more important than its title would seem to imply. It will be found most valuable to students of ethics. It treats the nature of evil in a genuinely philosophical manner, and is not a mere commentary on Plotinus. The analysis of the various kinds of evil is clearly rendered and a genuine contribution is made to our understanding of the place of evil in experience. The terminology used is that of Plotinus, but probably that is useful. We have no commonly agreed terminology for ethics on the philosophical side, and the mythological implications of an earlier terminology are not misleading in Mr. Fuller's hands. The book may be illuminating also in reference to the similar treatment of evil by Spinoza, whose theories are attracting attention in their "anniversary" year.

C. D. B.

PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION. By the late James Ward, Professor of Mental Philosophy, Cambridge: edited by G. Dawes Hicks, Professor of Philosophy in University College, London. Cambridge University Press, 1926. Pp. 188. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

The lectures printed in this book were delivered in 1880. The point of view of Professor Ward was exceedingly important in the development of psychology, and its results are very interestingly applied to a few educational problems in these lectures. The validity of Professor Ward's conclusions has been proved by the later developments in educational psychology, and some of his moral judgments are vigorous and illuminating, although naturally the outlook in regard to social issues is that of a vanished age. One has to remember that the book is a record of the past in order to understand how education can be discussed in a publication of 1926 without reference to Stanley Hall's work on adolescence and without any of the corrections of ancient platitude which

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might result if the book had referred to intelligence tests. The index contains amusing references, such as "Teachers, born not made"; "Robert Burns quoted"; "Alfred Tennyson quoted." These authorities on education are peculiar: and it "dates" the book to have Tennyson called "Alfred."

C. D. B.

TYPES OF MIND AND BODY. By E. Miller. "The New Science Series." New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1927. Pp. 95. Price, $1.00.

Perhaps the bodies of human beings may be divided into two fundamental types, each of which is characterized not merely by gross morphological traits, but each of which is correlated with characteristic functional peculiarities and abnormalities, and even with characteristic temperamental and mental traits. This interesting and disquieting hypothesis is discussed in connection with various physiological and psychological data, and is tentatively illustrated by comments on several historical characters, such as Baudelaire, Bunyan, and Byron.

CHARNER M. PERRY

A SHORT OUTLINE OF COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY. By C. J. Warden. "The New Science Series." New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1927. Pp. 96. Price, $1.00.

After devoting his first chapter to the thesis that animals played a part in the religious and magical beliefs of prehistoric and ancient peoples, the author sketches briefly views on animal psychology from Aristotle to Watson. He devotes a number of pages to an interesting résumé of doctrines occurring between these two extremes, though he recognizes that comparative psychology did not attain the dignity of a genuine natural science until behaviorism achieved "the complete overthrow of metaphysical speculation in comparative psychology and the substitution therefor of biological conceptions and methods."

CHARNER M. PERRY

NOTES ON THE ORIGINALITY OF THOUGHT. By Leone Vivante. Translated by Professor Brodrick Bullock. London: John Lane, 1927. Pp. 227. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

This is a translation of a book reviewed some time ago in the *International Journal of Ethics*. The translation is admirably done and will be very useful to students of contemporary Italian thought. The governing conception is that of a "necessity" which is not external or determined by natural law. This is said to be essential for the understanding of the arts, which are too much neglected by philosophers as evidence for the character of thought or mind. The evidence used by Vivante, however, is chiefly taken from literature, where the boundary between science and art is obscure; and in consequence it is not clear that the word "truth" bears the same meaning in all the parts of his argument. The problem of value is also discerned. The book as a whole will be found suggestive, even if the conclusions are not altogether clear.

C. D. B.

THE OLDEST BIOGRAPHY OF SPINOZA. Edited by Professor A. Wolf, of the University of London, with translation and notes. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1927. Pp. 196. Price 6*s*. net.

This biography of Spinoza was finished in 1678 and first published in 1719, fourteen years after the biography which is already well known. Professor Wolf has given us a most interesting introduction on the biographies of Spino-

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za and the manuscript from which the French text is printed in this volume. This biography is written by an enthusiastic follower in the days, soon after Spinoza's death, when it was still common to express the greatest disapproval of the "atheist." The good author says that "there is nothing that gives such beautiful ideas of the Deity as do the writings of Mr. de Spinoza." The atmosphere of the time is very well expressed in the book; and Professor Wolf has given us in this edition and in his notes a most valuable addition to our knowledge of Spinoza. It is a worthy tribute from England for the celebration of the 250th anniversary of Spinoza's death.

C. D. B.

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW. Vol. II. DISPUTES, WAR, AND NEUTRALITY. 4th ed., edited by Arnold D. McNair, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, and Lecturer in International Law at the London School of Economics. London: Longmans Green & Co., Ltd., 1926. Pp. 752. Price, 42s. net.

The first volume of this fourth edition of Oppenheim is to appear later; but this new edition of the second volume is most valuable at the present moment, especially as it contains seventy-two pages more than were in the third edition, and much new matter on the Permanent Court of International Justice, the reduction of armaments, compulsive means of settlement in relation to the Covenant of the League, etc. Dr. McNair has given us not merely legal interpretation of principles, but criticism of tendencies. The political situation so continually affects the interpretation even of acknowledged principles of international law that the lawyer and the layman both gain by continual reference to political issues. The trouble is that these issues change so rapidly that no book can contain the latest possible criticism. For example, in discussing disarmament Dr. McNair was writing when Germany had not yet entered the League. The great value of his work, however, is not diminished by such small points. He is a realist, and the text, therefore, of Oppenheim is not permitted to remain "abstract." To cite an example, whether the League itself may become a belligerent was answered by Oppenheim himself, in the earlier edition, affirmatively; but Dr. McNair inclines to a negative reply. The truth is that international law is changing and becoming in some ways more definite, in other issues more doubtful, as the situation changes. It is easy to see that the great difference is the existence and activity of the League of Nations. Many of the opinions of jurists must at this stage be speculative, or at least tentative; and such problems as neutrality will undoubtedly be affected by League action; but so far there has been no instance of a "League war," and there may never be any such war. The growth of international morality, underlying international law, is rapid, and that growth can be traced by comparing earlier with later editions of the textbooks of international law. Analysis such as Dr. McNair's, in close touch with actual politics, is one of the chief sources of moral development in the intercourse of nations.

C. D. B.

HUMANIZING EDUCATION. By Samuel Schmalhausen. New York: New Educational Publishing Co., 1926. Pp. 343.

From the unsparing pen of Schmalhausen comes the indictment that education is based upon fear, and that critical-mindedness is a crime against educational manners. The writer proceeds to develop the thesis that the gulf between credulity, which he calls superstition, and real education is growing wider. Education is shot through with unmitigated scientific and philosophic infantilism. The responsibility for this situation the writer places on the

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teacher, authority, and vested interests. "There is altogether too much teaching, talking, lecturing, and too little studying, thinking, and clarifying" (p. 21). Higher education is singularly divorced from life in the minutiae and routine detail of the specialist who evades the social—and therefore cultural—setting of education in abstracting it from its larger realistic background of human life.

Thinking that the thus far social miscarriage of education has produced a nation of "good-natured simpletons," the writer optimistically looks forward to a "sociologic-critical-mindedness" in education. "The New Education will be essentially sociologic. That sociology, grounded in a philosophy of social science, will ponder as its central query this pro-human problem: By what devices, mechanic and psychologic, can a purposeful education hope to liberate the nations of self-deluded men from the appalling consequences of their self-duperies?" (p. 274). The thing that our educational system lacks is—the writer puts it bluntly, but plainly—intellectual honesty. Various influences have tended to make the public schools of this country what they are, but two of the most powerful are authority and vested interests. Higher authority of superior officials and "those little bureaucracies" of custom suppress the individuality of the teacher, with the consequence that obedience usurps the place of reflection. The writer points out that our prevailing economic system will not permit honest thinking, and that a teacher in the public schools cannot afford to discuss the graft and jobs in the municipal government under which he makes his own bread. Also, "The average academic executive is a polished flunkey . . . . in reality a corporation executive, appointed by a board of profit-grubbing respectable citizens, who promise to keep the corporation of learning a going concern, provided it can produce *results*" (p. 285).

The book raises the problems of how to make unscientific minds scientific and scientific minds philosophic in an educational system controlled by traditional authority and vested interests. It is thoughtfully—if enthusiastically—written.

D. H. VASS

THE MAGIC FORMULA AND OTHER STORIES. By L. P. Jacks. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927. Pp. viii+367. Price, $2.50.

In these thirteen stories, selected from the earlier published five volumes, L. P. Jacks adds something to the strangeness of life by "depicting the strangeness of life as he has encountered it." Keen psychological observations upon characters normal enough in their setting, religious in tone or bearing, poignant in appreciation of the various mists that constitute the cloud men call life—these short stories are calculated to deepen insight and mellow curiosity into human sympathy.

T. V. S.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HELVETIUS: WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SENSATIONALISM. By Mordecai Grossman. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1926. Pp. 181. Price, $1.50.

Taking Helvetius as a thinker who conceived philosophy to be a theory of education, the author of this book, originally done as a doctoral dissertation at Columbia, seeks to present the thought of Helvetius as (*a*) a variant of the thought derived from the social situation in eighteenth-century France; and as (*b*) the articulation of the ethical and education implications of the central theme of the thought complex of which it was thus a variant—sensationalism. The closing chapter seeks to assess the deficiency of sensationalism as a basis for an educational system that is to be instrumental in a process of orderly progress. There is a bibliography, but no index.

T. V. S.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

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BEARD, CHARLES A. and MARY R. The Rise of American Civilization. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. 828, 824. Price, $12.50.

BROUN, WILLIAM. Mind and Personality. The University of London Press, 1927. Pp. x+344. Price 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

FRIESS, HORACE LELAND. Schleiermacher's Soliloquies: An English Translation of the Monologen with a Critical Introduction and Appendix. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1926. Pp. lx+176. Price, $2.00.

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RUGGIERO, GUIDO. Sommario di storia della philosophia. Bari: G. Laterza & Figli, 1927. Pp. 360. Price, Lira 18.50.

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The PRESS IMPRINT

June and July 1927

Humanizing the Sciences

Comment on *The Nature of the World and of Man* by sixteen members of the Faculty of the University of Chicago is running high.

Whatever their intentions toward college Freshmen, which are of no very great interest to the world outside the universities, the sixteen scientists have written sixteen fireside lectures ranging from astronomy to psychology, which the critics rank as the best of recent attempts to humanize the sciences. Opinion runs as follows:

"One of the finest and most engrossing popularizations of current science in existence. . . . . It is simple, clear, concrete, reliable. One emerges from it the richer by solid information and definite concepts."—HENRY HAZLITT, *New York Sun.*

"A manual of the physical and biological sciences of which it would be hard to speak too highly. The volume is so many things that an outline ought to be but frequently is not. It is selective in the sense of plucking the real heart out of a body of data."—*New York Times Book Review.*

"It is unexcelled for the general reader and many of those who have had scientific training will here learn for the first time what it is all about. Above all, it is vigorously inspiring."—*New York Herald-Tribune.*

"For the story is well told, well illustrated, and well colored with human significance. Certainly the volume is accurate; the names of the various contributors guarantee that. Certainly it is interesting and readable, and popular without being diluted."—*The Nation.*

"It sweeps on from one great truth to another in a way that gives one a profound respect for the recent progress of science."—*Saturday Review of Literature.*

"It is fascinating reading for anyone who has a spark of that divine curiosity about the ways of life which causes man to seek, and seeking, to progress."—*Chicago Tribune.*

That the orientation course upon which *The Nature of the World and of Man* is based is helping the students build a workable philosophy of life is indicated in a large body of comment from these students themselves. The following statements are representative of the student attitude toward the course:

"To me this course has been most stimulating. It has given a new and broader conception of the universe. It has aroused in me a new interest and spirit of curiosity. I feel that to some extent, I have learned to value the scientific spirit. The influence that science has upon our lives is better appreciated. I believe that the course was intended to present a brief but comprehensive picture of everything that concerns us, to shake up our minds, and to stimulate us to a little thought. It has done those things for me. I am eager to take more science courses and find out how and why the universe is as it is."

"I find the spirit of science to be open-minded, strong, fearless, and wholesome. It is strange to consider one's self related to the great universe of things. I am very enthusiastic about the course. The realization or the apprehension of the infinitude of the heavens, the universe of the atom has put me in my proper place in the cosmos."

"This course is called an orientation course. This expresses well its aim and what it has

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done for me. It has taken me out of the universe and has set me at a point outside where I could see everything that was going on and look at the ways of the universe from an impartial perspective. It has given an introduction to the natural sciences and their interrelationship. The greatest benefit I have received, a benefit which sinks all other results into insignificance, is that it has caused me to ask myself such questions as 'Who am I?' 'What am I?' and 'Where am I?' It has changed my outlook on the world."

Two printings of *The Nature of the World and of Man* have already been exhausted and a new printing of 15,000 has been ordered. This will include a revision of the chapter on "The Nature of Chemical Processes" by Julius Stieglitz. As re-written it will simplify the subject of chemistry for the layman. *THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN.* By SIXTEEN MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. *$4.00, postpaid $4.15.*

* * *

Gangs

Gang activities are familiar enough in cosmopolitan cities, but strangely, there has been no adequate sociological study of them. The forces that explain gangdom, adult and juvenile, have been brought to light by Professor Frederic M. Thrasher in *The Gang*, a book which critics believe destined to become the standard source book on the subject.

Professor Thrasher spent six years in his study of gangland—the poverty belt which surrounds Chicago's loop district. He lived with the gangsters, interviewed their leaders, and became intimately acquainted with gang life from the inside. Mingling with the "Murderers," the "Deadshots," and members of hundreds of other gangs, he learned their mysteries and secret signs, their attitudes toward society, and toward each other. And he found in investigating 1,313 gangs of all ages and sizes, the facts which explain the sensational features of gang life which are flaunted in the headlines.

He looks upon the gang as a social makeshift, which naturally appears in the cracks of the community and inevitably fosters the spread of crime. Abandoning the idea of a gang instinct, he attempts through a careful study of the natural history, structure, and functioning of the gang, to arrive at the true causes for its existence.

Mr. Thrasher has collected a vast amount of intensely interesting material which he discusses with a minimum of seminar jargon. A large part of the case material was secured from the gang boys themselves. A typical case is the following, obtained in an interview with a gang boy:

BILLY, THE BRAINS

Billy was the brains of the gang. He was "educated," a high-school boy too. He would work sometimes, but not often. The kids would bring their "stuff" to him. One day we had a big fight over it when we were robbing a merchandise car; we had cigarettes, pop, and a lot of other stuff. Billy had his stuff put away in a box with straw on top of it. The watchman looked at the straw, but Billy told him it was for a rabbit. Billy would sell "cartoons" (of cigarettes) for a half a dollar apiece.

Billy would plan things for our gang. He would get us a place to sleep when we were bumming away from home. He would get us keys to the bread boxes, so that we could get food when we were hungry. We would get the bread after the bakers left it early in the morning before the stores opened. . . . . Billy would find us a place to sleep in some house or basement. He would go around everywhere to see if there was a place to sleep or rob; he was a regular investigator.

Henry Zorbaugh of New York University comments: "Dr. Thrasher's monograph should be of interest to the sociologist and psychologist as a model of social research and a contribution to our knowledge of human behavior; to educator and social worker as an illuminating background against which to consider the practical problems of boy adjustment; and to the romantically minded as a fascinating story of 'the web of life' as it is spun in a great city."

Harry Hansen says in the *New York World:* "Here is a remarkable document and one that ought to be a source book for years to

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come. . . . . He has dug right down into boyland, gone to the root of the problem, and produced a book that will become an authority." *THE GANG.* By FREDERIC M. THRASHER. *$3.00, postpaid $3.15.*

* * *

Ernest DeWitt Burton

During a half-century of research Ernest DeWitt Burton achieved an international reputation as a New Testament scholar. In two years of extraordinary activity as President of the University of Chicago, he became equally well known as an educational executive. In addition, a leader in missionary and denominational enterprises, he offers an inspiring example of life lived to the full.

Dr. Burton's personality made a deep and lasting impression on those who knew him. "In him," says Henry Justin Smith, "were concentrated the mental vigor of youth and the benignity of age; the devotion of a missionary and the acuteness of a worldling; the simplicity of a plain man and the delicacy of a true aristocrat."

Of his associates, no one is better qualified to portray this great and enormously attractive individual than Thomas W. Goodspeed, who has been an intimate witness of his life-activity. In *Ernest DeWitt Burton: A Biography*, Mr. Goodspeed has followed his career from his student days at Denison, through his work as head of the Oriental Educational Commission, chairman of the China Educational Commission, and President of the University of Chicago, to his last days.

Mr. Goodspeed has not attempted to idealize Ernest DeWitt Burton, but to present him as he was in every period of his life. *ERNEST DeWITT BURTON.* By THOMAS W. GOODSPEED. *$3.00, postpaid $3.10.*

*

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

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OF "RIGHT" AND "GOOD" AND OF MR. ROSS'S VIEWS 337
By JOHN LAIRD, University of Aberdeen

ETHICAL BASES FOR ECONOMIC REWARD. 349
By ERNEST N. HENDERSON, Adelphi College, Brooklyn

PRIVATE VIEWS OF THE LAST *FIN-DE-SIÈCLE*. 362
By C. WILLIAMSON, London, England

CHRISTIAN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: ITS MORAL BASIS 377
By DONALD A. MACLEAN, Catholic University of America

MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL'S ETHICAL BELIEFS 390
By OLAF STAPLEDON, West Kirby, England

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF MORAL EVOLUTION 403
By ALBERT G. A. BALZ, University of Virginia

DETERMINISM AND MORAL EXPERIENCE 419
By J. E. TURNER, University of Liverpool

BOOK REVIEWS

NOBLE, EDMUND, Purposive Evolution 431
By DEWITT H. PARKER

MASON, DANIEL GREGORY, Artistic Ideals 433
By T. V. SMITH

MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM, An Outline of Abnormal Psychology 433
By C. D. BURNS

HORTON, WALTER MARSHALL, The Philosophy of Abbé Bautain . . . 435
By CHARNER M. PERRY

HAYES, EDWARD CARY (ed.), Recent Developments in the Social Sciences . 435
By T. V. SMITH

SHORTER NOTICES 437

BOOKS RECEIVED 443

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Vol. XXXVII JULY 1927 Number 4

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Of "Right" and "Good" and of Mr. Ross's Views *John Laird*

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